EFFECTS OF THE COMBAT COMMUNITY POLICING PROJECT ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN SELECTED RURAL COMMUNITIES IN BRONG AHAFO REGION

BY

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Thesis submitted to the Institute for Development Studies of the College of Humanities and Legal Studies, University of Cape Coast, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Master of Philosophy degree in Peace and Development Studies

MAY 2018
DECLARATION

Candidate’s Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of my own original research and that no part of it has been presented for another degree in this university or elsewhere.

Candidate’s Signature: …………………………… Date: …………………

Name: …………………………………………………………………………

Supervisors’ Declaration

We hereby declare that the preparation and presentation of the thesis were supervised in accordance with the guidelines on supervision of thesis laid down by the University of Cape Coast.

Principal Supervisor’s Signature: ……………………… Date: …………………

Name: …………………………………………………………………………

Co-Supervisor’s Signature: ……………………… Date: …………………

Name: …………………………………………………………………………
ABSTRACT

The purpose of the study was to examine impact of the COMBAT community policing project on domestic violence in Brong Ahafo region of Ghana. The mixed-method approach, also known as methodological triangulation, was chosen for this study. Specifically, the descriptive case study design was adopted and a total of 89 respondents participated in the study. These included 31 police personnel, 30 COMBAT volunteers, 18 community residents, and 10 key informants. Data collection techniques included the use of both qualitative and quantitative interviews as well as focus group discussions. Also, secondary data were collected from different published and unpublished sources. The findings revealed that the COMBAT adopted three complementary strategies to holistically address domestic violence – proactive strategies, reactive strategies and women empowerment and livelihood improvement strategies. The findings also showed that COMBAT operations have contributed to obvious decline in domestic violence rates at the community level. Insufficient funding from donors, lack of transport logistics, and low incentives for volunteers were identified as major challenges of the project. In view of these, it was recommended that the COMBAT involved the Domestic Violence Secretariat, Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection, as well as District Assemblies (DAs) in the design and implementation of their activities as this partnership will help them receive both financial and material support when the need arises. Besides, the District COMBAT Executives were advised to work in close collaboration with the DISEC in order to get some sort of political support from the District Assemblies.
KEY WORDS

Collective efficacy

Community participation

Community policing

Community-Based Anti-Violence Team (COMBAT)

Crime

Domestic violence
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DEDICATION

To my dear wife,

Martha Osei-Marfo (Mrs.)
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Undoubtedly, little is known about the viability of community policing in Ghana, and even within the Ghana Police Service (GPS) itself. Previous works on effects of community policing on crime and violence, such as Kessler and Duncan (1996) and Issahaku (2012), have all been limited to large cities. Nonetheless, overly focusing such studies on large cities might not capture crucial variables since the processes by which crime is generated in urban areas differ from the dynamics in rural communities.

Practically, the study will be useful in giving GPS and other stakeholders an independent evaluation of a rural community policing project so as to inform policy decisions in this regard. Additionally, this work could serve as a reference point and give direction to future research on effects of community-led mechanisms in fighting community crime and violence.

Background to the Study

The evolution of crime has necessitated the emergence of unconventional policing methodologies across the globe. Indisputably, community safety has been a common challenge facing most societies in their development process. In response to this, community policing is considered a crucial approach to ensuring safe and crime-free societies. According to Rosenbaum (1994), community policing concept is based on the improvement of the quantity and quality of the policing, decentralization of the police organization and greater emphasis on the proactive strategies, directed to problem solving strategies, as well as on emphasis of the increased police
accountability to the citizen’s requirements and needs. Community policing is also defined as a management strategy which promotes the joint responsibility of the citizens and the police for the community safety, through a working partnership and interpersonal contacts (Palmiotto, 2000). It is a concept of performing police tasks, which accents the establishment of the police and community partnership aiming to reduce crime and strengthen security.

There is growing interest in community policing internationally as a way of involving communities in their security provision. However, the fluidity of the approach makes it difficult for professionals and academics to reach a consensus on what community policing ought to be. While some view community policing as inculcating community-orientation into state police operations, others see the approach as a process of bringing together a range of policing providers to cooperate on local safety issues. Still, others describe community policing as exclusively non-state actors who serve a policing function (Cross, 2013).

Obviously, safe environments provide viable grounds for individual and community growth. In stable societies, investments are guaranteed and people feel free to undertake gainful economic activities. Sen (1999) emphasises the role of community policing in peace and development of societies. Sen proposes that all societal functions are interconnected in such a manner that if the stability of policing arrangement in a community deteriorates, it has tendency to upset other societal functions as well. Thus, the role of policing is crucial to the development of every human society.
Sen (1999) views the concept of development as an accumulation of freedoms or civil liberties that citizens harness within a given society. Thus, the more freedoms a country has, the more developed it is. Besides, modern societies operate through the governing pillars of rule of law and respect for human rights. These human rights include political freedoms, economic freedoms, social opportunities and protective security.

Globally, victims of domestic violence face many challenges that often prevent them from accessing justice and receiving the immediate necessary services. Domestic violence includes violence perpetrated by intimate partners and other family members, and manifested through physical abuse (such as slapping, beating, arm twisting, stabbing, strangling, burning), sexual abuse (such as coerced sex through threats, intimidation or physical force, forcing unwanted sexual acts or forcing sex with others), psychological abuse (which includes behaviour that is intended to intimidate and persecute, and takes the form of threats of abandonment or abuse, confinement to the home, surveillance, threats to take away custody of the children, destruction of objects, isolation, verbal aggression and constant humiliation) and economic abuse, includes acts such as the denial of funds, refusal to contribute financially, denial of food and basic needs, and controlling access to health care, employment, etc. (United States Department of Justice [USDJ], 2015).

Apart from its effects on individual victims, domestic violence is a pervasive human rights violation that threatens the peace and development of all societies. The World Health Organisation (WHO) has stated that violence against women (which is a major form of domestic violence) is a major threat to socio-economic development, and directly links domestic violence to
poverty, lack of education, gender inequality, and maternal ill health (WHO Report, 2010).

In most developing countries, research has found that mechanisms at the community level to prevent domestic abuse or provide the needed support for victims of domestic violence are woefully lacking (Cordner, 2001). In Ghana, researchers and practitioners alike have found inherent limitations with the legislative approach to dealing with domestic violence in the country. For instance, Issahaku (2016) has noted that the domestic violence law, Act 732/2007, is reactionary rather than being proactive, corrective but not preventative, and adversarial rather than being socially transformative.

With the advent of community policing in 2001, reactions toward domestic violence in Ghana have mainly been driven by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), and women and children’s rights networks working in partnership with the state police (Amoakohene, 2004). However, these approaches have overlooked the need to empower local members to lead and manage such projects. To correct this, ActionAid Ghana (AAG), in collaboration with the Domestic Violence and Victims Support Unit (DOVVSU), has introduced a project called Community-Based Anti-Violence Team (COMBAT), whereby local community members are empowered to lead in the fight against all forms of domestic violence. Other actors in the COMBAT project include the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), Department of Social Welfare (DSW), District Assemblies (DAs) and other local NGOs.
Made up of three men and four women volunteers who are selected by the local chief in talk with the entire community, the COMBAT are trained by the DOVVSU and other state institutions to enforce and promote the human rights of women and children. It is reported that the structure of COMBAT, a combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches, largely accounts for the successes the project has chalked so far (AAG, 2012).

AAG started using the COMBAT module in 2005, and now operates in over 200 partner communities across six regions in Ghana. However, the COMBAT have been operating in 40 rural communities in Brong Ahafo (BA) Region since 2010. The Asutifi North, Asutifi South, Tain and Banda districts were selected for implementation of the COMBAT community policing project due to high rates of domestic violence the police recorded from these areas annually (AAG Report, 2012).

It is reported that the COMBAT have adopted multiple strategies which are not only capable of addressing the root causes of domestic violence but also, which economically empower women to make them independent to be able to stand up against all forms of domestic violence in their communities (AAG Report, 2011). This suggests the use of more proactive strategies by the COMBAT.

Evidence suggests that COMBATs have contributed immensely towards reduction in domestic violence cases at the community level. For instance, the Upper West Regional DOVVSU Command attributed a significant 50 percent decrease in domestic violence cases in the Sissala East District to the roles played by the COMBAT in the various rural communities.
(AAG Report, 2010). Likewise, the BA Regional DOVVSU Command has reported that efforts of the COMBAT have contributed to notable decline in domestic violence figures from 1,115 cases in 2013 to 936 cases in 2014 (AAG Report, 2015). Besides, crime statistics from the Tain, Banda, Asutifi North and Asutifi South Districts have shown consistent decline in domestic violence crimes since 2012 (Annual DV Crime Report-BAR, 2015), which decline has been associated with activities of the COMBAT.

Despite notable contributions of the COMBAT toward reduction of local crime rates in the operational communities, the teams seem to have critical challenges. Apart from lack of means of transportation that has been identified as the major challenge facing the COMBAT volunteers, issues of low motivation for the volunteers and poor police cooperation have also been cited (AAG Report, 2012).

The study reviewed three theories to explain the concepts of community policing and crime in general. First, the Broken Windows Theory (Wilson & Kelling, 1982) posits that social disorder indirectly leads to serious crime, thus suggests that the police should empower local communities to apply informal institutions to control social disorders so as not to escalate into serious crimes. Second, the Collective Efficacy Theory (Sampson, Raudenbush & Earls, 1997) argue that social cohesion and community mobilisation unleash a society’s latent capacity to control itself in order to prevent crime and disorder. Lastly, the Routine Activities Theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979) posits that crime occurs only when a motivated offender meets a suitable target in the absence of a capable guardian. This theory is necessary
because it provides explanation for domestic abuses despite the fact that these crimes are hidden, grossly undocumented and take place in private settings.

Brong Ahafo is a region in Ghana that is noted for its high rate of occurrence of domestic violence over the years. The Ghana Police Service has reported that in 2009, the region recorded 1,023 cases of domestic violence, while the rate was 1,278, 1,040, 1,257 and 1,115 in the years 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 respectively (Ghana News Agency, December 7, 2015), with worse situations in rural communities where there is no police presence.

In 2011, the BA Regional DOVVSU Command stated that the high rate of physical, economic, social and emotional abuse of women in the region greatly affected victims’ socio-economic development, and appealed to traditional rulers, NGOs, trade unions and academia to join in partnership with the criminal justice system, health care systems, and the educational sector to design an integrated framework that would address the needs of domestic violence victims holistically (Modern Ghana News, December 3, 2011).

Statement of the Problem

There has been a growing scholarship on the study of crime. In Ghana, such scholarly works include Appiahene-Gyamfi (2003), Tankebe (2011) and Owusu and Agyei-Mensah (2010). Regarding community policing, despite the fact that it has influenced policing strategies internationally and remains the most popular policing strategy today (Palmiotto, 2000; Skogan, 2006), early studies about the effects of community policing on crime and violence were limited to large cities (Kessler & Duncan, 1996; Wycoff & Skogan, 1993). Particularly, in Ghana, previous studies have failed to examine activities of
community policing in rural communities. The works of Adu-Mireku (2002), Acheampong (2015), Issahaku (2012), and Tankabe (2009), for example, all concentrated on policing and crime trends in larger cities at the neglect of what happens in other towns and villages.

However, focusing the investigation of effects of policing strategies on crime in large cities for the sake of convenience might not yield conclusive results since there exist fundamental variations in the processes through which crime is generated in rural and urban settings. Moreover, the practicality of community policing as a crime prevention strategy for rural communities also remain least researched. To fill this gap, the present study focuses on the effects of the COMBAT community policing project on domestic violence in selected rural communities in Asutifi North, Asutifi South, Tain and Banda districts of Brong Ahafo Region. The choice of these districts is justified by the fact that they have recorded rise in the occurrence of domestic violence. In the year 2012, CHRAJ, for instance, reported a total of 129 cases of human rights abuse against children and women at the Asutifi district (CHRAJ, 2012).

**Objectives of the Study**

The general objective of the study was to examine effects of the COMBAT community policing project on domestic violence in BA. Specifically, the study sought to:

1. Find out people’s views and awareness of community policing.
2. Analyse the structure and strategies of the COMBAT project.
3. Identify the roles and collaboration among actors in COMBAT.
4. Examine the influence of the COMBAT operations on local domestic violence rates.

5. Explore key challenges of the COMBAT programme.

Research Questions

1. What are people’s views and awareness of community policing?

2. What are the structure and strategies of the COMBAT?

3. What are the roles and level of collaboration among key actors in the COMBAT project?

4. What is the influence of operations COMBAT on local domestic violence rates?

5. What are the major challenges facing the COMBAT project?

Significance of the Study

The results of this study will be useful in giving both the DOVVSU Command and AAG an independent evaluation of the COMBAT project so as to inform future policy decisions regarding the project. Also, the study has some implications for peace and development in the study area and Brong Ahafo Region in general. Beyond that, this work could serve as a reference point and give direction to future research on effects of community-led mechanisms in fighting community crimes.

