

UNIVERSITY OF CAPE COAST

IMPROVING COLLABORATION BETWEEN TRADITIONAL AND LOCAL  
GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES FOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE CENTRAL  
REGION OF GHANA

MUSAH DANKWAH

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REGION OF GHANA

BY

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Philosophy degree in Development Studies

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DECLARATION

**Candidate's Declaration**

I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of my own original research and that no part of it has been presented for another degree in this university or elsewhere.

Candidate's Signature: ..... Date: .....

Name: .....

**Supervisors' Declaration**

We hereby declare that the preparation and presentation of the thesis were supervised in accordance with the guidelines on supervision of thesis laid down by the University of Cape Coast.

Principal Supervisor's Signature: ..... Date: .....

Name: .....

Co-Supervisor's Signature: ..... Date: .....

Name: .....

## ABSTRACT

Ghana is still battling with a dual governance system nearly 60 years after attaining independence. The situation has resulted in misunderstandings and claims of superiority of authority between state officialdom and traditional rulers which derail local development efforts. The study set out to explore ways of integrating traditional authority with the local government system of governance. The Central Region was selected and categorised into three types of paramountcies within the jurisdiction of four Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs). The mixed method approach guided the study and a total of 658 respondents and discussants were sampled using both probability and non-probability sampling procedures. The new institutional, subsidiarity, modernisation, endogenous and the interactive governance theories were used to explain the tradition-modernity debate within the broader context of local level development. The study found that traditional authorities would like to be integrated into the local government system. This meant improving collaboration in all important deliberations such as serving as chairpersons on all relevant sub-committees of the District Assemblies. TAs felt that their direct involvement would be more beneficial to their people because they would be in a better position to press home the demands of their people and thereby avoid any possible conflict between the TAs and the District Assemblies. The study recommends that collaboration of the two authorities would require a more concerted effort on consultations and the amendment of the Chieftaincy Act 651 by Parliament with the view to introducing District House of Chiefs in consonance with the decentralised system of governance in the country.

## KEY WORDS

Decentralisation

Development

Governance

Local Governance

Local Government

Local Government Authorities

Traditional Authorities

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## DEDICATION

To my parents, Mr. Yunas Kwesi Ampah and Mrs. Hajira Efua Twi Ampah, my  
dear wife, Hamamet, and lovely children, Fidalat, Rizwan, and Affan



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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

CCMA	Cape Coast Metropolitan Assembly
CRHC	Central Regional House of Chiefs
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DA	District Assembly
DACF	District Assemblies' Common Fund
DCE	District Chief Executive
DD	Decentralised Department
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GoG	Government of Ghana
GTZ	German Technical Cooperation
HoD	Head of Department
IGF	Internally Generated Fund
ILGS	Institute of Local Government Studies
IMCC	Inter-Ministerial Coordinating Committee
KEEA	Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abirem
LI	Legislative Instrument
MDA	Ministries, Departments and Agencies
MLGRD	Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development
MMDAs	Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies
MMDCE	Metropolitan, Municipal & District Chief Executive
NA	Native Authority
NCCE	National Commission on Civic Education

NDPC	National Development Planning Commission
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NRCD	National Redemption Council Decree
PNDC	Provisional National Defence Council
PNDCCL	Provisional National Defence Council Law
RCC	Regional Coordinating Council
RPCU	Regional Planning Coordinating Unit
SD	Sustainable Development
SPSS	Statistical Product and Service Solutions
TA	Traditional Authority
UCC	University of Cape Coast
UDMA	Upper Denkyira East Municipal Assembly
UDDA	Upper Denkyira West District Assembly

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **Background to the Study**

A number of studies across the globe have affirmed the resilience, legitimacy and relevance of the institution of 'traditional' leadership as embodying the preservation of culture, traditions, customs and values of the rural people (Institute of Economic Affairs, 2010; Economic Commission of Africa, 2007). Organisations such as the World Bank and development Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs), in implementing poverty reduction programmes have sought opportunities that target the rural sector through working directly with traditional authorities (Kendie & Guri, 2006).

Traditional rule predates colonialism and represents the early forms of societal organisation and local governance, especially in the rural areas of Africa (Boafo-Arthur, 2000). The rest of the world has gone through eras of monarchical rule of one form or another. In countries like France, Russia, Mozambique and Uganda, the institution of traditional leadership was either abolished completely or an attempt made to do so. The socialist FRELIMO government in Mozambique banned chiefs at independence in 1975 and set up new governance structures. Despite this, the chiefs continued to play an important role in the rural areas both during and after the war. In response, the Mozambican government in 2000 decreed the chiefs a role as state assistants and community representatives. In 2002, a little over one thousand chiefs were formally recognized as rural 'community authorities' and delegated an extensive list of state administrative

tasks and civic-educative functions (Buur & Kyed, 2005). The powerful kingdom of Buganda, abolished in Uganda's 1967 Constitution after the Buganda king had been exiled in 1966, was restored in 1993 by President Museveni. In 1995 the Ugandan constitution was redrawn to recognize the institution of traditional leaders (Englebert, 2002; Herbst, 2000; Ray, 2003). The fact that the institution still exists today, even in those countries where it was abolished testifies to its resilience (Binsbergen, 2000).

Juxtaposed with the existence of traditional leadership institutions are the parallel 'modern' state or new forms of societal organisation, vested with enormous authority in rule making, application, adjudication and enforcement. The whole debate about traditional authority and local governance is not whether the traditional and modern systems of governance are competing against each other, but rather how to integrate the two systems more effectively in order to better serve citizens in terms of representation and participation, service delivery, social and health standards, peace and security and access to justice. The integration of the two systems has implications for aspects of public sector reforms (ECA, 2007).

The dominant public sector reform paradigm of the 1990s was the mantra of government reinvention characterised by demands for transparency, accountability, and responsiveness to citizen input, efficiency, and a trimmed-down state apparatus (Heeks, 1999; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). An important element in this government reinvention is decentraliation which, in development

discourse, enjoys incontrovertible consensus, as desirable, from both the left and right (Heeks, 1999).

For the left interested in deepening democratic processes, decentralisation offers the potential for enhanced political participation and greater popular control over decision-making at local level (Crawford, 2005). For the neo-liberal right, “decentralisation is supported as a further dilution of the powers of the central state. The distinction between the left and the right on decentralisation is that, while the neo-liberal right sees decentralisation as an opportunity for further national integration of dominant institutions in a country, the left views it as a challenge. The challenge for the left is that, decentralisation will not refuse competition, but will try to increase the contemporary governance institutions’ capacity such as access to resources to compete with traditional institutions. This is part of reasons why since 1988 decentralisation became widespread and significant dimension of political and administrative reform throughout Africa, Asia and Latin America” (Crawford, 2005:5).

Decentralised administration in Africa, is influenced by Western ideas and values like rationalism, individualism, positivism and technocratic approach to development (Ogwo & Andranovich, 2005). Such values may be inconsistent with the traditional value system and world view. In Africa today, traditional knowledge and values are an important driving force in the decision-making and development activities of the people (Miller & Havertkort, 2006). Consequently, the interaction between aspects of the western decentralised administration structures (backed by law) and traditional leadership structures (backed by

traditions) which are not well understood is likely to generate conflict because of the clash of some of the opposing views and these have implications for local development.

Traditional rule or governance found expression in forms such as religious leadership, lineage leadership, leadership in extended families and chieftaincy (Assimeng, 1996; Ray & Reddy, 2004; Bekoe, 2007). Today, the chieftaincy institution is the dominant form of traditional rule (Assimeng, 1996; Nabila, 2006). Indeed, traditional authorities in Ghana are referred to by the generic name as “chiefs” (Boateng, 1994; Ray & Reddy, 2004). Scholars who have enriched our knowledge about traditional rule in Ghana include Bentsi-Enchil (1971); Fynn (1974); Ollennu (1977); Arhin (1985); Gyekye (1996); Kendie and Guri (2004); Odotei and Awedoba (2005). These authors generally agree on two major forms of traditional rule. These two major classifications are the centralised political system (cephalous societies) and the acephalous societies or what is described as the *‘lose decentralised’* political system.

The cephalous societies have centralised authority, administrative machinery and judicial institutions, where cleavages of wealth, privilege and status correspond to the distribution of power and authority (Forts & Evans-Pritchard, 1975; Otumfuo Osei Tutu II, 2004). The Ashantis and Dagombas are examples of cephalous societies. On the other hand, the acephalous societies in their pure form, lack centralised authority, administrative machinery and constituted judicial institutions and there are no sharp divisions of rank, status or wealth. The Tallensi and Dagaabas are examples of acephalous societies. The



lineage system is predominantly used to regulate and govern such societies. Despite this simple political system, there is usually a central figure like the tindana whom the people respect and look up to for spiritual support (Boateng, 1994; Otumfuo Osei Tutu II, 2004).

Abochie (2005) suggests that pre-colonial indigenous administration in cephalous societies in Ghana was bureaucratic in that there were highly formalised systems or procedures within the hierarchy of chiefs. The traditional bureaucracy had elements of decentralisation and participation of citizens (Lutz and Linder, 2004). For example, within the Ashanti kingdom, traditional administration was highly decentralised and participatory. There was hierarchy of positions from the Asantehene, being the overall head, to the village chief who enjoyed considerable autonomy within the hierarchy of chiefs. Furthermore, there was wide scope of adult participation in decision-making in the traditional bureaucracy as issues like village projects and settlement of cases were often decided through open forum, debates and consensus building. The Modern state is said to be highly centralized and bureaucratic (Agyemang, 2009).

Gyekye (1997) and Kendie and Guri (2004) state that the African political culture values consensus building and social solidarity. Apparently, during the pre-colonial times the chieftaincy institution was the mechanism for maintaining social order and stability. Consequently, the functions of the chief have been an amalgamation of different roles such as military, religious, administrative, legislative, economic and cultural custodian (Ray & Reddy, 2004; Odotei & Awedoba, 2005).

As a form of integration the cephalous and acephalous societies were assimilated into the colonial governance structure and used to meet the objectives of the British colonial government. The colonial masters ruled through indigenous tribal groupings in the initial declaration of colony and protectorate status for the various parts of the country. The main impact of colonial rule on these societies was to effect the centralisation of authority of the Akan model in the areas where there had been no such centralisation since it was believed that laws develop with the centralisation of political authority (Arhin, 1985). Apter (1963) wrote earlier that an arrangement arose in this circumstance where British authority was represented by district officers while traditional authority was represented by tribal heads. This kind of arrangements, created as he put it, “an increasingly unstable political situation” resulting in conflicting sources of authority that was later procedurally integrated into one system, indirect rule. Thus, the earliest known attempt to integrate traditional governance into any governance system in Africa was that of the colonial administrators notably Britain and France (Agyemang, 2009).

While the British pursued what became known as indirect rule, the French policy was called assimilation. At the incipient stage of European involvement in the political affairs of Africans south of the Sahara, the policy adopted was direct rule with assimilation as its French version. In the direct rule, the policy was to disregard anything African and rather to impose European law on the ‘natives’ of Africa. The aim was to make Europeans out of Africans and when viewed within the whole colonial agenda it was seen as part of the civilising mission of the

Europeans. Direct rule sought to create an elite group of “civilised” natives but not necessarily of chiefs (Mamdani, 1999).

The indirect rule was like the French policy of association. In this policy, power was delegated to local chiefs where the institution of chieftaincy existed and others who had existing claims to power. In some instances where chieftaincy did not exist, it was created. The British ruled through chiefs as their surrogates who were sympathetic to British interests. The chiefs ruled the people according to existing customary laws and all powers were embodied in the chiefs and their council. Thus, the chiefs were responsible for law enforcement, labour recruitment, and tax collection. This was the same with the French and later Belgians and the Portuguese. The colonial policy was that so far as local laws and customs were compatible with colonial laws, they were permissible (Agyemang, 2009).

Linking indirect rule and modern governance, Buah (2007) explains that, the British colonial officials sought to modernize “traditional” African political institutions by gradually modifying their practices. However, on the contrary, it seems to have modified African political structures for the convenience of the colonial administrator. Buah (2007:38) offers a vivid explanation as to how the indirect rule introduced under Governor Sir Frederick Gordon Guggisberg worked:

Within a traditional state, or a group of smaller states, the paramount chief, their leading sub-chiefs and important counselors were constituted into a Native Administration, later named a

Native Authority, presided over by a paramount chief. The powers and functions of the Native Authority covered matters relating mainly to traditional and customary institutions and practices. These authorities operated under the general direction and control of the colonial district commissioner... chiefs were granted powers of controlling local tribunal, with limited jurisdiction relating to customary and testamentary matters, and to make by-laws which did not go counter to the British concept of law. These by-laws were to be approved by the colonial administrator in each district. The administrator could also withdraw the recognition of a chief.

Overtime, the British government usurped all the powers of the traditional authorities and assumed the power to do all those things traditional rulers had been doing including the power to wage wars, making rules for the maintenance of law and order, and the power to take measures to promote the economic and social welfare of the people. Arhin (1985:89) posits that, “the assumption of these powers put an end to the traditional states as independent, political communities”. Consequently, Sovereign Kings and other office-holders were converted by the European masters into chiefs or traditional leaders. Generally, the European colonial states in Africa often attempted to use chiefs, both traditional and neo-traditional as auxiliaries to colonial rule. In effect, the indirect rule strengthened the authority of the British while partially displacing and decentralising the authority of local chiefs (Aikins, 2012).

Now as agents of the Colonial government, traditional authorities had to carry out decisions of the government conveyed through a chain of commissioners who were in touch with the councils of the traditional rulers in their districts. So in the years prior to the independence struggle, traditional authorities faced a lot of difficulties with their subjects as a result of their loss of sovereignty and their position as agents of an alien government (Arhin, 1985). For instance, some educated elites felt that they were better qualified to mediate between the government and the people than the traditional authorities.

The Native Authority Ordinance of 1944 heralded the beginning of the erosion of the power of chiefs in local administration and a continuation of the process of change from chieftaincy based local government towards democratically elected government (Nsarkoh, 1974; Ray, 2004). Following the recommendations of the Coussey Constitutional Reform Committee appointed in 1948, the colonial government passed the Local Government Ordinance in 1951 (Cap 64). This Ordinance provided for a single comprehensive framework for local government in the country through the establishment of a two-tier local government structure at the local and district levels. Governance at the local level was vested in local councils in rural areas, and municipal councils in municipalities.

Governance at the district level was vested in district councils. Two-thirds of the council members were democratically elected and one-third represented the traditional authorities (Ayee, 1994; Nsarkoh, 1974). The introduction of democratic election implied that chiefs who used to have greater authority under

the native authority system now had to share power with democratically elected representatives. Such power sharing led to conflicts between the chiefs and the elected representatives, thereby stalling development (Ayee, 1994).

It is on record that Dr. Kwame Nkrumah had stated in 1950 that, if Ghanaian chiefs did not support his nationalist movement or his Convention People's Party (CPP) in his drive for independence from the British colonial government, then the chiefs might eventually find themselves overthrown (Nkrumah, 1957; Arhin, 1991). Thus, in the struggle for independence chiefs inclined towards groups with whom they felt their power was secured. This pitched most of the powerful chiefs against the party that eventually won independence for the country, the Convention People's Party (CPP) of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. This was more so in Asante where the chiefs supported the National Liberation Movement (NLM) as against the CPP.

It is therefore told that the Brong Ahafo Region which was carved out of Ashanti Region by the CPP government for administrative purposes was actually intended to reduce the power of the Ashantis. This has created many problems sometimes disturbing the peace and security of the state (NRC, 2003). The National Reconciliation Committee established to find solutions to human right abuses in Ghana noted this problem and commented in its report that "the carving out of Brong-Ahafo Region from Ashanti for administrative purposes without affecting customary allegiances also created a situation where chiefs in the Brong Ahafo Regional House of Chiefs owed allegiance to Asantehene in Ashanti

Region, thus creating split loyalties. This has left a legacy of conflict within that Region (NRC, 2003 cited in Agyemang, 2009: 68).

The NLM intended to utilise traditional governance notions and structures as expressed in the chieftaincy institution while the CPP was accused of using “western political concepts and models”. The NLM emphatically stated that “we do not only seek to preserve chieftaincy, we consider that chiefs should play an active and a definite part in the life of the country” (Nugent, 1996 cited in Agyemang, 2009:353). Nkrumah, however, portrayed the CPP as a modern party which opposed tradition, which is the chieftaincy institution. The battle line was drawn before independence. This pushed aside the chief’s mediating role between citizens and the central government. Even more recently, a high profile personality of Ghana’s growing democracy and a former Deputy Speaker of Parliament, stated that the institution of chieftaincy is anachronistic and should therefore be removed (Aikins, 2012).

After independence in 1957, the Nkrumah regime adopted the single tier structure of local governance, based on the recommendations of the Greenwood Commission that large and fewer councils would be administratively cheaper to run and help development services to be planned much more efficiently and economically. The one tier structure took the form of city, municipal, urban or local councils. In the short run, President Nkrumah maintained the composition of the local councils as two-thirds elected and one-third nominated to represent the chiefs (Ayee, 1994). However, under the Local Government Act of 1961, President Nkrumah changed the one-tier local government structure to a four-tier

structure, namely; regional councils, district councils, municipal/urban or local councils as well as town/village development committees. Furthermore, chiefs were banned from participating in local government (Apter, 1970 and Ayee, 1994).

The participation of chiefs in local governance was restored after the overthrow of Nkrumah in 1966 with one-third of local government units being nominated to represent chiefs and the two-thirds being elected members. This composition of local government was maintained by subsequent governments until the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) stopped formal representation of chiefs in the District Councils/Assemblies in 1981 (Ayee, 1994; Nkrumah, 2000 and Crawford, 2004).

Consequently, under the Local Government Law (PNDC Law 207), 1988, the PNDC government regarded the representation or active participation of Chiefs in decentralised institutions, such as DAs, or in organs of power, as undemocratic and counter-revolutionary. Hence, in the composition of the DAs, the Chiefs, unlike previously, lost the one-third membership usually reserved for them by previous governments. In other words, the PNDC decentralisation reforms did not set aside a place for traditional authorities within the structures of local government. The Chiefs however, were only one of the groups to be covered by the clause permitting the Central government to appoint one-third of the District Assembly members (Ayee, 1987; Ayee, 1994). Despite various attempts by past governments, particularly the Nkrumah and Rawlings' PNDC regimes, to weaken the chieftaincy institution, its ability to survive these political pressures is



a reflection of the resilience of this institution which cannot be dismissed in contemporary local governance (Ray, 2004; Boafo-Arthur, 2006).

Part of the reason for attempts by past governments to weaken the chieftaincy institution has to do with arguments about the compatibility of traditional rule with contemporary governance. The two schools of thought in this debate are commonly referred to as the traditionalists or the organic democrats on one hand, and the modernists or the democratic pragmatists on the other hand (Logan, 2008; Sithole & Mbele, 2008). The two schools hold very contrasting views about the relevance of traditional leadership.

On one hand, the Traditionalists or the Organic Democrats argue that culture promotes development. In this case, the proponents of culture believe that, values, beliefs and perceptions people hold tend to greatly influence their way of thoughts and behavior (Punnet, 2006) and that people will make available their local potentials, be it knowledge, resources and strategies for developmental purposes because of their attachment and loyalty to traditional leadership. On the other hand, the Modernists or Democratic Pragmatists argue that culture is not compatible with development and that it is antithetical to development (Njow, 2006).

Those who take the middle ground in this debate emphasise the fact that, the broad objective of good governance and civic responsibility is to empower state and non-state entities to participate in the development process and collaborate to promote peace (Alhassan, 2005). In a bid to fulfill these objectives, political parties made promises that relate to traditional institutions prior to both

the 2008 and 2012 general elections. For instance, the ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC) campaigned that it was going to strengthen the National and the Regional Houses of Chiefs to play effective roles in the development efforts of the country and their respective traditional areas. The party also promised and fulfilled the request by Traditional Authorities for an increase in the level of allowances paid to them. However, the NDCs promise in consulting traditional authorities with regards to the Presidential appointment of 30 percent membership of the District Assemblies never materialised (Bouton, 2004).

Since 1998, traditional authorities have agitated for more and unambiguous roles in the District Assembly system including the clause on 30 per cent appointment of Assembly members by the President in consultation with traditional authorities and other interest groups. The constitutional requirement (article 276[1]) that chiefs should not engage in politics has restricted them to the appointed membership (ILGS, 2008).

In addition to advocacy for a greater presence in local administration, the management of the relations between assembly officials and chiefs has been a challenge in many localities. While the local government legislation and arrangements make provision for the inputs of traditional authorities (through the appointed memberships and representation of the Regional House of Chiefs on the Regional Coordinating Councils), the concerns of the people as vested in the chiefs have not found their way in a systematic manner into the business of Assemblies. The chiefs suggest that they have not been kept informed about Assembly decisions, projects being implemented in their jurisdictions and

assignment of concessions of natural resources amongst others (MLGRDE, 2008). According to Gomes (2006), for successful and effective implementation of development projects at the local level, there should be effective co-operation among all stakeholders.

It is evident from the foregoing that traditional authorities are the custodians of culture and important agents in the development process. Titles such as 'Tradition as a Modern Strategy', 'Modern Dilemmas and Traditional Insights', 'The Indigenisation of Modernity', and so on reflect the growing prominence accorded to culture and tradition in development thinking and research (Nwaka 2004). The renewed interest in indigenous knowledge and institutions is in line with the current advocacy of the minimalist state and the 'enabling approach' as conditions for good governance in a period of structural adjustment and public sector reform. Under the pressure of civil society and the donor agencies, governments are urged to, and in fact obliged to reduce their role to what their dwindling or limited resources and capacities permit (Opoku-Mensah 2004). This implies decentralising the structure of governance, promoting genuine participation, and enlisting the broad participation of non-state actors and stakeholders including traditional institutions and leadership (Owusu, 2005).

Consequently, if culture is important and traditional authorities are the custodians, then the thesis of this study is based on the fact that, by the process of transitivity, traditional authorities are indispensable in the development process. Their importance is even more pressing in decentralised governance where the responsibility for development has been shifted to the local level. It is at this level

that the influence of traditional authorities is felt most. However, the often diverse, complex and dynamic interactions between the Assemblies and traditional authorities at the local level are seen as nasty complications for governance, and therefore regarded as potential sources of ungovernability. For instance, several words and phrases have been used in describing the relations between traditional and contemporary local government authorities. These include ‘interface’; ‘interactions’; ‘integration’; ‘cooperation’; ‘fusion’; ‘bridging the gap’; and ‘managing the relations’ and ‘duality of governance’ among others.

Although, all these words and phrases aim at one thing, that is, the best blend between the two set of authorities for effective local administration, their usage over the years has not helped much in resolving the duality ambiguities. Again, irrespective of which of the words or phrases is used, one finds in its explanation and interpretation the common reference being made to the word integration. Perhaps, the problem persist because the kind of mechanisms for integration and improved collaboration that have been proposed largely come from experts and academia or mostly left at the discretion of the District Assemblies. Considering the continued relevance of traditional authorities, Ghana would be better off if a more complete integration or an improved collaboration is found. This is because, if traditional authorities continue to suffer marginalisation, it would serve as a fertile ground for conflicts. The interactive governance theory (Kooiman & Bavinck, 2005) and new institutional theory (Bratton, 2007) support this study by facilitating an analytical understanding of the two systems of governance that interact in ways that are not well understood.

The special historical significance of the Central region as the gateway to colonialism and the attendant implications on the alteration of the local government system as well the researcher's familiarity of the region makes it a suitable choice for the study.

### **Statement of the Problem**

There have been calls in recent times as to whether Ghana's return to democracy from traditional rule is worth it (Am benne, 2013). The Omanhene of Assin Apimanim suggested that the District Assembly system should be scrapped and replaced with the Traditional Council system as existed in the past in order to promote peace and development. The chief argued that the suggestion, if taken, "would revive the institution of chieftaincy as it is an open secret that the institution is now in coma" (Today Newspaper, 2011).

Although, there is no attempt at implying a wholesale return to tradition and traditional institutions in our development efforts as the chief of Assin Apimanim suggests, there are manifest difficulties in attempting to achieve the broad objectives of the decentralisation policy while neglecting the institutions that people have evolved and lived with all their lives (Kendie & Guri, 2007). The 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana enjoins our development planning efforts to be conscious of culture and its ramifications for successful implementation of projects. Accordingly, Article 39 (1) of the constitution states that;

The state shall take steps to encourage the integration of appropriate customary values into the fabric of national life through formal and informal education, and the conscious introduction of cultural dimensions to relevant aspects of national planning.

The second clause of the same Article further requires that ‘the state shall ensure that appropriate customary and cultural values are adapted and developed as an integral part of the growing needs of the society as a whole. Additionally, Article 240 (Chapter 20) of the constitution provides the framework for local governance in the country. The key provision is: “Ghana shall have a system of local government and administration which shall as far as practical be decentralised”. As a bottom up approach to development and accelerated growth, the decentralisation policy adopted in the late 1980s sought to achieve the objective of ensuring inclusiveness and therefore the integration of local authorities for effective local governance (ECA, 2007). The truly legitimate aspiration of traditional authorities in contemporary period is to bring better living conditions to the people, and decentralisation is regarded as a means by which chiefs would be empowered to pursue that goal (Okyehene, 2010).

However, fulfilling this objective has come with a dilemma which forms the core of this thesis. The dilemma concerns the ambiguity about how to integrate traditional authorities in the current local government system (ILGS, 2008; Kendie & Enu-Kwesi, 2008). For Ayee (2007), the lack of a consistent policy regarding the integration of traditional authorities in local government units

by successive governments has led to the ineffective participation of traditional authorities in local governance.

According to Antwi-Barfi (2003), even though Ghanaians pledge allegiance to one republic, one government with one Constitution, there is in fact a dual governance system with dual power and authority. Ironically, the problems of poverty, neglect and exclusion are most pronounced at the local community level, in the villages and urban slums, where these communities ought to be encouraged to participate and mobilise resources and energies in order to bring their own agendas to bear on governance and development. The influence of traditional authorities at the local level is appreciated and it is at the local level that the integration of traditional and 'modern' authority would yield benefits.

The issues of collaboration are seldom addressed in many of the works in the area of traditional authorities and local governance (Owusu, 2005; Kendie & Enu-Kwesi, 2008). Therefore, from all the historical analysis of the problem, it is clear that, the issue of integration is yet to be seriously considered in local governance. This study seeks to correct this gap in the literature by exploring ways of integrating traditional and local government systems in the Central region. The Central region has been chosen for two main reasons, one in terms of governance and the other in terms of development. The first is that, there is no way the history of local government in Ghana can be told without the region which was the gateway to colonialism that ultimately paved the way for the distortion of the local governance system. It is therefore not out of place if a study on local governance is undertaken in the region to ascertain the effects of

contemporary governance system on region's development, especially as it is considered to be the fourth poorest region in Ghana. The other reason has to do with the researcher's knowledge and familiarity of the region. The ability to speak the local dialect of the people facilitated the research process.

### **Objectives of the Study**

The main objective of the study was to explore how to integrate the traditional authority system into the formal governance system in the Central region. Specifically, the study sought to:

1. Examine the existing institutional linkages (if any) between the traditional authority system and the local government system;
2. Establish how traditional authorities should be integrated into formal local government system;
3. Examine how the ambiguity in integrating traditional authorities in the current local government system affects development at the local level;
4. Ascertain how the general public perceive the roles of traditional authorities and formal local government actors in local governance; and
5. Make recommendations towards integrating traditional authorities in the contemporary local governance system for local level development.

### **Research Questions**

1. What is the nature of the existing institutional linkages between the traditional authority system and the local government system?



2. How should the traditional authorities be integrated into the local governance system?
3. How does the ambiguity in integrating traditional authorities in the current local government system affects development at the local level?
4. How does the general public perceive the roles of traditional authorities and formal local government actors in local governance?
5. What are the recommendations towards integrating traditional authorities in the contemporary local governance system for local level development?

### **Justification of the Study**

There is growing recognition that, there should be revision of the roles and responsibilities of the TAs in the arena of democratic governance, which goes beyond the role that is currently ascribed to them (MLGRDE, 2008). There are examples of some traditional leaders who have successfully spearheaded initiatives aimed at improving the role of TAs in development. And there are equally certain behaviours of some traditional authorities that have tainted the image of the noble institution. Therefore, knowledge from the empirical study of this nature will first of all help chart a course in the ongoing debate about the relevance of the traditional governance system and determine whether it deserves to stay or be abolished.

It is also hoped that the study will help policy makers to develop policies for enhanced engagements or collaboration between traditional authorities and local government functionaries. Most importantly, the study will help identify

common platforms where the recommendations could be shared as an input for the consultation towards developing guidelines for managing the interface between traditional and local authorities in local governance and development.

### **Scope of the Study**

The study focuses mainly on exploring how to integrate the traditional authority system into the formal governance system in the Central region. In terms of content, the study focuses on the chieftaincy system and does not extend to other forms of traditional authority such as religious leaders and lineage headship. This is because chieftaincy is the dominant form of traditional authority in Ghana (Assiming, 1996). The delimitation is influenced by the fact that, the involvement of chiefs in the local governance processes in the country constitutes a thorny issue in the decentralisation debate. The study explore the existing institutional linkages between the traditional and formal government systems, determine how traditional authorities prefer to be involved in the governance processes and discuss the effects of their non-involvement on development. The study does not delve specifically into the adjudication, economic and conflict resolution roles of traditional authorities.

### **Definition of Terms**

Some key terminologies of the study have been operationalised as follows:

**Traditional Authority** refers to Chiefs at all levels (paramountcy, divisional, sub-divisional, odikro, village) together with their elders, family heads, leadership

of youth and community vigilante groups. A **Chief** is simply a traditional ruler who has been duly nominated and installed in accordance with all the tradition and custom of an area. **Local government** refers to sub-structure of the national government. The use of term **local** therefore applies to the district and the community levels of the national government.

Similarly, **Development** in this study implies the improvement in the lives of people as a result of enhancement in their self-esteem and aspirations. The improvement in lives is also based on complex cultural and environmental factors and their collaborations. **Local collaboration** has been defined as a co-operation, a stakeholder relationship and a social capital. Indicators from the various consultations, research and commentaries suggest that the peaceful co-existence of local authorities and traditional authorities is critical to Ghana's local level development. **Integration** means making aspects of separate systems function in a coordinated and collaborated manner. Traditional authorities remain important controllers of resources for development particularly, their influence for mobilisation, representational functions, control of natural resources in trust for their people, custodians of social assets and conflict resolution and adjudication roles. It is their expectation that they have important roles in the conduct of local governance as stated in Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 which among other things urges nations to build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.

## **Organisation of the Study**

The study is organised into seven chapters. The first chapter focuses on introduction which covers the background to the study, statement of the problem, objectives, research questions, justification of the study, scope of the study and organisation of the study. Chapter Two traces the history of dual governance in Ghana up to the present times as part of secondary background information.

Chapter Three is devoted mainly for the theoretical and empirical review of literature associated with the study. It discusses the theoretical discourse on development and modernisation which appears to provide the basis for the relegation of traditional authorities. The chapter then reviews theories like subsidiarity, new institutional and interactive governance in support of the integration of traditional authorities in local governance. There is also a section that dwells on the general perceptions about the role of traditional authorities in local governance. The final section of this chapter discusses five local empirical works, as well as two foreign ones on the subject. The conceptual framework used in the study is also found in the third chapter. The theoretical and empirical reviews in the preceding sections in the chapter provide the basis for the methodological framework proposed in Chapter Four.

Chapter Four discusses the methodological issues in the study. Chapters five and six are based on the findings while the seventh chapter provides the summary, conclusions and recommendations of the study.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **HISTORY OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND THE ENSUING TRADITIONAL SYSTEM IN GHANA**

#### **Introduction**

This chapter discusses the duality in governance between the state represented by its institutions and functionaries and the leadership of the traditional institution of governance where contacts with each other are largely not integrated. The chapter highlights the history of the duality between the African traditional system and modern governance structures from the colonial era to the present time.

#### **Transformation in Local Government System in Ghana**

The traditional systems of government existed before the advent of colonialism. In the traditional systems of governance, the head of government in the communities was the chief supported by his elders or council composed of heads of families or clans. Some of the traditional kingdoms across Africa are Buganda and Toro in Uganda, Moshi in Burkina Faso, Yoruba and Hausa in Nigeria as well as Asante and Dagbon in Ghana, among others. The leadership of these kingdoms provided bonds of unity, ethnic cohesion and stability. The leadership provided a multi-functional role be it military, religious, land administration, judicial and executive responsibilities (Obuaba, 2013).

