Abstract:
Generally, historians who deal with ancient Greek history and thereby tackle the Peloponnesian War have mostly failed to recognize the full significance or import of the Epiteichismos (Greek; “to build upon”) strategy and its contribution to the rise and the imperialistic ambition of Athens, and Athens’ subsequent defeat during the Peloponnesian War, owing perhaps to their different motive, orientation, philosophy, targeted audience and aim for writing. (De Ste. Croix (1972), Robinson (1962), Westlake (1969), Powell (1988), Pomeroy et al. (1999)). Notwithstanding the fact that Thucydides is the primary source with respect to the account of the Peloponnesian War, traits of the intendment of the Epiteichismos strategy are equally scattered throughout the history of antediluvian warfare. Using a critical analyses of primary and secondary sources, this paper noting the deficiencies in existing secondary sources makes an attempt to give not only a systematic and coherent outline of the significance of the Epiteichismos strategy as the war unfolds, but to also show how both Athens and Sparta exploit this strategy to their respective advantage in the Peloponnesian War