Delimitations

The study was limited to an investigation of the formation, operations, and effects of the COMBAT in BA. The study investigated the COMBATS in BA as one instance of community policing project, and did not attempt to
generalise the findings to similar efforts in other regions due to variations in contextual factors. Residents of BA who lived outside COMBAT operational communities were not included in the study. Even though COMBAT officers fight other crimes, only domestic violence offences were considered in this study.

Limitations

Major limitations of the study were the fact that only 10 out of 40 communities were selected to participate in the study due to the dotted nature of the communities and the cost and time required to cover all. Also, the total sample size of 18 from the residents’ category to participate in the various focus group discussions was not large enough. This sample size was influenced by both financial and time constraints emanating from the fact that 12 (67%) of the FGD participants were farmers who spent most of their day hours in their farms. Besides, the costs involved in organising an effective group discussion prevented the researcher from organising more than three FGDs. However, the random sampling techniques used in selecting both the communities and respondents ensured representativeness. Lastly, unwillingness on the part of most domestic violence victims/perpetrators to participate in the study limited the researcher to interview only two domestic violence victims and one perpetrator.

Definition of Terms

The basic concepts as used in the research are defined below:

*Domestic Violence*: Any act or behaviour, perceived or actual, that constitutes a threat or harm likely to result in physical, sexual, economic, emotional abuse
or a combination of these in a domestic relationship (APA Task Force, cited in Rakovec-Felser, 2014).

**Policing:** The process of maintaining social order by the state police, groups, NGOs, CSOs or individuals authorized to do so.

**Community policing:** Citizens participating in policing for the purposes of both crime prevention and community development.

**Development:** This refers to a process of expanding the real freedoms and rights, such as social, economic, political, cultural and emotional, that people enjoy (Zedner, 2009).

**Organisation of the study**

The thesis is made up of five chapters. Chapter One deals with the background, statement of problem, objectives, research questions, scope and significance of the study. Chapter Two focuses on review of related literature. Chapter Three presents the research methods used in the study which captures the research design, study area, study population, sample and sampling procedure, data collection, data analysis and ethical consideration. Chapter Four covers the empirical results of the study and discusses the findings. Finally, the summary, conclusions, and recommendations are presented in Chapter Five.
CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

The study sought to investigate the effects of community policing programmes on domestic violence in BA Region. It focused on operations of the Community-Based Anti-violence Team project being implemented by ActionAid Ghana in BA Region.

This chapter reviews three theories and other literature related to community policing and domestic violence. These are the Broken Windows Theory, Collective Efficacy Theory and Routine Activities Theory. Additionally, a review of findings from some empirical studies on community policing is presented.

Theoretical Review

Many theories explaining the philosophy, goal, and characteristics of both community policing and domestic violence exist. However, the Broken Windows Theory, Collective Efficacy Theory, and Routine Activities Theory were theoretical underpinnings of this study, since the COMBAT community policing intervention and domestic violence revolve around issues that these theories deal with.

Broken Windows Theory

In almost all academic discourses on community policing, Broken Windows Theory, which posits that social disorder indirectly leads to serious crime (Wilson & Kelling, 1982), has been an influential frame of thought adopted to serve as a conceptual framework to adequately offer explanations for modern policing strategy. In the views of Wilson and Kelling, social
disorder is a precursor to or predictor of serious crime. The authors contend that physical signs of disorder in communities signal fear and unconcern among residents, thus signifying a breakdown in the informal institutions that check social disorder at the neighbourhood level.

Likewise, Gault and Silver (2008) defined Broken Windows Theory as “the idea that disorderly conditions left untended will lead to serious crime, much like a broken window left unfixed will lead to the breaking of more windows, and eventually to the demise of the entire building” (p. 240). According to this theory, the broken window sends a signal to members of the community that no one is in charge of the building or cares about it and, for that reason, causing more damage to the building costs nothing.

In essence, the broken window represents ways through which behavioural standards break down in a community. It suggests that, once people begin disregarding norms that keep order in a community without being sanctioned by authorities, both order and community slacken. Thus, signs of disorder such as street drunks, open drug peddling, physical attack of pedestrians by panhandlers and littering of the neighbourhood are signs of community deterioration, which leads to breakdown of informal community control and social organisation (Wilson & Kelling, 1982). Socially organised community is a replica of families caring for their homes, confidently interrogating intruders and suspicious behaviours, and ensuring stability with less in and out movement within the community.

Unlike the definitions offered by Wilson and Kelling (1982) and Gault and Silver (2008), Sampson and Raudenbush (1999) view disorder as crime,
even if it is at “different ends of the ‘seriousness’ continuum” (p. 608). This suggests that both physical and social disorders are evidence of crimes and ordinance violations but not just precursors. According Sampson and Raudenbush, both disorder and crime are manifestations of weakened informal social controls and structural antecedents. Much as I agree that most social disorders amount to offences depending on the political jurisdictions where they occur, not all social disorders are crimes using the ‘seriousness continuum’ so long as they are not written in the criminal procedure codes of the jurisdictions involved.

Practically, Wilson and Kelling’s (1982) broken windows model focuses on the significance of disorder in generating and sustaining more serious crime. They posit that disorder leads to increased fear and withdrawal from residents, thus encouraging more serious crimes to occur in the community owing to decreased levels of informal social control. For example, if artisanal mining (galamsey) activities attract many drug addicts, prostitutes, and violent people into a hitherto peaceful community, law abiding residents might begin relocating for fear of their life until such time that the community would be saturated with the artisanal miners who behave similarly. When that happens, informal social control systems break, resulting in higher crime rates because no one cares about each other.

In the preceding hypothetical situation, application of the Broken Windows Theory to community policing suggests that, the police can play a key role in indirectly disrupting this ‘disorder – fear’ and ‘withdrawal – violence’ cycle by adopting policing strategies that tackle disorder in communities which have not yet been overtaken by serious crimes. This will
help to reduce fear and subsequent residents’ withdrawal from the community. Since social disorders do not directly connote crimes, this theory proposes that the police act as fellow community members to help deal with social disorders without necessarily arresting those involved, with the ultimate aim of preventing the disorders from escalating into serious crimes.

The Broken Windows Theory has been difficult to appraise due to the variety of ways in which the model has been applied by various police agencies. For instance, the broken windows policing has been misconstrued for zero-tolerance policing in which disorder is aggressively policed and violators immediately arrested. However, the broken windows approach is far more nuanced than zero-tolerance allows, and so it would seem unfair to evaluate its effectiveness based on the aggressive arrest-based approaches that reduce officer discretion. Thus, the paradox may be that police departments are not really using broken windows policing when they claim to be using it.

According to Kelling and Coles (1996), proper evaluation of the broken windows treatment requires undeniably involving community outreach and officer discretion. This implies that individual patrol officers must have the power to decide whether an arrest is appropriate in a given situation, and many police stops and encounters with citizens in broken windows policing should not end up in arrests. As opposed to a zero-tolerance policy that focuses on arresting all minor offenders, Kelling and Coles describe a more community-oriented approach to partnering with residents and community groups to tackle disorder collectively in a way that still respects the civil liberties of offenders.
Some theorists reject the Broken Windows Theory by casting serious doubt on the connection between disorder and crime, thus questioning the rationale for policing disorder. According to this school of thought, those incidents which might be regarded as disturbances, but do not involve illegalities, are surely not the areas in which the police should intervene (Kinsay, Lea, & Young, 1986). I disagree with these theorists on the grounds that changing dynamics in modern societies have placed a responsibility on every citizen to ensure the safety of his environment. Simply put, security is a shared responsibility and since the police are part of our communities, they cannot remain unconcerned at the sight of gross social disorders and wait until the disorders become crimes before they act.

Matthews (1992) strongly opposes the idea of community policing on the grounds that there is no causal relationship between disorder and crime, arguing that only a minimal degree of empirical research supports this theory. Conversely, the findings of an empirical research by Silverman and Della-Giustina (2001) revealed that public drunkenness, gambling and prostitution often escalated into fights, robberies, and street shootings. I am of the view that the applicability of the broken windows policing approach should not only be judged based on the number of available empirical evidence supporting the theory but also, it must be considered a theory that argues for adopting preventative approach to dealing with violent crimes. Connecting it to the operations of the COMBAT, the officers do not wait till a misunderstanding between partners in a conjugal relationship result in spousal battery before they react, simply because heated verbal arguments do not constitute a crime.
Arguing out the linkage between disorder and crime, Kelling and Bratton (1998) further reinforced the broken windows thesis and stated that waiting until serious crimes occur to intervene is too late. Thus, dealing with disorderly behaviour early would prevent the cycle from accelerating and perpetuating itself. It could be deduced from this line of argument that the broken windows model suggests a long-term indirect link between disorder enforcement and a reduction in serious crimes. For this reason, if evaluation of the theory is undertaken within a short time, it may not be appropriately evaluating broken windows interventions.

Despite many criticisms against this theory, Meares and Kahan contend that broken windows policing was a key example of using legal policy to harness informal social norms for the purpose of augmenting law-abidingness (as cited in Harcourt, 2009). Otherwise put, broken windows policing reveals the potential in the appropriate interaction of laws and social norms to affect illegal conduct. The broken windows policing has the tendency to prevent crime through a social influence mechanism, not by changing the price of criminal behaviour. This explains how the COMBAT community policing mechanism operates through the use of local information centres, schools, churches, market campaigns, youth groups, among others, to influence people’s perceptions and attitudes towards domestic violence.

Even though the Broken Windows Theory largely explains the foundations for the gradual paradigm shift from the conventional policing approach towards crime to the community policing approach, it is not enough in itself to explain what accounts for the ability of certain communities to control social disorders more effectively than others, given similar
circumstances. Since this study’s focus was on the effect of the COMBAT community policing programme on domestic violence in BA, the need to consider another theory that captured the dynamics in different environments (contexts) that made some community policing programmes more successful than others became indispensable. As such, the collective efficacy theory was also reviewed to fill those gaps.

**Collective Efficacy Theory**

Originally, Bandura (1997) defined Collective Efficacy Theory (CET) as “a group’s shared beliefs in its conjoint capabilities to organise and execute the courses of action required to produce given levels of attainment” (p. 477). This is a build-up on theory of self-efficacy which, according to Bandura (1982), represents the “judgments of how well one can execute courses of action required to deal with prospective situations” (p. 122). Bandura advocates that, communities require interdependence of human functioning and collective agency to be able to realise a desired change. This is in line with the fundamental assumption of community policing that effective crime fighting requires police-community partnership in organisation and execution of the courses of action to prevent or reduce crime.

Building on notions of trust, cohesion, self-efficacy, collective action and informal social control, collective efficacy has been defined as ‘social cohesion among neighbours combined with their willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good’ (Sampson, Raubenbush, & Earls, 1997, p. 918). Sampson, Raubenbush and Earls et al. suggest that a combination of social ties, mutual trust, and social cohesion among residents of a community could become an effective tool for social control only when they have been
cooperatively directed towards a common target. This implies that collective efficacy is a task-specific process.

With regards to the COMBAT community policing, collective efficacy has the capacity to mediate the relationship between structural characteristics and violent crime. This is supported by the position of Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997) that communities where residents trust one another and exhibit preparedness to employ informal social control mechanisms do experience less crime. The theory has sparked a burgeoning interest in understanding the influence of ‘context’ amongst academic criminologists, social commentators and the public alike.

Of particular relevance to the present study of collective efficacy in BA is Sampson’s (2006) argument that ‘application of neighbourhood studies to other societal contexts is badly needed if we are to make further progress in understanding the generalizability of the link between community social mechanisms and crime rates’ (p. 162). Numerous studies in USA have tested the collective efficacy-crime nexus and reported a negative relationship (Browning et al., 2004; Mazerolle et al., 2010; Sampson & Wikström, 2008).

However, there have been some divergent results in other contexts (Villareal & Silva, 2006). Having said that, a meta-analysis by Pratt and Cullen (2005) found that collective efficacy seemed to be a central concept in the explanation of crime. In essence, the extent of collective efficacy in a neighbourhood seems to act to discourage or promote criminal acts by those with greater tendency for crime.
Unlike other critics who vehemently oppose the link between physical disorder and crime as posited by the proponents of the broken windows model, Sampson and Raudenbush (1999) explain that collective efficacy is the key concept that nullifies the connection between disorder and crime. They believe that the relationship between disorder and crime is forged, and argue that the common source of both disorder and crime is the social cohesion among community members and how they direct it towards specific collective goals (collective efficacy). This explains why much attention must be given to contexts when evaluating the effectiveness of any community policing programme such as the COMBAT.

Moreover, Sampson and Raudenbush (1999) have posited that the differential ability of communities to appreciate the common values of members and maintain effective social controls is the major source of neighbourhood variation in violence. This argument implies that socially cohesive neighbourhoods will prove better contexts for the realisation of informal social control. Invoking the broken window theory, Sampson and Raudenbush saw the ‘no one cares’ syndrome as another way of saying there is no collective willingness on the part of residents to intervene for the common good, thus un repaired broken windows are manifestations of lack of neighbourhood social control (collective efficacy).