Ghana developed a local government system despite the fact that strong Kingdoms existed. The earliest known attempt to integrate traditional governance

into any governance system in the country was that of the colonial administrators notably Britain and France (Boateng, 2013). In order for the new local government system to succeed, the colonial administration introduced certain new policies and strategies for local governance (Agyemang, 2009). One of such policies was the 'indirect rule' in which ethnic entities were adopted as basic units of local administration. For the British, their task was to educate the natives to manage their own affairs and to evolve from their own institutions a mode of government which would conform to western standards. The indirect rule system was therefore regulated by laws in which some powers were delegated to a chief or group of individuals known as 'Native Authority' to maintain law and order through native courts, to collect taxes and eventually operate a treasury.

As observed by Ahwoi (2010), pre-independence local government in Ghana developed along two parallel lines. The first relates to a series of Municipal Ordinances which regulated local government in the major municipalities of Cape Coast, Accra and Sekondi-Takoradi, to which Kumasi was later added. The second also relates to a series of Native Jurisdiction Ordinances which sought to regulate local government in the rest of the country through the State Councils and Native Authorities system. Several challenges emanated from the implementation of the Ordinances among which were the creation of conflict between the traditional councils and the colonial administration.

According to Obuaba (2013), the colonial administration saw the traditional councils as major obstacles to ruling the colony. Therefore, a Native Authority Ordinance was passed in 1944 that neglected the traditional authorities

and put the colonial administration in direct control of the localities. Among other things, the Native Authority Ordinance sought to first of all merge existing traditional paramount areas into viable units and by that initiated an artificial aggression process; second to appoint chiefs for areas where disputes and litigation made enstoolment or enskinment of a chief impossible; third to set up local committees to manage revenues and expenditures to ensure accountability while using the committees to tailor the goals of the administration; and fourth to introduce a system of grants-in-aid for local development, basically to implement centrally designed projects.

### **The Search for an appropriate Local Government System**

The Colonial administration concluded that there was the need for an appropriate local government system to be put in place. It was therefore proposed that the Native Authorities should be replaced by democratically elected councils, which should nevertheless retain a place for chiefs who were recognised as having an important role in the Gold Coast. The traditional councils and the citizenry became worried about the new system and could not identify themselves with it because of its alien and impersonal nature. As a result, new models of local government systems were introduced under the different republican regimes.

The first republican all Ghanaian government led by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah increased the number of local councils from 70 to 183. Unlike the earlier model, government abolished all seats reserved for the traditional councils. That decision marginalised further the traditional leaders in local governance. Moreover, the

local government system received a fatal blow with the introduction of a one party socialist state with its centralised planning system. In that arrangement, the centre governed the localities through centrally financed local councils. The effect of this was that, traditional leaders became dormant, local councils were less important and the people became apathetic to local matters and taxation (Agyemang, 2009; Obuaba, 2013).

In the post first republican system under the National Liberation Council (NLC), the NLC government introduced a new model of local government in 1966. The structure was a four tier one from regional to area level. It was a local government structure designed to restore the image of the local government institution. However, the main weakness of that system was that its management was left completely in the hands of civil servants. There was a complete absence of elected membership to any of the councils. In fact, it was a local rule through bureaucracy. Apparently, the era drew the bureaucrats into political positions as District Administrative Officers (DAOs) who occupied the status of the ousted local commissioners. On the contrary, chiefs were brought in only as chairmen of the Town/ Area councils, *the lowest level of decision-making*.

Under the second republic, the government enacted the Local Government Act, 1971. The Act provided for partial elected membership of councils and appointed members by traditional councils. Incidentally, the Act was not fully implemented before that government was overthrown by the military and the National Redemption Council (NRC) was formed. The overall effect of the transformations is that local government system remained explicitly under the



control and monitor of central government. Again, none of the structures gave any significant role to the traditional leaders. Additionally, sources of funds for the traditional councils were taken over as national assets especially lands, mineral deposits and forest resources, among many others.

The latest local government Act 1993, Act 462 replaced the Provisional National Defence Council Law (PNDC Law) 207 introduced in 1988. According to this Law, there are four levels of the decentralised system which include: the Regional Coordinating Council; the Metropolitan/ Municipal/ District Assembly; the Urban/ Town/ Zonal/ Area Council; and the Unit Committee. Also, Act 462 provides for seventy per cent (70%) elected membership and thirty per cent (30%) appointment to the MMDAs.


### **The Local Government Structure in Ghana**

The arrangement for decentralised governance in Ghana has been well documented by Ghana (1988), Ayee (1994) and Crawford (2004) as pulled together in this section. The legal framework that guides Ghana's decentralisation process is rooted in the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. Chapter 20 of the Constitution entitled "Decentralisation and Local Government" states that: Local government administration shall be decentralised and the functions, powers and responsibilities and resources shall be transferred from central government to local government units (Article 240 (1) and (2) of 1992 Constitution of Ghana).

The Constitution further envisages grassroots participation in governance and downwards accountability when Article 240 (2) (e) states that: To ensure the

accountability of local government authorities, people in particular local government areas shall, as far as practicable, be afforded the opportunity to participate effectively in their governance. The critical question that demands empirical answers is whether these virtues of participation and downwards accountability as envisaged by the country's constitution are being fulfilled.

Other legal provisions that guide Ghana's decentralisation process include the local government Act of 1993 (Act 462) and the subsequent Local Government Establishment Instrument of 1994 (L.I. 1589). These legal provisions sought to promote popular participation in the decision making process, good governance at the local level as well as enhance efficiency and effectiveness of the entire government machinery. Consequently, a four-tier structure of decentralisation was adopted, consisting of Regional Co-ordinating Councils (RCCs), Metropolitan/ Municipal/ District Assemblies (MMDAs), Town/ Area Councils and Unit Committees. In all, 10 Regional Coordinating Councils, 216 Metropolitan or Municipal or District Assemblies and over 1400 Urban, Zonal or Town or Area Councils and more than 17,000 Unit Committees have been prescribed by law (ILGS, 2008). Figure 1 illustrates the structure of the local government system.



**Figure 1: The New Local Government Structure in Ghana**

Source: Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD, 2005)

The four-tier structure of Ghana's decentralisation starts at the grassroots with a Unit Committee for every community or settlement with a population of about 500 to 1000 in rural areas and 1,500 people for urban areas. The role of the Unit Committees include the mobilisation of people for development projects, facilitation of development planning and implementation in their localities as well as acting or undertaking some functions on behalf of the District Assemblies, such as registration of births and deaths; public education campaign and revenue collection (Ayee, 2000). The advantage of the Unit Committee members is their knowledge of the communities they live in and can therefore articulate their felt needs to the District Assemblies for attention. The problem with the Unit

Committees as observed by a USAID study of Ghana's decentralisation process in 2003, is the growing apathy of people to offer themselves to be selected as Unit Committee members since members receive no remuneration nor recognition for their efforts (USAID, 2003).

The other sub-district structure, depending on the population size, is the Urban Council, where the population is over 15,000 people or the Zonal/Town/Area Council which has a population between 5,000 and 15,000. These Councils are composed of representatives from the Unit Committees within the catchment area as well as the Assembly Members of the area and government appointees. The role of the Urban or Area Council is to be a link between the District Assembly and the Unit Committees.

At the very centre of Ghana's decentralisation programme is the Metropolitan/ Municipal and District Assemblies as depicted in Figure 3. The Metropolitan Assembly is mainly in major cities where the population is over 250,000. The Municipal Assembly is for an area with a population of over 95,000 people whilst the District Assembly is for an area with a population between 75,000 to 95,000. The 2008 annual report of the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD) indicated that there were six (6) Metropolitan Assemblies, forty (40) Municipal Assemblies and one hundred and twenty-four (124) District Assemblies in Ghana. Due to their disproportionate sizes, the Metropolitan Assemblies are sub-divided into sub-metropolitan district councils. The MMDAs (which will be referred to hereof as District Assemblies) comprises the District Chief Executive who is appointed by the President, two-thirds of

members elected by universal adult suffrage and the remaining one-third nominated by the President in consultation with chiefs and identifiable groups in the district. Members of Parliament from the District are also members of the District Assembly but do not have voting rights.

Among the functions of the DAs, include the following (Ghana, 1988:8):

1. The formulation of programmes and strategies for the effective mobilisation and utilisation of the human, physical, financial and other resources;
2. Maintenance of security and public safety in the district in cooperation with the appropriate national and local security agencies;
3. Initiation of programmes for development of basic infrastructure;
4. Ensure ready access to the courts and public tribunals in the district for the promotion of justice.

Above the District Assemblies is the Regional Co-ordinating Council (RCC) which is made up of the Regional Minister, Deputy Regional Minister, the Regional Administrative Officer, the District Chief Executives and the Regional Heads of the Decentralised Department as ex-officio non-voting members. There are currently ten Regional Coordinating Councils (RCCs) in Ghana and their functions, among other things, are to co-ordinate and harmonise the programmes of the District Assemblies within their jurisdictions as well as review and co-ordinate public services in the region.

The current district assembly structure in Ghana has virtually no link with traditional authorities, despite their influential position, particularly in rural areas.

The closest traditional authorities are brought into the picture is through the nomination of one-third of assembly members by the President in consultation with the chiefs. Where the quality of consultation is poor, then traditional authorities are eliminated from the local governance process. This situation often creates difficult relations between the district assembly structures and traditional authorities and thereby negatively affecting development (Ayee, 2000).

This is particularly so because article 270 of Ghana's 1992 Constitution recognises the position of the chieftaincy institution and guarantees the existence of traditional councils according to customary law. This has created a kind of parallel governance system at the district level, namely; the district assemblies and traditional authorities, both vying for power, resource control and recognition. In the process the royalties of community members are torn between the District Assembly and the traditional authorities. Indeed, Ray (2004) reported of a divided sovereignty of many Ghanaians as they are both citizens of the state and subjects of their chiefs. The interactive processes between the traditional authorities and district assembly structures as well as the community members in Ghana have implications for local governance and development, which are poorly perceived.

### **The Definition, Functions and Constitutional Basis of Traditional Authorities in Ghana**

The Constitution defines traditional authorities as a group of people who hail from "appropriate families and lineages and are validly nominated, elected or selected and enstooled, enskinned or installed as chiefs or queen-mothers in

accordance with the relevant customary law and usage”. The place of traditional authorities has been guaranteed in the five constitutions which Ghana has had since independence, namely, the 1957, 1960, 1969, 1979 and 1992 constitutions. In addition to these, a Chieftaincy Act, Act 370 was passed by Busia’s Progress Party government in September 1971 to amend the statute on chieftaincy to ensure its conformity with the provisions of the 1969 Constitution and make other provisions relating to chieftaincy (Ayee, 2007). It also created a National House of Chiefs which was included in the 1979 and 1992 constitutions.

Chapter 22 of the 1992 Constitution guarantees the “institution of chieftaincy, together with its traditional councils as established by customary law and usage”. Consequently, Parliament is debarred from enacting any law which (a) confers on any person or authority the right to accord or withdraw recognition to or from a chief for any purpose whatsoever; and (b) in any way detracts or derogates from the honour and dignity of the institution of chieftaincy.

According to the Chieftaincy Act 795 (2008), a chief means a person who hailing from the appropriate family and lineage has been validly nominated, elected or selected and enstooled, enskinned or installed as a chief or Queen mother in accordance with the relevant customary law and usage. This is also stated in Article 227 of the 1992 Constitution. The categories of Chiefs as stated in section 58 of the Chieftaincy Act

759 are:

- The Asantehene and paramount Chiefs
- Divisional Chiefs

- Sub-divisional Chiefs
- Adikrafo/ Odikrowfo
- Other Chiefs recognized by the National House

A person does not qualify to be a chief if that person has been convicted of high treason, treason, high crime or for an offence involving the security of the state, fraud, dishonesty, or moral turpitude. Article 276(1) of the Constitution and Section 57(3) of the Chieftaincy Act (2008) state that a Chief shall not take part in active party politics. This is quite important because Chiefs are supposed to be above reproach. They are the custodians of our Culture and Heritage. They play the fatherly figure role for all members in the community. They are therefore supposed to be politically neutral and see to it that there is peace, unity and understanding in their traditional areas.

Chiefs have different titles in Ghana which reflect the geographical location of the chief. In the Volta region, the most popular name (title) is Togbe (which also means an elderly man). In the Akan speaking territories, the most common one is Nana (Chief) Ohema (Queen-mother). The people of Ga origin call their Chief "Nii". There are other titles. The Asantehene for instance is His Majesty Otumfou. Every chief has a stool or skin and they sit on these stools and skins during special functions and occasions.

Generally, Chiefs perform various functions. Culturally, they symbolize the Culture and Heritage of the people often projected at festivals. Politically, they are the traditional heads and authority in their traditional areas. They see to the peace and unity of their people. They also exercise executive, legislative and



judicial powers since pre-colonial times. Chiefs also see to it that there are development projects in their areas for the benefit of their subjects. The best place you can find them dressed elegantly and beautifully in their gold ornament (especially in Southern Ghana) is during festival times.

The 1992 Constitution of Ghana also establishes a House of Chiefs system which consists of three levels, namely, the National House of Chiefs; Regional House of Chiefs; and Traditional Councils. The National House of Chiefs consists of five paramount chiefs elected by each Regional House of Chiefs from the ten regions of Ghana. In other words, it has 50 members. Where in a region there are fewer than five paramount chiefs, the Regional House of Chiefs is mandated to elect such number of divisional chiefs to make up the required representation of chiefs for the region. The functions of the National House of Chiefs are to:

1. advise any person or authority charged with any responsible for any matter relating to or affecting chieftaincy;
2. undertake the progressive study, interpretation and codification of customary law with a view to evolving, in appropriate cases, a unified system of rules of customary law, and compiling the customary laws and lines of succession applicable to each stool or skin;
3. undertake an evaluation of traditional customs and usages with a view to eliminating those customs and usages that are outmoded and socially harmful;

In addition to these, the National House of Chiefs has appellate jurisdiction in any cause or matter affecting chieftaincy which has been

determined by the Regional House of Chiefs and appeal can be made to the Supreme Court. This appellate jurisdiction is exercised by its Judicial Committee, which consists of five persons appointed by the House and assisted by a lawyer of not less than ten years' standing appointed by the National House of Chiefs on the recommendation of the Attorney-General. The functions of the National House of Chiefs are onerous, especially when they deal with issues such as succession disputes and outmoded and socially harmful customs and usages which have been the bane of traditional authorities.

The Regional House of Chiefs, on the other hand, consists of such members as Parliament may, by law, determine. Its functions are complementary to those of the National House of Chiefs. Specifically, it is enjoined to:

1. hear and determine appeals from the traditional councils within the region in respect of nomination, election, selection, installation or deposition of a person as a chief;
2. have original jurisdiction in all matters relating to a paramount stool or skin or the occupant of a paramount stool or skin, including a queen mother to a paramount stool or skin;
3. undertake a study and make such general recommendations as are appropriate for the resolution or expeditious disposition of chieftaincy disputes in the region;
4. undertake the compilation of the customary laws and lines of succession applicable to each stool or skin in the region.

The Traditional Council, the third layer, consists of a paramount chief and divisional chiefs. Its main function is to determine, in accordance with the appropriate customary law and usage, of the validity of the nomination, election, selection, installation or deposition of a person as a chief. In other words, it performs functions similar to those of the National House of Chiefs and Regional House of Chiefs at the paramountcy level.

#### Traditional authorities and active party politics

A unique feature of the Constitution is the provision in Article 276 that “A chief shall not take part in active party politics; an any chief wishing to do so and seeking election to Parliament shall abdicate his stool or skin”. This notwithstanding, a chief may be appointed to any public office for which he is otherwise qualified. These two provisions are contradictory. On one hand, a chief is debarred from active party politics while on the other, he can be appointed by a government to hold a public office. There is an implied partisanship in this since in practice, governments have appointed chiefs who are either sympathizers or owe political allegiance. This has compromised the neutrality of some traditional authorities. Even though barring them from party politics is an infringement on their right, the neutrality of traditional authorities is important because of the father-figure role they play in society.

The new chieftaincy law (Act 759) of 2008

In June 16, 2008, the amendment to the Chieftaincy Act was passed and assented by His Excellency the President of the Republic. The new Chieftaincy Law (Act 759) of 2008, replaces the old Chieftaincy Law (Act 370) of 1971. The passage of the Act has brought some changes to the conduct of the affairs of the Chieftaincy in the country. For instance, the new Chieftaincy Law provides for the establishment of a new chieftaincy bulletin, the appointment of counsel to assist the Traditional Council in adjudication and extension of the term of office of the members and presidents of the Regional Houses of Chiefs and indeed the National House of Chiefs from three to four years.

The new Chieftaincy Act, 2008 (Act 759), passed by Parliament has outlined procedures and guidelines for kingmakers on the installation, enskinment, destoolment and de-skinment of chiefs. With regard to installation of paramount chiefs, kingmakers are expected to give two weeks notice to the National and Regional houses of chiefs before the installation or enskinment. For divisional chiefs, the kingmakers are to give advance notice to the Traditional and Regional houses of chiefs. The kingmakers are expected to give two weeks notice to the appropriate authorities if they want to destool or de-skin a chief.

Again, the Act stipulated that any aggrieved person should give at least one week notice to the appropriate authorities in the institution before filing an injunction against an installation or enskinment of a chief. The Act guarantees the power of a chief or queenmother to act as arbitrator in customary arbitration. A section of the Act indicates that a chief is not liable to a charge of contempt (in

court proceedings) if he makes a statement in good faith in respect of or during legitimate customary proceedings or practices which are not in willful violation of a specific order of a court. All these are attempts towards addressing serious concerns about the myriads of chieftaincy disputes that affect development at the local level.

However, the Act is still silent over issues of increased agitations for representation by traditional authorities in Local governance other than the 30 per cent appointment of assembly members by the President in consultation with the traditional authorities.

### **The Relevance of Chieftaincy in the Ghanaian Social Set-up**

There are those who argue about the irrelevance of chieftaincy institution in the current democratic experiment. Interestingly, democratic governance in Ghana, in all ramifications, draws its strength from the traditional governance structure and it is fair to say that national politics would not be as tolerant were it not for the effective and impartial handling of the people by chiefs, especially when one considers the stabilizing role they play during elections (Okyehene, 2010; IEA, 2010). Aside their undisputed role as custodians of culture, traditional leaders collaborate in all aspects of the governance processes of the country including the maintenance of peace and order, making available important resources such as land for development and undertake development initiatives.

Chiefs remain the nodes of connection between the central government and the ordinary people of the community and sometimes the larger group of

people depending on the status of a particular chief. In other words, they are the mouthpiece of the ordinary citizens of a particular community. They have also mobilised their people for development in the past, a clear example of such great king in this regard was Okyenhene Nana Sir Ofori Atta of Akyem Abuakwa who founded the Abuakwa State College at Kyebi for his people.

Chiefs in the 21<sup>st</sup> century Ghana have also not slept on their stools and skins but also strive to bring development not only to their various traditional areas but the country at large. The Asantehene, Otumfuo Osei Tutu II on his enstoolment 1999 vowed to improve education in Ashanti and Ghana as whole. He set up the Otumfuo Educational Fund awarding scholarships to the teeming needy but brilliant children throughout Asante and beyond and also building educational infrastructure in places in dire need. Today he has the Otumfuo Charity Foundation that tackles the various spectrums of developmental needs such as HIV/AIDS, Healthcare, and Environment among others.

The Okyenhene is also not left out in bringing development to his people and Ghana as a whole. On his enstoolment as Okyenhene in 1999 he vowed to wrestle the wanton destruction of the environment in his Kingdom, he set up the Okyeman Environmental Foundation to champion that cause. Indeed, he has been the loud mouth of environmental preservation ever since and the zeal to see the environment protected has culminated into the establishment of an environment and agriculture university to oversee that agenda. He also has much interest in Education, HIV/AIDSs, Sanitation, and issues relating to child development, subsequently he has an endowment fund for these areas of interest. It is worth

mentioning that he broke an ancient tradition (barring chiefs from running) to lead a marathon and actually tested for HIV in public, a feat, he is the first traditional ruler to chalk (Dankwa III, 2004).

Despite the changing influence of chiefs in Ghana, over 80% of land is under the control of chiefs. Chiefs, therefore, have a strong influence on the political economy, industrial development, agricultural productivity and the construction industry. This is because, the chieftaincy institution is involved in all large-scale land acquisition processes irrespective of the land tenure arrangement in the jurisdiction through renewable leases of up to 50 and 99 years' duration for foreigners and citizens, respectively, for agriculture (Campion and Acheampong, (2014). There is no gainsaying the fact that from community to community, the authority of chiefs continues to be more revered, not feared, and their views and directives more likely to be implemented than that of government.

To sum up, the modern traditional chief in Ghana today is an important and indispensable player in the development process of the country, particularly at the local and community levels. His role entails the development, implementation and monitoring of development programmes and projects. Not only do they know the needs and challenges of the local environment, they also understand the dynamics of the different groups living in the local environment. They are also able to mobilise these different groups and stake holders in their environments to work together for the success of programmes and projects. Furthermore, their knowledge of local needs and aspirations and the requisite expertise needed to satisfy those needs can contribute significantly to poverty alleviation and

reduction. This local knowledge adds a unique added value to the development process and indeed the sustainability of development projects (Asantehene, 2009).

Nonetheless, traditional authorities have been accused of incessant chieftaincy and land disputes. And such modernists claim that Chieftaincy is a plurality of governance that is no longer needed and so there is the need to do away with drivers of mediocrity, confusion, conflicts and bad governance. However, with the needed collaboration from key stakeholders like the District Assembly, traditional authorities who are collaborators in policy delivery (Dawda and Dapila (2013)) could regain its lost glory stated by the modernists. The main role of the District Assembly is developmental, as stated in Act 462 of the 1992 Republican Constitution of Ghana. The DA is to assist with the provision of infrastructure as well as maintain and sustain such infrastructure.

### **Summary**

The section looked at the duality of governance between the State represented by its institution and functionaries within the local government administrative set-up and the traditional leadership institution represented by the Chiefs and elders. It traced the history of the governance systems from the colonial up to the present times and outlined the functions, current structure and the composition of the two set of authorities.



## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **THEORETICAL REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK**

#### **Introduction**

This chapter mainly deals with the review of related literature which borders on the theoretical and empirical framework of the study. It first discusses the theoretical discourse on Western rational thought and African indigenous thought concerning the transition from tradition to modernity. It traces the history of how the idea about traditional and modern societies emanated from the complex concept of development and why Modernisation Theory has been used to explain the current state of governance on the African continent. It demonstrates how the schism between Western rational thought and African indigenous thought has provided the basis for the relegation of traditional authorities. After all theoretical discussions, the chapter reviews the empirical works of five related studies on the integration of traditional authorities in local governance for development.

#### **Theoretical Literature**

Before delving into the empirical and conceptual discussions on the integration of traditional authorities in local governance for development, it is important to situate the argument within a theoretical context. First and foremost because the study examined the integration of the two systems of authority in the governance processes within the broader framework of the overall developmental

agenda, the theoretical discussions begins with whole idea about development and the implications on local governance.

### **The Evolution of the Concept of Development**

Economic historians generally agree that the industrial revolution in Europe and North America in the eighteenth century greatly influenced development thinking over the years (Chang, 2003). However, the concept of development became popularised following the inaugural speech to Congress regarding American foreign policy by US President Harry Truman on 20<sup>th</sup> January, 1949. Having exhausted the first three ideas of that speech, he proceeded with point four as:

We must embark on a bold new programme for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of *underdeveloped* areas. [This is where] more than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas. [And that] for the first time in history, humanity [the American] possesses the knowledge and skill to relieve the suffering of these people (Rist, 1997:71).

The quote is clear as to whom ‘these people’ referred to. It referred to the people of the poor nations who consequently have been officially described as the

underdeveloped countries (Kendie, 1999:60). Invariably, “from 1949 onwards, often without realising it, more than two billion inhabitants of the planet found themselves changing their name, being officially regarded as they appeared in the eyes of others, called upon to deepen their Westernisation by repudiating their own values. No longer African, Latin American or Asian, all these large areas were now simply “underdeveloped” (Rist, 1997:79). Indeed, this view was earlier raised by Sachs (1992) and later by Crafts (2001) as they explain that the famous speech by Truman described the largest part of the world as ‘underdeveloped areas’, with particular reference to the Southern parts of the world, which are expected to move along the same track of the industrial nations to attain development.

After fighting for freedom from the ills of colonisation in the hands of the so called ‘developed’ countries, the leaders of the newly independent states accepted their new label in order to enable them assert their claim to benefit from the ‘aid’ that could help them develop. Again, since they could not be spoon-fed forever, they were to travel the path of development mapped out for them by their masters in modern or industrialized states in order to equally become modernised (Rist, 1997).

The implication of this discourse is that societies of the underdeveloped areas called Third World countries were no longer seen as diverse with different possibilities of conducting their social and economic life but were rather placed on a single path of progress and judged as doing well or not based on the criteria of the Western industrial nations. Since this speech, the race began for the South

to catch up with the North in the “good life” called development. In the course of this race, some people began to question whether they are running in the right direction as the goal of ‘development’ becomes illusive. Kendie (2009:59) cautions that development practitioners in the global south must begin to contest development theory and practice because the study about development as presented by the so called ‘modernists’ “has resulted in social and cultural dislocations” in the south. As a corollary, Ahmad (2013) suggests that, the grouping of nations and the making of power blocs are to procure the natural resources of some countries. The situation has caused serious anguish in the hearts of those who are loyal to their poor countries, and is a major reason for the growth in terrorism and the race for weapons of mass destruction.

Even now Africans’ current state of ‘development’ is being attributed to poor governance. In July 2009 President Barack Obama stated in an address to the Ghanaian parliament that Development depends on good governance and that such ingredient has been missing in far too many places, for far too long. And that it is the only change that can unlock Africa's potential which is a responsibility that can only be met by Africans. Having traced how the concept emerged, it is important to briefly consider the various theories and debates that have emerged and continue to emerge in the search for development.

### **Defining Development**

The concept of development is elusive and difficult to define since it is associated with a wide range of definitions and interpretations (Oyugi, 2000;

Todaro & Smith, 2006). The absence of a universally agreed definition of the concept has led to what Musto (1985:6) referred to as a “*crises theory*” and states that after three decades of intensive reflection on development policy issues, we know even less of what development actually means.” As a holistic concept, development encapsulates almost every aspect of human life in cultural contexts. It evolves from the collective experiences of a society and reflects societal values and preferences. Thus being a value concept, there have always been difficulties in arriving at a common consensus as to the meaning of development. That is why Pearce (1990) contends that what constitutes development depends on what societal goals are being advocated.

According to Thirlwall (1986), development denotes a change, whilst Trevallion (1988) defines it as growth accompanied by change. At least in a broad sense, this remains one perception within which the term development is used; to describe the process of economic, technological and social transformation within societies and countries. This process often follows a well-ordered sequence (as for example, demonstrated by the Rowstonian Growth Model) and exhibits common characteristics across countries. This dynamic process of growth and change can be identified by the collection of data and the systematic observation of social, political and economic characteristics of society and the analysis of the spatial organisation of human activities; that is the interlocking and interdependent systems of society.

Arguably, colonial rule left most of Africa a legacy of intense and lawless political competition amidst an ideological void and a rising tide of

disenchantment with the expectation of a better life (Mafeje, 2002). Put differently, the political environment at independence in many African countries was profoundly hostile to development. The struggle for power was so absorbing that everything else, including the development path they were expected to chart, was marginalised. The elites responded to this dilemma by making token gestures to development while trying to pass on the responsibility of the notion for development to foreign patrons. Thus while African leaders talked about the fragility of political independence and the need to buttress it by self-reliant development, they eagerly embraced economic dependence (Mafeje, 2002).

In time, this frame of mind led to the conception of development as something to be achieved through changes in the vertical relations between Africa and wealthy countries: a greater flow of technical assistance to Africa, more loans on better terms, more foreign investment in Africa, accelerated transfer of technology, better prices of primary commodities, greater access to western markets, adoption of western governance system, among others. In this spirit, African governments expected a large portion of their development budget to be financed externally. For example, African leaders, such as Kenyatta and Nyerere, argued that now that independence had been won, the overriding task was development, without which political independence could not be consolidated. They argued also that without development, African countries would not be able to eradicate the humiliation of colonialism. Undoubtedly, this gave the western colonialists the urge to promote the concept of development on the African continent (Ake, 1996).

Consequently, the ideology of development was exploited but got limited attention and served hardly any purpose as a framework for economic transformation of the African continent. Of course, development plans were written and proclaimed. But what passed for development plans were aggregations and objectives informed by the latest fads of international development community such as import substitution and export promotion. As these fads changed in the larger world, so they were abandoned in Africa. The ideology of development itself became a problem for development because of the conflict between its manifest and latent functions. The conflict is apparent in the actions of African leaders who proclaimed the need for development and made development the new ideology without necessarily translating it into a programme of societal transformation. They did so not because they were uninterested in societal transformation, but because their minds were absorbed in the struggle for power and survival (Ake, 1996). In the end, it fell to the West to supply a development paradigm, namely, the modernisation theory.

### **Development as Modernisation**

Modernisation Theory came into prominence in the 1950s and early 1960s as an approach to development and social change. It offers an account of the common features of the process of development drawing on the ideas and analysis of early social thinkers and scientists such as Durkheim and Weber. Durkheim distinguished between two basic types of society namely traditional and modern (Webster, 1990).

For traditional society, Durkheim argued that social cohesion is based on mechanical solidarity having traditional norms, beliefs and values. He contrasted this with that of a modern society by arguing that social cohesion in modern society is based on organic solidarity where they have more complex social differentiation with division of labour. In essence, Durkheim sought to explain that society moves from a less complex situation where groups of families or clans with similar characteristics conform to rigid patterns of traditional norms and beliefs to a more complex situation with increased population, fierce competition, and widened differentiation leading to the eventual creation of a new (modern) society. The creation of the modern society therefore creates a new pattern of morality, norms and beliefs which make social rules much less rigid than those of a traditional society because they have to act as guides for much more complex and diverse activities (Webster, 1990). Another social thinker whose work has also had a great influence on development thinking is Max Werber.

Like Durkheim, Werber tried to explain the emergence of industrial western society when he argued that the basic explanation for the expansion of the economies of Western Europe was the existence of a cultural process peculiar to western society, namely rationalisation (i.e. rational organisation of business enterprises) to establish steady profitability and accumulation of capital. For him, the most significant force that brought the transition from the traditional and pre-capitalist culture to modern capitalism was the diligent, hardworking rational ethos of the spirit of capitalism (Webster, 1990). In short, Werber too brought a



distinction between a traditional and modern society but saw much of the distinction in terms of a fundamental contrast of ideas and values. Apart from these adherents of traditional-modernity nexus, modern modernisation scholars such as Walt Rostow postulated stages of development applying to every country. According to Rostow (1964 as cited in Webster, 1990:52):

It is possible to identify all societies, in their economic dimensions, as lying within one of five categories; the traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, take off, the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass consumption.

The five stages were derived from an analysis of the British industrial revolution and he explains them as follows. First, traditional society is characterised by a basically agrarian economy with low level of technology leading to low methods of production and limited output. Second, a precondition for takeoff refers to a situation where the economy is localized with improvements in trade and commercial activities and attributes these improvements to external factors that ensure that the necessary structures for industrialization are laid. Third, the takeoff stage refers to a situation where there is commercialisation of agriculture, increased productivity and investments, as well as expansion in infrastructure to create congenial environment for further growth.

Fourth, the drive to maturity stage is when there is expansion in science and technology, excess output, and society trades off old values against new ones among others. The fifth stage, age of high mass consumption is where there is

further consolidation of the advancement of the four initial stages. An example is when an economy manufactures to satisfy demand for consumer durables. So after struggles to attain independent political kingdoms African states were buffeted by popular pressures to live up to the ideals of modernisation and the promise of economic development by passing through the various stages of development.

Modernisation Theory has therefore been used to explain the current state of development on the continent. From the literature, the standard interpretation of the theory is that control of economic and other resources gradually passes from families to the state and capitalists as societies move from traditional to modern states. In the African context the markers of change are the establishment of colonial rule and the rise of the modern bureaucratic state (ECA, 2007). All kinds of false explanations have been offered to account for autocratic tendencies, corruption, inefficiency and mismanagement among African leaders. These range from predispositions of chiefly institutions in Africa in which power is supposed to be personalised and arbitrary to unlimited access by chiefs to public resources and to venality and lack of ethics among modern African leaders. Such prejudicial suppositions overlook the fact that traditionally Europe was a land of corrupt absolute monarchs and predatory and callous feudal lords (Mafeje, 2002).