According to Sampson (2004), while studies have found collectively efficacious communities to experience fewer social problems, less is known about community settings and institutions that promote collective efficacy. This implies that, instead of focusing on the role of neighbourhood structural features and social ties to explain neighbourhood problems, much attention
should be paid to the collective processes that protect communities against a range of neighbourhood problems. A recent study suggests that collective efficacy is considered the key explanatory process associated with the spatial distribution of a range of social problems (Wickes, Hipp, Sargeant, & Homel, 2013).

Bandura (1997) argues that collective efficacy varies across environments and represents beliefs pertaining to specific tasks. The necessity to examine why citizens may or may not be willing to become partners with the police and take responsibility for problems in their communities have largely been ignored in community policing literature. However, to better appreciate why residents may or may not take specific actions in the face of perceived neighbourhood problems, one cannot underestimate the importance of the collective efficacy theory. This is because collective efficacy suggests that the absence of certain conditions in neighbourhoods reduces the chances that residents will act in ways to enhance community life (Sampson, 2004).

Several studies have concluded that collective efficacy predicts group aspirations and motivational investment in undertakings, performance accomplishments (Bandura, 2000), organisational commitment, and job satisfaction (Walumbwa, Wang, & Lawler, 2003). These research findings should guide researchers who wish to investigate the effectiveness of community policing projects, such as the COMBATs, bearing in mind that collective efficacy plays a key role in the success or failure of any such projects. Even though collective efficacy varies across situational circumstances, studies have also shown that the association between collective efficacy and social problems is found in both developed and developing
countries (Maimon et al., 2010; Mazerolle et al., 2010; Sampson & Wikstrom, 2008; Zhang et al., 2007), thus making it a key theory to review in this study.

Research has found that features of the environment, such as population, income and heterogeneity, affect crime rates through the mediating effects of social ties, cohesion, and trust among residents (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993; Morenoff et al., 2001; Rose & Clear, 1998; Sampson, Raubenbush, & Earls, 1997). Likewise, Bandura (2000) refers to collective efficacy as the “interactive, coordinative, and synergistic dynamics” of a group’s transactions (p. 75).

Routine Activities Theory

The Routine Activities Theory (RAT) posits that the occurrence of criminal activities requires the convergence of three elements: a motivated offender, a suitable target and the absence of capable guardians (Cohen & Felson, 1979). Even though it has features of rational choice and criminological theories, the routine activities theory is built on human ecological theory whereby social structures ensure such convergence.

There are two main assumptions that underpin the routine activities approach: (1) in order for crime to occur, motivated offenders must converge with suitable targets in the absence of a capable guardian, and (2) that the probability of this occurring is influenced by our routine activities - including our work, family, leisure, and consumption activities (Cohen & Felson, 2003).

Basically, the RAT approach assumes that the frequency of crime will decrease if (1) the probability of success is decreased, (2) the perceived benefits are reduced, and (3) the perceived costs are increased (Cohen &
Felson, 1979). In effect, when potential criminals perceive prior attempts as successful and feel they are likely to avoid punishment, they are more likely to engage in criminal activities (Dugan et al, 2005).

This approach emphasises time and space as a vital utility for understanding locations of crime, while explaining the situational features. According to Felson (2003), since illegal activities must feed upon other activities, the spatial and temporal structure of routine activities should play an important role in determining the location, type and quantity of illegal acts. Emphasis on location, therefore, makes crime an integral part of our social organisation.

The theory defines how changes in social and economic conditions influence the general crime rate. Felson and Cohen (1980) propose that criminal activities are a “structurally significant phenomenon” (p. 390), implying that violations are neither random nor trivial events. Consequently, it is the everyday activities that people engage in over the course of their lives that render some entities (people or objects) more vulnerable to be considered as suitable targets by rationally calculating offenders.

First, RAT looks at crime from an offender’s viewpoint. It is the offender’s assessment of a situation that determines whether a crime should take place. Possible reasons that motivate people to commit crime include need, environment or experience, and beliefs. Second, a suitable target can be described as any person or property that any offender would like to take or control. Third, capable guardian is either a person or thing that discourages offenders from committing crime, such as police officers, vigilante groups,
secured locks, fences, alarm systems, barriers, security cameras, lighting and neighbours.

Though the RAT had originally been developed for the analysis of crime rates, the theory has also been applied to many domestic violence crimes. For instance, Leclerc and Felson (2016) successfully applied RAT to child sex abuse cases despite the fact that these crimes are hidden, grossly undocumented and take place in private settings. Empirical research on sexual violence offers vital information with regards to the timing, context and how these crimes take place. Research has found that in close family relations, the settings provide opportunities without posing high risks for the offender in cases of younger victims (Snyder, 2000).

Despite its enormous applications, the RAT approach has been criticised for its theoretical deficiencies. First, RAT views crime as an inherent feature of social organization, suggesting that offenders are no different from other individuals and that the motivation to commit crime is evenly distributed across the population. However, Garland (1999) argues that all crime is local and no two situations are ever the same. Thus, the RAT approach takes for granted how culture influences divergent motivations for crime.

Additionally, RAT has been criticised for its failure to provide a lucid explanation for which groups of people form part of or what basically makes people victims, offenders, or capable guardians. According to Kornhauser (1978), this lack of articulation can be described as aleatory processes, which include all those characteristics of individuals that affect their exposure to
differential associations and all those characteristics of situations that affect the differential diffusion of culture patterns.

The Concept of Community Policing

The history of policing reveals that the idea of community policing was first conceived and documented by Sir Robert Peel, the father of modern professional policing, in 1928 (Jordan, 2016). As such, Braiden (1992) notes that when Sir Robert Peel established the pioneer London Metropolitan Police, he set forth a number of principles, one of which could be considered the seed of community policing: “the police are the public and the public are the police.” (p. 108). The author, however, stated that the police lost sight of this relationship as the central organising concept for police service for several reasons.

The definition of community policing differs greatly among police researchers, professionals and organisations. Whereas some describe community policing by purpose and functions, some do so by structure and programmes, and still others as a philosophy. As a result of this lack of conceptual clarity and agreement in community policing as an idea or programme, Peak and Glenor (1996) have noted that new policing strategies such as community-oriented policing, problem-oriented policing, neighbourhood-oriented policing and a host of others have often been misconstrued for community policing.

The community policing concept emphasises policing with and for the community rather than policing of the community. This policing approach seeks to improve the quality of life in communities. In improving the quality
of life, police agencies aim to solve community problems together with the community residents as defined by the members of the community. Beyond this, the concept of community policing, specifically what is involved in implementing community policing, has proven problematic to unequivocally define.

According to Rawlings (2002), “at the crux of the partnerships is the belief that the prevention and reduction of crime and disorder problems require the coordinated, concentrated effort of individuals and agencies affected by and concerned with the problems. Because crime has multiple causes, solutions must be equally multifaceted and cannot be reached by the police acting alone” (p. 204).

According to Herbert (2001), community policing is where “officers and neighbourhood residents approach each other as co-equal partners in the design and implementation of programmes designed to address local problems. Such co-production practices can plausibly lead to greater effectiveness and greater legitimacy: effectiveness because the community would be more fully involved; legitimacy because the police would be open to democratic oversight. Similarly, the Police Executive Research Forum (2008) refers to the concept of community policing as “an organisation-wide philosophy and management approach that promotes partnerships, proactive problem-solving, and community engagement to address the causes of crime, the fear of crime, and other community issues.” (p. 7).

All community policing programmes attempt to create and sustain positive working relationships between the police and the community with the
intent to reduce crime (Chappell, 2009). However, Gilbert and Settles (2007) argue that community justice should be indigenous to the neighbourhoods served, and that such programmes should not be imposed from the outside but should emerge from discussions about neighbourhood problems and how best to respond to these problems by residents of the neighbourhood. This philosophy of community policing suggests that before the police implement policies in any neighbourhood, they first need input from the members in order to help identify their problems (Fielding, 2005; Skogan, 2004).

**Salient Principles of Community Policing**

Analysing the philosophy of community policing from both theoretical and experiential perspectives, two defining principles underlie all community policing efforts - community participation (partnership) and problem-solving. Community policing underscores the significance of active partnership among the police, the community, civil societies, traditional authorities, and other agencies of government working together to identify and find home-grown solutions to crime related problems in the community.

Community participation can be defined as the process through which stakeholders influence and take part in decision making, which includes the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of programmes and projects (Morgan, 1993). Similarly, the World Bank (1992) defines participation as a process whereby those with legitimate interest in project influence decisions which affect them.

Even though causality of crimes varies from one jurisdiction to another, depending on many factors, community participation must be an
essential component of all crime prevention efforts irrespective of the setting. Community participation renders more efficient and effective control than any programme by the state police alone (Hillier, 2008). From sociological perspective, solutions for crime and deviant behaviour, when premised on community participation, has a greater success rate since community members become active defenders of their space against crime (Hillier, 2008; Wong, 2008)

Generally, community partnerships require strong cooperation and collaboration between the state and law-abiding citizens in a win-win relationship. In community policing, partnerships may be built between the police and community and other entities within local jurisdictions for the purposes of crime prevention, crime reduction, and maintenance of order.

Public-police partnerships offer the opportunity to incorporate the public who make up a community, so as to develop social structures in that community. Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990) state that “the police must form a partnership with people in the community, allowing average citizens the opportunity to have input into the police process, in exchange for their support and participation” and that “contemporary community problems require a new decentralized and personalized police approach, one that involves people in the process of policing themselves” (p. 166).

Lovell (1992) notes that, to examine the levels of participation in any community project, the researcher must understand the context in which it takes place. This requires knowledge of variables such as population numbers and density, economic conditions, religious traditions, literacy, health status,
physical benefits, political economy, government structures and effectiveness, and levels of infrastructural development. This suggests that strategies that may be effective in one community might not necessarily be needed or appropriate in another because of differences in contextual constraints and possibilities.

The second most dominant principle of community policing is problem-solving. Cherry (2015) defines problem-solving as a mental process that involves discovering, analysing, and resolving difficulties. She further posits that the ultimate goal of problem-solving is to overcome obstacles and find a solution that best resolves the issue, adding that the best strategy for solving a particular problem depends largely on the unique situation.

Evidence suggests that most of the earlier theoretical models of problem-solving were formulated from the point of view of an ‘external’ observer, thus making them rather less effective (Newell & Simon, 1972; Osborne, 1963). This can be likened to the traditional policing approach where the police are viewed as an external force which imposes law enforcement on citizens.

On the contrary, recent problem-solving models try to make inquiries into issues from an ‘internal’ point of view of the observer, examining the cognitive processes that take part in the task of solving a problem (Simonton, 1984). The models support the COMBAT’s notion that their effectiveness in dealing with domestic violence is the result of their joint efforts with the stakeholders in the problem identification and resolution processes.
Community Policing and Crime Prevention

The institutionalisation of community policing was a reaction to a perception that nothing works in terms of crime control strategies of the police. Thus, the concept of community policing can be defined as both policing philosophy and policing strategy. The philosophical approach assumes that police officers and private citizens, working together in creative ways, can help solve community problems related to social and physical disorder as well as neighbourhood decay (Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990).

On the other hand, central to the strategic view of community policing is image branding through healthy police-public relations. This involves efforts that promote community-sensitive police service, prioritisation of community needs, respect for human rights, regular positive contacts with community members, cultural sensitivity and tolerance, exercise of good police discretion, and police accountability and transparency (Cordner, 2000).

Under normal circumstances, every community desires peace and development and this requires specific arrangements among societal agencies to put crime in check. For instance, Geason and Wilson (1988) note that during high rates of crime in the United States, law enforcement agencies turn to the community for assistance. Extant research suggests that in the absence of help from the public, crime cannot be significantly reduced even if more money, manpower, and improved technology are used (Lindsay & McGillis, 1986).

Domestic violence, in particular, is an area of crime where community and police collaboration is crucial. This is because most domestic violence
incidents occur in private spaces where the general public hardly witness. In such situations, Geason and Wilson (1988) note that only “a resident can make sure a household is secure; only a neighbour can recognize suspicious activity at a backdoor” (p.19).

In his evaluation of a number of community policing programmes in some American cities, Yin (1986) concluded that successful community crime prevention programmes were those involving a complex range of activities, including neighbourhood watch programmes, police patrols, better communication between police and community, and effective communication among residents. Above all, he noted that the most successful interventions against crime were those involving joint action by residents and local police.

**Evaluating the Success of Community Policing Programme**

The goal of every community policing project is to reduce crime and disorder by cautiously examining their characteristics in the neighbourhood and then applying appropriate remedies to resolve them. It is important to emphasise that the careful analysis of the crime patterns in a neighbourhood and the application of suitable remedies are shared responsibilities of all stakeholders (Fielding, 2005; Skogan, 2004). This demands tapping into the expertise and resources that exist within the communities so as to relieve the police of some of their human and material constraints.

Research has revealed that citizens are more willing to be involved in informal social control of their neighbourhood when they know they can count on police officers to back up their decisions (Terpstra, 2009). Explaining why most residents often remained unconcerned about crimes, Carr (2005) and
Newburn (2001) have both noted that most residents are not conversant with that kind of tactics that should be applied to control or prevent crime in their neighbourhoods.

Palmiotto (2000) delineates three important criteria for measuring the success of community policing initiatives. These are effectiveness, efficiency, and equity. The author refers to effectiveness as the quality of delivery of police services, such that it meets the expectations of the community. This suggests effectiveness to include reduction in local crime, decreased citizens’ fear of crime, and improved quality of life in the community. Likewise, Oliver (2004) identifies measures of effectiveness in community policing programmes to include “concentrating on solving community problems, how the community and the police work together in partnership, and the level of customer satisfaction” (p. 337).

In the same vein, Palmiotto (2000) writes that the efficiency of community policing programme is measured by evaluating whether the strategy has obtained the best results from the available resources, and whether the resources are being used to their fullest in order to solve community problems. Additionally, the author notes that the equity criterion refers to the fair distribution of police services. In community policing, equity involves equal access to police services, equal treatment by the police and equal distribution of police services and resources among communities (Palmiotto, 2000).
Traditional Policing versus Community Policing

Unlike the traditional model where policing is directed solely to crime-fighting and most important measures of police effectiveness are crime statistics, the community-policing strategy defines an effective police work as meeting citizens’ needs and expectations, and the ultimate objective is to make people feel safe in their communities.

According to Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990), crime is not the only measure that average citizens use to assess the police. What citizens are most concerned with and confront daily are their fear and the quality of life in their neighbourhoods. Many researchers agree that fear of crime was more prevalent than crime because it reflected not only direct and indirect victimizations but also, it breeds disorder in the community as well (Skogan, 1987; Tyler, 1990).

Existing empirical studies support the contention that disorder constitutes an important source of citizens’ fear. Covington and Taylor’s (1991) study found that residents’ perceptions of vulgarities are the strongest predictor of fear. Accordingly, Perkins and Taylor (1996) established a significant relationship between residents’ fear of crime and all of the measures of community disorder across three contexts.

More so, the disorder-fear nexus inspires the prominence of disorder control as a means to fear reduction. In the 1960s, The Victims’ Rights Movement and Criminal Justice Research was the first to encourage serious police attention to fear of crime in the United States, shifting many urban
police departments’ attention to consider the fear of crime as a legitimate police goal (Silverman & Della-Giustina, 2001).

Consequently, fear of crime became a key issue for the police, and fear reduction was acknowledged as an important police function. The argument is that, people tend to conclude that the police are reluctant or unable to deal with community problems, when they are in the state of fear. This implies that citizens’ fear and perceptions of neighbourhood conditions may translate directly into their evaluations of police performance. Therefore, citizens’ fear and perceived quality of life in their community should be considered as the external measures of police effectiveness in addition to crime statistics.

Research has proven that traditional policing is incident-oriented. This means that the approach does not change or reduce the total number of criminals in society at any given time except that it keeps changing their locations, thus moving some of them from the neighbourhoods to police cells and prisons. According to Xu, Fiedler and Flaming (2005), this practice requires that someone has become a victim before the police act, inferring that the police will not take action against disorderly behaviour until it has escalated into a criminal act, nor will they address the social conditions that give birth to crimes. In this sense, the traditional approach is institutionally unresponsive until an individual has turned into a criminal, a crime has been actualised, or someone has been victimised.

Conversely, community policing aims at more effective ways to fighting crime by emphasising proactive policing and crime prevention. As Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990) suggest, the best solution for any crime
is prevention, thus dealing with the problem before harm is done. In the long run, crime prevention may actually reduce the number of criminals and lower the social cost of crime. Practically, proactive policing necessitates removal of the social conditions of crime, and considers disorder as a proximate predictor of crime. Community policing also takes into account the root causes of crime such as poverty, marginalisation, discrimination, and horizontal inequalities as well as normative factors such as socio-cultural values of communities. Based on a crucial assumption of the connection between disorder and crime, the philosophies of community policing argue that efficient policing must target both.

The Concept of Domestic Violence

The concept of domestic violence has received varied definitions and interpretations from different scholars and practitioners. The USDJ (2015) defines domestic violence as a pattern of abusive behaviour in any relationship that is used by one partner to gain or maintain power and control over another intimate partner. It may include physical, sexual, emotional, economic, or psychological actions or threats of actions that intimidate, manipulate, humiliate, isolate, frighten, terrorize, coerce, threaten, blame, hurt, injure, or wound someone. However, this definition does not take into consideration abuses directed at children in conjugal relationships.

On the other hand, the International Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA) underscores the fact that domestic violence represents a pattern of behaviour rather than a single isolated episode, and can also involve children within the household, house help and even infants. According to the Coalition on Violence Against Women (COVAW) (2003), domestic violence within the
home is about power and control, where the perpetrator of the same uses violence as a way of restraining the other. The COVAW indicates that domestic violence includes dowry related violence, marital rape, and all harmful traditional practices.

**Causes of domestic violence**

The causes of domestic abuse can be complex, but there are also many myths about why some people abuse others with whom they have close relations. According to Strauss (1973), the general system theory views violence as a system rather than as a result of individual mental disturbance. It describes a system of violence that operates at the individual, family, and societal levels that manifests in stereotyped family violence imagery learned in childhood and continually reaffirmed through social and cultural interactions.

According to the resource theory of domestic violence, the more resources (social, personal, and economic) a person can command, the more power he or she exercises. This theory argues that the individual who is rich in terms of these resources has less need to use physical force. In contrast, a person with little education, low job prestige and income may use violence to compensate for a real or perceived lack of resources and to maintain dominance. Research shows that serious physical acts of wife abuse are more likely to occur in poorer homes (National Family Violence Survey, 1985).

Moreover, the sub-culture violence theory posits that some groups within society hold values that encourage, and even permit the use of violence. Offered as an explanation of why some segments of society and some cultures are more violent than others, this theory is perhaps the most widely accepted
theory of violence. For example, African-American teenagers endorsed reactive violence (i.e. violence used in response to actual or perceived threats) at higher levels than Whites and Hispanics (Funk et al., 1999)

In the view of the World Health Organisation (WHO), lack of legal protection within the sanctity of the home is a strong factor that perpetuates violence against women (WHO, 1996). Similarly, in many countries, domestic violence is exacerbated by legislations, law enforcement and judicial systems that do not recognise domestic violence as a crime. For instance, when committed against a woman in an intimate relationship, these attacks are more often tolerated as norms (UNICEF, 1999).

Moreover, the role of alcohol and drug abuse in family violence is also documented (Wilson et al., 2000). Even though researchers generally do not consider alcohol and drug use to be the cause of violence, they recognize that it can contribute to, accelerate, or increase aggression. Multiple sources of data establish a correlation between substance abuse and violence (e.g. Shannan, 2007).

Furthermore, feminist theories of violence against women emphasise that patriarchal structures of gender-based inequalities of power in society are the root causes of domestic violence. That is, the violence, rather than being an individual psychological problem, is instead an expression of male domination over females. Violence against women, in the feminist view, includes a variety of control tactics directed at women (Dobash & Dobash, 1979).
Effects of domestic violence

Domestic violence has wide ranging effects on the victim, which have always been pain and suffering. These effects could be both short term and long term. Besides, the effects could be both physical and psychological and can impact the direct victim as well as any children who witness parental violence.

In most cases, the physical injuries sustained by women appear to cause health difficulties as they are ageing. For instance, hypertension, arthritis and heart diseases have been identified with battered women as directly caused by serious domestic violence in their adult lives (Perrone, 1992). The author further notes that medical disorders such as diabetes or hypertension may be aggravated in victims of domestic violence because the abuser may not allow them access to adequate medical care.

Similarly, Strauss (1990) notes that emotional and psychological abuse inflicted by batterers have longer term impacts and may be more costly to treat than the physical injuries. Specifically, Barnett (2000) found that depression remains the leading response to domestic violence, indicating that 60 percent battered women reported depression. Several empirical studies have shown a significant correlation between domestic violence and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), characterised by symptoms such as nightmares, intrusive imagery, flashbacks, insomnia, and hyper-vigilance (Mertin & Mohr, 2000; Vitanza, Vogel & Marshal, 1995).

The most serious among the effects of domestic violence on the victims is when they lose their lives as a result of the abuse. This takes several
forms as manslaughter, murder, suicide or through sexually transmitted
diseases like HIV AIDS. In a study conducted in America, Fischbach and
Herbert (1997) found that battered women are at greater risk for suicide
attempts.

Empirical Review of Community Policing Projects

In this section, two distinct empirical works conducted by the Battered
Women’s Justice Project (BWJP) and the Overseas Development Institute
(ODI) were reviewed. These empirical works looked at the structures and
effects of community policing on domestic violence in particular, and crime
and violence in general.

Marin county case study

This study was conducted by the BWJP between 1999 and 2001 to
examine the impact of community policing on domestic violence in four
selected communities, including Marin County in California. The BWJP NGO
in the United States exists to promote justice and safety for victims of
domestic violence and their families.

Marin is a predominantly urban county in California with a little over
250,000 population and has sixteen agencies that provide policing services.
These included Marin County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO), Municipal Police
Departments in Novato, Mill Valley, Sausalito, Twin Cities, San Anselmo,
Tiburon, Fairfax, Ross, and Belvedere, the College of Marin, and the
Californian Highway Patrol, California State Parks Police, National Park
Service Police at Sausalito, and Point Reyes.
The major partners in the County’s community policing project were MCSO, Marin Abused Women’s Services (MAWS), Community Unit Responding to Batterers (CURB), Domestic Violence Coordinating Council (DVCC), Marin County law enforcement agencies as well as residents of the County.

Initially, the MCSO, being the main law enforcement provider in Marin County, partnered with MAWS to design a community policing methodology to address domestic violence in the county, which the latter agreed and assigned a full-time Deputy Sheriff to work in the MAWS’s office. The Deputy Sheriff worked as a liaison and created the Community Policing Action Team.

The key objective of the Marin County community policing project was to promote co-production of safety by increasing social capital and creating and maintaining links with citizens who felt estranged and helpless when confronting problems in their communities. Additionally, the project sought to reduce the rates of recidivism through post-arrest interventions in the prison.

In operation, the MAWS provided support services to domestic violence victims, including the operation of hotlines for only domestic violence cases, running of emergency shelter, a transitional housing programme, women’s support and advocacy services, legal referrals, among others. In addition, it also developed an education programme that focused on changing patterns of men’s violent behaviour.
Being the facilitator of the project, the MAWS formed Community Action Teams (CAT), made up of local volunteers and assisted by MAWS’s staff, which organised and planned prevention campaigns. The CATs provided opportunity for community members to cooperatively organise campaigns that held domestic violence perpetrators answerable and transformed informal institutions which condoned the act.

Additionally, the DVCC handled issues of coordination and response to domestic violence across community organisations, government agencies, and the courts. It was noticed that the council was formed to increase safety for those who were potentially and currently affected by domestic violence. Also, the DVCC sponsored community awareness and action.

To achieve co-production of safety, the project clearly outlined the role of the police as that of “catalysts for local change, helping residents to exploit their own informal social control abilities.” while that of the advocates was to “serve a critical capacity by ensuring police understand the dimension and complexity of violence against women” (Sadusky, 2003). This way, the police and the partners had very different but complementary roles.

The study found that efforts of the Marin community policing led to a significant reduction in domestic violence cases, thus drastically reducing fear of crime in the county. It was also found that trust, mutual respect, and effective communication among the actors were critical to the success of the project. Ultimately, the study established that the greatest power to protect women was within their own communities.
In conclusion, the Marin County community policing programme was able to reduce domestic violence rates by 34 percent in 2001. This was achieved by clear cut definition of roles between the law enforcement agencies and the other anti-domestic violence advocates. Besides, the financial commitment of the State through the DVCC really aided the smooth running of the operations of the project.

The Amhara Regional State of Ethiopia case study

The study titled “Securing communities for development: community policing in Ethiopia’s Amhara National Regional State” was a project undertaken by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in 2013 in Ethiopia. The aim of the project was to understand the different manifestations of community policing around the world, the factors that determined the unique shapes that they take, and what that means for relevant stakeholders (Denney, 2013).

Amhara State is located in the North of Ethiopia and is one of the country’s nine Regional States, with a population of approximately 20 million. Amhara National Regional State was the seat of Imperial -Ethiopia, thus making Amharic the official language until the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974. The Emperor was overthrown for deepened inequality by the Derg military regime which promised socialist plans to correct the situation but failed. According to Paul (1997), the police under the Derg enforced the regime’s hard rule, thus gaining a reputation for arbitrary arrests, unlawful detention and extra-judicial killings.
The Amhara community policing programme started in 2005 to serve multiple objectives. Whereas the police recognised community policing as a way to reduce crime, the communities saw community policing as an opportunity to take on policing responsibilities themselves. The Amhara community policing programme sought to mobilise the communities for development, whereby the community cooperated with the police to reduce crime which, otherwise, inhibits community development.