Yet, these institutions were superseded by liberal democracy in Europe under changed socio-economic conditions. In contrast, in Africa where plenty of egalitarian traditional societies and representative political institutions existed liberal democracy never took root. Attempts to adopt liberal democracy after

independence succeeded only in producing one-party dictatorships under a veneer of European bureaucratic structures and procedures. Thus, the outcome was neither African nor European. This legacy has plagued virtually all African countries and accounts for a great deal of what went wrong in the post-independence period (Mafeje, 2002).

Since the 1970s there has been a continued preoccupation with the neo-colonial state in Africa and its negations among African scholars (Ray, 1996). With the introduction of Structural Adjustment Programmes in the 1980s and the conditionalities imposed on adjusting African countries by the World Bank and the IMF, the debate about development intensified. Topmost on the agenda was “democratisation” and “good governance”. Both terms were given currency by the World Bank and other international agencies. In fact, these were opportunistic intellectual interventions that sought to take advantage of the political and economic malaise in Africa (Blom, 2002). As has been mentioned, Africans had been concerned about the absence of democracy and gross mismanagement in their countries. But they did not necessarily conceptualise the problem in the terms of the Bretton Woods institutions. Their main concern was the betrayal by the neo-colonial state and its repressive nature. In the 1970s under the influence of the radical left there were insistent calls for the “dismantling” of the colonial states as they turned out to be undemocratic and authoritarian as the rest (Mafeje, 2002).

## **Development and Local Governance**

The debate between governance and development is that of the chicken and egg situation. While some argue that for there to be sustainable development, there is the need for good governance, others believe that development should be pursued before attention is paid to good governance. It is important to first of all distinguish between the concepts since there is the tendency to assume that governance is the same as good governance and that development is the same as sustainable development whereas they are not. According to Kabumba (2005), governance simply refers to the process of managing resources and that this process could either be good or bad. Therefore, for a particular country there could be good or bad governance or government. Also, development could be seen as being synonymous with growth; and sustainable development as that kind of growth that is durable.

Additionally, whereas governance is described as “the process by which authority, whether codified or simply recognised de facto in society, is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources”, government, on the other hand is shortly defined as “a formal legal organisation” (Kendie and Marten, 2008:2). Governance may also be practiced at various levels being at the family, enterprise or government realm on one hand or at the local (community), regional, national and international realms on the other hand. As Crawford (2003) put it, local governance which simply refers to the exercise of authority at the local community level is about citizens and institutions and their relationships with the state at the regional, municipal and community level. According to Lutz

and Linder (2004), in order for local governance to be good regardless of the type of leadership, factors such as legitimacy, social inclusion, human rights, transparency and accountability must be in place.

The UNDP (1997:9) considers good governance as a subset of governance which “embraces all the methods-good and bad-that societies use to distribute power and manage public resources and problems”. In a similar fashion, the World Bank had earlier defined governance as “the use of power in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development” (World Bank, 1992:1). Tordoff (2002) argues that in Africa development actors like civil society and non-state institutions are weak as against the modern bureaucratic state that is often repressive and therefore providing clarity to the concept of governance before considering what is good governance is necessary.

The modern bureaucratic state questions the relevance of traditional institutions of governance in the transformation of African economies and governance systems (ECA, 2007). The debate is whether or not traditional leadership is compatible with democracy and one of its main principles, decentralisation. In this debate two schools of thought can be broadly distinguished.

The first school of thought perceives traditional leadership as being incompatible with democratisation and decentralisation whilst the second school of thought argues for co-existence of some kind since traditional leadership institutions are an important part of the historical heritage of local communities

and cannot therefore just be wished out of existence (Ray, 1996; Ntsebeza, 2003; Logan, 2008; Sithole & Mbele, 2008).

The proponents of traditional leadership institutions, also known as the traditionalists/ organic democrats contend that traditional authorities can neither be simply legislated out of existence nor merely be relegated to being part a traditional social sphere distinct from the modern world of civil society (Owusu, 1997; Blom, 2002 and Senyonjo, 2004). The major thrust of the argument of this school of thought is that traditional leadership institutions are not static and frozen in time. Like all aspects of culture and tradition, it is argued that the institution of traditional leaders grows and adapts itself to the changing values and aspirations of its people since it does not exist in a vacuum. It is the ordinary people who condition it and reshape it to be constantly relevant. The values of democracy including, participation, respect for human rights, mutuality and cooperation with others all influence the nature and functioning of the institution of traditional authority in the contemporary society.

The traditionalists/ organic democrats regard the traditional authority as the true representative of their people, accessible, respected, and legitimate, and therefore still essential to politics on the continent. Proponents do not see traditional leadership as an anomaly or a compromise of democracy or a contradiction within a more legitimate setting of modern more generically applicable governance. Rather, traditional leadership is seen as a system of governance that fulfils different needs towards people who understand more than one type of democracy (Abotchie, 2006; Logan, 2008; Sithole & Mbele, 2008).

In order to appreciate the relevance of traditional leadership institution, Owusu (1997) and Blom (2002) for instance argue that it is extremely vital to understand how it is based on customary village institutions involving general norms and ideas about leadership. They contend that a ruler's subjects are fully aware of the duties he/she owes to them as they are of the duties they owe to him/her and are able to exert pressure to make him/her discharge these duties. In some cases, according to Moto (1998), a traditional leader may in fact, by popular will be stripped of his position if his/her behaviour is not that expected of such a high institution. This clearly indicates that the power of the traditional leader largely rests with the ruled and as a result the people have the democratic rights in demanding political accountability, transparency, service, participation and probity from leadership.

On the contrary, the modernists/democratic pragmatists argue that, traditional leadership is not compatible with democracy and its basic principles including decentralisation and human rights. They view traditional authority as a gerontocratic, chauvinistic, authoritarian and increasingly irrelevant form of rule that is antithetical to democracy. Indeed, the proponents see traditional leadership as an anomaly and that citizens under traditional authorities are not true citizens. Rather, they are subjects of undemocratic authority that does not have systems of accountability to the people. This assertion is based on the fact that, traditional authority institution does not give everyone the chance to be elected. For instance, the proponents of this school of thought claim that, women especially are discriminated against by a system that favours men via patriarchy in the common

system of inheritance in the traditional society (Abotchie, 2006; Logan, 2008; Sithole & Mbele, 2008). The issue therefore is that, the modernists assertion about the ills of traditional rule as outlined in the preceding paragraph including lack of accountability mechanisms make the subjects of such undemocratic authority susceptible to arbitrariness and despotic leadership bringing nothing better to their people than underdevelopment. This argument also helps in further presenting a balanced view of the causes of underdevelopment of the African continent. There is no doubt that Africa's developmental crises are a manifestation of its governance woes in both pre and post independent eras. The neo-liberal thinking of blaming the ills of colonialism of the state of development on the continent on the West is further explored in the following section.

### **A critique of the Neo-colonialist thinking of the Causes of Underdevelopment**

Africa's underdevelopment has been a manifestation of bad governance, backward culture, corruption, wars and conflicts, poor leadership, greed and selfishness (Ecobar, 1997). Bad governance has been a profound and pervasive tool of obstacle to development in Africa. For instance, in pre-colonial Africa, it was Africans who raided villages and towns especially on the west coast, captured fellow Africans and sold them as slaves to the white slave drivers. Lagos thrived on this and King Kosoko was very comfortable with slave trade in his domain. Similarly, no sooner had Spain pulled out of Western Sahara in 1976 than Morocco invaded and annexed the territory.



The capitalists assisted Mubuto Sese Seko to kill Patrice Lumumba in Congo, renamed Zaire and now DR Congo. His remains was burnt to ashes, put in a plane and scattered over the country to prevent even his ghost from resurrecting. Mobuto went on to become one of the worst despots of all times and was richer than his country until the rebel forces of Laurent Kabila pushed him out in May 1997. Today after nearly two decades of wars and conflicts, DR Congo is among the most dangerous countries in the world. Similarly, Robert Gabriel Mugabe became the whiteman's nemesis in the then Southern Rhodesia after he successfully fought both the British colonialists and Ian Smith who had declared unilateral independence from Britain. A charismatic leader took Zimbabwe to independence in 1980 and it became one of the best economies in Africa. Today Mugabe is still gunning for political power when his country has had the sole privilege of achieving what has commonly been referred to as "run-away inflation". One third of Zimbabweans live in exile or are seeking economic or political asylum.

From North to South, East to West except for few countries and leaders, the story of Africa is the same. Countries like Togo, Gabon and Guinea have had despots who ruled for over 30 years with Togo and Gabon having the sons succeeding their fathers. Equatorial Guinea with its oil wealth has less than a million people. Yet the oil wealth has not improved the lot of the people but only the family and cronies of President Teodore Obiang Nguema Mbasago who has spent over 30 years in power. Economic woes, insecurity, civil wars, internal strives and conflicts, looting of public wealth, capital flight, lack of infrastructure

and capacity have become the hallmarks of Africa's underdevelopment. On the contrary, everything the developed West have ever done is first to secure the future of their citizens. Good governance promotes the accumulation of physical, financial, political and cultural capital whereas bad governance prevents that accumulation. So there is an inverse relationship between political, cultural capital and development. It is appropriate therefore to explore further the links between development and culture.

### **Development and Culture**

The term 'culture' has different meanings and connotations depending on the context in which it is being used (Schech & Haggis, 2004). The purpose here is not to delve into the various definitions. The intention is to have an operational understanding of the term 'culture' and how it is linked to the concept of development and local governance, including the relevant institutions that accelerate rural development in the African context.

The study adopts a broader view of the concept of culture to incorporate all socially transmitted behaviour patterns, knowledge, arts, beliefs, traditions, institutions, and other products of human work and thought that characterise a society or group (Leininger, 2001; Punnett, 2006; Njor, 2006). It is the way of life of a people which include the material, spiritual, and non-material aspects of life such as the values, beliefs, and unconscious processes that create the social reality of 'being' (Gabriel & Sims, 2000; Geissler, 2004).

Phil (2007) elaborated on this definition by identifying six dimensions of culture as technological, economic, political, institutional, values and belief-conceptual. This definition of culture highlights the fact that different societies or groups have different cultures which provide identity and meaning for their existence, and which can strike deep response cords from the people. The term therefore involves arbitrarily assigned meanings to symbols such as words, language or objects, and such assigned meanings which are shared by the cultural group are passed on from one generation to the other.

Development and culture are widely acknowledged to be linked in a number of different ways, in terms of both the “ends” and the “means” of development, yet efforts to systematically study such links remain woefully inadequate (Njor, 2007). There are two schools of thought in this regard. One school of thought sees culture as an important factor in enhancing development outcomes (Sen, 2000; Kuran, 2004; Schech & Haggis, 2004; Cassar & Bezzina, 2005; Punnett, 2006). The other school of thought sees culture as antithetical to development (Rostow, 1960 cited in Njor, 2006; Sorenson, 2003).

Critics of culture argue that the notion of development implies change from old ways of doing things and people should therefore be released from the bonds of traditional cultures and lifestyles, which are considered signs of underdevelopment and obstacles to development (Marshall, 1994 cited by Schech and Haggis, 2004; Rostow, 1960 cited in Andreasson, 2005). Such thinking is however out of tune with the growing recognition of diversity as a condition for innovative models of development that are more sustainable. It is therefore argued

that tradition and modernity should not be regarded to be incompatible, but should rather complement one another to accelerate development in a sustainable manner. The evidence is provided by the economic progress of Japan despite its strong hold on traditional values like group responsibility and interpersonal trust clearly showing that tradition and modernity can effectively complement each other for greater results.

The proponents of the important role culture plays in development are of the view that the values, beliefs and perceptions people hold tend to greatly influence their way of thoughts, motivation and behaviour (Worsely, 1999; Cassar & Bezzina, 2005; Punnet, 2006). In other words, culture is a major force that shapes behaviour and social structures with implications for development. Indeed, culture is the basis of all social action, including economic and political life.

Alhassan (2006) and Njor (2006) report on the effectiveness of some African indigenous knowledge and practices since they are adapted to and defined by their culture and national environment. For example, the World Health Organisation (WHO) recognises the potency of traditional medicine, which includes: “Diverse health practices, approaches, knowledge and beliefs incorporating plant, animal and/or mineral based, spiritual therapies, manual techniques applied singularly or in combination to maintain well-being, as well as to treat, diagnose or prevent illness” (WHO, 2002:7).

The Commonwealth Foundation’s “Culture Toolkit” also documents examples of best practice, such as the use of radio to increase accountability in Belize and spreading the message of HIV/AIDs prevention through local cultural

methods (Commonwealth Foundation, 2008). Truly, it is acknowledged that building on indigenous knowledge and practices is a necessary condition for self-reliant development. This may be done by making the form and content of development intervention informed by indigenous knowledge and practices, be they values, aspirations or social institutions which are important to the people (Okolie, 2003).

There are other writers who see great value in culture and argue that, it is through culture that people make sense of the world and of their lives and that it is part of human existence which keeps adapting to suit the changing historical events so as to ensure proper functioning and survival of the people (Rao & Walton, 2004; Odotei & Awedoba, 2005). There is therefore usually a strong attachment of people to their culture as it evokes a sense of identity and pride. The attachment of people to their culture is in a way a fundamental human need (Kleymeyer, 1994) since people have need for culture just as they have need for food.

Sen (2000) adds another dimension when he argued that if development can be seen as enhancement of freedom in a broad sense, then cultural freedoms are among the freedoms, based on which development should be assessed. Any development that tries to replace indigenous culture rather than building on it should therefore be frowned on, since development will make more sense and generate higher commitment if it grounded on the local context.

There are both positive and negative aspects of any culture with the potential to promote or hinder development. The important thing is to identify the

positive aspects of culture and use them in ways that could enhance development. For example, Landes (1998) and Njor (2006) maintain that the economic strides in Japan and other Asian countries is because they remained true to their culture and tradition. According to the authors, these countries have not just imitated the West blindly, but have picked only the aspects of Western culture that can complement their own indigenous values such as group responsibility, company loyalty, interpersonal trust and implicit contracts that bind individual conduct. There may be merit therefore to argue that the underdevelopment of Africa may be traced to the inability of many African countries to incorporate their culture with various development efforts.

Many people wearing the Western cultural lenses may find aspects of African tradition as weird and counterproductive to development. However, it is contended that African traditional beliefs and worldviews are another body of knowledge about reality or another science that has to be recognised and taken on board in our search for a more authentic and sustainable development. Maintaining cultural diversity by protecting and promoting one's own culture while recognising and valuing the existence of others' culture is the key for generating innovative models of development. As observed by Kambhampati (2004), it is unfortunate that, through ethnocentrism and dominance of the Western worldview, people tend to look down on other cultures or worldviews as unscientific or superstitious.

Indeed, some aspects of Western culture and beliefs may also look weird to some Africans, but these are hardly questioned due to the uneven power

relations that underlie knowledge production in a particular way. The Western culture has been documented and projected as the only truth thereby subordinating other truth claims like the African worldview which is easily condemned as superstition or unscientific. This view is supported by Njor (2006) where he recounts a story of how a hunter in an African village shot and killed a fellow hunter during the hunting expedition, yet was released by the traditional courts on grounds that he shot at a tiger and went to pick it only to realise it was a human being. To bolster his claim, the hunter enlisted the testimonies of African traditional healers/priest, who testified to the fact that the victim was endowed with powers to transform himself into animals. People with Western mindset could not imagine how any sane jury or judge could find such a lousy and baseless defense persuasive.

This story was then compared to a similar one in which an American shot and killed his wife yet was set free on the defense that he had carried out the shooting whilst in his sleep. The incident was supported by medical experts that the man suffered from a sleeping disorder known as somnambulism. Yet, the same people who found the African hunter's story absurd did not find anything wrong with the American somnambulist, apparently due to ethnocentrism or the cultural lenses they were wearing.

It is obvious that, the difference between the African hunter and the American somnambulist is that the latter has been documented to create a certain desired reality whilst the former is not documented and shrouded in secrecy and prone to being condemned as superstition, rather than another reality. The

challenge therefore is for African writers to document and explain some of the African phenomenon and project them as another science different from the Western science. This will ensure that the rich African culture and values are not eroded in the name of modernity.

The discourse on culture and development often brings out conflicting considerations. For example, there is often the dilemma and conflicting posture between modernity and cultural traditionalism. Should rational scientific methods be used to explain the world or should we adopt the traditional African “irrationalism” that has the tendency of explaining some of the problems of the world as witchcraft? Should we develop social institutions based on rational reasoning and the changing dynamics of society or rely on traditional systems of social control which might not be appropriate for evolving complexities of our societies? Should the individual be subordinated to the community in the name of African culture of collectivism or there is value for the individual to focus on individual needs and interests? Should we adopt technologies generated from the West or hold on to indigenous African technologies that may be ineffective? In the face of these conflicting views on modernity and African tradition, I have argued that there is value in both worldviews, which have to be evaluated on their own merit and context with the view of tapping into the strengths of each in a complementary manner.

The desire to integrate traditional culture with development should therefore be done with a critical mind and seeking consensus building as to how this could be done effectively. That we should take culture into account when



designing or implementing development policies has been known for a long time and documented by various writers (Kuran, 2004; Schech & Haggis, 2004; Cassar & Bezzina, 2005; Punnett, 2006; Gay, 2007). What is not yet known is “how” to take culture into account especially when one considers the notion held by people that culture is only for tourism purposes (Kendie & Martens, 2008). In discussing the link between culture and development, Millar et al (2006) cited in Kendie & Marten (2008) underlies the current development paradigm referred to as endogenous development.

### **Endogenous Development**

Haverkort et al, (1999) defines Endogenous development as development based mainly, though not exclusively, on locally available resources such as land, water, vegetation, local knowledge, culture and the way people have organised themselves. Endogenous development strives to optimise the dynamics of these local resources, thus enhancing cultural diversity, human welfare and ecological stability.

As explained by Kendie & Martens (2008), the concept of endogenous development is about making use of available local potentials for developmental purposes-be it knowledge, institutions, resources and strategies. Although these authors do not down play the adaptation of external development ideas, they caution the literature on development culture which points to a development thinking and practice that have been shaped by modern epistemology, with a

tendency to exclude most traditional systems of knowledge. They write that culture

...has been part of the African development discourse and needs no constitutional provisions to remind us. However, western style education and neo-colonialism have imposed developmental systems that are alien to the ways of the African. Exogenous development has become the norm and Africa is literally dressed up in other people's clothing. This explains the undue neglect of traditional institutions in governance. The imposition of winner-takes-all principles, as opposed to the consensus building inherent in 'traditional African' jurisprudence, is at the base of much of the conflicts on the continent.

As a corollary, Nana Nketsia (2006:11) is cited in Kendie & Martens (2008) for providing an apt summary:

...Many of Africa's present problems, such as ethnic conflicts, exploitation of natural resources, growing criminality, increasing poverty, HIV/AIDS, and the inequality of the position of women, are considered the result of outmoded customs, laws and institutions. What most analysts fail to point out, however, is the fact that many African conflicts arise out of a different world-view being imposed on the continent.

Kendie and Guri (2004) have noted that while formal community based organisations and local non-governmental organisations have been actively

promoting development activities in many communities, the tendency has been to neglect important indigenous practices. The authors posit that, there are many failed projects resulting from insufficient linkage of the projects to local/ indigenous practices to warn development practitioners to re-think development practice. They claim that the tendency of formal development organisations to bypass local knowledge systems and practices frustrates development work and is partly at the base of inability to reduce poverty.

Benneh et. al. (1997) have maintained that government officials, policy makers and development planners ought to credit local communities with some amount of wisdom, knowledge and dynamic institutions capable of promoting sustainable development. This is because, notwithstanding their imperfections, local institutions are progressive. According to Emery (2000), local knowledge is rooted in local institutions. It is important to recognise that both Indigenous and other knowledge systems and practices have strengths that can help the other system when they are invited to work together in executing development projects. Berkes (1995) has emphasised that it makes sense to incorporate into development planning a process for understanding and using local knowledge system and conducting participatory research to strengthen those systems.

In furtherance of this, Emery (2000) provides three goals that are associated with all development projects. These goals are:

1. All development initiatives should strive for sustainable projects.
2. All development projects should strive to benefit all people affected.

3. All development projects should strive to have the broadest possible knowledge base to achieve the best possible results.

Thus, considering the pivotal role of Chiefs as wielding a lot of power and influence, they have the power to do and undo development processes in their jurisdictions. Community initiated projects that have the personal involvement of the chief are bound to succeed and sustain. In most cases, chiefs preside over community meetings where development is discussed. The missing gap, however is that, the outcome of these meetings does not necessarily have links with the formal local government planning system (ISODEC, 2001). Perhaps, this is due to the fact that, Traditional Authorities lack effective representation on MMDAs.

In order to illustrate how traditional knowledge systems can be incorporated into projects and project planning, Emery (2000) has developed a guideline of best practices and drawn on several case studies across the world primarily from examples provided by the International Labour Organisation (ILO), The World Bank (WB), Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC), and the United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). Emery (2000) proposes the following principles as best practices in the integration of indigenous knowledge:

1. Indigenous communities should be able to provide free and informed prior consent before any development project is initiated.
2. Indigenous communities should be able to choose their own representatives and not have them assigned.
3. Indigenous traditional knowledge is best acquired by engaging indigenous

holders of the knowledge as active participants in the project, using traditional knowledge as part of the team of experts.

4. Indigenous people's participation as bearers of traditional knowledge is best achieved by observing trust, respect, equity, and empowerment as the basic principles of interaction.
5. Traditional rights to resources, self-governance, and the integrity and autonomy of indigenous peoples' cultural realities should be respected.

ILGS (2008) notes that, lack of formal representation of traditional authorities in the local government structures has led to the inadequate representation of traditional authorities in the sub-committees of MMDAs, even though these committees provide essential platforms to shape development policy and programmes at the local level. This invariably affects their contributions and inputs into project planning, implementation and monitoring. The literature reviewed so far on development and governance has provided hints that the different meanings associated with the term 'development' and how it can be achieved are produced within a particular cultural context. In other words, depending on the cultural lenses one is wearing the understanding of development as an "end" and as a "means" may vary. The links between key concepts of the study such as decentralisation, governance and development is explored further.

### **Decentralisation, Good Governance and Development**

Democratic decentralisation is often associated with governance virtues like political participation, responsiveness and accountability (Blair, 2000;

OECD, 2004; Smith, 2007). The presumption is that decentralisation will bring governance closer to the people at the local level and thus provides better opportunities for local residents to participate in decision-making. Also, local citizens will be able to hold their elected representatives accountable through the power of their thumb, and that local public servants will also be accountable to the elected representatives (Smith, 2007). The reality however, is that the varying and sometimes conflicting interests among the various actors in the decentralisation process, as well as their power differentials often come into play to generate results that are not consistent with good governance principles.

For example, Smith (2007) reported of the tendency of civil servants at the local government level, who because of their aspirations, lifestyles and professionalism wish to retain their links with the central government and will prefer to account to the central rather than the local government. Smith provided an example of teachers in Pakistan who successfully opposed a reorganisation of education that would place them under local authority control, because of their fear of reduced career opportunities in other local government areas as well as fear of reduced prestige of their profession. Such interests, hostile to decentralisation, may also be exhibited at the national level as politicians and bureaucrats at the centre are reluctant to let go their power and control of resources to the periphery in the name of decentralisation.

Tam (2005) adds another dimension to this debate when he argues that the offering of material goods in political clientelism may sometimes take the form of threats rather than inducements. He cited the example of the government of

Singapore threatening to withhold improvements of housing in districts that elect opposition legislators. In Sub-saharan Africa, where there is widespread poverty and relatively weak state institutions, patron-client ties are expected to be prevalent as the poor depend on such relationships for survival. This brings into question the suitability of liberal democracy for Africa.

In Ghana, it is perceived that devolution of power to the local level can lead to rural development and poverty reduction because it allows the state apparatus to be more exposed to the local context and therefore more responsive to local needs, thereby improving efficiency of resource allocation (Crook & Sverrisson, 2001; Ribot, 2002, Smith, 2007). Although there seems to be an ambiguous linkage between decentralisation and development, it is commonly agreed that decentralised local governance contributes to development in terms of promoting local participation in the development process and the design of policies that are adapted to local needs (Crook, 1994; Sharma, 2000; Azfar et al, 2004; Mehrotra, 2006).

Besides, local resources for social and economic development can be more easily mobilised and efficiently applied in the development process as well as tailoring the activities to the specific needs of the local population (Rondinelli, 1981; Ayee, 1994; OECD, 2004; Smith, 2007). The rationale is that decisions about public expenditure that are taken by a government closer to poor communities are likely to be more responsive to local situations than a remote central government. Indeed, Mehrotra (2006) reported that democratic devolution of primary health care service to locally elected health committees in Ghana, Mali

and Benin increased access to affordable health services, which has in turn increased immunisation rates and reduced infant mortality.

Although one would agree with the principles underlying the potential benefits of democratic decentralisation, much will also depend on the political will and how the institutional framework for decentralisation is fashioned. For example, if there is not sufficient countervailing power to check the possible abuse of political power captured by local elites, then the benefits of such a democratic decentralisation may only be concentrated on a few powerful (USAID, 2003; Smith, 2007). Another concern is the capacity of the citizens in the locality to effectively participate in decisions and hold local politicians and public servants accountable (Cloete, 2002; Crawford, 2004). For example, Cloete (2002) reports of low levels of development in situations where there is half-baked decentralisation with little power or authority devolved to the lower levels and where there is weak administrative systems and weak civil society to hold local authorities accountable.

Crook (2003) contends that in Africa and other developing countries, the achievement of authentic participation of rural people in development depends on the devolution of power to the local government structures. However, Smith (2007) cautions that locally elected government, as envisaged in devolution, is not a guarantee to people's participation. He argued that in many Third World countries democratic elections are easily captured by local elites such as businessmen, public servants and wealthy farmers, whose interests are not to empower the poor, but to maintain their privileged positions.



For example, a USAID study on Ghana's decentralisation found that participation in the districts assemblies is dominated by elite groups like nurses, teachers and businessmen USAID (2003). These elites also tend to capture resources for development and allocate such resources in ways that will maintain the existing patterns of power and wealth (Blair, 2000 cited in Smith, 2007). This may take the form of deflecting expenditures towards local elites under the influence of patronage, corruption, electoral manipulation, fraud and misappropriation (Helmsing, 2003; Smith, 2007).

A number of writers point to a weak correlation between democratic decentralisation and poverty reduction (Blair, 2000; Crook & Sverrisson, 2001; Oluwu & Wunsch, 2004; Blunt & Turner, 2005; Robinson, 2007). For example, despite the great strides in decentralisation in Columbia and Brazil, in terms of devolving power to local democratically elected bodies, these countries have achieved relatively little in the way of poverty reduction as well as reducing or improving regional disparities (Crook & Sverrisson, 2001). Manors (1999) equally made pessimistic conclusions about experiences in Bolivia, India and Bangladesh. Similar conclusions are drawn by Adamolekun, cited in Francis and James (2003) who reported that despite the several years of implementing decentralisation by some African countries like Uganda, Kenya, Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria and Ghana, there are no real success stories as far as improved development performance at the local level is concerned.

Nonetheless, various explanations have been provided to explain the poor performance of decentralisation in Sub-saharan Africa. According to Wunsch

(2001), the failure is attributable to the over centralisation of resources, limited transfers to sub-national governance, a weak local revenue base, lack of local planning capacity, limited changes in legislation and regulations as well as the absence of a meaningful political process. Oyugi (2000 cited in Jain, 2007) explains the poor performance of decentralisation in Sub-saharan Africa to poor design of decentralisation programmes, imitative nature of decentralisation programmes which fail to take into serious consideration their feasibility within the prevailing political environment and the lingering culture of central hegemony over the localities, both politically and administratively.

A further administrative constrain as argued by Kotze (1997) is that some operatives at the decentralised administration are political appointees, who may have little administrative capacity. Such appointees are more inclined to tow the party line at the expense of community interest, thereby compromising development efficiency and effectiveness for political expediency. This situation is exemplified in Ghana where there are perceptions that ruling party executives in some districts usually put undue pressure on the politically appointed District Chief Executive (DCE) to release some district resources to support local political activities. Where the DCE is reluctant to comply, he or she is often branded as not good and consequently the local party executives may make recommendations to the President for the removal of such a DCE. This view is corroborated by Crawford (2004) when he reported that the lack of fully elected District Assembly, including the DCE, in Ghana's decentralisation process, entails a significant deficit in the system of democratic representation and in the

accountability of local representatives to the electorate. In other words, the democratic principle of popular control is severely compromised.

Theoretically, the policy of devolution has potential for the relatively rapid development of sub-Saharan African. However, implementation failures have accounted for the poor performance of decentralisation efforts in some African countries. Such implementation failures are mainly caused by the weak institutional framework under which decentralisation is undertaken. In this regard, a notable dimension is the tendency for Africa countries to borrow Western models of decentralisation without adequately adapting them to suit the local context with inherent traditional attributes. Unfortunately, such institutional bottlenecks militating against effective decentralisation have not attracted sufficient scholarly studies.

Given the pros and cons for decentralisation and development, as discussed above, it is recognised that decentralisation is a complex, multi-dimensional process which takes place within a particular political context and therefore evolves differently in different countries depending on the context (Smoke, 2003; Oxhorn, 2004; Dauda, 2006). Understanding the local context and taken this into consideration in the decentralisation policy holds the key to its success in terms of rural development and poverty reduction. These contextual issues are further explored in the following.

### **Contextual Issues Impacting on Decentralisation Outcomes**

The outcomes of decentralisation are greatly influenced by the political, social, economic and cultural context which varies from place to place (Hagan, 2000; Phoebe Griffith, 2003; Bankauakaite & Saltman, 2006; Dauda, 2006 and Lauer, 2007). This re-echoes the commonly used phrase that “context matters”. There is recognition that decentralisation takes place within a particular political context, and therefore evolves differently in each country (Crook, 2003; Dauda, 2006:292). Consequently, the prevailing political culture in a country has great influence on the functioning of public institutions, including the decentralisation process which needs to be carefully studied and analysed (Bankauakaite & Saltman, 2006).

The histories and nature of both the indigenous African societies and the intensity of the colonial experience of each country have led to the emergence of various forms of political cultures which shape the general governance system and institutional framework of these African countries. For example, Lauer (2007) reported that in East Africa, the political cultures of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda vary considerably despite having been ruled by the same colonial power, the British, and despite adopting liberal democracy. The difference can be related to the different history and the indigenous social system and values of each country.

Many Third World countries inherited centralised political culture (Falleti, 2005) and bureaucratic culture (Leftwich, 2000;& Jain, 2007) from their colonial masters and some of these post-colonial governments still hold on to this central control with little power or authority devolved to the lower levels (Cloete, 2002)

thereby making decentralisation ineffective. In this regard, the political willingness of central governments to transfer more power to decentralised units will positively influence decentralisation outcomes (Crook, 2003 & Mitchinson, 2003). Indeed, Crook (2003) reports of positive decentralisation outcomes in Uganda as a result of political willingness to transfer more power to the local level.

The other contextual issues point to the fact that the economic and cultural realities in Western nations compared to African countries are different (Jain, 2007 and Lauer, 2007). Consequently, the borrowed Western political systems, which informed the decentralisation process in many African countries, may be incompatible and ineffective unless adapted to reflect the unique cultural and economic realities of these African countries (Leftwich, 1993; Rao & Walton, 2004; Jain, 2007). There is merit in this line of thinking and should be explored further. Whilst western democracy might be a fine idea for developed countries where there is high literacy rate and better understanding of democracy, with more developed democratic institutions and higher income levels, developing countries like Africa may find democracy unsuitable for various reasons. In the first place, the high poverty levels and illiteracy in many African countries tend to eliminate many people from effectively engaging in formal political processes, which is then hijacked by a few elites with self-seeking interests. These elite politicians at the national and local levels often use their money, power and party platform to capture the votes of rural people to represent them in democratic institutions like the District Assembly or Parliament.

Consequently, there is the tendency for these rural people to vote in block for reasons which may not be related to their long-term development and well-being. In this regard, democratic elections may become a blunt instrument for ensuring political accountability in many African countries, with implications for decentralisation outcomes. In other words, if the citizens are incapable of holding their elected representatives to local government accountable, then decisions and development administration will not be responsive to the people, particularly the poor. Besides, the political institutions in many African countries are not well developed thereby easily subjected to misuse and abuse by self-seeking politicians. No wonder many democratic elections in Africa are prone to disagreements and conflicts.

Furthermore, decentralisation is a multi-dimensional process that entails political bargaining over the content and implementation of different types of policies (Montero & Samuels, 2004; Falleti, 2005). Clegg (1990) as well as Blunt and Turner (2005) also emphasise how decentralisation can be shaped positively or negatively by existing institutions, social and cultural traditions. For example, the struggle for power and resources between decentralised institutions and traditional authorities could negatively affect decentralisation if not well managed. Again, the differences in perceptions and worldviews as to how local governance and development should be conducted can negatively affect the outcomes of decentralisation. Such interactive processes between the traditional authorities and their implications for local governance and development have been given little scholarly attention.