The structure of the programme involved the assignment of trained Community Police Officers (COPs) across various districts of the State. Additionally, Advisory Councils, Conflict Resolving Committees, and Family Police structures were also established in the communities to investigate and resolve complaints at various levels. Moreover, shoe shiners and other trade associations were engaged as police informants. Additionally, Amhara community policing also draws upon pre-existing customary structures such as the militia and elders.

At the Family Police level, one elected family member resolved all conflicts within the family and reported any criminal to the COPs. At the Conflict Resolving Committee level, 5 representatives from 50 households (5:50 ratio) were elected to maintain order and resolve disputes within their immediate neighbourhoods through customary means, and reported to the COPs. The Advisory Council consisted of 8-15 members with high repute in the community elected to address issues of crime/conflict and also raised funds for operations of the local Community Police Office.
Operationally, the COPs assigned by the Amhara Regional Police Commission to various communities worked collaboratively with the Family Police, the Conflict Resolving Committees and Advisory Councils on daily basis. Additionally, the COPs organised militia and community volunteer patrols, with the latter patrolling during day time while the former did so at night hours. Besides, the COPs assisted community members decide whether to pursue reported cases through customary or state justice systems.

It is important to also note that, despite the hierarchical nature of the community policing structure, access to the system was allowed from any level. That is, in practice, crimes/disputes were not dealt with from the lowest level through to the top since there was no strict reporting format that cases followed. Rather, people reported cases at any level (Family Police, Conflict Resolving Committee, Advisory Council or COPs) depending on their personal relationships with those involved, the severity of the case and convenience.

Considering its effects, the study first found that the introduction of community policing in Amhara had significantly decreased crime rate in the area, with a reported decline from 73,384 in 2008 to 51,368 in 2013 (Denney & Kassaye, 2013). Secondly, it was found that the programme had alleviated fear of crime among neighbourhoods. Thirdly, the findings showed an improved access to police services in Amhara as residents no longer walked over long distances to report an incident. Besides, the study revealed that police-community relation had been improved in Amhara as a result of the programme.
In spite of the reported successes, the study identified some major challenges. First, inadequate funding was identified as the key problem of the programme. Since its inception, the Amhara Regional Police had only paid salaries of the COPs, leaving all the other operational costs to the communities. Although this shows the communities’ willingness to support community policing, it raises long-term sustainability issues. Other challenges included lack of transport, scant training for actors, and less involvement of women.

In conclusion, the Amhara region has obviously been successful in a large scale roll-out of the community policing policy that has enhanced access to police services, reduced crime rates as well as fear of crime, and improved community-police relations at the local level. It was also found that the smooth operation has been aided by the fact that community policing in Amhara builds on enduring informal institutions such as the elders of families, militia, and volunteer patrol officers.

Conceptual Framework for Community Policing

So far, three related theories have been discussed that support importance of the community in controlling crime and disorder. In order to develop a conceptual framework for understanding crime prevention from community policing’s point of view, this study adopts the collective efficacy and routine activities as the primary theories underpinning this crime prevention approach.
Since the RAT assumes that all crimes occur within a context of space and time, the influence of community in arranging crime space as well as control mechanisms cannot be overemphasised. The CET explains that neighbourhoods with strong social bonding, shared social values, and high sense of communal identity breed a crop of individuals who are likely to intervene when people are seen perpetrating evil.
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework Based on CET and RAT

Source: Author’s construct (2017)

The conceptual framework illustrates the linkages among key theoretical postulates espoused in this study and also highlights the logical premise of the study. First, the study conceptualizes community setting as an important determinant of any crime situation. The culture, history, economics, technology, and physical environment are macro-level factors that shape activities which take place within the community.

Collective efficacy facilitates or inhibits routine activities in any community. For instance, if neighbours do not care about the welfare of one
another (no guardian) it is likely that any potential person can be a target of crime. Conversely, if social cohesion and willingness to act for a common good is present, then crime may not take place.

Similarly, the RAT stipulates three important elements that ought to converge in space and time for crime to occur - motivated offender, suitable target, and absence of a capable guardian- which can be a police officer or a vigilant neighbour. The latter, as earlier noted, is a person who is duty-bound to keep an eye out for the safety of other neighbours as well as their property (collective efficacy).

Therefore, police-community identification of problems and collaborative policing efforts lead to better crime prevention. This is beneficial to the police since it will reduce the resources (human and monetary) the police might have to devote in crime prevention and will build trust and confidence in the police. To the community, fear of crime is reduced and public safety enhanced.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODS

Introduction

The study sought to examine the effects of community policing on domestic violence. Specifically, the COMBAT community policing project being implemented in BA was used as a case study within the peace and development dynamics of the region. This chapter provides information on the
research design, target and study population, the sample size, sampling procedure, sources of data, data collection instruments, data analysis and ethical considerations.

**Research Design**

Research designs play the crucial role of influencing the way knowledge is studied and interpreted because the choice of a paradigm dictates the intent, motivation and expectations for any particular study. For instance, positivism is based on the rationalistic, empiricist, and deterministic philosophy in which causes highly determine effects.

With the interpretivist/constructivist approach to research, the assumption is that reality is socially constructed. Simply put, this approach seeks to understand the world through human experience whereby the researcher relies on the participants’ views of the situation being examined.

To investigate the effects of the COMBAT project on domestic violence in BA, non-participant observation strategies could have been employed, whereby exclusive reliance would have been placed on either the qualitative or quantitative approach in this work. Either of these methodologies would have provided the researcher with the required information to some extent. Nonetheless, each of the foregoing approaches was critically considered and found not to be sufficient to address the research objectives appropriately. Neither of the individual approaches could have shed more light on the dynamics of community policing in Ghana.

As such, the mixed-method approach, also known as methodological triangulation, was chosen for this study. This is because the researcher sought
to go beyond mere investigation of effects of community policing on domestic violence to describe, discuss, and explain people’s lived experiences of the COMBAT project. This approach allows the use of a combination of qualitative and quantitative paradigms in the investigation of a research topic.

To achieve the stated research objectives, data were gathered using questionnaires and interviews. The questionnaires administered and the interviews conducted covered four thematic areas in specific detail namely: general understanding of community policing; administrative structure and operational strategies of the COMBAT; community participation and acceptance of COMBAT; and the link between COMBAT activities and local domestic violence levels.

Regarding its strength, the mixed methods approach overcomes a weakness in using only one method. Thus, the design uses the strengths of both methodologies to provide broader perspective on the phenomena under investigation. However, this approach is time-consuming, expensive and requires a researcher with experience in the application of both qualitative and quantitative research designs.

Specifically, the study was a descriptive design which employed the case study method to examine and describe the context of the study area, the phenomenon of domestic violence, the structure and operational strategies of the COMBAT, the project’s effects on local crime levels, and the roles and relationships among the major stakeholders of the project. Descriptive research design offers the opportunity to describe social systems, relations, as well as background information about issues (Sarantakos, 2008).
Study Area

The BA region was selected for the study due to its unsavoury reputation for high rates of violent crime in general, and domestic violence in particular (DOVVSU, 2011) and the recent widespread publications that the introduction of the COMBAT project in the region has greatly contributed to progressive reduction in domestic violence figures (AAG Report, 2010). The COMBAT operates in four districts in the region, namely Asutifi North, Asutifi South, Tain and Banda districts. In all, a total of 40 COMBAT communities exist in the four aforementioned districts.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASUTIFI NORTH DISTRICT</th>
<th>ASUTIFI SOUTH DISTRICT</th>
<th>TAIN DISTRICT</th>
<th>BANDA DISTRICT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amomaso</td>
<td>Amanfrom</td>
<td>Adamu</td>
<td>Banda Boase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asamang</td>
<td>Apenemadi</td>
<td>Bepoase</td>
<td>Biema</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bogyampa</td>
<td>Atta–ne-Atta</td>
<td>Bepoayase</td>
<td>Bofie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dokyikrom</td>
<td>Dadiesoaba</td>
<td>Degedege</td>
<td>Wewa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donkorkrom</td>
<td>Manhyia</td>
<td>Kolongo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia 2</td>
<td>Mehame</td>
<td>Kwame Tenten</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambit 1</td>
<td>Nkrankrom</td>
<td>Nasana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goamu Atwidie</td>
<td>Ohiatua</td>
<td>Njau</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kodiwohia</td>
<td>Sienkyem</td>
<td>Nsuhanu</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koforidua</td>
<td></td>
<td>Wiasekrom</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kojokrom</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yabrso</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwau</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nsuta</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obengkrom</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yaw Brefo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yaw Wusukrom</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fieldwork (2017)

The Brong Ahafo Region is one of the 10 political regions in the Republic of Ghana. It was carved out of the former Ashanti Province in March 1959 by the Brong Ahafo Region Act (Act 18/1959) with Sunyani being its capital. The region has a land size of 39,554 km² and a total population of 2,310,983 (GSS, 2010). Politically, BA has eight municipalities and 19 districts, with the agricultural sector employing about 67 percent of the entire population.
Aside agriculture, some districts have rich deposits of minerals such as gold, diamond, iron-ore and bauxite. For example, there are large stocks of gold in Asutifi North, Asunafo North and Tano North districts. Diamonds are found at Wamanhinso, granite at Gambia No. 2, while Dadiesoaba, Goatifi and Konkrotreso have bauxite deposits (GSS, 2013). The 2010 PHC data suggests that the spatial distribution of mineral resources in the region influenced seasonal internal migration.

Brong Ahafo Region has one Regional Police Command in Sunyani, nine Divisional Police Commands in Sunyani, Goaso, Dormaa, Berekum, Kintampo, Techiman, Nkoranza, Wenchi and Bechem. Besides, each of the 26 districts in the region has its own District Police Command which supervises the number of Police Stations under their jurisdiction. In respect of the DOVVSU, the Regional Coordinator operates from the Regional Police Headquarters with a total staff strength of 25. At the district level, there were between two and five DOVVSU personnel at every District Command.

Available data shows that nearly half of the population 12 (years and older) are married, with the majority of the rural dwellers married compared to those in the urban areas (GSS, 2013). The statistical data further indicates that the percentage of female divorcees, widows and separated (14.3%) is more than three times that of males (4.4%) in BA. The Ghana Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) revealed that about 31 percent of the age group 20-24 years are in a sexual union compared to 58.4 percent of those between 25-29 years (DHS, 2008). Several studies have shown a close association between
the incidence of domestic violence and the age of victims and perpetrators, with lower incidence rate among older women (e.g. Aizer, 2011).

In terms of education, reports indicate that while as low as four percent of the male population has never attended school, close to 30.7 percent of the females have never attended school (Ghana Statistical Service [GSS], 2013). According to the 2008 Ghana DHS, the incidence of domestic violence in Ghana was lower among individuals with no formal education than among those with primary or higher levels of education. The same data, however, indicated that the percentage of individuals who tolerated wife-beating was relatively higher among those with no formal education, suggesting an association between levels of education and domestic violence.

According to the 2008 PHC, the proportion of economically not active population was 25.6 percent of the total population 15 years and older. Among the employed, the public sector accounted for only five and half percent persons 15 years and older (GSS, 2010). This suggests that the majority of the households in the region have low incomes. Although domestic violence generally affects everybody, contemporary studies have found that it is connected with persons with low income levels (Bobonis et al., 2013).
Study Population

The population for this study comprises all police personnel in BA Region, both commissioned and non-commissioned officers. The target population was mainly the police officers within the Regional DOVVSU Headquarters, Asutifi District Police Command, and Tain-Banda District Police Command. As of May 2017, the staff strength of the BA Regional
DOVVSU Headquarters stood at 25, with Asutifi and Tain-Banda District Police Commands having 71 and 67 officers respectively.

Additionally, the study population included all the 280 COMBAT officers across BA. Although, the main sample was taken from the police and COMBAT officers in BA, other senior officials with varied experiences in security and human rights from CHRAJ, DSW, DAs, AAG, facilitating NGOs as well as residents of the communities which are implementing the community policing project were also interviewed.

**Sampling Procedures**

Before conducting the fieldwork, the researcher had been granted permission by both the BA Regional Police Command and the AAG Regional Programmes Coordinator. This permission was in response to a prior written request by the investigator to interview police officers and COMBAT officers in the region. In granting the said request, the BA Regional Command indicated to the Regional DOVVSU Command, Asutifi Police Command and Tain-Banda Police Command to support the researcher in the data collection.

Using both probabilistic and non-probabilistic sampling techniques, a total sample size of 89 was used for the study, with 29 people participating in the interviews and 60 responding to the questionnaires. The sample size was composed of 30 COMBAT officers, 31 police officers, 18 community residents, three project staff, two DA staff, two civil servants, two victims of domestic violence and one perpetrator of domestic violence as indicated in Table 2.
Table 2: Distribution of Respondents by Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent category</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COMBAT members</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOVVSU/Police officers</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community members</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project staff</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA officials</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil servants</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victims/Perpetrators</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fieldwork (2017)

Apart from the Regional DOVVSU Coordinator who was purposively selected due to her key role in the COMBAT project, the other 30 police officers were randomly selected from three police strata created by the researcher (Regional DOVVSU, Asutifi District Police, and Tain-Banda District Police Commands) due to the participation of these Commands in the COMBAT project. With a total strength of 163 officers from these three Police Commands, 13, 12, and five police officers were simple randomly selected from the Asutifi, Tain-Banda and Regional DOVVSU Commands respectively.

Likewise, the selection of the 30 COMBAT officers involved the use of random sampling techniques. First, the researcher decided to select 10 out of the 40 communities in which COMBAT was operating throughout BA. More communities could have been used for the study but for time and
financial constraints, considering the scattered nature of the districts as well as communities in which COMBAT operated. For instance, the travel distance between Asutifi North/South District and Tain/Banda is approximately 136 kilometres. For time and financial constraints, the researcher selected 10 out of the 40 communities in which COMBAT was operating for the study using stratified proportion technique.

Having settled on 10 communities, the researcher then randomly selected four out of 16 COMBAT communities from Asutifi North, two out of nine communities from Asutifi South, three out of 11 communities from Tain, and one out of four communities from Banda districts, using the proportionate stratified sampling technique since the number of COMBAT communities varied from one district to another as indicated earlier. These 10 communities were Amanfrom, Degedege, Dokyikrom, Goamu Atwidie, Kolongo, Mehame, Nsuhunu, Obengkrom, Wewa and Yaw Brefo.

Since each COMBAT team consists of seven members per community, three out of the seven members were selected from each of the 10 sampled communities, using the lottery sampling method. The selection of three members from each COMBAT team was to ensure that the views from the sampled respondents were a fair representation of all COMBAT members in the study area since they were the main focus of the investigation.

Additionally, 18 community members were selected to participate in three different Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) which were organised in Amanfrom, Kolongo and Goamu Atwidie communities. Each FGD consisted of six participants from the selected community together with the researcher as
the moderator, and assisted by one facilitator. The first FGD had only male participants including two local chiefs, two religious leaders, the community’s chief farmer, and a male teacher. The second FGD was made up of only female participants including the queenmother, two market women leaders, a female teacher, and two respected women in the community. The third FGD had both male and female participants and was composed of three ordinary male residents and three ordinary female residents in the community. The researcher selected only people who were above 18 years, had stayed in the community since the inception of the COMBAT project, and had had experience in sexual relationship to participate in the FGDs. All the discussions were organised in classrooms with serene environments after close of school. The same FGD guide was used across all the three different FGDs, and the responses were recorded manually using a pen and a notepad as well as electronically using a tape recorder. Each session lasted for a period of two hours. Informed consent was obtained from the participants prior to the start of the discussion.

The remaining 10 respondents were purposively selected from within the target population to seek their views and experiences on the organisation, management, operations, contributions, and challenges of the COMBAT project since each of them possessed in-depth knowledge about it, including officials from the DAs, CHRAJ and DSW and project staff. Also, two victims and one perpetrator of domestic violence who had had first-hand experience with the project were reached to participate in the FGDs.
**Sources of Data**

Data for the study were collected from both primary and secondary sources. Secondary data were collected through the review of reports from AAG, DOVVSU Command, Districts Analytical Reports, the 2010 PHC Report, DHC Report (2008), Ghana DV Report (2016), as well as other relevant data from newspapers and online sources. The review of secondary data gave the researcher much insight into domestic violence in the study area. Primary data were collected directly from the study participants using different techniques.

**Data Collection Instruments and Procedures**

A key factor that needs to be considered prior to the choosing of a data collection instrument is the research problem. Against this backdrop, the investigator put into deep consideration the categories of people in the sample, the institutional/social contexts from which the people were sampled as well as their psychology. Lee (2004) argues that in social research, it may be difficult to have an inclusive list from which participants are selected for a study. Moreover, there is also the challenge of locating a sample frame within the targeted population.

For the purposes of data collection, interview schedules, interview guides, and discussion guides were data collection instruments adopted for the study. The use of many data collection tools to study a phenomenon such as in this case is referred to as the triangulation approach to data collection. According to Yin (1994), triangulation is the combination of several methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon, and the purpose is to overcome the weaknesses or biases of a single method.
The study adopted the use of semi-structured interviews because they present pre-designed questions which do not change in the course of administration just because of the nature of responses and remain the same for all respondents. Coming from a police background and knowing that police officers are hesitant in giving information, the interview schedule was considered most appropriate for the police respondents since the technique avoided any suspicions of secret recordings, as might be in the case of personal interviews.

With respect to the police participants, the researcher liaised with the Station Officer of each of the three Police Commands for the various sample frames and selected the required number of participants from each Command using the lottery sampling technique. The researcher then arranged to meet the officers to administer the instruments to them. To ensure 100 percent response rate, the researcher collected all the completed instruments on the same day. Administration of instruments to the COMBAT officers was relatively easy as each District COMBAT Chairman arranged for the researcher and his enumerator to meet all respondents under their command at agreed locations for the administration of research instruments and collection.

Two different semi-structured interviews with close and open-ended questions were administered to 30 police officers as well as 30 COMBAT officers. The interview schedule was chosen over questionnaire because it allowed personal contact between the investigator and respondents and also, it could be used for both respondents who had formal education and those who did not have formal education. For instance, 15 (50%) of the COMBAT respondents had attained only basic education. As such, portions of the
instrument were administered in vernacular (Asante Twi) for better understanding.

Additionally, three FGDs were conducted in three different communities. The level of social cohesion among neighbours, their willingness to act together for a common good, level of collaboration and acceptance of the project, and their personal evaluation of it were the topical issues discussed. In this regard, the first group discussion conducted in February 2017, consisted of six female participants from Amanfrom community. This sample included people who were above 18 years of age, had been or was still in any form of sexual relationship, and had resided in the community since the inception of the COMBAT project. Using the same criteria, a male-only group discussion also took place in Kolongo community, and followed by FGD for both male and female participants in Goamu Atwidie. The researcher conducted the FGDs on three consecutive Sundays in classrooms and each lasted for two hours.

Furthermore, a total of 11 key informant interviews (KIIs) were conducted in order to get very rich information about the COMBAT project. The unstructured personal interviews enabled the researcher to gain much insight into the participants’ independent judgments, feelings, knowledge, experience, and case stories from the real world. They also produced corroborative or contrary views to the information obtained from the other techniques of data collection. The researcher arranged to meet the interviewees at places of their own choice (See Table 4 for the composition of respondents in the key informant interviews).
Table 3: *List of Key Informants*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent category</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DOVVSU Reg. Coordinator</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMBAT Reg. Coordinator</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Coordinating Directors</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District CHRAJ Officer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Social Welfare Officer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Director of CMCE (NGO)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Director of SODIA (NGO)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perpetrator of domestic violence</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victims of domestic violence</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fieldwork (2017)

Throughout the period of data collection, the researcher was accompanied by one research assistant who was selected from the study area and trained by the researcher regarding the ethics of the study. Responses from the personal interviews as well as the FGDs were recorded both manually and electronically, using note pads and a mobile phone respectively. The data collection process lasted for almost three weeks, starting from February 2, 2017 to February 22, 2017.
The researcher encountered two key challenges during the data collection stage. First, most individual police officers felt less comfortable to take part in the study, even though confidentiality and anonymity were assured. Second, the COMBAT officers demanded ‘lunch’ from the researcher before participating, citing issues of low motivation from the project officials. Other minor challenges included poor road and communications networks to most of the communities, as well as unwillingness on the part of most domestic violence victims/perpetrators to participate in the study.

**Data Processing and Analysis**

According to Yin (1994), data analysis describes the examination, categorization, tabulation and, in most cases, re-emerging of facts with a view to addressing the original proposition. In this regard, Twumasi (2001) states that it is pertinent for the researcher to analyse data in relation to the research objectives and questions in order to achieve appropriate outcomes. To this effect, the research objectives and questions provided the framework within which the researcher examined the data.

In line with qualitative research principles, data analysis began at the field right after the first interview. This enabled the researcher to determine whether or not participants were appropriately reacting to the research questions and also, if the interview guide needed to be refined. As each focus group discussion or personal interview was completed, the researcher scrutinised the contents so as to determine what had been learnt and what more needed to be explored.
Transcripts of interviews were written as field notes, edited and corrected. In processing the notes taken during the personal interviews and the FGDs, code numbers were issued to every instrument (interview guide and discussion guide) whereby thematic keywords were assigned to the segments of the questions answered for the purpose of sorting the answers. In order to be able to conduct content analysis, the coded instruments, the frequencies of thematic keywords and the sequencing of words and phrases were carefully examined.

Consistent with the objectives of the study, the researcher used Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 23 software to generate descriptive statistics comprising cross tabulations, percentages, charts and graphs as and when they were suitably required for the analyses. Results were presented in figures, charts, tables, direct quotations from personal interviews and statistical commentary for clarity of interpretation.

**Ethical Considerations**

Typical ethical challenges in every academic research, among others, include negotiating access to information, obtaining informed consent, invasion of privacy, deception, confidentiality and anonymity (Bryman, 2004; Maxfield & Babbie, 2001). In view of these, due processes were observed before being granted permission to engage police officers and COMAT officers in the study.

Besides, the respondents were informed of the nature of the study and reasons for it to enable them to exercise the choice to either participate or not. Participation was also made entirely voluntary and respondents were informed
of their right to withdraw from participating in the study without bearing any liability.

Furthermore, the principles of informed consent, confidentiality and anonymity of the police officers interviewed were critical because of the peculiar setting of the GPS, the oath of secrecy sworn by officers and the national security interests. To this effect, a statement of informed consent to participate in the study was developed as part of the introduction to all the data collection instruments.

**Chapter Summary**

In this chapter, the research methodologies adopted in this study were comprehensively discussed. The mixed-methods approach in which a combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods is used to investigate a research topic underpinned the study. Three different data collection techniques were employed namely, unstructured interviews, semi-structured interviews and FGDs. In recent times, various researchers have used methodological triangulation in their studies because of the approach’s ability to investigate complex phenomena by increasing the possibility of widening the breadth of knowledge (Benzies & Allen, 2001).

Major limitations of the study were the fact that only 10 out of 40 communities were selected to participate in the study due to the dotted nature of the communities and the cost and time required to cover all. Also, the total sample size of 18 from the residents’ category to participate in the various FGDs was not large enough. This sample size was influenced by both financial and time constraints, coupled with the fact that 12 (67%) of the FGD
participants were farmers who spent most of their day hours in their farms. Besides, the costs involved in organising an effective group discussion prevented the researcher from organising more than three FGDs. However, the random sampling techniques used in selecting both the communities and respondents ensured representativeness.

CHAPTER FOUR
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The purpose of the study was to investigate the effects of the COMBAT community policing programme on domestic violence in the BA region. The mixed-method approach, also known as methodological triangulation, was chosen for this study. Specifically, the study adopted a descriptive case study design. Data collected from the survey respondents were entered into computer for analysis using Statistical Packages for Social Science (SPSS) version 23. Besides, data from FGDs and personal interviews were coded, grouped into themes, and logically summarised. This chapter outlines findings emanating from the personal interviews, interview schedules, and FGDs and are presented under thematic headings established for the research objectives.

Background characteristics

This section presents background characteristics of the respondents in general, and the COMBAT members in particular. This was done by analysing the sex, age, educational background, and marital status of the respondents. Existing literature has found evidence for strong correlations between the
incidence of domestic violence and a wide range of individual and socio-economic factors such as age, sex, education, occupation and marital status (Aizer, 2011). This lends credit to the World Bank’s position that lack of economic resources underpins women’s vulnerability to violence and their difficulty in freeing themselves (World Bank, 1993).

The study was conducted using a total sample of 89 respondents. Out of the 89 respondents, 31 (34.8%) were police officers, 30 (33.7%) were COMBAT officers, 18 (20.2%) were community members, and the remaining 10 (11.2%) consisted of key informants purposively drawn from public institutions and NGOs that are concerned with promoting human rights and security within the study population, as well as victims/perpetrator of domestic violence who were identifiable and willing to participate in the study. In all, 50 (56.2%) of the total respondents were males and 39 (43.8%) were females.

With regards to the 31 police officers who participated in the study, 23 (74.2%) were males while 8 (25.8%) were females. The gender distribution of the respondents reflects the actual nature and context of the broader population of the GPS. Compared to the number of male police officers, the number of their female counterparts was very low, thus suggesting the need for affirmative action by way of recruiting more female police officers to inspire high feminine participation in community policing activities. This probably explains why no woman was found serving as a CPO in the entire Amhara Regional State community policing project in Ethiopia (Denney, 2013).

Besides, the data reveals that 5 (16.1%) of the police officers who participated in the study were senior police officers (Assistant Superintendent
of Police and above) while 26 (83.9%) were junior officers (Chief Inspector and below). In relation to their academic background, 16 officers had attained tertiary education, 11 had attained senior high school education (SHS) and four with middle school leaving certificates (MSLC). Also, 16 out of the 31 police respondents were married, six were divorced, four were single, and five officers were courting. The socio-demographic characteristics (age, education and relationship status) of the police officers who participated in the study are presented in Tables 4, 5 and 6 respectively.