The analysis reveals the need to search for ways that can ensure that the decentralisation process going on in many African countries is grounded in the culture and African realities. Political inclusiveness and diversity may provide the key to generate more innovative and effective decentralisation that is responsive to the local context (Blunt & Turner, 2005; Jain, 2007). How this can be done, given the entrenched Western pressure for liberal democracy in African countries, needs serious reflections by researchers.

### **Perceptions about the Institution of Traditional Leadership**

Perceptions are shaped by our beliefs, values and norms which form the culture of a people (Worthman et al., 1992). Expectations guide perception and can arise from what other people communicate about others experiences and desires. Knowledge about traditional institutions helps us to promote behaviour consistent with our beliefs and feelings (Mensah, 2003; Worthman et al., 1992). Popular views on chiefs and chieftaincy are acutely relevant since African governments, international institutions and donor countries are displaying a renewed interest in chieftaincy (Ubink, 2007). Whereas many post-independence African governments saw chiefs as impediments to modernisation and nation-building and tried to curtail their role in local government and national politics (Buur & Kyed, 2005; Sharma, 1997) since the 1990s a large number of African countries have enhanced or formalized the position of their chiefs (Englebort 2002; Ray 2003b; Sklar 1999).

Tangwa (1996) argues that traditional African leadership and authority systems might be understood as “the harmonious marriage between autocratic dictatorship and popular democracy”. Specified formal practices positioned the citizenry to critique, authorise and sanction their rules; their continued reign and the selection and ascension of their successors. Thus, Ritzenthaler and Ritzenthaler (1964) describe the king making procedure of the Bafut kingdom of Cameroon as the exercise of democracy in traditional institutions where, when the new ruler has been installed, he is presented to the Bafut population for “stoning”. The ceremonial stoning may consist of tiny, harmless pebbles in the case of an approved and respected new leader, or of large, injurious rocks hurled so as to maim, chase or kill the undesired incumbent. In either case, it reminds the new ruler of what could happen if his rule becomes illegitimate.

Similarly, there are special festivals such as “Apor” celebrated in Brong Ahafo Region of Ghana during which the chief can be publicly criticised, even insulted by ordinary citizens. The same can be said about the Ga people during the annual Homowo festival. More importantly, citizens have a constitutional right of destooling their chiefs if they are found to have committed serious crimes or broken a taboo. Crimes such as murder, and theft; misdemeanours such as talking to someone’s wife, or in the old days not giving birth to a child, were automatic grounds for destoolment of a chief in the Akan political system. Chiefs could also jeopardise their stools if they were seen as violating their oath to leadership such as not consulting on decisions, not being available to the people, being despotic and so on (CDD, 2001).



In the Upper West Region and other parts of Ghana, the principle of ascertaining transparency among the people is that, a chief does not go anywhere alone; there is always someone with him as a witness. Again, there are customary codes that underline the limited power of the chief and the power relations between the chief and his subjects such as the following: “If a chief reprimands you for doing something, he does so by the authority of the citizens”; “There are no bad chiefs, only bad advisors”; “It is when the state kills you that the chief kills you”. One gold-embossed emblem on top of the staff held by the chief’s spokesman during public ceremonies depicts an egg in the hand; the symbol likens power to an egg. When held too firmly, the egg breaks; and when held too loosely too, the egg falls out of the hand (CDD, 2001 cited in Kangsangbata, 2006: 29).

Moreover, Dake (1996) holds the view that African traditional authorities are autocratic and that has been transferred to modern democratic ideas, making governance on the continent undemocratic. Ajei (2001), in an attempt to prove the existence of democracy in African traditional systems of governance, outlines the political system of Ashanti. For Ajei, the Ashanti traditional system is democratic, while Dake (1996) describes African traditional systems, including that of Ashanti as autocratic. However, Appiah (1993) contends that, the democratic aspects of traditional leadership were weakened by the colonial processes, because Kings and Queens did not generally allow the lay citizens’ interests to take priority in national response to colonial invasion. Thus, if the King did not suffer much during colonialism, a number of his subjects clearly did.

While this tradition-modernity debate within the broader context of development may contain some useful insights, its basic assumptions have limited applicability. The theories of Subsidiarity, Interactive Governance and New Institutionalism have very useful insights, particularly for works that have implications for governance.

### **The Theory of Interactive Governance**

Interactive Governance Theory was developed by Kooiman and Bavinck (2005:3) who define the concept as “the whole of public as well as private interactions taken to solve societal problems and create societal opportunities”. It is a theory that highlights the interactions between the state and other societal parties from local to international levels. The theory is an integration of several other theories including systems thinking, complexity theory and system dynamics.

Often diversity, complexity, and dynamics are seen as nasty complications for governance, and thus can be seen as potential sources of ungovernability (Kooiman, 2003). The interactive governance theory mainly supports this study because it facilitates an analytical understanding of the two systems of local governance that interact in ways that are not well understood. The theory provides the way forward by emphasising on the diversity, complexity and dynamics of governance processes at the local level (Kooiman et. al, 2008) as follows.

Diversity relates to spatial variability in natural, social and cultural conditions in a given society. Diversity demands that the governing system be

sensitive involving an appreciation of variation, a perception of distinction and a compassion for difference. Complexity on other hand refers to the fact that system elements are interactive, overlapping and interdependent and therefore often in conflict. Complexity thus calls for inclusiveness. Finally, dynamics is concerned with the fluctuation and change that occur as a consequence of the tension within a system and/ or between systems. Dynamics therefore logically lead to a need for flexibility. Flexibility in this sense relates to the ability to adapt promptly to system dynamics and change. Flexible systems are pragmatic.

### **The Principle of Subsidiarity**

According to Carrington et al. (2008), the principle of subsidiarity, or multi-level governance, focuses on the relationships between modern institutions of governance and local communities. The theory is based on the view that modern institutions of governance possess certain powers traditionally exercised by the pre-colonial state. Because the pre-colonial states have given some of their traditional sovereign powers to modern institutions of governance, they are considered to be making a leap of faith in joining those institutions. Subsidiarity theory assumes that a local community may improve its domestic affairs by allowing the decentralised institutions to play a role in the formation of its domestic policies. It is believed that this transplant of operational parts from the local community to the decentralised institutions helps the community to strengthen its legitimacy, acceptability, efficiency, and effectiveness.

Subsidiarity principle calls for social problems to be addressed from the bottom up, rather than from the top down. As a doctrine previously associated with the Catholic social theorists, subsidiarity holds that where families, neighbourhoods, churches, or community groups can effectively address a given problem, they should. Where they cannot, municipal or state governments should intervene. Only when the lower bodies prove ineffective should the central government become involved. Tetey (2006) contends that in order to ensure that decentralisation in Ghana leads to the goals and principles articulated in the constitution and other government policies, there has to be a change in the fundamental premise from which these visions emanate. Such a change requires that the country's decentralization program be based on the principle of subsidiarity.

By operationalising the principle of subsidiarity, the framers of the 1992 Ghana's Constitution recognised the underlying principle of subsidiarity as critical to achieving a stable and steady democracy. Chapter 20 and Article 35(d) of the Constitution prescribe the system of decentralisation and local government in the country and enjoin the state "to take appropriate measures to give opportunities to people to participate in decision-making at every level in national life and government". The subsidiarity principle requires democratic participation as one of its key elements because without it citizens are unable to influence policy, monitor their government and hold them accountable.

The subsidiarity principle discusses the allocation of tasks amongst the key players of governance. The principle maintains that the bottom-up approach

should be developed and retained at the local level, and that the transfer of power and resources to the higher level of government should not be affected unless the lower level is no longer in a position to effectively continue to provide services. The essence is to ensure good governance. Unfortunately, “the general reluctance of central government authorities to give popular voice by surrendering power, authority and resources to local level institutions, particularly institutions that enhance the democratic tradition at the grassroots level, gives credence to the fact that the basic tenets of the subsidiarity principle are ignored” (Kisseih, 2007:1).

According to Gibson (2005), subsidiarity provides the intellectual anchor for, and the easiest way of, deepening decentralisation as it proposes a minimalist role for central governments. The principle advocates that those institutions that are closest to beneficiaries of government undertakings, and have the needed competencies, are the best situated to undertake those activities (eg, policy development, program management, service delivery), and should be given the opportunity and mandate to do so. In the view of Gibson (2000:4) "authority should reside at the lowest level commensurate with the necessary information and resources for making and implementing decisions, with the onus of proof on those who would move powers to a higher level." Such a framework is believed to reduce costs and maximize human development (Tetty, 2006).

According to Tetty (2006), the primary test of any government activity is whether it should be in that activity at all or whether that activity can best be performed at a subordinate level which is closest to the intended target. That way, the activity is more likely to reflect the wishes of that group, be efficacious, be

more closely monitored by citizens, and government can be more easily held accountable by them. According to the subsidiarity precept, authority, by default, should reside at the lowest possible level of government, and delegated upwards under the rarest and most necessary of circumstances. This inverts the hierarchy of the governmental structure where the center delegates authority to the periphery, and invests in the latter the delegating authority.

Without devolutions any effort to promote government and community partnerships will lack trust and credibility. There is apathy and mistrust because for a lot of citizens, democracy is not real (DeBresson & Barker, 1998). They lack participation. Issues are not debated and are imposed on them as fait accompli. Meanwhile, these decisions affect their daily lives. National level regulatory agencies and institutions are far removed from the reality of the people in various communities and are slow to act and implement policies and decisions.

Thus, the principle of subsidiarity advocates curbing top-heavy, overly hierarchical bureaucratic institutions that operate from the center. They need to be replaced by agencies that are proximate to communities with the power to pursue administrative and regulatory functions which have resonance within their jurisdictions. As Onibon et al. (1999) observe in the context of natural resource management in West Africa, central governments have arrogated to themselves the legal authority to regulate and run the sector, but do not have the capability to do so effectively.

The consequence is what Soumare calls 'non-functioning legality' (cited in Onibon et al., 1999), resulting in environmental degradation and destruction.

Subsidiarity enables such incompetence to be curbed with the transfer of de facto authority and responsibility for natural resource management to sub-national structures. Implicit in the principle is a privileging of indigenous/local knowledge, and experience, over distant centers of knowledge production, as a more appropriate basis from which to pursue developmental initiatives. This position ruptures much contemporary approaches to development which tend to marginalize such knowledge and experience, and rather valorizes the position of central government and its experts.

The preceding argument does not suggest that central government bodies have no role in the sub-national structures that emerge from the reconfiguration of the existing architecture of government. What is proposed is an effort to move the functions of such bodies in the direction of coordination, for general welfare, rather than serving as first order policy making and executing authorities. Central governments are well-situated to assist local authorities, through a genuinely consultative process, to carry out their duties in ways that are consonant with overall objectives of national development strategies. In fact, the draft World Charter of Local Self-Government granted supervisory powers to higher levels of government in order to ensure that national statutes, policies and programs are carried out appropriately in all local government jurisdictions (Tettey, 2006).

### **New Institutional Theory**

Institutional theory has conventionally been concerned with the embeddedness of actors in national culture and institutions. However,

perspectives about the how and why institutions matter in political life define the central concerns of new institutionalism in political analysis. New institutional theory assumes that, the actions and behaviours of ordinary people are shaped by the structure of rules, procedures and customs of where they live (Bratton, 2007). In other words, the reason why institutions matter is that laws, customs and established practices in institutional settings can play a powerful role in shaping the behaviour of individuals. Therefore, in defining institutions in these terms we need to focus not only on formal institutions and practices but also on informal institutions and relationships. As argued by Levi (1990: 409), “the most effective institutional arrangements incorporate a normative system of informal and internalised rules”. North (1990: 36) agrees and argues that the most significant institutional factors are informal choices which are preferred over formal rules because:

In our daily interaction with others, whether within the family, in external social relations, or in business activities, the governing structure is overwhelmingly defined by codes of conduct, norms of behaviour and conventions. Underlying these informal constraints are formal rules, but these are seldom the obvious and immediate source of choice in daily interactions.

Building on the ideas of North, Kaufmann et al (2000) and Knack (2003) have found a positive relationship between the quality of institutions and governance systems. New institutionalism therefore simply amounts to bringing quality institutions back in helping resolve the governance deficits.



## **Modernisation Theory**

Modernisation theory refers to a theory which states that development in developing worlds can be attained through following the processes of development that are used by currently developed nations (Rostow,1960). It is a social economic theory which is some refer to as the development theory. The Theory came into prominence in the 1950s and early 1960s as an approach to development and social change. It offers an account of the common features of the process of development drawing on the ideas and analysis of early social thinkers and scientists such as Durkheim and Weber. Durkheim distinguished between two basic types of society namely traditional and modern (Webster, 1990).

Modernisation scholars such as Walt Rostow postulated stages of development applying to every country. According to Rostow (1964 as cited in Webster, 1990:52): “It is possible to identify all societies, in their economic dimensions, as lying within one of five categories; the traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, take off, the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass consumption”. Modernisation Theory has therefore been used to explain the current state of development on the continent. From the literature, the standard interpretation of the theory is that control of economic and other resources gradually passes from families to the state and capitalists as societies move from traditional to modern states.

In the African context the markers of change are the establishment of colonial rule and the rise of the modern bureaucratic state (ECA, 2007). All kinds

of false explanations have been offered to account for autocratic tendencies, corruption, inefficiency and mismanagement among African leaders. These range from predispositions of chiefly institutions in Africa in which power is supposed to be personalised and arbitrary to unlimited access by chiefs to public resources and to venality and lack of ethics among modern African leaders. Such prejudicial suppositions overlook the fact that traditionally Europe was a land of corrupt absolute monarchs and predatory and callous feudal lords (Mafeje, 2002).

### **Empirical Review on the Integration of Traditional Authorities in Local Governance**

Various studies have been done in the area of the role of traditional authorities in local governance. This study critically examines five of these empirical studies from Ghana and two from outside Ghana-Western Samoa in the Pacific and Botswana by McPherson (1997) and Lutz and Linder (2004) respectively. The five from Ghana include the works of:

1. Knierzinger (2011): Chieftaincy and development in Ghana: From political intermediaries to neotraditional development brokers;
2. Taabazuing (2010): Towards effective participation of chiefs in Ghana's decentralization process: the case of Wenchi district;
3. Kendie and Enu-Kwesi (2008): The role of traditional authority in the decentralised system in Brong Ahafo and Central Regions;

4. Institute of Local Government Studies (2008): Guidelines for managing relationships between local and traditional authorities at the district level; and
5. Bouton (2004): Interactions between the Local Government and the Traditional authorities.

Comparatively, the work of Knierzinger (2011) gives a detail account of how the institution of Chieftaincy was positioned under the various regimes of government in Ghana. His argument is that, contrary to many prophecies of doom since independence, chieftaincy is still very popular. One of the reasons for this persistence is the remarkable malleability and fluidity of traditional authority system. His paper focuses on the intersections between the traditional actors (e.g. chiefs, queen mothers, stool fathers, elders, 'linguists' and development chiefs) and development actors of which they are part. It discusses how traditional authorities interact with (and act as) politicians, business men, NGOs and development agencies and how these intersections can be described on the national level.

In order to derive empirical evidence on the intersection between chieftaincy and politics, Knierzinger (2011) surveys the views of over 1,000 people in Greater Accra in 2005 on the comparative relevance of chiefs and members of parliament (MPs). The selected respondents (1005 valid cases) were predominantly of the opinion that chiefs are more trustworthy, more caring and more powerful than MPs as far as the well-being and everyday lives of the people are concerned. The response given by Professor George P. Hagan, CPP

presidential candidate in 2000 elections and a key informant to the Researcher described this relationship between traditional authorities and the politicians of the modern political system quite bluntly:

You cannot win an election in Ghana if the chiefs do not support you, because while you are asleep, they are with the people. A chief said to me you cannot win if you have no money to give to the chiefs. If you give me money I can go from village to village in my domain and tell people to vote. At times the voting is done even in the chief's palace. And people go to the chief's house to greet him in the morning and ask him how they should vote. He would not open up his mouth; he would give them a sign. [...] So let's be realistic: The theory is that they should not participate, and that is the idea (Knierzinger, 2011: 35).

In practice, however, many chiefs have circumvented this constitutional provision calling for it to be amended or expunged from the constitution of the republic of Ghana. Although Knierzinger (2011) used a large sample size which has positive implications for the outcome, his work does not sufficiently explain how respondents were selected.

Taabazuig (2010) explores the interactive process between decentralised structures and traditional authorities in Wenchi district, with a view to generating lessons and insights that can guide the recommendation of a more appropriate decentralisation framework to tap the strengths of traditional authorities towards accelerated rural development. Within the framework of action research

methodology, he employed the mixed-methods to triangulate his findings. Specific methods employed were focus group discussions (FGDs), in-depth interviews (IDIs), and observation, complemented by context analyses of relevant documents.

It was found that the interactive processes between traditional authorities and decentralised structures are characterised mainly by competition for power and legitimacy, leading to mistrust and an inability to take advantage of the synergy effect between the two systems of local governance in accomplishing accelerated rural development. The study established that the outcomes of decentralisation and development in Wenchi district are shaped by the local context such as the values, perceptions, institutions and relationships among the various actors. Consequently, the search for a more effective decentralisation process and sustainable development points to inclusiveness and diversity rather than to universal blueprints. Key recommendations are that traditional authorities should not be fused with the decentralised structures, but should remain as countervailing institutions to check the misuse of power by the decentralised structures.

This recommendation, however, contradicts certain aspects of his own conclusions as well as the work of ILGS (2008) in which traditional authorities have advocated for a greater presence in local administration. For instance, Taabazauing concluded that the relationship between traditional authorities and district assembly operatives could be strengthened if opportunities were created for the chiefs to have a greater say as to who was selected to represent their

communities within the decentralised structures. It is therefore no surprising when Taabazuing (2010) further recommended that traditional authorities should be given the ceremonial role of the right to address meetings of the District Assembly and the Area Councils. Additionally, the author recommended that chiefs should be given the chance to nominate at least two people onto the Unit Committees. In a nutshell, Taabazuing's work kicks against the idea of integration as it's mainly advocates for the status quo where traditional structures remain as ceremonial figureheads.

The work by Kendie & Enu-Kwesi (2008) was initiated by the Support for Decentralisation Reform Programme (SfDR) of German Technical Co-operation (GTZ) as a response to the need to generate empirical data that will inform policy reforms to effectively integrate the traditional authorities into Ghana's decentralisation system. The study was carried out in the Central and Brong Ahafo regions where four districts and their corresponding four paramountcies as well as four communities were selected for the data collection. Additionally, the study employed a combination of descriptive and cross-sectional surveys. Moreover, a combination of methods such as focus group discussions by district assembly staff, and traditional authorities, as well as household surveys using interview schedules were adopted for data collection from relevant stakeholders. At the end, a total of 397 interview schedules were completed and analysed at the household level.

The study confirmed the existence of a gap between the TAs and state institutions, and suggested the need for co-operation between these institutions in

order for local level development to occur. It was also acknowledged that, although some efforts are being made to integrate TAs into Ghana's decentralised administration and planning system, the mechanisms put in place to ensure that this happens are unclear. Although, the study finally gave some specific areas where the two institutions can be integrated, the criteria used for the selection of the study paramountcies and districts were too broad and have implications when defining the boundaries of integration.

In an issue paper developed from reviewing reports emanating from various consultations and studies on traditional authorities and local governance in Ghana, the ILGS (2008) situate the ambiguity in the role of traditional authorities in local governance among the following key issues: (a) Protocol at the local level between traditional and local authorities (b) Representation of Traditional authorities on MMDAs (c) Relations between Traditional authorities, Unit committees and Local government sub-structures (d) Platforms of engagement between local authorities and Traditional authorities (e) Infrastructure management, monitoring and evaluation (f) Peace-building, Security and Conflict prevention (g) Natural resource management (h) Internal revenue mobilization (i) Human rights observance and reduction of the practice and impacts of negative socio-cultural practices, and (j) Capacity building for Traditional authorities. Having identified these areas of lack of synergy between the traditional and assembly structures, the paper further proposes desirable outcomes and specific guidelines aimed at achieving the problems outlined.


The final empirical review relates to the work of Tara Bouton. As earlier stated, Bouton's work was also about the interactions between the traditional authorities and the local government in Ghana. Just like the work of Johannes Knierzinger, Tara also approached the interface from the historical context which created a foundation for better understanding of current perceptions on the issue. Using In-depth Interviews, Tara engaged eight (8) members of traditional authority and six (6) past and current officials of local government. His data analysis was purely qualitative. In the end, Bouton (2004) concluded that stress on the local government could be effectively alleviated through increased conversation with the traditional authorities, specifically by defining representation of the traditional authority in the district assemblies and at the local council level, as well as promoting adjudication by the traditional authority as a viable option for alternative conflict resolution in the district courts.

Although Tara Bouton's conclusion confirms what other writers have said on the subject, his generalizations based on only Komenda traditional area could be problematic. His study also fails to indicate the particular working places of the local government officials he interviewed.

Having looked at five empirical reviews majority of which are from Ghana and Ghanaian authors, it is important to also look at a few examples outside the country. Two foreign models have been adopted from Macpherson (1997) as well as Lutz and Linder (2004). The framework looks at the leverage points for the integration of traditional and local government structures at Western Samoa and Botswana in a more formalistic manner. The example by McPherson



concerns a situation where the authority is empowered to act as the local government.




**Figure 2: A Model where Traditional Power Heads the Local Government**

Source: Macpherson, 1997

As illustrated above, McPherson (1997) uses this model of local government from Western Samoa (located in the South West Pacific Ocean). In 1999, the “Village Fono act” in Western Samoa allowed village fonos (parliaments), which are headed by the paramount chief, to “exercise power or authority in accordance with the costumes and usage of that village.” In many of the colonial states the traditional authorities were the local government. This is likely to be “strongly opposed on practical administrative grounds, but especially on the basis of arguments for democracy, given the emergence of the democratic state which demands that all levels of its government conform on the whole to the

core value of universally-elected governments (Ray 2003: 114).” However, this model is still viable in rural areas where traditional societies are intact and traditional leaders have a high level of legitimacy among the people.

The next model relates to separate structures with various interactions at the local and national level. Some countries have established a parallel structure at different levels of government. A house of chiefs at the national and local level exercise certain rights and has an advisory function at the national and/or local level and/or needs to be consulted for different issues. This model is shown by Figure 3 as follows:




**Figure 3: A Model of Separate Interactions between Traditional and Local Government**

Source: Lutz & Linder ( 2004)

In Botswana this is the common form of integration (Sharma 2003). There is a house of chiefs without significant power, but there is recognition of the chieftaincy. The President was given the authority for the recognition, appointment, deposition, and suspension of chiefs. The chief arranges tribal ceremonies, assists in checking crime, promotes the welfare of the tribe, and presides over meetings. The law nevertheless requires that every chief implement the instructions given to him by the minister. The chiefs are paid salaries, and the state has complete supremacy over the traditional leaders (Lutz & Linder, 2004).

There is also a third model where traditional authorities have a clear function in local government as part of one or more of the local government bodies. It is a situation where there is a formal recognition of traditional authorities in local government. This is done through reserved seats or through allowing (or encouraging) traditional leaders to run for certain local offices. The advantage of this model is that it fully integrates traditional leaders within modern local governance structures. Their power and recognition in this case is not only symbolic. The disadvantage lies in the fact that representatives with different origins and sources of legitimacy are governing within the same structure, which can then lead to conflict. But as noted before, their substantial integration can further increase the implementation capacity of the modern structures because traditional leaders have been part of the decision-making procedure, thereby lending their legitimacy to the policies in question. This third model which is eventually modified to suit the conceptual framework for this study is shown in Figure 4.



**Figure 4: A Model of Formal Power Relations of Traditional Authorities in Local Government**

Source: Lutz & Linder (2004)

### **Conceptual Framework on the Integration of Traditional Authorities into the Local Government System**

A study of integration between traditional authorities and local government requires an appropriate conceptual framework that will form the foundation for the study stemming from the statement of the problem through data collection to the analysis of data. The conceptual framework creates a synergy among the variables underpinning the study, key among which include the concept of collaboration, linkages, traditional authorities and local governance. Collaboration concerns an enhanced coordination, co-operation and interaction among key


actors in the process of development. There are different models of co-operation between institutions of traditional and local governments. Whether and how traditional authorities are included in local governance depends on various elements. Traditional structures are not equally important in all regions of the developing world. The incentive for governments to share power with traditional authorities at the local level is rather low if they are weak or in a minority position (Lutz & Linder, 2004).

After modification of Figure 4, Figure 5 indicates how TAs should be integrated from the local to the National level in Ghana. However, the emphasis of the study and the researcher is at the local level. At the bottom of the structure is the local level where it is expected that the concept of the District Level Association of Traditional Councils should be working well, especially in Districts with multiple paramountcies like the KEEA. The idea is to enable the association build consensus on issues of representation and development. It would then enable the traditional councils to interact formally with the District Assembly.

Thus, the decision regarding the representation of traditional authorities in the District Assembly, for example, would be left entirely in the hands of the respective traditional council(s). This will in effect stop the current practice of getting such representatives by the District Assembly through consultation with the TAs who continuously claim that they are either not properly consulted or not at all consulted. The effectiveness of collaboration between the District Assembly

and TAs have implications for the achievement of the desired development outcomes at the local level.

Additionally, the traditional authorities can be allowed to contest the District Assembly elections if they so desire. In order to improve the level of collaboration at the Regional level, it is being proposed that the two members of TAs should be represented at RCC and who should have more stakes in the affairs of TAs at the RCC. The starting point for these reforms is to let the two reps have voting rights on the RCC in order to remove perceptions that they are there as ceremonial representatives. Similarly, at the National level, there is a proposal that whoever emerges as the President of the National House of Chiefs should be made to sit in cabinet meetings. The suggestion is to restore the lost image of the chieftaincy institution and to directly offer the institution the opportunity to be part of the highest decision making body of the ruling government. Figure 5 shows the modified conceptual framework for the study.



**Figure 5: Conceptual Framework on the Integration of Traditional Authorities into the Local Governance System**

Source: Adapted from Lutz & Linder (2004)

## **Summary**

The discourse on development and culture showed how Western worldview shaped the understanding and practice of development. The effectiveness of these development paradigms have been questioned based on how they address contemporary problems of poverty, social unrests and environmental crises on the African continent. The search for alternative development models points to cultural diversity and its role in generating innovative and more sustainable models of development. The chapter explored the concept of development and its links with culture and discussed the functioning of institutions in Africa. It highlighted the dialectic tension between tradition and modernity; universalism and peculiarity; western science and indigenous knowledge. Within this tension the threat of erosion of traditional African culture by Western cultural values were brought to the fore. The theoretical and conceptual reviews undertaken so far helped in informing the right methodology for the study. The next chapter discusses the detail methodology used in this study.



## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **METHODOLOGY**

#### **Introduction**

This chapter discusses the wider theoretical implications of the study methodology outlining the study design, research approach, data sources, sample and sampling procedures, data collection instruments, data processing and analysis.

#### **Study Areas**


The Central region which is typically rural in nature is bordered by the Ashanti and Eastern regions to the north, Western region to the west, Greater Accra to the east, and to the south by the Atlantic Ocean (Gulf of Guinea) coastline which is 168-kilometre in length (GOG, 2015). It occupies an area of 9,826 square kilometres or 4.1 per cent of Ghana's land area, making it the third smallest in area after Greater Accra and Upper East. The region was historically part of the Western region until 1970 when it was carved out just before the 1970 Population and Housing Census. According to the Ghana Statistical Service (2012), the total population of the Central region is 2,201,863. Out of this number, seventy percent (70%) of those aged between 15-64 years are economically active and approximately ninety four of this group is employed. The region consists of 20 Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies with a total number of 23 constituencies. It is predominantly Akan speaking (82%) with a number of small other ethnic groups from across the country (GSS, 2013).

The region was the first area in the country to make contact with the Europeans. Its capital, Cape Coast, was also the first capital of the Gold Coast until 1877, when the capital was moved to Accra. It was in the castle of Cape Coast that the historic Bond of 1844 was signed between the British and the Fante Confederation. The bond obliged traditional leaders to, among other things, submit serious crimes such as murder and robbery to British jurisdiction and laid the legal foundation for subsequent British colonisation of the coastal area. In short, it allowed the British to usurp judicial authority from traditional courts (Buah, 1998).

The boundaries of the traditional political institution of chieftaincy in the region do not necessarily conform to that of the current local government administration. The traditional areas involved in the study are six which are within the jurisdiction of four Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies. The traditional areas are broadly grouped into three based on the boundaries of these districts in which they are located. The only Metropolitan area in the Central region that is coterminous with a paramountcy or traditional area (Oguaa) and happens to be one of the study areas is Cape Coast. The second categorisation of paramountcy-district integration is the one where there are multiple traditional areas located within one district. The traditional areas of Komenda, Edina, Eguafu and Abrem were selected to represent this second category. The third category which is the opposite of the second, is where a single paramountcy traverses the boundaries of multiple districts. The Denkyira paramountcy, which has the Upper Denkyira East Municipality and the Upper Denkyira West District, represents this

category. The different categories of paramountcies in the Central region also present an aspect of paramountcy-District Assembly relationships where similarities and differences can be inferred.

There are 34 paramountcies in the region with some overlapping the administrative jurisdictions of the District Assembly. There are about 32 major festivals in the region (CRHC, 2012). Notable among these are the Aboakyer at Winneba, Fetu at Cape Coast and Bakatue at Elmina. The region is endowed with rich natural resources like gold and bauxite found mostly in the Upper Denkyira area. Agriculture is the main type of economic activity for both males and females whilst a significant proportion of the people are engaged in selling, production and transport businesses in the informal sector. Even though it has been considered as the citadel of education in Ghana because of the availability of almost all the best second cycle schools in the country including Mfantshipim School, Wesley Girls High School, Saint Augustine's College, Adisadel College, Holy Child School among others, the Region is nonetheless listed as one of the four poorest across Ghana. This unenviable record has raised questions about the impact of development in a location where the governance of the country took its roots. The map of the study region is shown by Figure 6 and included is a brief description of the study districts within the region which are also provided in the subsequent pages.




**Figure 6: Central Region Map with Study Areas**

Source: Cartographic Unit of Department of Geography and Regional Planning, UCC (2012)

## Cape Coast metropolitan and Oguaa traditional area

The people of Cape Coast are believed to be part of the Fantes who migrated from Tekyiman in the Brong Ahafo Region. The Cape Coast Metropolitan Assembly was established by Legislative Instrument (L.I. 1927) of 2007 and gazetted in February 2008. The Metropolitan Assembly has two Sub-metros namely Cape Coast South and Cape Coast North. The main Accra-Takoradi highway separates these two sub-metros with Abura as the capital of the newly created sub-metro within the Cape Coast North constituency. In 2010, both sub-metros (i.e. the entire metropolis) had a total population of 169, 894 with 40, 386 total number of households. The total adult population (18 years and above) of the metropolis was 110, 333 (GSS, 2013).

Unemployment rate in the metropolis was 11.3 per cent whilst the overall employment situation was that 63 per cent of the working population was in the private informal sector mainly consisting of self-employed businesses without employees. The Cape Coast Metropolis houses the regional seat of the House of chiefs. As coterminous with the Cape Coast Metropolis, the Oguaa Traditional area has 42 towns and villages and 7 divisional chiefs. Figure 7 shows the map of the Cape Coast Metropolis which shares boundaries with the Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abirem to the West, Abura-Aseibu-Kwamankese to the East and the Twifo-Hemang-Lower Denkyira District to the North.



**Figure 7: Cape Coast Metropolis in Regional & National Context**


Source: Cape Coast Metropolitan Assembly (CCMA), (2012)

## Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abirem municipality and traditional areas

The Komenda, Edina, Eguafo and Abirem municipality is an amalgamation of four traditional areas. The entire municipality, according to the 2010 Population and Housing Census report had a total population of 144,705 with 35,403 total number of households. Majority of the adult population (18 years and older) are engaged in farming activity (GSS, 2013).

Oral history has it that Eguafo Kingdom created the other three traditional areas in the Municipality. It is narrated that the founder of Komenda, Nana Komeh migrated with his people from Techiman in the Brong Ahafo Region and finally settled in the Eguafo Kingdom before settling in their current site. Komenda has 24 divisional and sub-chiefs within the paramountcy (Eguafo Traditional Council, 2012).

Edina (Elmina) the capital and development hub of the municipality was founded by Kwaa Amankwa who first settled in Eguafo before founding Elmina during one of his hunting expeditions. Edina is headed by the Omanhene who has about 18 sub-chiefs. There are eleven towns that constitute the Eguafo traditional area each of which forms a division. The kingdom was founded by Nana Tekyi who led one of the Fante states that migrated from Tekyiman (Elmina Traditional Council, 2012). The Abirem traditional area which is believed to be the youngest of the four traditional areas has 14 divisional and sub-divisional chiefs.



**Figure 8: KEEA Municipal in Regional and National Context**


Source: KEEA Municipal Assembly, (2012)

The Upper Denkyira East Municipality and Upper West District and the Denkyira Traditional Area

The Upper Denkyira East Municipality whose capital is Dunkwa-on-Offin is also the administrative headquarters of the Denkyira kingdom with the



traditional capital at Jukwa. The kingdom has close to 50 divisional and sub-divisional chiefs. The map of Upper Denkyira East Municipal is depicted by Figure 9.



**Figure 9: Upper Denkyira East Municipality in Regional and National Context**

Source: Upper Denkyira East Municipal Assembly (2012)

The Upper Denkyira East Municipal had a population of 72,810 while that of the Upper Denkyira West District was 60,054 in 2010 (GSS, 2013). According

to the Ghana Statistical Service, the Upper Denkyira West District was carved out from the Upper Denkyira East Municipality, by a legislative instrument, LI 201 in 2006. Its capital, Diaso is one of the major divisions within the Denkyira traditional area. The map of the District is presented by Figure 10.



**Figure 10: Upper Denkyira West District in Regional and National Context**

Source: Upper Denkyira West District Assembly (2012).

## **Research Design**

The design was based on a mixed-method approach which emerged within the last two decades and involves collecting and analysing both quantitative and qualitative data in a single study (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). Thus, Creswell (2003) posits that, a mixed-method approach is one in which the researcher tends to base knowledge claims on pragmatic grounds using different methods to gain insight into an issue under investigation.

The rationale for using a mixed-method approach is also in line with the objective of the study, which seeks to explore the factors that have either strengthened or weakened the integration of traditional authority in local governance for local level development. In sum, the mixed methods design was chosen because the data collected from the study lent itself to qualitative and quantitative approaches. The study designs were exploratory and descriptive. It was exploratory because of the theoretical gap on the issue of integration. And it was descriptive because the study analysis involved giving a clear picture of the problem of lack of cooperation between the leadership of the traditional and formal government institutions.

## **Target Population and Sampling Procedure**

The study targeted the two political leaderships and the people: the indigenous leadership and the people of Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abirem, Oguaa, & Denkyira Paramountcies and the respective contemporary leadership of the local government system. As evidenced by both literature and practice, all the

study areas stated are governed by two political systems. These are the indigenous political system and the national government. The indigenous political system mainly refers to the traditional authority or chieftaincy institution while the national government is represented by the local government system through the District Assembly concept. Two groups of political leaders could therefore be identified in all the study areas: the Paramount Chief and his council of elders representing the traditional authority or chieftaincy institution and the Metropolitan/Municipal/District Chief Executive and the Assembly members representing the local government system.

In this study, part of the target population that was studied referred to as the survey population (Jaeger, 1988; Sarantakos, 2005) involved the selection of the community members in all the traditional areas. With much reference to the topic the Researcher became interested in district-paramountcy dynamics. This led to the categorisation of the 34 paramountcies found within the four MMDAs for the study in the Central region. After categorising the traditional areas for the purposes of identification with the corresponding districts, the total populations of the respective districts were used for the sampling. A sample size of 382 is representative of a population between 75,000 and 1,000,000 (Kirk, 1995) and (Sarantakos, 2005). The 2010 Population and Housing Census put the total adult population (18 years and older) of the corresponding districts within the study paramountcies at 258,635. This population gives a corresponding sample of 382 according to the table for determining sample size. The categorisation of the paramountcies in the Central region into three is shown in Table 1.

**Table 1: Types of Paramountcies in the Central Region**

<b>Category of paramountcy</b>	<b>Metropolis/Municipality/District</b>	<b>Traditional Area(s)</b>
Paramountcy in a single district	1. Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abirem	Komenda, Edina, Eguafo and Abirem.
	2. Mfantiman	Abeadze and Ekumfi, Mankessima and Nkusukum. Awutu and Senya.
	3. Awutu-Senya	Atti Mokwaa, Hemang and Twifo.
	4. Lower Denkyira	Assin Atandansu and Assin Apimanim.
	5. Assin South	Assin Fosu, Afutuakwa and Owirenkye.
	6. Assin North	Ajumako, Breman Essiam, Enyan Denkyira, Enyan Abaasa and Enyan Maim.
	7. Ajumako-Enyan-Essiam	Abura Abakrampa, Asebu and Ayeldo.
	8. Abura-Asebu-Kwamankese	
A paramountcy with multiple districts	1. Upper Denkyira East 2. Upper Denkyira West	Denkyira
Paramountcy co-terminus with a district	Cape Coast	Oguaa

Source: Author's construct (2011)

The categorisation of the paramountcies with the corresponding district population is found in Table 2. The total populations of the respective districts

helped in arriving at the sample size used for the study using the central limit theorem.

**Table 2: Population of the Study Areas**

District Name	Paramountcy type	Total population	Population 18years & older	Total Number of Households
KEEA	Multiple paramountcies	144,705	76,885	35,403
Upper Denkyira East	Overlapping paramountcy	72,810	40,301	14,200
Municipal Upper Denkyira West	Overlapping paramountcy	60,054	31,116	13,436
Cape Coast	Coterminous	169,894	110,333	40,386
<b>Total</b>		<b>447,463</b>	<b>258,635</b>	<b>103,425</b>

Source: GSS (2012)

The representative sample size of 382 taken from the adult study population of 258,635 for a survey gave a proportionate share of theoretical samples of 114; 105; and 163 respondents to be chosen from [KEEA], Denkyira and Oguaa traditional areas respectively. However, guided by the central limit

theorem and the idea that in sampling, the higher the proportion of the sample size to the population, the higher the representativeness of the sample of the population, the sample sizes were increased. For example, owing to the peculiar nature of the multiple paramountcies in a single district, that is KEEA, the Researcher decided to raise the figures to 200 for each of the three broad categories of paramountcies making a total of 600. The sample 200 in each case was arrived at to allow for more convenience and with the understanding that at least a sample of 50 people could be taken from each of the four paramountcies in that category of multiple paramountcies in a district (i.e. KEEA). Based on this analysis, a total sample of 600 was chosen for the survey in the three broad types of paramountcies.

Depending on the size (in terms of population) of each traditional area, between two-four most heavily populated communities covering more than two-thirds of the entire area were chosen for the survey exercise. For instance, in Komenda traditional area, the Komenda township and Kissi were selected whiles Eguafo and Abreshia were chosen for the Eguafo traditional area. In the Denkyira traditional area, Jukwa, Dunkwa-On-Offin, and Diaso were chosen. In Oguaa, Esikafo Ambantam and Ntsin area were taken to represent Cape Coast South constituency of the metropolitan area whiles Abura and Efutu represented Cape Coast North constituency.

It was also found that the socio-demographic background of the population in the study areas were relatively similar. For instance, apart from the majority of the people being illiterate and semi-illiterate, most of them are

farmers. Thus based on the homogenous nature of the population, the samples should be assumed to be representative. Since there were also four District Assemblies involved in the study areas, an in-depth interview involving at least two core staff of each District Assembly was carried out.

Again, in each of the traditional areas, an Assemblyman was identified and interviewed. In total 6 of them, all of whom resided in the capital of the traditional area were drawn into the study. Moreover, the coordinating directors as well as the Chief executives of the respective Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies of the study areas were targeted for the study. The intention was to interview all these core members of the various MMDAs and even explore the opportunity of conducting a focus group discussion of the core staff wherever possible. In the end, four Chief executives and four coordinating directors from the four MMDAs participated in the study. Additionally, the Planning Officer in KEEA granted interview at the latter stages of the data collection exercise to bring the total number of Assembly core staff used in the study to 9.

Furthermore, a representative of the Regional House of Chiefs was also targeted for the study. Similarly, in order to give the study a national character, a representative of either the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development or the Ministry of Chieftaincy and Traditional Affairs was also targeted for interview. The researcher had the opportunity eventually to interview a representative of the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development. A summary of the sampling procedure used for the study is shown in Table 3.



**Table 3: Summary of Sampling Procedure**

<b>Category of respondents</b>	<b>Method of data collection</b>	<b>Number selected</b>	<b>Sampling method</b>
Traditional Authorities	Focus Group Discussion	6-Paramountcies	Purposive
District Assemblies	Interview	4-District Assemblies	Purposive
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• DCE/PO/DCD</li> <li>• Assembly members</li> </ul>			
Community members	Interview	600-People	Stratified sampling
Regional level- President of Central Regional House of Chiefs	Interview	1-Representative	Purposive
National level-1representative-(MLGRD) or National House of Chiefs	Interview	1-Representative	Purposive

Source: Author's construct

## **Data Sources**

Data was obtained from both primary and secondary sources. Primary data was obtained through the various interviews and discussions that solicited the opinions of the general public as well as those of authorities from the traditional institution and the District Assemblies about the linkages between traditional leadership institution and formal governmental institutions in local governance and local level development. The secondary sources of data were obtained from books, journals, and institutional reports (information from the Ministries, the relevant House of Chiefs and Traditional Councils) through the Library and internet search.

## **Data Collection Instruments**

Since mixed methods were employed in this study, the instruments for data collection incorporated both methods. The main methods and the relevant instruments employed included:

1. Desk review of national and local records or documents (both published and unpublished);
2. Face to face interview through the use of interview schedule (for community members);
3. Interviews using Interview schedules (for DA staff & Assembly members); and
4. Focus Group Discussions through the use of Focus Group Discussion Guide.

## Desk review

The Desk review involved a library-based method of gathering information from documentary sources by high-lightening the issues that were relevant to the study. This was mainly done at the main UCC library and more specifically IDS library where books, journals, institutional reports and past theses of students were consulted. Records from key ministries, departments and agencies were sourced from their official websites. These government websites which are mostly free to access and contains most prominent information allowed the researcher to obtain relevant information and national records without travelling to Accra. Thus, this was the cheapest medium of gathering the information. The materials read gave the researcher an opportunity to interpret what was already known and to point out in the literature contradictions and gaps in existing knowledge. The information and findings of the desk study was integrated with other secondary sources from the internet search and the primary data collected for the analysis.

## Interview

An interview schedule was used in this study. The interview schedule was administered to community members with an aim of soliciting their views on the topic. The interview schedule had aspects of closed ended questions with predetermined standardised questions and answers meant to collect data that could be subjected to statistical analysis. There were, however, few open ended

questions which were later coded and standardised to conform to the original predetermined questions and answers for easy statistical analysis.

As indicated in Table 6, interviews were also conducted with six Assembly members one of which was found at the capital of every traditional area using interview schedules. Apart from the Assembly members, the District Coordinator and the Chief Executive of each of the four Assemblies as well as the Presiding member of one of the Assemblies were also interviewed using interview guides. They numbered 9 in total. The questions contained in the guide were open ended and allowed for more probing during the interviews. According to Bernstein (2004), people will always provide much more information in a one-to-one discussion than they will in a public forum. Although, interviews cannot substitute for more public forms of participation, they often provide information that cannot be obtained any other way.

#### Focus group discussion

Focus Group Discussion (FGD) was the main method employed in interviewing the traditional authorities. A moderator's guide was developed along the key headings of the study objectives. The discussion which was aimed at soliciting information on the study topic within a group environment proved to be successful. There were an average of 6 participants in each of the six focus groups basically made up of the paramount chief, sub-chiefs and elders. In some of the traditional areas, the assembly members rejoined the chiefs and elders in the discussions. I facilitated all the discussions and had two assistants who helped in

taking the notes. In addition to taking the notes, a digital voice recorder was used with the permission of participants.

The FGDs were conducted to complement the responses from the survey and this also allowed greater flexibility in the questioning process. It also allowed the facilitator to clarify issues that were unclear, control the order in which questions were asked and to probe for additional information. Sarantakos (1997) suggests that FGDs, due to the group environment, allow significant points to be presented in a real, emotional and summary form as spontaneous expression. The FGDs also provided significant information about the study object and explained trend variances, reasons and causes through the views of respondents.

All the instruments used were divided into sections covering the various objectives of the study as sections. For instance, section “A” dealt with some general issues relating to the background of respondents. Other relevant issues covered in the rest of the sections included linkages between the Traditional Authorities and District Assembly systems, linkages among the various Traditional areas, the roles and responsibilities of Traditional Authorities, the resources for development and perceptions about the Traditional Authorities and District Assemblies in local level development and governance.

### **Pretest of Instruments**

Asebu Traditional Area was conveniently chosen for the pretest exercise. Asebu was chosen because of several factors. The area happens to be one of the biggest Traditional Areas within the Abura-Asebu-Kwamankese District and as

such happens to have one of the richest history in terms of the traditional set up. Also, the researcher observed a close collaboration between the Paramount Chief and Assembly members of the area during the reconnaissance visits over a period of time. As at the time of the pretesting, one of the assembly members was the secretary of the Paramount Chief.

As the first step towards the pretest exercise, reconnaissance visit was paid to Asebu in October 2011. The purpose was to enable the researcher familiarise with the traditional set up of the area and to solicit views from key stakeholders to help shape the study instruments. During the visit an appointment was booked with the Secretary of the Paramount Chief. Upon follow ups, a date was communicated for the interaction between the chief and elders and the researcher. Unfortunately, the meeting had to be postponed on two occasions because of other engagements by the Paramount Chief.

Eventually, the opportunity came for both parties to meet on November 15, 2011. After observing the usual protocol which included the detailed explanation of the purpose of the study, the tone was set for fruitful discussions. The discussions were made to follow the various objectives of the study. Among the lessons learnt from the pretesting include helping to shape the instruments before embarking on the actual field work in January 2012. This step allowed the researcher to determine the final questions needed to be included and follow-up questions to be incorporated in the actual fieldwork interviews.

It also provided a better understanding of how respondents interpret questions asked of them. More importantly, data obtained from respondents in the

actual fieldwork demonstrated that the revised questions developed after the pretesting of the instruments were more clearly understood by respondents. This is in line with the position by Fowler and Roman (1992) that the primary objective of respondents' debriefings is to determine whether concepts and questions are understood by respondents in the same way the survey designers intend.

### **Field Work/ Data Collection**

The actual fieldwork began on January 6, 2012. Before this date, initial visits had been paid to all the traditional councils to discuss the purpose and time table for the study. All the visits began in Eguafo and the other traditional areas in KEEA municipality through Denkyira and ended at the Oguaa traditional council. After every visit to the traditional area, the respective district office was contacted for the appointment towards the data collection. Apart from the discussions on suitable dates for the data collection, introductory letters obtained from the Institute for Development Studies were issued to all potential groups and individuals to be interviewed.

After the researcher had finished booking all the appointments, the services of two research assistants were sought to facilitate the interviewing process. These assistants were taken through the instruments after the pretesting period to understand the issues involved in the study and to enable them have a common frame of understanding for asking the questions and interpreting the

issues in order to ensure consistency in the use of terminologies, language and recording of responses.

The appointments booked gave an overall two months period for the data collection exercise. As a result, telephone calls were made to the respective traditional council, district and individuals concerned at least from a week up to the day before the appointment time. This was done to confirm the appointments and fully prepare the minds of the interviewees. While the researcher personally led in the focus group discussions and the interviews at the District Assemblies with the DCEs, DCDs and PMs, as well as the Assembly members, the research assistants took full charge of the questionnaire administration with little assistance from the researcher in Denkyira to reduce the number of days spent on the field in that area. In each traditional area, a minimum of three days were used for getting the needed primary data especially the focus group discussions and the household interviews. The actual data collection lasted over a four months period.

### **Challenges Encountered on the Field**

The study entailed extensive travelling across the study districts and traditional areas. This was expensive in terms of money and time. Another major challenge was that despite the numerous calls to commit respondents to appointments, some could not be found at the agreed time for interviews to be conducted. This led to reschedule of some appointments. The uncooperative nature of some respondents, especially in the household interviews discouraged the research assistants to some extent. Some of the respondents were



uncooperative because they felt the research was a funded project of which they were to benefit financially for granting interviews. This challenge was overcome through sharing of worse past personal experiences encountered on the field with the research assistants during daily briefings of what happened on the field.

Although the initial plan was to interview the paramount chiefs together with their council of elders, not all the paramount chiefs agreed to this arrangement. At Elmina and Denkyira, the paramount chiefs declined to be part of the interviews whilst the paramount chiefs of Komenda and Eguafo preferred separate interviews. In the rest of the paramountcies, the paramount chiefs and the elders in the traditional leadership structure accepted to have a common interview. The reason for the preference of separate interviews was to allow the sub-chiefs from the traditional structure to freely express themselves on the study topic. However, as the study progressed, there were indications that such chiefs preferred separate interviews from that of the elders because of the overly politicisation of their leadership and accusation of their perceived sympathy for either the ruling or the largest opposition parties in the country respectively.

### **Ethical Issues**

The study methodology was subjected to official ethical considerations. The researcher ensured that the methodological approach of the study did not violate research ethics. This was done by first ensuring that a letter of introduction obtained from the Institute of Development Studies and which sought to introduce the researcher had been distributed to all the offices, personalities and palaces to

be involved in the study. Following from that all respondents who participated in the study were properly briefed on the objectives of the study and their consent duly sought. In this regard, under no situation was any respondent coerced to be part of the study. Additionally, strict confidentiality of the information the respondents provided was adhered to. Finally, all protocols with respect to community entry were observed.

### **Data Processing and Analysis**

The field data was processed and analysed using a combination of both qualitative and quantitative techniques. The quantitative data was cleaned, sorted, coded and inputted into the computer using the Statistical Product and Service Solutions (SPSS) version 16. After data entry some cleaning was done to check for wrong entries and inconsistencies. Data output on key questions for analysis was then generated in frequencies, percentages, and cross tabulations.

With regard to the qualitative data, the data was first organised according to the interviewed categories. The interviews for the DCEs and Assembly members were processed separately from the focus group discussions. Again, the SPSS version 16 was used in processing the interviews of the former whilst the latter was done manually through transcription of the audio tapes as noted by Creswell (2008) that 'transcription is the process of converting audiotape recordings or field notes into text data'. After getting the transcribed data which was made up of exact statements, narrations and facts, the data was categorised or classified. Moreover, certain descriptive statements were summarised but

carefully maintained all the typical or illuminating quotes especially those that showed diversity in the various study areas. Further synthesis was done to check biases and inconsistencies.

The final stage in the data analysis was the interpretation of results. It involved explaining the results, answering the how questions, attaching significance to particular results and putting patterns into the conceptual framework (Sarantakos, 2005). It entailed going beyond the data to understand the results, make meaning out of the data and draw conclusions. Data was presented in two main parts. The first part covers research questions 1-3 which immediately follows the initial discussion of the socio-economic and demographic profile of respondents. The second part covers research question number 4 which bordered mainly on people's perceptions about some key issues pertaining to the study topic. As a result, the presentation and discussion of the main findings was done in two chapters preceding the final chapter on summary, conclusion and recommendations.

### **Summary**

The chapter discussed the main methodology used for the study. The researcher employed the mixed methods approach with an exploratory and descriptive research design. The target population included Chiefs and elders, Assembly members, Local government/ District officials and community members. The selection of the study areas was done using purposive, stratified and convenience sampling procedures. Analysis and discussions follow next.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **INTEGRATION OF TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE**

#### **Introduction**

This chapter is devoted to the interpretation and discussion of the outcome of the field work on the main objective of the thesis. It looks at the views of respondents integrated with the findings of the desk review about the subject of integrating traditional authorities in local governance. The chapter consists of five main sections which centres mainly on the first three research questions. The next section deals with the socio-economic and demographic profile of the respondents and discussants. The remaining three sections have been used in addressing each of the first three research questions raised in the study.

#### **Socio-Economic and Demographic Profile of the Respondents**

In order to put the study into context socio-economic and demographic profile of respondents and discussants in terms of sex, age, occupation, level of education as well as the structures of the District Assembly and traditional leadership involved in the study were examined. The analysis of these socio-economic and demographic characteristics is provided as follows:

##### **Sex of respondents**

Gender issues in local government focuses mainly on gender sensitive leadership and gender mainstreaming in local governance (Evertzen, 2010). These

areas are all considered critical in the discussions and studies of traditional leadership in local governance. The gender variable was also considered appropriate in the study especially when there is increasing advocacy for women representation in decision making bodies that are important for local government. A total of 658 people were interviewed. The number comprises 600 community members (CM); 42 traditional authorities (TAs); 9 core staff of the respective District Assemblies (AS); 6 Assembly Members selected from each of the six paramountcies or traditional areas and 1 person from the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development. Table 4 presents the sex distribution of the various categories of respondents used for the study excluding the official from the Local Government Ministry.

**Table 4: Type of Respondents by Sex**

Type of respondent	Male		Female		Total	
	F	%	F	%	F	%
Community members	279	46.5	321	53.5	600	100.0
Traditional authority members	40	95.2	2	4.8	42	100.0
District Assembly staff	9	100.0	0	0	9	100.0
Assembly members	6	100.0	0	0	6	100.0
Total	335	50.9	323	49.1	657	100.0

Source: Field work, Dankwah (2012)

Of the total of 657 respondents from the study, 334 were males while the remaining 323 were females. This result gives a total distribution of approximately 50.8 per cent males and 49.2 percent females indicating an overall total sex ratio of 97 females to every 100 males drawn for the study. The ratio is normal as males have over the years dominated leadership positions in the governance structures in Ghana from the household through to the local and the national levels (Boateng, 2009). However, the revelation is consistent with the conventional argument in literature that even though women comprise over 50 percent of the world's population, they continue to be under-represented as voters, leaders and as elected officials, including at the local level. As a result, women do not have equal influence over the policy decisions that affect their lives (Evertzen, 2010; Abotchie, 2006; Logan, 2008; Sithole & Mbele, 2008). The authors attribute the situation to a system that favours men via patriarchy in the common system of inheritance in the traditional authority set up.

From the study, majority (53.5%) of the female respondents were community members (CM). The rest of the targeted respondents- Assembly Staff (AS), Assembly Members (AM) as well as a staff of the Ministry for Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD) were all males. There were two females among the 42 members of Traditional Authorities (TAs) interviewed. This revelation does not confirm the stance of the modernists who claim that the traditional leadership system only favours men via patriarchy in the common system of inheritance in the traditional society (Logan, 2008; Sithole & Mbele, 2008). Also, the President of the Regional House of Chiefs is among the 42 TAs.

With particular reference to the six paramountcies, the sex distribution of respondents indicates that only Oguaa and Edina paramountcies had one each out of the only two female chiefs among the 42 traditional authorities interviewed for the study. In terms of the community members, only KEEA traditional areas together had equal number of male (100) and female (100) interviewees. However, as independent paramountcies within the KEEA municipality, Komenda and Eguafo TAs have equal number of male (27) respondents representing 54 per cent and female (23) respondents representing 46 per cent of interviewees. In the case of Abirem and Edina paramountcies, more females were interviewed with Abirem having the maximum of 28 out of 50 respondents. Similarly, in the two other traditional areas (Oguaa and Denkyira) in the coterminous and the multiple districts within a paramountcy categorization respectively, more females were interviewed. Whereas Oguaa traditional area recorded a percentage female to male ratio of 52: 48, that of Denkyira paramountcy stood at 59: 41. None of the Local government officials and Assembly members interviewed was a female. The same applies to the three MMDCEs interviewed. The distribution of the various categories of respondents also indicates that KEEA municipality had the highest number of all the categories with the exception of core staff of the District Assemblies. This is attributed to the multiplicity of paramountcies within that district.

The KEEA municipality also recorded the highest numbers of respondents per paramountcy for the focus group discussions. The numbers included eight for Komenda, seven for Edina, seven for Eguafo, and nine for Abirem traditional

areas. Comparatively, Oguaa and Denkyira paramountcies provided four and six chiefs respectively for the focus group discussions. The number for Oguaa traditional area decreased from the initially agreed number because there was a clash of programmes and they had to split to enable them carry out both functions. It should be noted that, the total number of respondents reduced by one (from 658 to 657) in the comparative analysis of the six paramountcies. This is because the respondent from the Local Government Ministry could not be put directly under any of the three paramountcies used for the study. The distribution of respondents involving Community Members (CM), Traditional Authorities (TAs), District Assembly (DA) staff, Assembly Members (AM) representative from the Central Regional House of Chiefs in accordance with the respective paramountcies is shown in Table 5.



**Table 5: *Distribution of Respondents by Paramountcy***

Type of respondent	Komenda		Edina		Eguafo		Abirem		Oguaa		Denkyira		Total	
	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%
Community members	50	84.7	50	83.3	50	86.2	50	83.3	200	95.7	200	94.8	600	91.3
Traditional Authority	8	14.0	7	11.7	7	12.1	9	15.0	4	1.9	6	2.8	41	6.2
District Assembly staff	0	0	2	3.3	0	0	0	0	3	1.4	4	1.9	9	1.4
Assembly members	1	1.7	1	1.7	1	1.7	1	1.7	1	0.5	1	0.5	6	0.9
Regional House of Chiefs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.5	0	0	1	0.2
Total	59	100	60	100	58	100	60	100	209	100	211	100	657	100

Source: Field work, Dankwah (2012)

## Age of respondents

The study examined the ages of respondents. The minimum age was 18 years while the maximum was 74 years. The mean age of the respondents was 39.6 years with a standard deviation of 12.2. Out of 657 people interviewed, 345 representing approximately 53 percent were aged below 40 years indicating that the respondents were more youthful. The 600 community members from the survey had the chunk of the youthful respondents. However, only 1 out of the 42 representatives of the traditional authority was found in that youthful age category. As noted by Kangsangbata (2006), old tradition suggests a preference for the elderly in the selection of chiefs. Even though result of this study confirms this old tradition where the elderly are more preferred when it comes to the selection of chiefs, the practice is now changing as remarked by a chief in Komenda:

You see, several other factors are considered in deciding who becomes a chief. As we sit here I am the youngest of all, though I won't disclose my age in the presence of Nananom after they have stated theirs [laughter]. Frankly speaking, despite my youthful age, Nananom still accord me the needed respect as the chairman of the arbitration committee within this traditional area.

Additionally, 26 out of the 47 (55%) respondents aged 61 years and above were also found to be traditional leaders. Table 6 shows the details of the ages of respondents who granted interview in all the paramountcies.

**Table 6: Age of Respondents by Paramountcy**

Age (years)	Komenda		Edina		Eguafo		Abirem		Oguaa		Denkyira		Total	
	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%
18-20	2	3.4	0	0	1	1.7	1	1.7	5	2.4	4	1.9	13	2.0
21-30	13	22.0	9	15.0	6	10.3	13	21.7	51	24.4	47	22.3	139	21.2
31-40	16	27.1	17	28.3	18	31.0	13	21.7	66	31.6	63	29.9	193	29.4
41-50	16	27.1	16	26.7	15	25.9	13	21.7	49	23.4	51	24.2	160	24.4
51-60	6	10.2	12	20.0	13	22.4	10	16.6	27	12.9	32	15.1	100	15.2
61-70	6	10.2	6	10.0	4	7.0	8	13.3	9	4.3	14	6.6	47	7.2
70+	0	0	0	0	1	1.7	2	3.3	2	1.0	0	0	5	0.7
Total	59	100	60	100	58	100	60	100	209	100	211	100	657	100.1

Source: Field work, Dankwah (2012)

## Occupation of respondents

The occupations of respondents were of relevance to the researcher in order to determine the skill and competencies that traditional rulers possessed which possibly have bearings for the kind of work they do in terms of administering governance at the local level. The occupations of respondents were classified to conform to the categories used in the Ghana Statistical Service (2013) with the labour force module. According to GSS (2013), occupations have been classified as managers, professionals, technical and associate professionals, clerical support workers, service and sales workers, agricultural-forestry and fishery workers. Others are craft and related workers, plant-machines operators and assemblers as well as those classified as other workers. It is important to state that most of these classifications were applicable to respondents' occupations in the study.

About 29.7 percent of the 657 respondents were engaged in services and sales work as shown in Table 7. Similarly, 26.9% of the respondents were also engaged as agriculture, forestry & fishery workers. Under this category, 14 out of the 42 (33.3%) representatives of traditional authority were found to be farmers. Furthermore, technical and associate professionals constituted 14.8 percent of those interviewed while professional workers accounted for 14.5 percent of the total respondents. Moreover, 10.7 percent of the respondents were employed as clerical support workers with approximately 3 percent engaging in craft and other related occupations.

**Table 7: Occupation of Respondents by Paramountcy**

Occupation	Komenda		Edina		Eguafo		Abirem		Oguaa		Denkyira		Total	
	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%
Services & sales workers	19	32.2	16	26.7	9	15.5	12	20.0	71	34.0	68	32.2	195	29.7
Agriculture, forestry & fishery workers	20	33.9	13	21.7	25	43.1	26	43.3	22	10.5	71	33.6	177	26.9
Technical & associate professionals	9	15.3	8	13.3	8	13.8	10	16.7	32	15.3	30	14.2	97	14.8
Professionals	4	6.8	9	15.0	10	17.2	2	3.3	46	22.0	24	11.4	95	14.5
Clerical support workers	2	3.4	10	16.6	4	6.9	6	10.0	34	16.3	14	6.6	70	10.7
Craft & related workers	1	1.7	1	1.7	1	1.7	2	3.3	0	0	3	1.4	8	1.2
Other occupations	4	6.8	3	5.0	1	1.7	2	3.3	4	1.9	1	0.5	15	2.3
Total	59	100	60	100	58	100	60	99.9	209	100	200	99.9	657	100.1

Source: Field work, Dankwah (2012)

In terms of occupational distribution across the paramountcies, more of those in services and sale activities were found in Oguaa traditional area (34%); Denkyira (32.3%); and Komenda (32.2%) as more agriculture, forestry and fisheries workers were concentrated in Abirem, Eguafo and Denkyira traditional areas.

#### Level of education of respondents

In accordance with the local government regulation, Act 462, all District Assemblies are supposed to function with their respective decentralised departments. The decentralisation of all sectors of the economy to the local level includes ensuring that relevant officers and stakeholders of such decentralised departments have the requisite educational attainments to function effectively. Therefore, the educational attainments of both the rulers and the ruled in a given locality have implications on the extent to which chiefs can effectively discharge their roles local government. In terms of educational attainments, about 90 per cent of those interviewed had between primary to tertiary education qualifications. With specific reference to the TAs, only 3 out of 42 chiefs interviewed had no formal educational background. In terms of order in educational attainment those who held junior secondary qualifications were in the majority, followed by senior secondary school holders, tertiary, and primary levels.

Most of the traditional leaders interviewed also hold different forms of secondary level academic qualifications including the GCE Ordinary and

Advanced levels, or technical qualifications like the London City and Guilds or the former 2-year Post Secondary Certificates. There were 8 chiefs who held tertiary level certificates including one with a master's degree in Democracy, Governance and Law. Though considered as the youngest among the members of the Komenda traditional judicial committee, the master's degree qualification in the area of democracy, governance and law by one of such members was strongly considered as the basis for choosing him as their chairman.

Additionally, respondents from the Oguaa traditional area had higher academic qualifications than those from the KEEA and Denkyira paramountcies. From the study about 66 out of the 657 respondents had no educational background. Out of the 66 with no educational background Oguaa had the lowest percentage (24.2%) as against 41 percent and 34.8 percent in the KEEA and Denkyira respectively. The analysis of respondents' level of education is shown in Table 8.

**Table 8: *Highest Educational Attainment of Respondents by Paramountcy***


Educational attainment	Komenda		Edina		Eguafo		Abirem		Oguaa		Denkyira		Total	
	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%
No education	4	6.8	3	5.0	9	15.5	11	18.3	16	7.7	23	10.9	66	10.1
Primary	14	23.7	3	5.0	11	19.0	11	18.3	22	10.5	32	15.2	93	14.2
Junior High School	17	28.8	15	25.0	16	27.6	21	35.0	47	22.5	65	30.8	181	27.5
Senior High School	14	23.7	19	31.7	12	20.7	10	16.7	63	30.1	53	25.1	171	26.0
Tertiary	10	16.9	20	33.3	10	17.2	7	11.7	61	29.2	38	18.0	146	22.2
Total	59	99.9	60	100	58	100	60	100	209	100	211	100	657	100

Source: Field work, Dankwah (2012)



### Traditional Authority and the District Assembly Structures in Study Areas

The study adopted the definition of Kendie et al. (2006) for traditional authority which embodies all the structures, systems and processes that communities have evolved over the years to govern themselves. Since the study was conducted in Akan speaking areas, the TA system found in all areas is shown by Figure 11.