Table 4: *Distribution of the Police Officers by Age*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-27</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-37</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>38.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38-47</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>29.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48-57</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fieldwork (2017)

Table 5: *The Distribution of the Police Officers by Education*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MSLC</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHS</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>51.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fieldwork (2017)

Table 6: *The Distribution of the Police Officers by Relationship Status*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship status</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

69
Unlike the police respondents, the COMBAT sample had a higher number of female participants than their male counterparts. Out of the 30 COMBAT officers sampled, 19 (74.2%) were females while 9 (25.8%) were males. The data in Table 5 show that 18 (60%) of the COMBAT respondents were married, seven (23.3%) were single, four (13.4%) were divorced and 1 (3.3%) was courting. The composition of COMBAT in terms of marital status suggests that the teams constituted a pool of varied relationship experts with rich experiences from which members could tap during operations.

The data further show that nine COMBAT respondents (30%) had attained secondary education (SHS), 8 (26.7%) were middle school leavers (MSLC), 2 (7.0%) had attained basic education (JHS), and 11 (36.7%) had not obtained any formal education at all. Likewise, 9 (50%) out of the 18 community respondents were found to have attended school up to JHS, 2 (11.1%) up to SHS, 2 (11.1%) up to MSLC and 5 (27.8%) had not received any formal education. Lovell (1992) notes that knowledge of the literacy level of a community helps in examining the levels of participation in any community project. Tables 7, 8 and 8 respectively present the age, education and relationship status of COMBAT officers who participated in the study.

Table 7: The Distribution of the COMBAT Officers by Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>51.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courting</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fieldwork (2017)
Table 8: The Distribution of the COMBAT Officers by Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NIL</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JHS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSLC</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHS</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fieldwork (2017)

Table 9: The Distribution of the COMBAT Officers by Relationship Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship status</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courting</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fieldwork (2017)

Knowledge on sex and marital status of residents in a community provides vital information for the planning and execution of community intervention initiatives. For instance, it has been found that married men are assumed to have unconditional sexual access to their wives (Ellsberg, Heise, Pena, Agurto, & Winkvist, 2001). Moreover, Garcia-Moreno et al. (2005)
have stated that women who are separated or divorced tend to report higher incidence of domestic violence than those who are currently married.

People’s Understanding and Awareness of Community Policing

The call for community policing is progressively becoming popular among scholars, police professionals, donor agencies and governments, with varied practices across the globe. Yet the extent to which people understand different policing approaches which they often refer to as community policing remains uncertain. Against this background, the first objective of the study was to investigate various views held by the key stakeholders of the COMBAT programme as their understanding of the concept, to a large extent, influences the actors’ choice of policies, strategies and tactical approaches.

The findings show a clear variations in the understanding of community policing across and within the various categories of respondents. Among the police officers category, all of the 31 (100%) respondents claimed they understood what the concept of community policing is about. However, in their individual definition of the concept of community policing, 16 respondent (51.6%) defined the concept as the process whereby the police and community acted in partnership to fight crime within their community, while 11 respondents (35.5%) defined community policing as a process whereby the GPS specially recruited some people of good behaviour from every community to come and assist the police in their duties. The remaining 4 respondents (12.9%) referred to community policing as a special unit within the GPS that is specially trained to use bicycles, motorbikes, and foot to
patrols selected residential areas in some cities to scare away potential
offenders by their mere presence.

For example, when asked to indicate her understanding of community policing, a police officer in Sunyani said:

*Community policing is a process whereby police officers work in collaboration with community members on the best ways to control crime in their neighbourhood. The benefit of this style of policing is two-way, it saves the police lot of time, human resources as well as money and also help empower community members to control minor incidents before they become major issues. (February 6, 2017).*

Another police officer in Hwidiem stated:

*Community policing is a system which involves the selection of law-abiding citizens and taking them through some form of formal police training at the various police training schools and passing them out to come and assist the police. The community police officers are normally engaged in motor traffic control duties, patrolling in their neighbourhoods, serving as informants to the police and any other duties assigned them by the Station Officer. (February 10, 2017)*

Yet another police officer in Banda Ahenkro had a different view of the concept of community policing altogether. He stated:

*Community policing is a special unit in the Ghana Police Service with their headquarters in Tesano, Accra, who have specialised in beat patrol duties. Their duty is to patrol residential areas, exchange contact with residents in those areas, and regularly visit them to discuss security issues with*
them. Sometimes too, the community police officers visit schools, markets, and other public places to raise awareness on crime and they give out phone numbers to call in the event of criminal attacks. (February 20, 2017).

Like the police respondents, all the 30 COMBAT respondents indicated that they fully appreciated the concept of community policing. However, when these respondents were asked to indicate whether or not the following people - teachers, police officers, market women, nurses, information centre operators, churches, drinking bar operators, pastors, assemblyman, family head, queen mother, and students - had any roles to play in a community’s fight against domestic violence, a mixed reaction was received.

The results indicated that all the 30 COMBAT respondents agreed to the fact that teachers, police officers, nurses, churches, Assemblymen, family heads, students, queen mothers, information centre operators, market women, and pastors have roles to play in every community’s efforts to curtail domestic violence. However, the differences in views arose with respect to whether or not drinking bar operators also have any roles to play in the fight against domestic violence. Out of the 30, only four respondents (13.3%) believed that drinking bar operators within our communities had responsibilities to help fight domestic violence. This shows that the entire COMBAT officers need in-depth training to broaden their understanding of community policing.

With regards to the community members’ category, 13 out of the 18 respondents claimed they understood what community policing is about while the remaining five denied knowledge of the subject matter. Out of the 13, nine
said community policing is about the ability of community members to resolve their own conflicts and maintain peace with little interference from the state police, while the other four saw community policing as informal engagement of local people by the state police to perform minor duties within their communities and serve as informants as well. It is noteworthy that not a single respondent made reference to the community holding their police accountable for their conduct in the community policing approach.

To this end, the differing views offered by the key actors in the COMBAT programme regarding what community policing meant to them support Skogan’s (2004) observation that, if you ask 10 different people what community policing is, you will get 10 different answers. Indeed, the fluidity of the community policing approach makes it very difficult for both professionals and academics to reach a consensus on what community policing ought to be. That notwithstanding, there is a need for all actors in any particular community policing programme to have common understanding of the concept. Research has found that while some view community policing as instilling community orientation into formal policing, others see it as a process whereby the police cooperate with community members in crime fighting, and still people refer to the approach as solely local members serving policing functions within their communities (Cross, 2013).

**Awareness of the COMBAT Programme**

The success of every community policing programme depends, to a large extent, on how far communication and awareness creation go across the length and breadth of the community. Simply put, all people who are directly
or indirectly affected by the community programme should be fully aware of the various stages of its implementation. The awareness of a community programme does not only make local people patronise it but also, it makes them feel part of it.

The data show that not all police officers in BA were aware of the ongoing COMBAT programme within their operational jurisdictions. For instance, 26 respondents (83.9%) said they were aware of the operations of the COMBAT. However, the remaining five respondents (16.1%) could not tell anything about activities of the COMBAT. Whereas three officers (9.67%) indicated that they had heard about the COMBAT project but did not know whether they worked in partnership with the police or not, the other two respondents (6.45%) said they were not aware of the existence of any such community policing programme in their area at all.

One possible reason why some police officers were not aware of the programme could be that creation of awareness on COMBAT activities target residents of rural communities much more than their urban counterparts. As a result, the awareness of the COMBAT programme increased as one moved from the towns (Sunyani, Kenyasi, Hwidiem, Tain and Banda) to the remote villages. It was therefore not much surprising to have two respondents from the Sunyani DOVVSU Command indicating that they were not aware of the programme.

Unlike the police respondents, all the 18 community respondents indicated that they were very much aware of the activities being undertaken by the COMBAT within their respective communities. This suggests that
awareness of the programme was higher among local community members because they were those whom the programme directly benefited. During a FGD in Goamu Atwidie, one of the participants reacting to a question on the extent to which community members were aware of the operations of the COMBAT stated:

*The COMBAT is a very popular programme in this area which every resident of this community and beyond is aware of. If you ask even a primary school pupil about the COMBAT, they will not only tell you about what they do but also, they will lead you to their individual houses. This is because the COMBAT officers, in their T-shirts, regularly visit market centres, schools, health centres, churches, mosques and other public gatherings to sensitize and educate people on dangers associated with domestic violence. (February 12, 2017)*

**The Structure and Strategies of the COMBAT**

This section explored the command structure and reporting mechanisms within the general COMBAT system. Of significant interest to the researcher was to examine the structure and strategies of the COMBAT in order to get a clear picture of the structural arrangements of the COMBAT from the regional level, through the district level to the community level so as to fully appreciate how the COMBAT intervention functions. Besides, practical approaches that the system adopted to holistically address incidents of domestic violence were also looked into.

When asked during an interview to describe the structural arrangements of the COMBAT programme in BA, the AAG Regional Programmes Coordinator explained that the hierarchical structure showed
reporting relationships for administrative purposes only, emphasising that operational decisions were taken by the local team members on the ground without any interference from the top. He described the structure of COMBAT in the following words:

*ActionAid Ghana is in charge of the administration of the entire COMBAT project at the regional level, and exercises such control in the districts through two local NGOs, Centre for Maternal Health and Community Empowerment (CMCE) and Social Development and Improvement Agency (SODIA). The CMCE is administratively in charge of all COMBAT teams in both Asutifi North and South districts while SODIA takes care of all the teams in Tain and Banda districts. However, each district has its own District COMBAT Executives who regulate the activities of COMBAT teams within each district, but do not interfere in decisions of the teams. At the community level, each team adopts their unique approaches to fighting domestic violence and take all operational decisions by themselves without the influence of any organ.* (February 6, 2017).

Further investigations revealed that the AAG worked in close collaboration with the Regional DOVVSU Command in giving guidance and direction to the effective administration of the project, while the CHRAJ and DSW also monitored and contributed to the programme as and when necessary. At the district level, the study found that the CMCE and SODIA also worked in partnership with the District Police Commands, the District Assembly, and other public institutions at the district level. These NGOs collected periodic reports from the District COMBAT Executives, and also reported directly to the AAG.
With respect to the District COMBAT Executives, these were found to be local COMBAT members who have been duly elected by the entire membership of COMBAT in a particular district to check excesses in their operations. They monitored and reported on activities in the various communities to the local NGOs. However, at the community level, it was noted that each team operated independently without being operationally accountable to any authority within the project’s structure. It was found that the COMBATs accounted to only the community.

Figure 3 shows the various parts that together make up the COMBAT community policing system in BA and the communication relationship that exists among the various components. From the figure, it can be seen that AAG is at the helm of affairs with CMCE and SODIA directly under it, suggesting a direct reporting relationship. Under the SODIA and CMCE are the District COMBAT Executives, and followed by the COMBATs in that order. Each COMBAT has its own chairperson to preside over hearing and other activities.

Comparing the structure of the COMBAT community policing to the Marin County and Amhara Regional State community policing models which were discussed under the empirical review section, the COMBAT reveals a unique model of community policing, despite some observed similarities with the afore-mentioned models in USA and Ethiopia. The COMBAT shares with the Marin County model its emphasis on collaboration between state agencies and NGOs whereas it shares with the Amhara Regional State model regarding its emphasis on community mobilisation in policing functions.
Interestingly, studies have found that countries developing community policing are able to draw on diverse models, leading to hybrid approaches that are capable of meeting changing demands of contemporary communities (e.g. Denney, 2013). Like the Marin county model which is NGO-facilitated, the findings show that AAG, also an NGO has liaised with responsible state agencies to empower local members to take up the fight against domestic violence by themselves. However, whereas the Marin Country structure led by MAWS draws expertise from the major partners (MCSO, CURB, DVCC, and MCP) to form the community policing team, the COMBAT are local residents who have received some form of training from the major partners (AAG, DOVVSU, CHRAJ, and DSW).

Obviously, bringing professionals from various organisations to work as a team on a project is more likely to address issues holistically than drawing on the expertise of others to address the issues by community members themselves since it takes time to get the required experience. Another key difference between the Marin County community policing model and the COMBAT is the former’s inclusion of the courts, which permit them easy access to prisons to administer post-arrest interventions to domestic violence perpetrators in order to reduce recidivism.

Just as the Amhara Regional State community policing model structure begins from the household and travels upwards the community, district (kebele), to the regional level, the COMBAT structure also extends from the community to regional level. Nonetheless, the difference between the two is that whereas residents could lodge complaints at any of the five hierarchical
levels within the Amhara Regional State model, community members can report incidents to only their local teams in the COMBAT model.

The implication is that the COMBAT model would have a relatively limited operational scope due to its inability to handle certain domestic violence cases because of lack of legal capacity. It is striking to note from the Marin County and Amhara Regional State empirical reviews that crucial roles played by the states through the criminal justice systems enabled their models to address a wide range of cases to their logical conclusions.