**Figure 11: The Akan Leadership Structure**

Source: Adapted from Kendie et al. (2008)

Aside the paramount chiefs, all the paramountcies have at least seven of the key divisional positions who serve as the counsel for the paramountcy. These include the (1) Twafohen (front commander); (2) Adontehen (middle

commander); (3) Ninfahen (right wing commander); (4) Benkumhen (left wing commander); (5) Nkyidomhen (rear commander); (6) Gyaasehen (welfare/ and general affairs commander) and (7) Sanaahen (treasurer).

In pursuance of Section 3(3) of Act 462, the Legislative Instrument 1589 (1994), provides for the establishment of Zonal Councils and Unit Committees as the sub-district and community structures respectively for the operationalisation of the decentralisation programme in the municipality. The Local Government policy requires that all sub-structures work in harmony for effective local governance. The composition of the sub-district structures of the study areas is shown in Table 9.

**Table 9: *The Sub-District Structures of the Study Areas***

Assembly	No. of Sub-Metros	No. of Zonal/Urban Councils	No. of Area Councils
KEEA Municipal	NA	6	37
Cape Coast Metropolitan	2	0	45
Upper Denkyira East Municipal	NA	1	7
Upper Denkyira West District	NA	0	4

Source: Field work, Dankwah (2012)

The Cape Coast Metropolis had 45 Area Councils which were coterminous with Electoral Areas. Three of the 45 councils were added after the 2010 District Assembly elections. Out of the 45 Area Councils, Cape Coast South had the majority of 27 with the rest (18) belonging to the North. The sixth


session of the Metropolitan Assembly had a total membership of 64 out of which 19 were appointees of the ruling government. Whilst Cape Coast South Office had already been established with some officers and an administrator at post, the North was however battling with office accommodation difficulties at the time of the fieldwork. Additionally, the Urban Council sub-structure for the Metropolis was not yet established.

The KEEA Municipal Assembly had six Zonal Councils which were further sub-divided into 37 Area Councils. The Zonal Councils were Komenda, Elmina, Ntranoa, Ayensudo, Kissi, and Eguafo-Abirem. The Assembly had 37 elected Assembly members and 16 government appointees. On the other hand, the Upper Denkyira East Municipal had one Urban Council and 19 Area Councils. The Assembly had its capital at Dunkwa-on-Offin. The western part of the traditional area which also assumed a district status in 2006 has its capital at Diaso. The Upper Denkyira West has 4 Area Councils.

The main role of the District Assembly is developmental, as stated in Act 462 of the 1992 Republican Constitution of Ghana. The DA is to assist with the provision of infrastructure as well as maintain and sustain such infrastructure. The District Assembly representatives confirmed that their role as local government actors was to promote development at the local level as enshrined in the 1992 Constitution. This finding is similar to that of Dauda and Dapila (2013) who in their study on collaborative challenges between the two structures found that the role of the Assembly was basically a developmental one. The TAs in this study collaborated with what the DA representatives confirmed. Under the Local

Government Act, the DA has overall responsibility for the development of the district both politically and administratively. The DA is required per the 1992 Constitution of Ghana to have executive, legislative and deliberative powers at the district level.

In line with the overall objective of ensuring an improved collaboration of TAs in local governance for development in the Central Region, a merged framework on the collaboration of the two separate structures is shown in Figure 12.



**Figure 12: Structure of Improved Collaboration between TAs and DAs**

Source: Field work, Dankwah (2012)

The detail and specific findings to the study objectives with the corresponding research questions are as follows. Objective one concerns the institutional linkages at various levels between the traditional authority system and the local government system.

### **Linkages between the Traditional Authority and Local Government Systems**

Literature reviewed highlighted difficulties about the unclear modes of cooperation between traditional authorities and MMDAs which prevent effective contribution of each actor towards the common goal of local development and creates conflicts. The said difficulties in literature emanate from the lack of formalised roles and institutional linkages between the TA and the DA systems as reviewed (ILGS, 2008; Kendie & Enu-Kwesi, 2008). Each of these systems has its own hierarchical structure without any form of interconnections between them that is backed by law as espoused in Figure 12 and the conceptual framework. It was found that, there is no direct link between for instance, the Paramount and the District Chief Executive. In all the FGDs, the Chiefs complained about how frustrating it is to wait in queues with the general public in their attempt to discuss developmental concerns of their areas with the DCE, the highest political office holder. The situation did not promote effective collaboration. Meanwhile, as argued, the collaborations are supposed to occur at the district level between traditional authorities and the formal local government institutions to facilitate quick service delivery.

## **Linkages at the regional level between the regional house of chiefs and ministries, departments and agencies**

The first research objective and the corresponding research question also focused on the institutional linkages between the traditional authority system and the local government system at the regional level. Majority of the traditional authorities acknowledged that, in Ghana's decentralised system, the regional level plays a crucial role. Although the region is part of the local government system, it is assigned quite different type of development management roles and responsibilities related to coordination and supervision. (Kendie & Enu-Kwesi, 2008) have earlier agreed to this finding. They have argued that, typically, the region should be serving as the intermediate level where local and central government requirements and priorities meet and are reconciled. Consequently, this resulted in the establishment of a Regional Coordinating Council (RCC) for each region, with a secretariat responsible for coordinating and harmonising the development planning activities of the MMDAs in the region.

The traditional authorities were aware that the above arrangement is aimed at achieving a number of objectives in order to achieve local level development. As explained by Kendie and Enu-kwesi (2008) these objectives include removing overlapping functions and duplication of efforts between MDAs and MMDAs at the local levels, removing ambiguities in reporting, and creating a team of experts at the regional level to advise, offer technical assistance, forewarn on setbacks, coordinate and regulate local development activities, support the MMDAs to compensate for capacity deficiency and serve as liaison organisation between

central Government and the MMDAs in terms of policy translation in local context, project implementation and general management.

Further interactions at the Regional House of Chiefs revealed that, the House is expected to provide input in the deliberations of the Regional Coordinating Council where chiefs are represented. Other councils and state commissions at the regional level where chiefs are represented include the Prison's Service Council and the Lands Commission. According to the President of the Central Regional House of Chiefs, the representation of chiefs on such commissions and councils pointed to the fact that tapping indigenous knowledge in decision making was of great importance in ensuring inclusiveness and promoting local level development.

Moreover, the relationship between the President of the Regional House of Chiefs and the Regional Minister was explained not to go beyond that of traditional and administrative roles respectively. This means that anything traditional, such as performing rituals against the drying up of Kakum river falls under the jurisdiction of the leadership of the Regional House of Chiefs and the Oguaa paramountcy while all administrative responsibilities of the region is spearheaded by the Regional Minister. This confirms the assertion by Kendie and Mensah (2008) about inadequate integration and coordination of the activities of the departments of the MMDAs.

On the issue of which of these two authorities wields more power over the other because of the shadow power play between the two as demonstrated by Knierzinger (2011) when he compared the relevance of MPs and Chiefs in his

study in Greater Accra. In that study, it was found that Chiefs are more caring and trustworthy. Similarly, in this study, the TAs felt that the Assembly was expected to be under the TA system. This understanding of the TAs contravenes the Local Government Act 462 which makes the District Chief Executive the most powerful personality at the local level. According to the President of the Central Regional House of Chiefs, at the district level a Paramount Chief is supposed to handle all traditional issues under his jurisdiction while the political appointee of the district deals with all the administrative issues under the district. He argued that once the chief's traditional role includes administrative functions, the chief executive is supposed to be under the Paramount Chief. This position is in line with the assertion in the literature that before colonisation, the traditional authority was solely regarded as the axis for the exercise of executive, legislative and judicial powers (Boafo-Arthur, 2001; Bouton, 2004). However, there is no such legal recognition of the chief executive becoming a subordinate of the paramount chief. The situation therefore provided a potential ground for creating conflict between TAs and DAs as argued in the work of the Institute of Local Government Studies (ILGS, 2008).

Additionally, the study made efforts to find out which actions were being taken at the regional level to integrate indigenous knowledge issues and culture in development policy making. It was explained by the President of the Central Regional House of Chiefs that there is the need for greater collaboration between the two authorities as they work hand in hand. For instance, the president remarked that no land is owned by the District Assembly and therefore no



meaningful development can occur without the Assembly consulting the traditional authority. To buttress this area, an example was cited in the construction of the Central regional hospital where large tract of land was released by the traditional leadership of Abura. Again, the traditional authority was consulted to perform rituals when the Kakum River dried up in 1987 and 1995 in order to resolve the acute water problem in the Cape Coast metropolis.

### **Linkages between the district assembly and traditional council in local governance and development**

Literature confirms that both local government and planning laws emphasise the district as the focal point for centring development planning and budgeting activities at the local level (Kendie, Enu-Kwesi and Guri, 2008). The result of the interviews conducted with the District coordinators in all the four Assemblies drawn for the study emphasised that while the preparation of a national development plan is the responsibility of the NDPC, the responsibility of sub-national development planning is vested in the MMDAs acting through their metropolitan, municipal and district planning co-ordinating units (MMDPCUs). MMDAs are responsible for the overall development of their areas by ensuring the preparation and submission to Government of their development plans and budgets for approval and implementation. The generation of plans from the levels of the sub-district structures through participatory approaches is very important. It is at this level that the participation of traditional authorities becomes very crucial (Kendie, Enu-Kwesi & Guri, 2008).

Thus, the study sought to establish these linkages between the assembly and the traditional leadership from both the public and the traditional authorities. The public here is referring to the 600 community members who were selected for interviews. These included 50 people in each of the four paramountcies within the KEEA municipality which gave a total of 200, as well as 400 other members of the public spread equally in Oguaa and Denkyira paramountcies. There were six traditional councils involved in the study. Aside the views expressed by the traditional authorities about the linkages between the traditional council and the respective District Assemblies, community members also shared their views and opinions. The District Assembly officials contacted were also asked to express their views on the linkages between the two authorities.

In general, while the Assembly and the community members attested to some level of institutional linkages between the two sets of authorities, the traditional authorities felt there were no linkages amongst them. Specific opinions expressed by the public through the survey on how the two systems are linked are found in Table 10 with the attendant discussions following.

**Table 10: Public Opinions on Linkages between the DA and the Traditional Council in Local Governance**

Nature of linkages	K.E.E.A.				KEEA		C/ Coast		U/D		Total					
	Komenda		Edina		Eguafo		Abirem		"KEEA"		Oguaa		Denkyira			
	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%		
TAs collaborate with DA in decision making	16	8.0	11	5.5	20	9.9	27	13.4	74	36.8	59	29.4	68	34.0	201	33.5
TAs have rep at DA to give feedback	14	7.2	25	12.9	12	6.2	8	4.1	59	30.4	75	38.7	60	30.0	194	32.3
TAs and DAs better linked in elections	20	9.8	14	6.8	18	8.8	15	7.3	67	32.7	66	32.2	72	35.1	205	34.2
Total	50		50		50		50		200		200		200		600	100

Source: Field work, Dankwah (2012)


Table 10 shows that, approximately 33 percent of the public perceive that, in general, chiefs have representatives who take part in District Assembly meetings and report back to the traditional councils. The respondents (32.5%) further explained that sometimes the traditional councils held meetings on important matters of which invitations are extended to District Assembly officials to share ideas. Aside these two ways of meeting, the chiefs also paid visits to the DCEs where the two authorities hold informal discussions and lobby for projects. This thinking of the public suggests a good working relations and linkages between the two authorities. The public position, however, contradict claims about the non-involvement of traditional authorities in the deliberations of the former (ILGS, 2008) as well as the assertion by Kendie and Mensah (2008) about inadequate collaboration and coordination of the activities of the departments of the MMDAs and the traditional authorities.

A comparative analysis of the linkages between the six traditional areas and their respective District Assemblies did not reveal any different scenario from the overall picture given by the public survey. Figure 12 indicates the differences in opinion across the paramountcies. About 37.5 percent of the respondents in Oguaa traditional area indicate that the link between the traditional authorities and the District Assembly manifests in the representation of TAs at the DA. Even though the local government Act 462 stipulates this issue of representation the practice, according to the respondents has not been consistent with the law. As a result, there were counter responses on the manifestation of the link through the representation of TAs in DAs deliberations from the remaining traditional areas

indicating that the link ended with consultation of chiefs directly on major decision to be taken (33.5%).

On the specific issue of collaboration between TAs and DAs, some respondents (37%) in the KEEA stated that discussion on the improvement or the development of various tourist attractions were evidence of collaboration between traditional and the District Assembly leadership. For instance, in Eguafu it came up that the KEEA Assembly in partnership with Central Regional Development Commission (CEDECOM) had on their plan to develop the “Dompou” hill that has interesting rock formation, butterflies sanctuaries, caves, and serene environment into a cottage. The development of a famous cave into a site was also mentioned in Abirem.

Similarly, at Komenda One major area that was mentioned is the eco-tourism as identified by Cedecom. These include the Fort, Komenda college Cave; the lagoons, woodlots and a goldmine at the beach. The first goldmine in the country is found at Abrobeane just some few kilometres from Komenda. The mine has not been tapped since it was discovered in 1471. The opinions expressed in terms of linkages between the two authorities are shown in Figure 13.



**Figure 13: Public Opinion on Linkages between TAs and DAs across the Paramountcies**

Source: Field work, Dankwah (2012)

About 7.5 percent of the 600 community members across the study areas felt that the two authorities are better linked during the election season where the pressing needs of the traditional leaders are given the desired attention. This line of thought is corroborated by Clegg (1990), as well as Blunt and Turner (2005) who emphasise how decentralisation can be shaped positively or negatively by existing institutions, social and cultural traditions. For example, the struggle for power and resources between decentralised institutions and traditional authorities could negatively affect decentralisation if not well managed.

From the FGDs, there were mixed reactions regarding the linkages between the two authorities. Whereas in K.E.E.A paramountcies there were claims of unequal treatment between the Assembly and some of the paramountcies, no such complaint was made in the two other paramountcies (Oguaa and Denkyira). Perhaps, this could be attributed to the multiplicity of paramountcies within the KEEA Municipal Assembly set up. The following is the analysis from the focus group discussions.

#### **Linkages between the assembly and traditional council in multiple paramountcies within a district assembly**

The linkages among the various paramountcies and the KEEA Assembly showed that Komenda paramountcy did not have any inhibitions against the Assembly for the perceived unequal treatment of the other three paramountcies. Though the chiefs confirmed hearing some of the paramountcies accusing the Assembly of bias, they however, admitted the fact that Edina or Elmina has been the capital of the municipality and therefore must naturally be more developed than the others. They however, believed that development of the capital must gradually catch up with the rest of the municipality as over concentration of developmental efforts in the capital could eventually lead to the impoverishments of those in the hinterland. As argued by Wunsch (2001) the failure or poor performance of decentralisation in sub-Saharan Africa is attributable to the over centralisation of resources.

At Elmina the chiefs debunked the perception of over concentration of the District Assembly's development in the area saying no evidence existed to support the claim. The chiefs alleged that the Traditional Council had been sidelined in most deliberations of the Assembly. This was in contravention to the local government legislation and arrangements which make provision for the inputs of traditional authorities into the business of the assembly through their appointed representatives (MLGRDE, 2008). The Elmina chiefs cited an example of non-involvement of the traditional council in major decisions concerning the people. The chiefs cited that there was a certain location designated for a fishing market popularly called Marine Park. The decision to use the location for a fishing market was taken without consulting the Traditional Council which had a different opinion on the matter. For the Traditional Council, the expectation was that since there were plans to construct a fishing harbour it was a waste to use that location for other purposes. The decision by the Assembly was thus to show the traditional council how powerful it was and that the action confirmed the relegated role of the chiefs in local governance (Ahwoi, 2010; Ayee, 2007).

Additionally, the chiefs felt that, the local government act spelt out that in constituting the Assembly, 30 per cent of the members of the Assembly should be chosen in consultation with the Traditional Council. This, the chiefs alleged did not happen. The Assembly kept selecting its own members to represent the Traditional Council. Again, nobody briefed the chiefs after Assembly deliberations. Moreover, if the need arose for the chiefs to be involved in any



meeting there was always a very short notice which sometimes disrupted an already designed itinerary of the Traditional council.

The chiefs stated that, several complaints had been lodged at the Assembly to correct the problem but nothing serious had been done. Even on his first introductory visit to the Edina Omanhene, the newly appointed Municipal Chief Executive was informed about the same problem but nothing was done. They recalled that, under President Mills' leadership, when the newly appointed Deputy Minister was to be introduced to the traditional council, the information got to the traditional council the very day he was due to pay the courtesy call. Unfortunately, the paramount chief was in court that very day and so nobody was detailed to receive him.

As to whether they have been able to identify the root causes of this poor relationship between the Edina traditional council and the Assembly, the following answer was given:

One of the reasons is the lack of consultation or enforcement of the 30 per cent constitutional representation of the traditional council on the Assembly membership. Admittedly, however, the problem is not only peculiar to the Elmina traditional area/council. For example, "I have been a House of chiefs' registrar for over 30 years with the traditional council set up and have observed all over where I have worked that there is no proper form of consultation of the traditional councils in the formation of the Assembly membership, who at the assembly cares about 30 percent constitutional provision, nobody..nobody?". In Elmina, in particular, we

would say that the Assembly does not feel the importance of the council in the administration of the municipality.

Further probe into the nature of the relations between the council and the MCEs, past and present, raised issues of administrative challenges. The chiefs complained they did not understand why they kept receiving invitations of the Assembly very close to functions. On the contrary, all the District Assemblies had no complaints about the TAs and rather indicated a good working relationship between them. The complaints and high expectations from the TAs therefore prove the Modernist theorists right when they argue that TAs are chauvinistic, authoritarian, seemingly incompatible and increasingly irrelevant form of traditional rule that is antithetical to democracy.

On the specific issue of challenges encountered between the Traditional Council and the various local government structures such as the Unit Committees, Area Council and Assembly persons, it was indicated that the relationship was poor. There was poor feedback especially from the Assembly persons in terms of what happened at Assembly meetings. It was expected that the Assemblyman would meet with the chiefs for deliberations on development needs of the community before attending the Assembly meetings. This was not the practice at all and therefore all that is to be done to enforce constitutional provisions which would strengthen the ties between chiefs and Assembly officials was deliberately not being done.

It is the Assembly's arrangement to hold quarterly meetings of which traditional authorities are required to partake in the deliberations through their

chosen representatives. The 30 percent quota for chiefs and other recognised bodies to have their representatives at such meetings was not enforced. Therefore, in most of such meetings, the chiefs were unaware of what went on before and after the meetings. Again, the Assembly had adopted a certain posture whereby depending on the party in power, representatives of the party in power, instead of representatives of chiefs are selected by the DCE without adequate consultation of traditional authorities. In most cases the Assembly's so called chosen representatives for the traditional council were unable to keep the council informed about deliberations at the Assembly.

Again, when they even decided to report, the representatives determined the relevant issues to report to the chiefs or otherwise not report at all when they felt the issues discussed were irrelevant to the development needs of their communities. All these confirm Ayee's (2007) observation that since independence in 1957, there has been little, if any, effective participation of chiefs in decentralisation in Ghana. This finding is also consistent with that of Gomes (2006) when he emphasises on the effectiveness of collaboration between stakeholders and explains that With reference to a stakeholder analysis, for successful and effective implementation of development projects at the local level, there should be effective collaboration among all stakeholders.

At Abirem specifically, the chiefs confirmed the allegation of unequal treatment between the paramountcies by the Assembly and explained that, the concentration of the Assembly was mostly on Elmina and Komenda to the neglect of Eguafo and Abirem. To substantiate this allegation, the Esiam chief argued that

the geographical location of Esiam was considered more as part of Cape Coast North and therefore the town was the most neglected. The chief, however, stated that the situation encouraged the people of Esiam to initiate self-help community projects including the construction and renovation of classroom blocks as well as the stocking of a newly constructed community library facility. The initiative is however not surprising as among the most important roles that traditional authority is expected to play in local development and governance includes providing a lead role in lobbying for social developments for their people (Arhin, 1985; Ray, 2003). As the Asantehene, Otumfuo Osei Tutu (2002) summarises in Ayee (2007: 2):

Our predecessors engaged in inter-tribal wars, fighting for conquest over territories and people. Today, the war should be vigorous and intensive against dehumanization, poverty, marginalization, ignorance and disease. ... Chieftaincy must be used to propel economic development through proper lands administration, through facilitating investments in our communities, and through codification and customs and traditions making it impossible for imposters to get enstooled and creating unnecessary situations for litigation.

**Linkages between the assembly and traditional council in paramountcy that is coterminous with assembly**

According to the chiefs of Oguaa, the Assembly and chiefs relate well on a number of occasions. The only setback the chiefs registered was that the monetary

arrangement of the traditional council is not supported by the Assembly. They contended that, at least there should have been some form of administrative support for the traditional council just as the little given to the Regional House of Chiefs by the Chieftaincy secretariat. They also accused the Assembly members of having their own agenda and lacking understanding of the values of Chieftaincy. For instance, many of the Assembly members represent a number of communities which are put together as electoral areas, and some of which did not even vote for them. They therefore present different things during Assembly deliberations rather than the concerns of the chiefs. Because DA members who represent electoral areas do not live in their communities, they are less sensitive to the needs of such communities. The chiefs are frustrated because they are not consulted as to when and how projects earmarked for their areas are to be implemented (Arhin, 2001). The following is the manner in which they expressed their frustration:

Our hands are tied to such an extent that only revolution or new constitutional arrangement can reverse the trend. In fact, politicians are hypocrites. This year is an election year and if one imagines the way and manner they would troop into the various palaces to seek the support of chiefs, one wonders why they refuse to address their concerns when they assume the reins of government. They come seeking chiefs' support because they know the people listen to them. It is the same corrupt local government system which has made some sectors of the society lose some respect for the chieftaincy institution.

Indeed, the current president is most credited for his in-depth understanding and appreciation of the Chieftaincy system, but the governance system does not favour it.

### **Linkages between the assembly and traditional council in a paramountcy with multiple district assemblies**

At Denkyira, there is only one traditional council for both the Upper and Lower Denkyira traditional areas. In other words, the Denkyira paramountcy overlaps two main districts, as well as having part of it in entirely different district. The traditional capital is Jukwa which politically lay within the Lower Denkyira district while Dunkwa happened to be the administrative capital. In the Upper Denkyira area, the Denkyira Traditional council dealt with two political administration offices. These are Upper Denkyira West District Assembly at Diaso and Upper Denkyira East Municipal Assembly at Dunkwa on-Offin. Interestingly, due to the location of Jukwa (Lower Denkyira) situated within a different district altogether, the Council also deals with the Twifo Hemang Lower Denkyira (THLD) Assembly on matters relating to the people of Lower Denkyira. The chiefs alleged that, had it not been the location of Jukwa (Lower Denkyira), Upper Denkyira would have been part of Western Region.

The survey results showed that, the public have wide range of information when it comes to relations between the traditional council and the Assemblies. The public showed their level of awareness of the two institutions by citing their

knowledge about the quarterly Assembly meetings, the hosting of traditional durbars and the initiation or commissioning of projects.

In the case of the District Assembly staff, there was an agreement among the Municipal and District Chief Executives (MDCEs) as well as the Municipal and District Coordinating Directors (MDCDs) that the best way to link the Assembly to the traditional authorities is to allow TAs to fully participate in Assembly deliberations in order to ensure that major decisions that concern the local people are well taken on board. As argued by the MCE of Upper Denkyira East Municipal “as the embodiment of the traditions and culture of the people, chiefs should be physically present in Assembly meetings and actively participate in the deliberations in order to enhance the role of chiefs in development”. This trend of response did not differ from the opinions of the majority of Assembly members who granted interview but added that, the full involvement of chiefs in Assembly deliberations would help minimise the tension and accusations leveled against them about the lack of collaboration between the two agents of development.

### **Common platform shared by the paramountcies and district assemblies**

To further ascertain the extent of relations and linkages between the two authorities, the discussion also centred on whether there were any binding arrangements for the two authorities to come together. The general response from the public was that, if a paramount chief had a problem in his area that needs the Assembly’s intervention, he draws the Assembly’s attention accordingly.

However, the only official time that the Assembly invited the chiefs was during Assembly an session which in the opinion of the public was just for ceremonial purposes. They only call traditional leaders to meetings to give a short address before the actual deliberations begin while the Assembly members and officials meet thereafter and deliberate on the issues affecting the chiefs' area of jurisdiction.

From all the six FGDs, the chiefs argued that, the 30 percent consultation of TAs in the Assembly membership has been abandoned and now the Assembly pleases itself with its own appointments. Even the paramount chiefs are not properly consulted on this matter. The issue only comes up at Regional House of Chiefs meeting for deliberations. What is even more disappointing is that the representative of the Traditional Council itself is chosen by the assembly without consulting the paramount chief. This view is in contravention of the subsidiarity principle which calls for social problems to be addressed from bottom up, rather than from the top down (Tettey, 2006). On the contrary, 33.5 percent of community members expressed the opinion that TAs collaborate with DAs in decision making. Though the figure cannot be described as overwhelming, it suggests an attempt at some level of collaboration between the DAs and TAs.

Within the K.E.E.A. paramountcies a chief reported that, "As a paramount chief, I almost had a distasteful encounter with my Queen mother. This is because she was directly appointed by the Assembly to represent the Traditional council without my knowledge. Just imagine, how can recruitment to the Assembly be made without the knowledge of the Coordinating Director or the District Chief




Executive? No, this cannot be done at the Assembly but the Assembly keeps doing it to the Traditional Council'. It is important to correct this wrong with all the seriousness it deserves", he added.

The situation was not different in Oguaa and Denkyira traditional areas as they vehemently protested against the non- involvement of chiefs in certain important decisions of the Assembly including the selection of traditional council representatives. Out of the eight key core Assembly staff interviewed, 6 (75%) indicated that the most common platform for the Assembly and TAs to deliberate together is generally the Assembly meetings. It was however, admitted that the arrangement does not offer a suitable opportunity for chiefs to properly share their concerns as most often than not they are only made to give introductory remarks at the beginning.

### **Linkages among the paramountcies**

In the public survey, 250 out of the sample of 600 representing 41.7 per cent indicated that paramountcies have informal relations with their neighbouring paramountcies. This friendly relations manifest in the form of celebrating festivals together or having fun games occasionally. However, 38 per cent of the respondents also confirmed a formal nature of relations with neighbouring paramountcies as they stressed on the independence of each paramountcy by indicating that they are together because they share a common boundary to one district. Figure 14 captures all the responses from the general public on the form of linkages existing among the various paramountcies.



**Figure 14: Linkages among the Paramountcies**

Source: Field work, Dankwah (2012)

From the Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) in all the participating traditional councils, the general opinion was that the paramountcies now exist as mainly independent entities because of colonialism. It was explained that, around the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> centuries the different independent paramountcies of K.E.E.A. Municipality today, were all one as Eguafu kingdom. As the chiefs of Oguaa traditional council put it, the way the paramountcies are created is all part of the divide and rule tactics of the colonial administration. They said the Fante Confederation resisted attempts at dividing the people for the selfish interests of the colonialists.

Although, they claimed equal status between the various independent states leading to peaceful co-existence and harmony, they added that when the

Paramount chiefs themselves met they accorded the seniors amongst them the needed respect. However, that gesture by itself does not in any way constitute a superiority of one paramountcy over the other. For instance, the chiefs of Abirem claimed that all the paramountcies have equal status even though traditionally Eguafo happens to be the most senior followed by Edina-(Elmina). The Abirem people met the people of Eguafo when they arrived in the area and have lived peacefully with them since then. Nonetheless, because of the equal status among the paramountcies, each paramount chief has an equal chance of being elected as the President of the Regional House of Chiefs.

An issue was raised regarding the general acceptability of the capital for all the paramountcies. The response was that Elmina, for example is just the capital because development started along the coast where good road networks existed. It was explained that if one observes closely along the coast from Axim in the Western region through Central Region to the smaller towns to Accra, through the Ada area where the white started trading, one would see trade posts all over. This explains where development started but the real ancient capitals and traditional headquarters were in-land or in the hinterland.

### **How Traditional Authorities prefer to be Integrated in Local Governance**

The second research question explores how traditional authorities expect to be integrated into the local government system. Traditional authorities have been involved in local governance in various capacities, ranging from the “indirect rule” approach adopted by the British colonial government to the current

situation in which they participate in the District Assemblies (DAs) as appointed members and expected to have a consultative relationship with local government units (Ayee, 2007). Nonetheless, there have been increased advocacy for clearer roles by traditional authorities in local governance and development at the local level. The research question two was therefore devoted for eliciting ideas from traditional authorities themselves on their preferences regarding the integration process.

### **How traditional authorities should be integrated in multiple paramountcies within a district assembly**

This subject of how chiefs would want to be integrated into the formal governance system ignited some thought provoking ideas from the study. Even within the first category of multiple paramountcies in a district (KEEA), there were varying inter and intra views from the different traditional areas. It was strongly advocated at Komenda that, there should be re-branding of the 30 per cent inclusion of chiefs in the Assembly representation. The re-branding meant that Article 276 of the Constitution which required traditional authorities to be consulted by the President with “other interest groups” should be amended. Not only should the phrase ‘other interest groups’ be removed but also, the mode of consultation should be clearly spelt out. The IEA (2008) had indicated that, before the coming into force of the 1992 Constitution only 6 per cent out of the 30 per cent government appointees to the general assembly was allocated to the chiefs. However, concerns are that, the fortunes of chiefs have not changed much since

the coming into force of the 1992 Constitution because there is still an ambiguity about the 30 percent representation and mode of consultation.

The paramount chief of Komenda indicated that Nananom must be allowed to actively partake in District Assembly deliberations. He argued that, the presence of Nananom should not be just ceremonial but be actively involved in the decision making process as their views represent those of their subjects. He insisted that the ceremonial status of chiefs at Assembly gatherings should be a thing of the past. In a separate FGD, his elders were of the opinion that representatives' of chiefs should be given special privileges at the Assembly and take measures that ensure that they give proper feedback to their respective chiefs.

For example, they suggested that there could be reserved seats for Nananom at the Assembly in a bid to enforce the 30 percent constitutional representation of TAs at the Assembly. This idea is in line with the conceptual framework. The conceptual framework dwells on the reservation of specific number of seats for TAs in order to improve collaboration between TAs and DAs. This when implemented has the potential of improving protocol of Chiefs at the DAs. This is reason why TAs anticipate that the waiting period at the DCEs office by Nananom must stop with immediate effect. It makes DCEs disrespect Nananom.

At Elmina, the concern was that there should be a relook into the Chieftaincy Act, (Act 759). The chiefs pointed out that, the Act gives Nananom the power to adjudicate on judicial matters but unfortunately the decisions/judgments pronounced cannot be implemented or enforced because

those decisions must be reported to the circuit courts or high courts for execution. The implication is that, Nananom lacks the power to execute orders of the judicial committees. Therefore, for Nananom to play a more prominent role such powers must be given to them. Again if someone violates the orders for communal labour Nananom must be given the power to punish those recalcitrant. This finding is corroborated by the work of Bouton (2004). In his work, Bouton concluded that the use of TAs could promote the adjudication process at the local level and even make it a viable option for alternative conflict resolution in the districts courts. This proposal was however opposed by the four MMDCEs interviewed. Their argument was that the Chiefs were asking for more than they could chew because they have not been able to manage the numerous chieftaincy disputes pending at their National and Regional Houses of Chiefs.

This view was however opposed by the paramount chief of Eguafo as he argued that there are examples of Nananom who are on certain Boards, Regional Councils, and Local Government Services Councils and so on. He added that he was on a local government service council not long ago. He was also the first chief to be appointed to the Ghana Education Service Council. According to Eguafo chiefs, there is a thin line between traditional rule and central government rule. For them, if traditional rule had been allowed to develop, the evolution of traditional rule would have brought us a better governance system than we are currently experiencing under democracy. If traditional rule had been allowed, all these politicisation of national issues would not have been necessary. For the paramount chief, “traditional rule is a straight forward rule. There are no

inhibitions to development. The chief calls his people for development and they respond positively. The convergence between traditional leadership and local governance is, therefore, determined by the extent to which Nananom are brought into the Assembly system. Perhaps, this is consistent with views by Njor (2006) and Gay (2007) that if contemporary governance and development administration in Africa have to be successful, then they ought to be grounded in the culture of the people embodied in the traditional rule.

Unfortunately, the extent of the involvement is that of confrontations between the state and the chief. Every government has had some form of confrontation with chiefs. This, according to Eguafo sub-chiefs, is because all that is being done by Ministers and government officials can be done by the chiefs. They challenged that the position occupied by the Chief Executive can be handled by any of the Paramount Chiefs. The current arrangement therefore makes the traditional institution completely irrelevant. This thinking is consistent with the suggestion by the Omanhene of Assin Apimanim that the scrapping of the District Assembly system would revive the institution of chieftaincy as it is an open secret that the institution is now in coma (Today Newspaper, 2011).

Interestingly, chiefs at Abirem were critical of the chieftaincy institution itself and suggested that Nananom should be serious and united as in most cases, their actions and inactions give the impression that they should be treated as such by the Assembly officials. They said, unnecessary politicisation and partisan stands taken by Nananom must cease as when they are genuinely seen to be neutral and well informed, no Assembly officials would take them for a ride.

They contended that, the link between the Assembly and traditional institutions is a complex one which demands a lot of training and education. Therefore, there should be frequent interaction making the two appreciate the fact that they are all agents for development. There should be mutual respect for officials of all the two institutions, especially the respects shown by the DCEs and their appointing authorities during election time to chiefs and his people must continue after the elections.

**How traditional authorities should be integrated in paramountcy that is coterminous with assembly**

Oguaa Chiefs rather advocated for a new constitutional arrangement. For instance, they claimed there have been talks on having an upper parliament or a special chamber where deliberations of a lower parliament would be approved. The same can be instituted at the local level where there could be Chiefs' Assembly which would oversee and give approval to District Assembly deliberations. If this happens, the dignity of the chieftaincy institution would be restored because decisions at both Assemblies at the local and national levels would be subject to the approval of traditional authorities who are closer to the people.

They argued that: there are many times that chiefs send decisions to the Assembly for reviews and support before implementation. So why is it not possible for the Assembly to seek approval from chiefs upon their deliberations? It is possible! Today, there are all manner of professionals among chiefs so in



terms of capacity, we do not fall short, we can even employ technical staff to aid us. The Assembly system has co-opted members who are of certain expertise as well. And so why can't chiefs be given technical people if the need arises to help them shape their thinking? The chief want this to be done first as recognition of their authority and second to restore their dignity. Members of parliament receive huge sums of money at the end of their 4-year term. But on the contrary, chiefs work for the good of society.

### **How traditional authorities should be integrated in paramountcy with multiple district assemblies**

The major concern of Denkyira chiefs was that, the provisions in the Chieftaincy Act that limit the powers of the chief to summon people to the palace for questioning and punishment must be restored. In an emotional mood, the chiefs in Denkyira unanimously agreed that:

The only solution to the problems traditional leaders face lies in the hands of those who really understand and appreciate traditional governance system. These include those who are in the royal lineage who have interest in making the system function better. Many of those who write in the area of chieftaincy only do so as an academic pursuit or to make names. Rather, there should be someone who has the chieftaincy spirit in his blood. The interest of the Denkyira traditional council is therefore to groom people from the royal lineage to take up the problems confronting the chieftaincy institution.

## **How the Ambiguity in Integration of Traditional Authorities in Local Government System can affect Development at the Local Level**

The third research question focused on the effects of lack of integration of traditional authorities in local development processes in the Central Region of Ghana. The analysis therefore sought to illicit the factors that could arise out of improper integration of TAs in governance in general and specifically in the planning, implementation and monitoring of local level development. Results of the public opinion indicated that more than a third (39.3%) of the 600 respondents stated that TAs would be reluctant in the exercise of their advisory roles to the government on important national matters if steps are not taken to properly integrate them. As the Report of the Committee of Experts (1991) put it, the institution of chieftaincy at the level of local government has a “more easily perceivable role to play in offering counsel and in mobilising the people for development” (Republic of Ghana, 1991: 150).

In addition to the 39.3 per cent of respondents who said that TAs would be reluctant in the exercise of their advisory roles to the government on important national matters if steps are not taken to properly integrate them, quite a sizeable number of respondents, 197 out of 600 representing 32.8 per cent were of the view that sidelining TAs was a recipe for creating a conflict or lawless society, and thereby threatening the security of the people. Modern democracy and its concomitant courting system allow impunity to grow. Even foreigners have joined this lawlessness because they know they can get away with it in the name of


democracy (Ambenne, 2013). Table 11 presents the entire responses on the effects of lack of integration of TAs in the local governance process.

**Table 11: *Public Opinion on the Effects of not Integrating Traditional Authorities in Local Governance***

Effects	KEEA		Oguaa		Denkyira		Total	
	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%
Reluctance in playing advisory roles	69	34.5	82	41.0	85	42.5	236	39.3
Withdraw participatory roles in administering their regions	18	9.0	3	1.5	6	3.0	27	4.5
Creation of a lawless society	74	37.0	67	33.5	56	28.0	197	32.8
Emphasising on the relegated role of TAs	39	19.5	48	24.0	53	26.5	140	23.3
Total	200	100	200	100	200	100	600	100

Source: Field work, Dankwah (2012)

The opinions of the public expressed in Table 11 is shown in Figure 15.



**Figure 15: Effects of lack Integration between TAs and DAs across the Paramountcies**

Source: Fieldwork, Dankwah (2012)

In terms of the FGDs, similar responses were received from the chiefs across the three broad categories of paramountcies where each of them cited their inability to develop one potential resource or another within their traditional areas due to lack of resources and the political will. The chiefs generally argued that if they were properly integrated into the local governance system, they would have been empowered and had a greater say and influence to develop their respective traditional areas. This would have resulted in the creation of employment opportunities for their youth. They stated that the lack of political will by

successive governments to develop the potentials of the traditional areas beard testimony that it would take the people themselves to achieve the needed development. Kotze et al. (1997) explained that the concentration of power at higher levels of governance is responsible for weakening performance of local institutions.

The study revealed that as a result of the Assembly's lack of involvement the major development potentials of the various paramountcies are not being tapped. Most of the development potentials in the KEEA area appeared to be the development of the eco-tourism in the municipality as identified by the Central Regional Development Commission (Cedecom). This confirms literature that, in Wenchi and Tain Districts where associations of chiefs and queen mothers exist, there is a comprehensive programme for eco-cultural tourism development and the association has been lobbying the districts to partner in the implementation (ILGS, 2008). Komenda for instance have the Fort, Komenda College Cave; the lagoons, goldmine at the beach. The first goldmine in the country is found at Abrobeane just some few kilometres from Komenda. The mine has not been tapped since it was discovered in 1471. They have the woodlots and the sea.

Sadly, the people claim though their concerns are known by the Assembly and its representatives, no serious steps have been taken to tap those potentials. The chiefs claimed that several fora had discussed these needs of the communities and they are also captured in the Assembly's development plan, but the capacity to execute it is always the problem.

By the local government act, all levies within the paramountcy go to the District Assembly. In the KEEA area, the only thing the people could pinpoint was the market tolls. But the chiefs alleged that, there are other areas where the traditional councils receive huge royalties from the natural resources coming from the area such as minerals and timber resources. Indeed, as argued at Elmina if the ban on sand winning had been lifted, it would have been the goldmine for the people of Elmina. All that needed to be done by the Assembly was a regulation that a percentage of the win sand should be paid to the traditional council. Unfortunately, all the monies coming in from the market tolls and the castle go to the Assembly and the Tourist Board. They hinted that the traditional council used to receive some percentage of the market tolls before 2009 but since President Mills' government assumed office, the council had not received anything.

At Eguafu, the feeling was that, the Assembly was not that responsive. For instance the traditional council building was in a dilapidated state. The chiefs said, the council should befit a modern facility with washrooms and proper conference hall. The MCE at the time of the fieldwork hails from the Eguafu area and the people claimed he was showing some concern and they looked forward to seeing what he could do. Unfortunately the resources that would bring some finances for the development are all in the hands of the government. The people claimed if they had been allowed to tap their own resources, they could have been self sufficient. They related that Tarkwa area chiefs are having lots of money because of the mineral resources. They alleged those chiefs are paid some reasonable amount of royalties. Central Region chiefs are on the contrary very poor because

they do not have anything in the region. Successive governments have identified tourism as the only thing that can develop the region. It is therefore a government policy to develop the region through tourism. The chiefs mentioned that there exist a fifteen year tourism development policy but “we have already spent six years doing nothing about it”. The Eguafo paramountcy is a good tourist potential. The traditional authority had thought of developing their tourist attraction sites because they believed it would bring a lot of peace and enjoyment to the people of Eguafo, and those of the KEA municipality at large.

The leadership had done a research and knows exactly what to develop to make it a very wonderful tourist destination. There is a high hill area called ‘Dompo’. On top of that hill one can have an aerial view of many places including Sekondi. The area around it enables one to have a panoramic view of the municipality. It is very beautiful when one sites the Atlantic Ocean from the top of the Dompo hill. “You feel like a bird flying into the ocean when you are at the place. It is our plan to build a platform at the area to give it more height and then build accommodation for camping, swimming pool and an ancient cave” , stated by the paramount chief.

According to history, people stayed in caves around the area and there are visible signs at the place which one can visualise that they were used as small cottages. Again, one can identify where the king stayed. There are also interesting rock formation, butterflies sanctuaries, caves, and serene environment. The chiefs pride themselves that if developed, Kakum cannot be compared to this place. They boasted that there is nothing at Kakum apart from the walk way. The

paramount chief has sold the idea to Cedecom, because they have shown interest in financing it with supervision by the AESL. Consequently, there has been a programme on the drawing board for starting the project.

For the people of Abirem who are basically farmers', especially in cash crops like citrus and palm plantations, their major concern was how to generate the needed revenue through the establishment of processing factories for such crops. They also have tourism attractions, especially natural forest and caves. According to the chiefs, the Assembly is well aware of this state of affairs but has refused to help the community tap this potential.

As argued by Benneh (1997), although the District Assembly is the overseer of the plan of projects, its implementation and monitoring requires the participation of the beneficiary communities if the projects are to be sustainable. The idea is that the medium-term development plan is a reflection of the collective aspirations and visions of all the people in the district. It is therefore important that the Assembly ensures the participation of the community in all aspects of the planning, implementation, and monitoring process. Most of the chiefs interviewed generally indicated that they were not involved in the planning and implementation of projects initiated by the Assemblies. The situation, according to the chiefs mostly results in misplaced priorities of government projects in their communities leading to low patronage or refusal to put such projects to good use. This confirms the assertion by Kendie & Guri (2004) that, there are many failed projects resulting from insufficient linkage of the projects to



local/ indigenous practices and therefore warns development practitioners to re-think development practice.

For instance, in the KEEA area, the chief of Kwahinkrom, who is also the chairman of the judicial committee within the Komenda Paramountcy related that the Assembly's initiated projects in their community were far at variance with the development needs of his community. He narrated that the community wanted their school facilities to be improved, including the provision of a new KVIP. On the contrary, the KEEA Assembly provided the community with a 32inches flat screen Television set with Multi TV decoder as well as a Poly tank for storing water. The situation, according to the chief of Kwahinkrom has resulted in the refusal of children going to school since they prefer watching multi TV. In response to the subject of project planning, implementation and monitoring, the relative responses of the 600 members of the general public are found in Table 12.

Although, approximately 22 percent of the public do not know whether chiefs are consulted or not, almost 50 percent of those interviewed were clear in their minds that traditional authorities are involved in Assembly deliberations on project planning. They explained that, it is impossible for the Assembly to implement any project in any community without the prior knowledge of the affected chief.

**Table 12: General Public Opinion on the Involvement of Traditional Authorities in Project Planning, Implementation and Monitoring**

Involvement	Planning		Implementation		Commissioning		Total	
	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%
Involved	91	45.5	68	34.0	129	64.5	288	48.0
Not involved	48	24.0	91	45.5	42	21.0	181	30.2
Don't know	61	30.5	41	20.5	29	14.5	131	21.8
Total	200	100.0	200	100.0	200	100.0	600	100.0

Source: Field work, Dankwah (2012)

Further probe on the matter indicated that what sometimes happen is that the Assembly out of difficulty in meeting many demands rather provides an alternative project contrary to what the chiefs had initially been consulted on. There was an inference that if chiefs were to be totally unaware of projects initiated in their communities, they would normally boycott the inauguration of such projects. This explanation may be true as 388 out of the 600 respondents, representing 64.5 per cent answered that chiefs are involved in the commissioning of projects in their localities.

### Summary

The Chapter discussed the first three objectives of the study. Those objectives dwelled on the institutional linkages, how TAs preferred to be

integrated and the effect of their non-integration on the development of their respective traditional areas. Generally, there were gaps in the existing institutional linkages between the DAs and TAs. In terms of preferences, TAs preferred an improved collaboration which was welcomed by the DAs who claimed they were already doing it. Finally, public perceptions generally confirmed that when collaboration was improved there would be better consultation which would lead to enhanced involvement.

## **CHAPTER SIX**

### **PERCEPTIONS ON THE ROLES OF TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE**

#### **Introduction**

Perceptions are shaped by our beliefs, values and norms which form the culture of a people (Worthman et al., 1992). Knowledge about traditional institutions helps us to promote behaviour consistent with our beliefs and feelings (Mensah, 2003; Worthman et al., 1992). Popular views regarding the new roles of chiefs were sought from the public and the traditional leaders themselves. Popular views on chiefs and chieftaincy are acutely relevant since African governments, international institutions and donor countries are displaying a renewed interest in chieftaincy (Ubink, 2007). These views were captured under various sub-themes including; the relevance of traditional leadership, the involvement of chiefs in politics, the relevance of the chieftaincy ministry, chiefs' inclusion in the formation or composition of Assembly sub-committees and the appointment of Assembly members and MMDCEs.

#### **Perceptions on the Relevance of Traditional Leadership**

From the public survey, approximately 84 per cent of those sampled indicated that traditional leadership is still resilient in their communities, even though they admitted that their powers have been limited. The views of respondents are presented in Table 13.

**Table 13: Perceptions on Relevance of Traditional Leadership**

Relevance	Frequency	Percent
Relevant	501	83.5
Irrelevant	99	16.5
Total	600	100.0

Source: Field work, Dankwah (2012)


Among those 99 respondents (16.5%) who claimed traditional leaders are no longer relevant, 39 of them (39.4%) said their powers have been usurped by the leadership of the contemporary system of governance. For others, some traditional leaders have not demonstrated good leadership and therefore are not worthy of emulation. Table 14 indicates all the responses on the irrelevance of traditional leadership.

**Table 14: Perception on irrelevance of Traditional Leadership**

Reason for irrelevance	Frequency	Percent
Traditional leaders are autocratic	13	13.1
Not everyone can become a chief/ It is ascribed	6	6.1
There is a lot of chieftaincy disputes	16	16.2
They stall or interfere in development initiatives	5	5.1
Limited powers/ Now powerless	39	39.4
They fail to lead exemplary lives	20	20.2
Total	99	100.0

Source: Field work, Dankwah (2012)

Table 13 indicates that 99 respondents expressed the opinion about the irrelevance of traditional leadership in the contemporary. The reasons assigned by the 99 members of the general public for the irrelevance of traditional leadership in today's governance and development is shown in Figure 15.



**Figure 16: Reasons for Irrelevance of Traditional Leadership**

Source: Field work, Dankwah (2012)

In FGDs at various paramountcies in the KEEA municipality, chiefs argued that Nananom exist side by side with the Assembly to promote development. Traditional leaders help in ensuring speedy adjudication of disputes in the community. They resolve disputes which would crowd the formal courts. Again without chiefs, people' identity would be lost forever. They are embodiment of people's culture and tradition. Nananom provide security to the

community as well because they have the capacity to quell all disputes before it deteriorates or end up in court.

They argued; 'Chiefs have still not lost their dignity. They are still well respected in our communities. Anything to downplay the relevance of Nananom will destroy the foundation of African societies. Britain of all countries is adopting a constitutional monarchy which indicates that even the architect of democracy and constitutional rule fully appreciate the role that traditional leaders play. The constitution clearly state that if a chief wants to be in politics he should abdicate his stool. It is unfair. Chief have not been given enough role to play so far as the governance system is concerned. The chief is an embodiment of the wishes of those living and yet unborn and therefore the governance system should take the wishes of the chief more seriously. If possible there should be the creation of bi-camera legislature at the Assembly level where the platform for chiefs would be different from that of the Assembly members.

Another factor is the lack of resources by traditional leaders to enable them function. The traditional council cannot match the Assembly with regards to access to resources and support system like the common fund. All the traditional authorities are asking is that they should be giving their due and formal recognition as the constitution itself mandates. More specifically, the chiefs of Komenda felt that the chieftaincy institution has only lost its relevance to a crop of politicians, but not the people. They claimed they are not accorded the needed recognition and they gave so many instances to attest to this. For example, during the 6<sup>th</sup> March independence anniversary, the invitation to the traditional council

came in from the Assembly barely less than 24 hours. Again a phone call reached the traditional council around 1pm on a particular day that the newly appointed Deputy Regional Minister for Central Region was to be introduced to the paramount chief and people of Komenda at 2 pm that same day. The paramount chief was not happy and so asked the Assembly PRO to explain the impression they have about the chiefs. Indeed, very often the traditional council have to cancel other appointments and itinerary because of the late invitation from the Assembly to Assembly functions. It was strongly suggested that the Assembly should bring in Nananom to perform administrative and executive functions to enable them advice and relate well with the traditional councils.

In their opinion, Edina traditional council felt that traditional leadership has not lost its relevance to the people. They said so because the Assembly relies on the leadership of the council for the provision of land for development. They added that anytime the Assembly wanted to circumvent the process, it found itself in difficulties. The recent example given was that, the Assembly informed Nananom to meet on a parcel of land selected to build a municipal police headquarters for Elmina. Unfortunately, Nananom were completely unaware of a change on the site selected for such a purpose and so the representatives of the council converged at the originally agreed location at Brunnyibima. In the end, they were informed that the sod cutting rites had already been performed on a chosen site by the Assembly. Nananom then had to raise alarm regarding the difficulty associated with using such land for the intended purpose. All this was a



result of a miscommunication from the Assembly relating to the sod cutting of a project which would be beneficial to the chiefs and the people of the area.

Again, the traditional leadership plays a very prominent role in resolving misunderstandings between people within and across traditional areas. Even when political parties are in conflict, they fall on Nananom for settlement amicably. The only problem is that the powers that Nananom wielded in the olden days have been taken away from them and so they are now toothless burdocks.

In a similar defense to traditional leadership, Eguafo chiefs argued that:

*Unit committee and the Assembly system in general do not have any roots in traditionalism when compared to the Chieftaincy system where the Chiefs have direct cordial relationship with the people and the various families. The Chief is always seen as the embodiment of the soul of the community. They spearhead the development agenda because they appreciate and understand the people better. Chieftaincy is an age-longed thing which could not be compared with the amateur assembly system which is struggling to gain firm roots. Chieftaincy is well organised with Divisional Chiefs and Family heads who are permanently and readily available to serve the people all the time.*

The chiefs, however, regretted that, the emergence of human rights philosophy in developing countries is causing the downfall of the chieftaincy institution which hitherto was highly revered. Western culture has diluted African way of life much to the extent that the institution of chieftaincy is now looked down upon. For instance, it is now common practice for a subject to refuse the

call of a chief and can even threaten a legal action if the chief insists on summoning such an individual before him for punishment.

Similarly, 78.4 percent of the Assembly members interviewed urged that chiefs should fight to assert themselves. They claimed most of the chiefs are not asserting themselves to the level where successive governments must respect them. Chiefs should command some huge level of recognition. This can be achieved by eliminating the numerous chieftaincy disputes, land disputes and outmoded customs. They stated that chiefs in pre-colonial times did not conduct themselves like what some chiefs are doing now and so they were able to assert themselves. Unfortunately “those chiefs did not even have high academic credentials or achievements. Now we have chiefs who are Engineers, Doctors, Lecturers, Professors, and Architects, and so on but we are unable to live up to expectation”. It should get to a period where a chief can be appointed as a Minister.

Refuting the perception that the institution of traditional leadership is undemocratic, the chiefs in Denkyira argued that, it is true that one must be a member of a royal family before being enstooled as a chief in accordance with custom and traditions. However, it is also true that one could be a member of the royal family but could not be chosen because of his inability to lead a life worthy of emulation. This does not make the institution autocratic. Some critics also blame chiefs for the situation they find themselves now due to the role they played in the colonial era. In fact, they cannot be blamed. They were coerced into doing so. They could not match the people who came with guns and other

ammunitions. They really knew what independence meant and were not ready to give in easily. For instance, it was asked whether one knows the mysteries behind why the castles are built on rocks? They are built on rocks because when the colonial masters asked for a land to build on, they were given the rocky area on the beach with the intention that they could not build on the rocks and would therefore abandon the idea of building their shelter. Secondly, they were given that portion so that they would not live among the indigenous people. The location at the beach was also strategic in order to push them into the sea should they misconduct themselves. So from the word go they didn't want colonialism but they didn't also have the power to resist them. It was a dilemma for them.

As for the Asafo Company, everyone agrees that they are no longer relevant. All their functions have been taken over by the regular army now. They are redundant. But they worked very excellently when chiefs were reigning. There were the army contingents of the traditional area and operated just like the regular army. The Adontehene, Twafohene, and so on, were all part of the army system. The "Twafo" chief was always in front during war and the "Akwamu" behind. The front guards are the "Adontehene" and the rest. Realistically, it is too late from the Asafo accompany to be revived because their revival would mean nothing to the chieftaincy institutions, the police, army and the other forces here taken over their functions.

Similarly, at Abirem they justified the relevance of traditional leadership saying that they ensure maximum security for their people. There are no police stations in many communities, but as a result of the mediation mechanisms put in

place by traditional leaders in such communities, conflicts are expeditiously resolved. The traditional leader put measures in place to tackle the sanitation problem of his area with all the seriousness it deserves to the extent that those who refuse to partake in such communal labours are fined. Without chiefs, filth would have engulfed a lot of communities leading to the spread of diseases. Again, a dynamic chief will have to ensure that government policies are implemented in order to promote community development. In addition, rules and regulations relating to civic responsibilities such as registering to vote, maintenance of peace are all some of the advocacy roles to be played by chiefs. An active chief plays the role of a health officer by educating his people on disease prevention.

Indeed, no major development initiative can be undertaken at the community level without consultation of the chiefs for the release of land. Anytime they are by-passed in this endeavour results in failure in project implementation. The government is aware that 80 per cent of the land in Ghana is owned by the traditional authorities or the stool lands and therefore they cannot be by-passed. Government can use LI to take over stool lands but if Nananom refuse to offer such lands to the state, the state cannot take it with force.

Interesting argument from Oguaa chiefs was that, the institution started losing its relevance in colonial days. Before colonialism, the institution was even more democratic than the so called democracy today. What is more democratic than assembling the people on every pertinent issue that concerns them? Everyone was allowed at such gatherings to speak his or her mind or share a view on an issue. Unfortunately, the current governance system which trickles down to local

governance takes its firm roots from the British governance system. In the British system, their Queens and Kings are powerless. They are only ceremonial heads, but incidentally our system is modeled around that of the British since they were the main colonial masters of the country. In the British system just like ours, parliament takes all the major decisions and the Queen only gives rubber stamp approvals. She dares not resist any attempt to sign; else the people could revolt as evident in their history when a King was beheaded.

Indeed, what makes the Ghanaian local government system complicated and at variance with the chieftaincy are the laws that seek to disempowering chiefs as owners of the land. This is because the ancestors used wars in conquering their enemies and taking over portions of land or annexing certain areas as their own. This took great effort and sacrifice and so someone could not just get up and in the name of formal laws denies another of his right to own a land. The most painful aspect of the government compulsory acquisition of lands is that most of the land is not being put to use. Consequently, the chief and his people are growing in size but do not have enough places to put their heads resulting in tensions all the time. If care is not exercised some of those tensions can be explosive.

Most of the formal laws are not favourable to the institution of chieftaincy. The community belongs to the people. It is important for those who settled them in a particular location with a special reason to take care of their needs. The chief knows his people well and is able to take care of their concerns better. In the traditional set up, no external chief dictates to a local chief as to what he can do or

otherwise to his subjects. Contrary, in the so called local government system, central government still strongly determines what should or should not be done at the local level. Failure to adhere to central government directives could result in the dismissal of the chief executive.

Another way of restoring the dignity of the institution of chieftaincy is that there are certain structures that aid and abet discipline within the traditional set up. In fact, the absence of such structures results in chaos and brings about indiscipline. One of such structure is the “Adumfo” (war lord). The fear associated with their work would let one run helter skelter when they are seen. It is a similar mechanism that the white man used in chasing out the people of their legitimate places of abode by ordering them around through the use of gun. They used the gun and their language –English to confuse the people. That is why a community in Cape Coast is called “Brofoyedur” meaning the white man has power. They had the power to command everyone to do what they desired. They had their army, and police at all times to defend the injustice meted out to indigenous people. In the typical traditional set up, it was difficult to enter a palace because all the army and police were in place just like it still exists in the Ashanti Kingdom. They have a place called Adum – the Chief of Adum has all the Abrafo – (war lords) working under him to maintain the desired discipline in the kingdom. The respect extends to corporate organisation. Any company on Ashanti land dares not refuse to pay royalty. The situation is not the same along the coast where chiefs have no control over resources.

At Denkyira, the argument advanced was that, the so-called adherents of democratic governance are the people who struggle to be made Chiefs or other traditional heads after attaining higher educational and political achievements. Traditional leadership is ordained by God unlike the institution of democracy. This is the reason why only a particular family is privileged to be enstooled as chiefs. Political administration is the handy works of man that can be destroyed at any point in time. As everybody knows, no one can destroy or abolish traditional leadership.

### **Perceptions on Chiefs' Involvement in Politics**

The controversy surrounding the role of chiefs in politics has received considerable attention in the literature. The famous Article 276(1) of the 1992 constitution of the Republic of Ghana is often quoted as evidence of the non-involvement of chiefs in politics. Professor George P. Hagan, CPP presidential candidate in 2000 elections, described this relationship between traditional authorities and the politicians of the modern political system quite bluntly:

You cannot win an election in Ghana if the chiefs do not support you, because while you are asleep, they are with the people. A chief said to me you cannot win, you have no money to give to the chiefs. If you give me money I can go from village to village in my domain and tell people to vote. At times the voting is done even in the chief's palace. And people go to the chief's house to greet him in the morning and ask him how they should vote. He would not

open up his mouth; he would give them a sign. [...] So let's be realistic: The theory is that they should not participate, and that is the idea (Knierzinger, 2011: 35).

In this study, traditional leaders in the various paramountcies shared varying opinions of the constitution that chiefs should not play active role in politics such as mounting political platform and campaigning for a political party. For example, in the Komenda traditional area the opinion was that Nananom exhibited "the real father-for-all" character and are able to suppress any affiliation to political party when it came to matters of development and not like politicians who make political capital out of what is due their people. The chiefs therefore argued that even if Nananom should be active in politics their style of politics should be confined to assembly deliberations where they would be debating about development concerns of their various paramountcies and share practical solutions to the problems confronting their people and avoid the rhetoric of the politicians.

In the Edina traditional area, chiefs added that, meddling in politics could fume insults on the noble institution so they thought that clause should be maintained. However, it was said that every human being is a political animal and that chiefs naturally could have political inclinations. But to campaign for that party on political platform was what the constitution debars. The advice was that politicians must also understand that Nananom cannot be in one party forever. Therefore, they should not single out those perceived not to be inclined to their



party for maltreatment and that Nananom again, must thread cautiously in order not to give themselves up.

In Eguafo, the paramount chief posed a question in response to the issue of whether chiefs should be involved in politics. He asked; “why should one fear that a chief should engage in politics? The constitutional provision banning chiefs from politics is just a camouflage. Everybody is a politician. Chiefs’ vote and therefore nothing bans them from divulging information on their political affiliations”. Perhaps, this stance confirms the argument by Knierzinger (2011) that the character of Ghanaian election campaigns makes it very hard for TAs not to meddle in party politics. He explains that, many of the campaign events take place in traditional settings, at traditional festivals and at chiefly durbars, where the chiefs often declare their preferences openly.

Aside these circumventions of constitutional provisions, there are also a considerable number of chiefs who bluntly ignore the ban on participation in party politics. In an article in the Daily Graphic, the political scientist Kumi Ansah-Koi singled out the Omanhene of Agogo Traditional Area, Nana Akuoku Sarpong, the late former Speaker of Parliament, Peter Ala Adjetey, who also was the Akyempimhene of Abiriw, and the former Chief Director of the Ministry of Health, Lepowura M. N. D. Jawula, as chiefs “who defied the constitutional injunction to openly engage in politics” (Knierzinger, 2011). In a reply to this article, the chief of Akyem Nkwantanang in the Eastern Region, Barima Adanse-Akyem Omane, again called for the amendment of article 276 of the Ghanaian constitution, which prohibits chiefs from actively engaging in partisan

politics. Boafo-Arthur conducted interviews with chiefs about article 276 and found that they were divided on this constitutional provision. The most important reason in favour of article 276 was their fear that they would compromise their role as ‘father of everybody’ in their respective communities (Boafo- Arthur 2001; Odotei 2003: 339).

The position of Eguafo was reinforced by Denkyira who felt that the provision or clause that bars chiefs from engaging in politics should be repelled to allow chiefs fully participate in politics as they are currently doing in a disguised form. For example, it can be enshrined in the constitution that chiefs can be made to contest in parliamentary elections as independent candidates. This would surely ensure that majority of the chiefs would find their way into parliament where they can help enact laws that would revive the institution.

Again, the minister responsible for chieftaincy and culture must automatically be a chief. This can be done through the formation of an electoral college by all Presidents of the Regional House of Chiefs who would in turn elect one member as the Minister for the sector. Additionally, logistics like vehicles and stationary should be made available to facilitate the work of the traditional council. For instance, many of the Divisional Chiefs who do not have reliable means of transportation find it difficult commuting between their villages and the traditional capital to attend meetings of the traditional council. Government can therefore provide each traditional council with at least a mini bus to facilitate the work of the council.

## **Perceptions on Chieftaincy and Traditional Affairs Ministry**

Almost all the chiefs within the three broad categories of paramountcies lamented that, it is unfortunate that their ministry does not have a cabinet status. For them, this raises the issue of whether the government is not just making mockery of the institution of chieftaincy. If the institution is that important and chiefs are that much revered, what prevents the ministry that oversees its affairs from becoming a cabinet ministry?’ most of the chiefs asked.

At Eguafu, it was said that, regrettably the Minister in the sector himself does not know much about chieftaincy. It’s important to appoint people with the requisite background to occupy such positions. There must be somebody at the Ministry who knows the spirit of the chieftaincy institutions. The government can at least appoint a chief to be head of the Chieftaincy and traditional affairs ministry. This is possible because Nananom have been part of the governance system right from the assembly level to the council of state. There have been chiefs who have served on important commissions. All these are part of the governance system. The chiefs are very collaborative. But the reality of the fact is that you need to assert yourself in order to find yourself being assigned to play such roles.

The fact that the ministry does not have a cabinet status is the last straw that broke the camel’s back. The chiefs admitted that, even though they appreciated the establishment of the ministry which hitherto did not exist at all, current disposition also made it a toothless burdock. The budgetary allocation to that ministry was a mockery of the chieftaincy institution. Even the little quota for

the chieftaincy secretariat had been added to that of Centre for National Culture. It was lamented that as paramount chiefs, the whole grant received in a quarter was GHC 100. The traditional council did not receive any form of financial support. For the Divisional Chiefs, no one cares about them. If that ministry was to be effective one, all those anomalies would have been rectified. As asked by one of the chiefs; “If a whole ministry could not ensure the enforcement of constitutional provisions relating to the institution it oversees then what is its relevance?” It was recommended strongly that a percentage of the assembly’s common fund say 2-3 per cent must be channeled into chieftaincy affairs or distributed to the respective traditional councils for development of their traditional areas.

### **Perceptions on the Inclusion of Chiefs in the Composition of District Assembly Sub-committees**

In KEEA traditional areas, there were varying views on this matter. In Komenda traditional area chiefs said sometimes they baffle at the calibre of assembly persons who work on some of the assembly sub-committees. The chiefs added there were lots of chiefs with the requisite backgrounds who could perform better on certain sub-committees, but were not consulted to make an input. This buttressed the challenges being faced with the 30 per cent consultation. If the 30 percent is complied with, Nananom knew which people to contact to fill that area of specialty on each sub-committee. In committees like security, development and legal, it is important for Nananom to have an input into their deliberations since their decisions have direct implications for their people.

Others claimed that the 30 percent quota given to Nananom and other interest bodies which is not even enforced is already limited. If the provision was to be effective and the quota increased to say 40%, Nananom could send very qualified representatives to serve on the respective sub-committee. In a situation where their inputs is already not needed it would be difficult to have representations of the traditional council on the assembly sub-committees. There is only one representative of the traditional council at the assembly. The problem is that, how can one person serve on all the important sub-committees at the assembly? This clearly leads to the neglect of inputs from the traditional authorities on the various subcommittees.

Nevertheless, there is a very potential tourist attraction sites which can bring the vibrancy in the local economy. The fort is one of the attractions. Had it not been the conflict between the Tourist Board and the Museums and the Monument Board, the Fort would have developed. These are some of the causes of our over-reliance on the assembly for developmental support. This is where politicisation comes in. Some chiefs have been tagged as belonging to a particular political party. He is therefore kept uninformed about assembly deliberations.

The first development concern in Elmina area was a very good fishing port or landing port for fishermen or something to store fish. Another thing should be the revival of the Komenda sugar factory which used to benefit the people of Elmina very well. Many of the workers in the defunct factory used to stay in Elmina. This boosted the Elmina local economy. Apart from these two, any other factory that would provide employment to the people is a priority. All these

projects require huge financial commitments. Unfortunately, the Traditional Council is not resourced to provide these needs. We largely rely on the sea for our livelihood and do not know where our people can generate money to support our development project especially in these days that the fishing industry is also collapsing because of low catch. The assembly has had this in its development plan for several years, but there is lack of political will for its implementation as succeeding governments only pay lip service on the issue.

Unfortunately the resources that will bring some finances for the development of traditional areas are all in the hands of the government. We are sitting on the land but whatever is in the land belongs to the government. If we had been allowed to tap our town resources, we could have been self sufficient. The Tarkwa area chiefs are having lots of money because of the mineral resources. They are paid some reasonable amount of royalties. Central Region chiefs are on the contrary very poor because we do not have anything in the region. Successive governments have identified tourism as the only thing that can develop the region. It is therefore a government policy to develop the region through tourism. There exist a fifteen year policy but unfortunately six years had been spent doing nothing about it.

According to history, people stayed in caves around the area and these are visible at the place where one can visualise that these were used as small cottages. One can identify where the king stayed. There are interesting rock formation, butterflies sanctuaries, caves, and serene environment. Kakum cannot be compared to this place. There is nothing at Kakum apart from the walk way. The

paramount chief has sold the idea to Cedecom, because they are financing it. There is also the AESL which is going to supervise it. A programme has been drawn for commissioning the place.

**Perceptions on the Appointment of Assembly Members/ Metropolitan,  
Municipal and District Chief Executives**

In all the FGDs chiefs indicated that, if they are given the due recognition in terms of the 30 per cent their presence would be much felt, their views would be much respected and their inputs in the assembly deliberations directly taken care off. Unfortunately, the current situation make assembly members feel that it is their views that matter and not those of chiefs. That is why they refuse to brief the chiefs after assembly meetings. They sometimes convene meetings in their strong electoral areas and give feedback to the people instead of informing Nananom about what happened at the assembly. In short, all that is being said is that the assembly meetings should fully integrate the views and concerns of chiefs and this can only be achieved with their presence.

The relationship between TAs and the assembly persons is all boiled down to the issue of education. If the two understand the functions of each other, there would not be any clashes. The chief's function is clearly spelt out and if anybody wants to have a confrontation, then it means the person does not know his functions. A good chief should be able to accommodate and educate any member of the local government sub-structure who wants to have a wrong approach to his work. Within the chieftaincy institution, chiefs play multiple roles that make them

very experienced people. We are politicians, judges, lawyers, spiritual leaders and development experts.

The creation of more electoral areas to reduce the area of supervision of an assembly member can go a long way in strengthening their links with Nananom. The current arrangements where assembly members oversee several communities make them neglect many of those communities perceived not to have supported their candidature. They only concentrate their efforts in their strong holds. This strains the relationship between them and the chiefs and people in their weak support based communities.

The traditional leaders complained that it was sad to say that the assembly system respects assembly members' more than traditional leaders. They added:

*An assembly man feels more powerful forgetting that we are gazetted chiefs. If we take the issue of the bye-laws for example, Nananom cannot enforce community bye-laws without seeking approval from the assembly which also goes to undermine our powers at the community level. Again, any customary law that conflict with the assembly bye-law becomes redundant, which means that the assembly bye-law is at a more powerful level. Our problem then is that give traditional authorities their due recognition of the 30% consultation in order to allow them to be part of the bye-law enactment process which will eventually reduce the possibility of having a customary law that is inconsistent with the assembly bye-law. Is this a difficult thing to do? On the other hand the chiefs being part of the bye-law enactment process would have given their consent already*



*and therefore would not have any problems implementing it. The assembly does its own appointment before they come to the chiefs to present who have been selected. We think they consider the low educational background of most chiefs to perpetrate that behaviour.*

At Cape Coast, they said they are told there should not be any partisanship in the work of the assembly. But the truth of the whole thing is that the entire assembly system operates under the disguise of politics. All appointments are made on the principal that one should at least be a sympathizer of the government in power before being appointed. That consideration is more paramount than consulting chiefs on the matter.

Denkyira supported the earlier assertions and emphasised that when the government decides, nobody can influence its decisions. The concern of chiefs over this particular issue of 30 per cent consultation has been battled with over quite a long time. The main concern has been the failure of governments in enforcing the provision to its logical conclusion.

The appointment of DCEs issue received a majority endorsement in all the FGDs. Many of the chiefs lamented that, even though the constitution says the appointment of DCEs must be made in consultation with chiefs, it is never adhered to. Having been aware of the various schools of thought on this subject most of the chiefs felt that DCEs must not be elected. However, the consultation with the chiefs must seriously be respected.

## **CHAPTER SEVEN**

### **SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **Introduction**

This chapter brings the whole research journey to its logical conclusion by way offirst and foremost summing up the entire research process. Secondly, it presents the major findings of the study, and thirdly draws the relevant conclusions. Fourthly, it makes appropriate recommendations based on the findings and conclusions, and fifthly outlines contributions to knowledge and the literature. Finally, it suggests areas for further research.

#### **Summary**

The decentralised governance system is to a large extent influenced by western ideas such as technocratic approach to development which may not be consistent with the traditional value system in which traditional knowledge and values are still important elements in decision making and development activities of the people. The interaction between aspects of western decentralised governance and traditional governance systems have not been well understood which have sometimes generated conflicts. This has had implications for local development. The study sought to explore how to integrate the traditional authority system into the formal governance system while taking into account the non-elective nature of the traditional leaders.

Various conceptual and theoretical issues on local governance and chieftaincy were reviewed. The main theoretical underpinnings that guided the

study included the interactive governance theory and the subsidiarity principle. The study was guided by the both positivist and the interpretive research philosophies. The research design was based on a mixed-methods approach.

Data on how to integrate the traditional and contemporary systems of governance was collected from the traditional and District Assembly authorities, as well as the regional house of chiefs and the general public. The main instruments used were Interview schedules and Focus Group Discussion Guides divided into sections covering the various objectives of the study.

Interview schedules were used for selected Assembly members in every traditional area, the District Coordinator and/or the Chief executive of each of the four main District Assemblies as well as the 600 community members across the study areas. A Focus Group Discussion was the main method employed in interviewing the traditional authorities using a moderator's guide developed along the key headings of the study objectives aimed at soliciting information on the study topic within a group environment that proved to be successful. A convenience sampling procedure was adopted in selecting the members of the general public who were largely petty traders, farmers and fisherfolks.

The major findings of this study are summarised as follows:

1. In terms of institutional linkages between the two systems of government, there is a communication gap between the traditional authorities and the District Assemblies. The communication gap is explained as a half hearted attempts at co-operation, and accompanying these attempts are suspicions and mistrust between the TAs and government functionaries. For example,

though Act 462 makes reference to the representation of TAs in the composition of the District Assembly, the power to make that appointment is exercised by the political authority of the day instead of leaving the process entirely in the hands of the TAs.

2. There appeared to be no clear integration between traditional authority system with all the other relevant local government institutions. For instance, there was no institutional arrangement for ensuring interaction between the traditional authorities and the Assembly structures at local level. The chiefs therefore would like to be truly involved in all important deliberations including being made to serve as or represented on all relevant sub-committees of the District Assemblies. TAs wanted to be formally notified in all interactions between them and the Assemblies. TAs felt that their direct involvement would be more beneficial to their people because they would be in a better position to press home the demands of their people and thereby avoid any possible conflict between the TAs and the Assemblies.
3. Ghana's decentralisation process has not been effective in tapping the traditional governance system, leading to frequent conflicts and misunderstanding between the district assembly structures and traditional authorities, thereby stifling local development. The ambiguity created in integrating traditional authorities into local government structure has made some chiefs to be recipients of development instead of being partners in development. The chiefs asked for a limited role of Assembly members

who are sponsored by political parties with their own egoistic agenda to allow for a more integration between the Assembly and the local people whom the chiefs naturally represent;

4. TAs are largely perceived to be relevant today contrary to assertions by modernists about the irrelevance of traditional leadership in contemporary governance system. Integration is necessary because attempts at sidelining TAs would create conflicts at the local level and make the system of governance ungovernable as explained by the theory of interactive governance. Again, the principle of subsidiarity makes traditional authorities indispensable stakeholders at the local level. It is only when the local level cannot function that a higher level must be consulted; and
5. Traditional leaders effectively blend traditional roles in governance such as maintenance of law and order with new roles especially in areas of health, education and provision of basic needs such as water and sanitation.

## **Conclusions**

The Akan traditional authority is a well structured decentralised system comprising of institutions from the paramountcy to the household level. These include the paramount chief at the apex, the divisional chiefs, sub-divisional chiefs, heads of clans/families as well as heads of households in that order. According to the study, the decentralised arrangement has existed from time

immemorial till today and is still responsible for governing and ensuring development, peace and harmony in the traditional areas.

The study concludes that; first of all there is a gap between the TAs and state institutions especially the District Assemblies and therefore advocates for better cooperation between them in order for effective local level development to take place. Secondly, traditional authorities largely agreed that the constitutional provisions debarring their active involvement in local government activities should be amended. The amendment should make it open for those interested in contesting for political offices to do so. This in their view will stop the current practice where chiefs have to pretend to be non-partisan when in fact the political identities of most of them are publicly known by their subjects.

Thirdly, the ambiguity in integrating traditional authorities in the local government system has affected their full participation in the governance process and development in general. For instance, the delays and perceived corruption in the judicial system could have been avoided if traditional authorities had been given back their judicial powers in adjudicating cases. Finally, the public largely perceived that the relevance of traditional institutions today is not in doubt. TAs contribute toward development in diverse ways in their respective paramountcies. They are also revered as custodians of custom and the embodiment of the people's way of life.

## **Recommendations**

Based on the findings and conclusions drawn, the following recommendations are made:

1. In order to enhance institutional linkage of TAs in local government at the national level, the Ministry of Chieftaincy and traditional affairs should have direct link with that of the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development. At the local level, the MMDAs must inform TAs in all its deliberations.
2. The MLGRD should ensure that TAs are made to serve on relevant sub-committees of the MMDAs at all levels to allow them make inputs into sector plans at national, regional and district levels. At the local level, however, steps should be taken to ensure legislative reforms to clearly define the role of TAs in the decentralised governance system. The modalities for consultation with TAs for the appointment of 30 percent of DA members should be clearly defined and respected. For instance, the idea of Upper chamber of parliament should be extended to the local level where chiefs could deliberate over decisions of the Assemblies' executive committee refer to in this study as Upper chamber of the Assembly. Additionally, TAs should introduce the concept of District House of Chiefs. TAs can also be made to serve on the Assembly's Executive Committee.
3. Successive governments should have the political will in ensuring that the decentralisation policy is effectively and fully implemented. For instance,

there should be clear mechanisms for integrating TAs into Ghana's decentralised administration. This includes making sure that there is synergy between the District Assembly structures and traditional authorities. One practical strategy to achieve this is to include the ministry of chieftaincy and traditional affairs in the Inter Ministerial Coordinating Committee of the Cabinet for purposes of implementing the decentralisation programme. Secondly, the role and vision of the Ministry of Chieftaincy and Traditional Affairs should be known and appreciated by nananom and all government ministries and agents.

4. Academics in Africa should ensure that African indigenous knowledge and worldview perceived as irrelevant and out of fashion is respected as another science and reality capable of complementing Western science to generate innovative outcomes in terms of addressing present day problems. In other words, rather than being passive assimilators of western modernity, Africans should take an active role in the selection and, at times, fusion of what they got from Europe and what they already had as a people. This surviving strategy has failed in many African societies due to the impact of western scientism and modernity-forces that despise African traditions and knowledge systems as diabolic, backward and superstitious. For example, the notion that the traditional governance system is not amenable to democracy should be disputed and discarded in academia.



## **Contributions to Knowledge**

The study was able to build on the knowledge base that demonstrated the relevance of the theoretical underpinnings of local governance, decentralisation and traditional authority nexus as expounded in literature to develop a conceptual framework that explains the integration of the two governance systems. So far, most studies on traditional authority-local government interaction have focused on debates or suggestions from academics about how the two systems can collaborate. In this study, the researcher has tried to shift focus on the preferences of the chiefs to the integration process. Theoretical arguments were further strengthened in the discussion of findings where the study sought to demonstrate that, although the topic is popular the findings in the study area are not wholly the same as those in other studies. For example, in terms of methodology the categorisation of the paramountcy-district dynamics adopted in this study is something that earlier studies have not focused on.

The study went beyond the much rhetoric in literature about the involvement of chiefs' in local government and the fact that the presence of the local government functionaries takes away portions of the authority and influence of the traditional leaders to ask the chiefs about how they preferred the integration process to be like. The study reveals that there is no way any meaningful local government programme could be implemented without strong involvement of traditional authorities.

Objective 4 of the study was to assess perceptions of the general public including whether or not the integration between traditional authorities and formal

local government functionaries should be abrogated based on the reason that the chieftaincy institution has outlived its usefulness, hence, it must be abolished. In the attempt to examine this debate, the findings of this study have raised another question namely, is the presence of chieftaincy in local communities undermining or complementing local government? Thus, the researcher finds that in the communities where the institution of chieftaincy is well entrenched with very powerful traditional leadership, the status and roles of these traditional leaders overshadow that of the assembly members and town council members. This results in a situation where the assembly and unit committee members are likely to play low profile role in the administration of those local communities.

### **Limitations of the Study**

The main limitation of the study was the inability to interact with a representative of the Ministry of Chieftaincy and Traditional Affairs. This would have helped in juxtaposing their views with those provided by the representative of the local government ministry about the integration involving the two ministries and their relevant departments. Similarly, the descriptive nature of the analysis and discussions took some shine out of the work.

### **Suggestion for Further Research**

It is suggested that a study should be conducted on the perceptions of key ministries and agencies such as those of Ministry of Chieftaincy and Traditional Affairs as well as the National House of Chiefs on the subject of integration.

Additionally, a study on how chiefs should be notified with respect to their participation in the appointment of District Assembly members would be worthwhile. Such notice should indicate the number of chiefs to be consulted and which category of chiefs are to be consulted-whether paramount, divisional or sub-divisional.

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## APPENDIX A

### INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR COMMUNITY MEMBERS

This is a PhD Research on the interface between the District Assemblies (DAs) and Traditional Authorities (TAs). The research examines the participation of Traditional Authority in the existing governance landscape, their actual and potential roles and responsibilities in governance structures as well as the perceptions on potential institutional linkages between Traditional Authorities and District Assemblies in terms of administration, justice delivery and development.

We would be most grateful if you could answer these questions for us in order to achieve this objective. Your responses would be treated confidential.

#### Section A: Background of respondents

1. Name of Community.....Traditional Area.....
2. Sex.....3. Age.....
4. Highest academic qualification.....
5. Occupation.....

#### Section B: Profile of the TA system and its linkages with the DA

6. How is the Paramountcy/ Traditional area related to the surrounding paramountcies?
  - a) Have a common festival (b) Paramountcy carved out from the other
  - (c) Have nothing in common (d) Other (specify).....
7. How does the Paramountcy/ Traditional area relate with the District?

- a) The Paramount Chief or his representative holds quarterly meetings with assembly membership
  - b) The Traditional Council organises durbars and invites assembly officials
  - c) The two leadership meet when a project is being initiated or commissioned
  - d) Not aware of any form of linkages between Traditional Authorities and District assemblies
  - e) Other (specify).....
8. Would you say Traditional leadership/Chieftaincy is still relevant form of governance system in this era of democratic dispensation?
- a) Yes (b) No
9. Please, explain why you think Traditional leadership/Chieftaincy is relevant in response to your answer to question 3 above
- a) Traditional leadership/Chieftaincy is also a form of democratic governance (b) They are accepted and more closer to the people
  - (c) They help settle a lot of disputes (d) They promote development initiatives (e) Other (specify).....
10. Please, explain why you think Traditional leadership/Chieftaincy is not relevant in response to your answer to question 3 above
- a) Traditional leaders/Chiefs are autocratic (b) Not everyone can become a Chief (c) There is much Chieftaincy disputes (d) Theyinterfere in development initiatives/ stall development (e)



Other

(specify).....

**Section C: Views on forms of integration/ Nature of engagement**

11. What is/are your view(s) about the links between the Traditional Authorities and the District Assembly?

(a) The Chief and elders collaborate with the assembly on a wide range of issues

(b) The traditional council has an assembly representative who liaise between the council and the assembly

(c) I understand the constitution mandates the assembly to have a representative from the traditional council

(d) Not aware of any form of links between the two set of authorities

(e) Any other (specify) .....

12. What challenges have you observed Chiefs normally encounter with local government/ district assembly officials in their efforts to promote development?.....

13. In your opinion, how can the working relations between traditional leaders and local government/ district assembly officials be improved?.....

14. What should Chiefs and DCEs do to ensure that the people benefit from development initiatives of their communities?.....

.....

**Section D: Involvement in the Formulation, Implementation and Monitoring of local government programmes**

15. How are the concerns of your community taken on board by the assembly?  
a) Hold community durbars where views are taken (b) Assembly member sends the concerns of the community (c) Other specify.....
16. Are TAs involved in the infrastructural planning processes at the Assemblies? (a) Involved (b) Not involved (c) Don't know
17. Are TAs involved in the infrastructural implementation processes of their localities? (a) Involved (b) Not involved (c) Don't know
- (a) Are TAs involved in the commissioning of infrastructural projects of their localities? (a) Involved (b) Not involved (c) Don't know

**Section E: Roles of traditional authorities/ Local Government Actors**

18. What new roles would you prescribe for Chiefs in the development of your communities?.....
19. What new roles would you prescribe for assembly members in the development of your communities?.....
20. What new roles would you prescribe for DCEs in the development of your communities?

**Section F: General perceptions**

21. What is/are your view(s) about the current appointment arrangement of DCEs?.....

22. What are views of the chieftaincy institution in the urban areas?.....
23. Are you aware of any better ways of treating traditional leadership elsewhere on the continent?.....
24. What are some of the likely consequences of not properly integrating traditional authorities into the local governance system?.....
25. Any other comment?.....

Thank you very much

**APPENDIX B**  
**FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE FOR TRADITIONAL**  
**AUTHORITIES**

This is a PhD Research on the interface between the District Assemblies and Traditional Authorities. The research examines the participation of Traditional Authority in the existing governance landscape, their actual and potential roles and responsibilities in governance structures as well as the perceptions on potential institutional linkages between Traditional Authorities and District Assemblies in terms of administration and justice delivery.

We would be most grateful if you could answer these questions for us in order to achieve this objective. Your responses would be treated confidential.

**Section A: Structure of the TA System**

1. Historical Profile of the Paramountcy
2. How is the paramountcy related to the surrounding paramountcies?
3. How does the paramountcy/ Traditional Area relate with the District?

**Section B: Views on forms of integration/ Nature of engagement**

4. Which form of integration is most preferred with regard to relations between traditional leaders and local government officials?
  - a) Having traditional leaders as only an advisory body to be consulted when making important decisions of the assembly

- b) Reserving one-third membership of local government units for traditional leaders without representatives at the RCC (like the 1957 & 1979 Constitutions)
  - c) Reserving one-third membership of local government units for traditional leaders and having traditional leaders representatives at the RCC (like the 1969 Constitution)
  - d) Reserving 50% membership of local government units for traditional leaders and having 50% increase of traditional leaders representation at the RCC
5. What are your general views on having a joint ministerial portfolio for the Traditional authorities and Local Government? [Instead of separate ministries for TAs & Local Government].
  6. How can the working relations between traditional leaders and local government officials be improved?
  7. How would you rate the importance of the following District Assembly staff in the development of your traditional area?

<b>Authority</b>	<b>Very important</b>	<b>Important</b>	<b>Not important</b>
DCE			
DCD			
PM			
Assembly members			
Unit Committee Members			

**Section C: Involvement in the formulation, implementation and monitoring of local government programmes**

8. What are your concerns with regards to the representation of traditional authorities in the sub-committees of MMDAs?
9. Are Queen mother's sufficiently represented at the assemblies to champion the cause of women/children and their communities?
10. What is the extent/mode of involvement of TAs in the development planning processes of the District?
11. Which specific areas of work of TAs conflict with that of local government officials?
12. What should be the limit of Traditional authorities' involvement in Politics?

**Section D: Appointment of Assembly Members/ MMDCEs**

13. What is your opinion about the consultation of Traditional authorities in the appointment of the 30% assembly members as required by law?
14. What should be the extent of consultation of traditional authorities by government in the appointment of DCEs?

**Section E: General perceptions**

15. What is your position about Queens in the Houses of Chiefs?
16. What is your position on the idea of a District Level Association of Traditional Authority?
17. What is/are your view(s) about the current appointment arrangement of DCEs?

18. Are traditional authorities given copies of district byelaws?
19. I understand that 1/3 of the members of the District Assembly are to be appointed by the government in consultation with the traditional authorities. Does this happen?
20. What would be the consequences of not integrating you properly into the local governance system?
21. Any other suggestion or comments on the study.....

Thank you

**APPENDIX C**

**INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR ASSEMBLY MEMBERS**

This is a PhD Research on the interface between the District Assemblies and Traditional Authorities. The research examines the participation of Traditional Authority in the existing governance landscape, their actual and potential roles and responsibilities in governance structures as well as the perceptions on potential institutional linkages between Traditional Authorities and District Assemblies in terms of administration and justice delivery.

We would be most grateful if you could answer these questions for us in order to achieve this objective. Your responses would be treated confidential.

**Section A: Background of respondent**

Name of respondent (optional)	Sex	Age	Highest Academic Qualification/ background

Name of Electoral area.....District.....

Name of Traditional area.....

**Section B: Background issues on local governance and links with**

**Traditional Authorities**

Q1. Which of the following will you accept as the definition of local governance?

(Tick [√] as appropriate).



- a). It involves performing the functions of a state which includes protection of citizens from external aggression and maintaining internal peace and security [ ]
- b). The process in which governing outcomes depend on the interaction of a complex set of institutions and actors drawn from but also beyond local government [ ]
- c). The process of bringing governance to the doorsteps of the beneficiaries of governance [ ]
- d). The strategies put in place to achieve local level development [ ]
- e). Governance at the grass root level [ ]
- f). None of the above [ ]

Q2. Are there any formal arrangements or common platform where the Assembly officials and Traditional leaders within your MMDA come together? 1. Yes 2. No

Q3. Please, explain which occasions the two authorities normally meet.....  
 .....

Q4. Which of the following will you say is the aim of local governance? (Tick as appropriate)

- a). To enhance rural development
- b). To promote democracy
- c). To ensure fair distribution of resources
- d). Any other (specify).....

Q5. How would you rate the importance of the following traditional authorities in local governance within your MMDA?

Authority	Very important	Important	Not important
Paramount Chief			
Divisional Chief			
Queen Mothers			
Opinion Leaders			
Family Heads			

Q6. In your role as local government practitioner, how has any of the traditional authority aided your progress in the district?.....

Q7. In your role as local government practitioner, how has any of the traditional authority negatively affected your work in the district?.....  
.....

**Section C: Integration of Traditional Authorities into Local Governance**

In a bid to play a more prominent role in the local governance process, chiefs have put forward the following preferred mode of integrating them into the assembly system. Please, indicate your reactions to these issues.

Q8. That, chiefs (not their representatives) should be allowed to fully participate in assembly deliberations in order to ensure that major decisions that concern their people are well taken on board. 1. Fully Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Fully Disagree

Q9. Please, explain your answer to Q8.....

Q10. That there should be an upper chamber of the assembly made up of some carefully selected chiefs who would in conjunction with the executive committee of the assembly see to the final implementation of the deliberations of the general assembly. 1. Fully Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Fully Disagree

Q11. Please, explain the extent of your agreement or disagreement with Q10.....

.....

Q12. That government must provide every traditional council and palace with a police who would provide security services just as every house of chief executive and the chief himself is provided with a security guard. 1. Fully Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Fully Disagree

Q13. Please, explain the extent of your agreement or disagreement with Q12.....

.....

Q14. That each sub-committee of the MMDAs must have a chief or his /her representatives since these committees provide essential platforms that help to shape development policy and programmes at the local level. 1. Fully Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Fully Disagree

Q15. Please, explain the extent of your agreement or disagreement with Q14.....

.....

Q16. That Queen mothers lack sufficient representation at the assemblies to champion the cause of women/children and their communities 1. Fully Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Fully Disagree

Q17. Please, explain the extent of your agreement or disagreement with Q16.....

Q18. That there is lack of transparency and accountability on the part of the assembly on the use of funds for developmental projects of the communities to the people through their traditional leaders. 1. Fully Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Fully Disagree

Q19. Please, explain the extent of your agreement or disagreement with Q18.....

Q20. That there is lack of formal space for traditional authorities in the mainstream local governance structure. 1. Fully Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Fully Disagree

Q21. Please, explain the extent of your agreement or disagreement with Q20.....

Q22. What are your general views on having a joint ministerial portfolio for the Chieftaincy and Local Government Ministry? 1. Fully Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Fully Disagree

Q23. Please, explain the extent of your agreement or disagreement with Q22.....

Q24. How can the working relations between traditional leaders and local government officials be improved?.....

Q25. What do you like most about traditional rule and traditional authorities?.....

- Q26. What do you not like at all about traditional rule and traditional authorities?.....
- Q27. How would you want the fusion of traditional authorities into the Assembly system to be like?.....
- Q28. How do you rate the overall contribution of traditional authorities to the development your district? (1) Very effective (2) Effective (3) Not Sure (4) Ineffective (5) Very ineffective
- Q29. Should Chiefs be appointed as DCEs? 1. Yes [ ] 2. No [ ] Please, explain your answer.....
- Q30. What will be the effects of improper integration of Chiefs into the Local governance system?.....
- Q31. Any suggestion about how to integrate traditional authorities into the local governance system.....

Thank you

## APPENDIX D

### INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR DISTRICT ASSEMBLIES

This is a PhD Research on the interface between the District Assemblies and Traditional Authorities. The research examines the participation of Traditional Authority in the existing governance landscape, their actual and potential roles and responsibilities in governance structures as well as the perceptions on potential institutional linkages between Traditional Authorities and District Assemblies in terms of administration and justice delivery.

We would be most grateful if you could answer these questions for us in order to achieve this objective. Your responses would be treated confidential.

#### Section A: Background of respondent

Name of respondent (optional)	Sex	Age	Highest Academic Qualification/ background	Designation

#### Section B: Background Issues on Local Governance and Links with Traditional Authorities

Q1. Which of the following will you accept as the definition of local governance?  
(Tick [✓] as appropriate).

- a). It involves performing the functions of a state which includes protection of citizens from external aggression and maintaining internal peace and security [ ]
- b). The process in which governing outcomes depend on the interaction of a complex set of institutions and actors drawn from but also beyond local government [ ]
- c). The process of bringing governance to the doorsteps of the beneficiaries of governance [ ]
- d). The strategies put in place to achieve local level development [ ]
- e). Governance at the grass root level [ ]
- f). None of the above [ ]

Q2. Are there any formal arrangements or common platform where the Assembly officials and Traditional leaders within your MMDA come together? 1. Yes 2. No

Q3. Please, explain which occasions the two authorities normally meet.....

Q4. Which of the following will you say is the aim of local governance (Tick as appropriate?)

- a). To enhance rural development
- b). To promote democracy
- c). To ensure fair distribution of resources
- d). Any other (specify).....

Q5. How would you rate the importance of the following traditional authorities in local governance within your MMDA?

Authority	Very important	Important	Not important
Paramount Chief			
Divisional Chief			
Queen Mothers			
Opinion Leaders			
Family Heads			

Q6. In your role as local government practitioner, how has any of the traditional authority aided your progress in the district?.....

.....

Q7. In your role as local government practitioner, how has any of the traditional authority negatively affected your work in the district?.....

.....

### **Section C: Integration of Traditional Authorities into Local Governance**

In a bid to play a more prominent role in the local governance process, chiefs have put forward the following preferred mode of integrating them into the assembly system. Please, indicate your reactions to these issues.

Q8. That, chiefs (not their representatives) should be allowed to fully participate in assembly deliberations in order to ensure that major decisions that concern their people are well taken on board. 1. Fully Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5.

Fully Disagree

Q9. Please, explain your answer to Q8.....



Q10. That there should be an upper chamber of the assembly made up of some carefully selected chiefs who would in conjunction with the executive committee of the assembly see to the final implementation of the deliberations of the general assembly. 1. Fully Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Fully Disagree

Q11. Please, explain the extent of your agreement or disagreement with Q10.....

.....

Q12. That government must provide every traditional council and palace with a police who would provide security services just as every house of chief executive and the chief himself is provided with a security guard. 1. Fully Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Fully Disagree

Q13. Please, explain the extent of your agreement or disagreement with Q12.....

.....

Q14. That each sub-committee of the MMDAs must have a chief or his /her representatives since these committees provide essential platforms that help to shape development policy and programmes at the local level. 1. Fully Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Fully Disagree

Q15. Please, explain the extent of your agreement or disagreement with Q14.....

.....

Q16. That Queen mothers lack sufficient representation at the assemblies to champion the cause of women/children and their communities 1. Fully Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Fully Disagree

Q17. Please, explain the extent of your agreement or disagreement with Q16.....

.....

Q18. That there is lack of transparency and accountability on the part of the assembly on the use of funds for developmental projects of the communities to the people through their traditional leaders. 1. Fully Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Fully Disagree

Q19. Please, explain the extent of your agreement or disagreement with Q18.....

.....

Q20. That there is lack of formal space for traditional authorities in the mainstream local governance structure. 1. Fully Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Fully Disagree

Q21. Please, explain the extent of your agreement or disagreement with Q20.....

Q22. What are your general views on having a joint ministerial portfolio for the Chieftaincy and Local Government Ministry? 1. Fully Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Fully Disagree

Q23. Please, explain the extent of your agreement or disagreement with Q22.....

.....

Q24. How can the working relations between traditional leaders and local government officials be improved?.....

Q25. What do you like most about traditional rule and traditional authorities?.....

Q26. What do you not like at all about traditional rule and traditional authorities?.....

Q27. How would you want the fusion of traditional authorities into the Assembly system to be like?.....

Q28. How do you rate the overall contribution of traditional authorities to the development your district? (1) Very effective (2) Effective (3) Not Sure (4) Ineffective (5) Very ineffective

Q29. Should Chiefs be appointed as DCEs? 1. Yes [ ] 2. No [ ] Please, explain your answer.....

Q30. What will be the effects of improper integration of Chiefs into the Local governance system?.....

Q31. Any suggestion about how to integrate traditional authorities into the local governance system.....

Thank you

## APPENDIX E

### INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR REGIONAL HOUSE OF CHIEFS

This is a PhD Research on the interface between the District Assemblies and Traditional Authorities. The research examines the participation of Traditional Authority in the existing governance landscape, their actual and potential roles and responsibilities in governance structures as well as the perceptions on potential institutional linkages between Traditional Authorities and District Assemblies in terms of administration and justice delivery.

We would be most grateful if you could answer these questions for us in order to achieve this objective. Your responses would be treated confidential.

1. Do you share the view that there is lack of formal space for traditional leaders in the mainstream local governance structure? 1. Yes 2. No
2. Give reasons for your answer.....
3. What are your general reactions towards the 30% consultation of Chiefs and relevant bodies towards the appointment of assembly membership?.....
4. How should Chiefs be notified with respect to their participation in the appointment of District Assembly members- formally or informally?.....  
.....
5. How many Chiefs are to be consulted in the particular district and at what levels (paramountcy or divisional)?.....

6. Which efforts are being made at the regional level to integrate indigenous knowledge issues and culture in development policy making?.....  
.....
7. How do you want the Chieftaincy system to be integrated into the local governance system?.....
8. Which aspects of the Chieftaincy Act would you want to see reviewed and why?.....
9. What would be the consequences of not integrating you properly into the local governance system?.....
10. Any General Remarks/ Suggestions about the study.....  
.....

Thank you