Figure 3: The Structure of COMBAT
Source: Fieldwork (2017)

Strategies of the COMBAT

Every community intervention programme requires to adopt specific strategies that are most appropriate to help achieve the intervention’s set
objectives. The COMBAT community policing project was identified as a kind that sought to address the root causes of domestic violence, change people’s perceptions about women, and empower women to fight for their rightful positions in society. As such, the COMBAT adopted a multi-layered approach to domestic violence.

In this regard, the researcher identified three distinct operational approaches employed by the COMBAT in the fight against domestic violence - proactive anti-violence strategies, reactive anti-violence strategies and women empowerment and livelihood improvement strategies. To this end, it was noticed that the situation at hand determined which approach or combination of approaches was appropriate to achieve the desired results. This was consistent with Palmiotto’s (2000) argument that the success of an approach should be measured in terms of quality of delivery of policing services.

Since community policing strategy is more of a preventative approach to crime, the COMBAT also concentrated much efforts to raise public opinion against acts of domestic abuses in order to reduce or avoid the possibility of its occurrence in the first place. Notable among the anti-violence approaches to fighting domestic violence at the community level included public education, sensitisation and awareness creation on the causes, effects, and legal implication of domestic violence. During one FGD in the Kolongo community, a participant explained some preventive tactics of the COMBAT, saying:

*In this community, the COMBAT officers make conscious efforts to create awareness about the short and long term*
negative consequences of domestic violence on the victim, the perpetrator and witnesses of such acts, through film shows, drama in schools and churches, use of the community information centre etc. For instance, there was a time when the COMBAT officers had to convince the chief and opinion leaders in this community to ban some inhuman cultural practices, including forced marriages, cruel widowhood rites, and female genital mutilation (February 17, 2017).

Appreciating the fact that conflicts form an integral part of individual and community life, it was discovered that the COMBAT also had their own means of reacting to domestic violence after the incident has occurred in the community so as to mitigate the immediate effects or prevent recurrence. The COMBAT’s reactive anti-violence approaches to domestic violence involves a range of actions that the officers take to arrest abusive situations, including physical separation of fighting couples, administration of first aid to victims, counselling of victims, settling of cases, arresting of perpetrators, signing of bond of good behaviour by perpetrators in minor incidents.

In this regard, the COMBAT procedure for hearing cases was examined and found to be similar to how the traditional court systems work, except that the parties were not made to swear any oath before giving their testimonies. The following was how a COMBAT leader in Amanfrom community described a standard local hearing procedure:

It begins with receipt of a complaint from the victim, relatives or eye witnesses. Summoning of the perpetrator(s) to appear on a specified date. Inviting traditional leaders, religious leader, youth leaders, and women leaders to witness the proceedings, depending on the nature of the case. Hearing begins by the victim giving his/her testimonies, followed by their witnesses
and introduction of evidence (if available). Perpetrator is given the opportunity to tell his/her version of the story, call witnesses and introduce evidence (if available). After presentations from both parties, COMBAT panel now questions the victim, perpetrator or witnesses to seek further clarification, explanation. The proceeding breaks for a short while for the panel to take a decision based solely on the merit of the facts presented. The verdict is first communicated to the community leaders present, and then the parties involved (February 11, 2017)

It also came to light that penalty for established domestic abuse ranged from the perpetrator rendering unqualified apology to the other party, paying a compensation depending on agreement between the parties, to signing of a bond of good behaviour for six or 12 months. However, where agreement could not be reached in cases involving severe abuse of human rights, the incident was referred to CHRAJ whereby the COMBAT serve as witnesses. In a situation where criminality (felony) was established, the hearing was discontinued and the case referred to DOVVSU for further investigation.

Another notable approach to dealing with domestic violence in the study area was the COMBAT’s women empowerment and livelihood development schemes. During a FGD in the Amanfrom community, most of the female respondents associated abuse of women in the area with their low economic status. Women appear to be powerless when they are not engaged in productive economic activities to support their family. One woman respondent emotionally asserted:

*My husband never had problems with me when I used to buy foodstuff in large quantities from this village and sold them Kumasi. A back injury I sustained in a road accident some five...*
years ago has incapacitated me and collapsed my business. 
Since then, my husband has being fighting me over trivial 
issues (February 11, 2017).

This lends credit to the World Bank’s position that lack of economic 
resources underpins women’s vulnerability to violence and their difficulty in 
freeing themselves (World Bank, 1993). This approach focuses on provision 
of basic employable skills to underprivileged women to make them 
economically active in order to reduce their vulnerability to economic and 
other forms of abuse. For instance, the COMBAT in Asutifi North District 
have established Vision Ladies Association to offer employable skills to 
underprivileged teenage mothers and pregnant teenagers.

Roles of Key Actors in the COMBAT Project

This sections describes the roles and responsibilities of the key 
stakeholders involved in the COMBAT programme since these partners have 
differing perspectives on the benefits as well as challenges of the programme. 
As indicated earlier under the structure of the COMBAT, the study identified 
major actors in the COMBAT programme to be AAG, DOVVSU, CMCE, 
SODIA, CHRAJ, DSW, DA and the communities. However, it was observed 
that the AAG did all the administrative work while the community members 
really performed the policing functions on the ground.

The investigation revealed that AAG introduced the COMBAT 
initiative. As both the originator and project facilitator, AAG provided policy 
direction and funding for the entire project. The study found that AAG solely 
funded all the activities of the COMBAT project, including the cost involved 
in consultations with community leaders, sensitisation, training of COMBAT
members, outdoing of the COMBAT, provision of yearly incentives, and organisation of Annual COMBAT Day.

Summarising the role of the AAG in the COMBAT project, the Project Coordinator said:

_The AAG seeks funding from both internal and external sources to finance both administrative and operational activities of the entire project, including training of the COMBAT volunteers, annual motivation to the volunteers, organising skill training for community members, providing funds for community education, and awareness campaigns among others. As the manager, we give strategic directions to the entire project. It is because of the COMBAT project that we built a modern office complex for the BA Regional DOVVSU Command in 2011._

(February 6, 2017)

It was further discovered that CMCE and SODIA are both women-focused local NGOs that sought to protect the rights of women as well as promoting their socio-economic development prior to the advent of the COMBAT project. The key role of the CMCE and SODIA in the COMBAT project is to serve as liaison between AAG and the COMBAT communities. In this regard, the responsibilities of these two local NGOs included intensive consultations with traditional and opinion leaders in the various communities during the planning stage of the COMBAT, organising their training, and issuing identity cards (ID) to team members. Simply put, the local NGOs are responsible for managing of the entire project at the district level and reporting to AAG.

Examination of the project’s blueprint revealed that the DOVVSU ought to be the main law enforcement partner in the COMBAT project.
However, the absence of DOVVSU offices as well as personnel in some Districts in the study area compelled AAG to partner with the local police to implement the project. Specifically, roles of DOVVSU included provision of training for COMBAT members, partnering with COMBATs on special anti-violence campaigns, supply of learning materials to aid COMBAT’s community education. Responding to questions on contributions of DOVVSU in the COMBAT project, the Regional DOVVSU Coordinator indicated:

*The DOVVSU Command is responsible for fighting all forms of domestic violence in this region. However, I admit we cannot do it all alone due to limited resources. That is why we have embraced the COMBAT intervention. Besides the training we give to the COMBAT officers, we actively participate in their anti-violence campaigns. More importantly, we show heavy presence during the launching and outdooring of the COMBAT projects at both district and community levels to lend some sort of legal support to them. (February 6, 2017)*

Another actor in the COMBAT programme is the CHRAJ since it is the state body constitutionally mandated to receive and investigate complaints of human rights abuse in both public and private spheres, of which incidents of domestic violence is part. The study revealed that the role of CHRAJ in the COMBAT went beyond their usual way of sitting and receiving complaints at their offices to visiting rural communities with COMBAT officers to educate members on civil consequences of human rights abuse. During a key informant interview, one District Director of CHRAJ said:

*I can say that our collaboration with the COMBAT has given us much insight into what is actually going on in the communities. Our weak staff strength has always prevented us*
from going into the communities to undertake sensitisation campaigns against civil right abuses. However, officials from CHRAJ occasionally join COMBAT volunteers to educate community members on domestic violence issues involving civil rights abuses (February 8, 2017)

The study also found that the DSW played an important role in the COMBAT project as the statutory agency responsible for regulating the operations of children’s homes in Ghana. Central to the obligations of DSW was found to be promotion and protection of children’s rights. It was discovered that BA region had 15 private children homes, out of which six were closed down in 2016 for improper management. Surprisingly, none of the children’s homes was found in any of the COMBAT operational districts. Therefore, the DSW officers in the COMBAT districts partnered with the COMBAT officers to transport victims to homes in Sunyani whenever the need arose.

With regards to the roles of the COMBAT communities, the most crucial among them was to select capable, willing, and trustworthy volunteers for the project, through extensive consultations among the traditional rulers, religious leaders, women groups, youth groups, and other identifiable groups. Besides, the community members cooperated with the COMBAT by supplying timely information on crime to them. It also came to light that local information centres gave free airtime to the COMBAT to create awareness and educate community members. Though not directly charged with any financial obligations, it was revealed that some community leaders provided emergency funds to support COMBAT operations. A traditional ruler in Goamu Atwidie had thus to say:
When ActionAid Ghana first came here some seven years ago, they made us understand that nobody could fight anti-social behaviours and crimes in this community better than we the inhabitants can. Therefore, they asked us to show some level of preparedness for them to help us. That was when we realised the need to mobilise both the youth and women to get ready to stand up against any form of spousal abuse, child maltreatment, child labour, and cruel cultural practices among others. There are instances when we the elders in this village contribute monies and give it to the COMBAT volunteers in order to show our appreciation for the selfless job they are doing for the community. Yes, we always motivate them (February 12, 2017)

Last but not the least among the actors in the COMBAT programme are the District Assemblies. The study found participation of DAs in the COMBAT project to be far below what one would anticipate, granting the overarching responsibilities that DAs have in ensuring the peace and security of their constituents through the use of the District Security Council (DISEC) mechanism. However, further enquiries revealed that AAG and its local NGOs consulted the DAs only when COMBAT was going to be launched in the district to give the project a political support, but not to engage them in true partnership. In a personal interview with one DA official, he said:

Yes, the Assembly is very much aware of the activities of the COMBAT. However, they do not have representation on the DISEC, which I think is not proper. The Assembly believes that if the COMBAT deeply involves the DISEC in designing their operational approaches, it will go a long way to foster collaboration between the COMBAT facilitators and the Assembly (February 10, 2017)
The COMBAT’S Collaboration with Community Institutions

Central to measuring the success of any community policing programme is the level of partnership or engagement between facilitators of the programme and social institutions in the community. This is consistent with the broken windows theory’s proposition that social disorder and crime are inseparably related such that efforts to reduce disorder might ultimately translate into reductions in criminal activity as well (Sampson & Raudenbush, 1997). That is, effective arrangements in the social space have the potential to affect human behaviour both positively and negatively.

In view of this, the study examined the extent to which the COMBAT officers collaborated with traditional leaders, community members, local schools, the DAs, local NGOs, health facilities, and officials of National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) in their operations. Computations from the surveyed data obtained from the 30 COMBAT respondents in respect of their partnership (collaboration) with the afore-mentioned community institutions have been tabulated for easy analysis.

By and large, it was noticed that the COMBAT’s level of partnership with institutions within their communities varied from one institution to another in terms of planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of their activities. Generally, the results show between High and Medium involvement of some local institutions in the planning and implementation stages of the COMBAT’s activities. However, involvement of these institutions during monitoring and evaluation was found to be very low across all the local institutions.
Table 10 shows the level of partnership between the COMBAT and traditional leaders in the study area. It can be seen from the table that 20 respondents (67%) indicated that the COMBAT’s partnership with the traditional leaders was fairly high during planning and implementation stages. However, their level of collaboration with the traditional leaders in terms of monitoring and evaluation was found to be very low. For instance, 20 respondents (66.7%) said the COMBAT least involved traditional leaders in the monitoring of their activities while 29 (96.7%) out of the 30 respondents indicated that it reduced to very low during evaluation stages of their activities.

Table 10: The COMAT’s Level of Collaboration with Traditional Leaders

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<td>High</td>
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<td>53.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
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<td>26.7</td>
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<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Very low</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>29</td>
<td>96.7</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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</table>

Source: Field survey (2017)

Similarly, the results shown in Table 11 reveals that the COMBAT’s collaboration with community members regarding planning of their activities was fairly good. Fifteen respondents (50%) indicated that their partnership with the community was very encouraging when it comes to planning of COMBAT activities while the remaining 15 (50%) said it was somehow
encouraging. It is noteworthy that deep involvement of community members in the planning of community initiatives cannot be overemphasised since they are directly affected by whatever decision that might be taken as well as outcomes of all the policies.

Table 11: COMBAT’s Level of Partnership with Community Members

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<tr>
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<td>4</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26.7</td>
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<td>High</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>46.6</td>
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<tr>
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<td>26.7</td>
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<td>26.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Very low</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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</table>

Source: Field survey (2017)

Majority of the respondents said the COMBAT partnered with the community members to a very large extent during implementation of their programmes. Altogether, 22 respondents (73.3%) indicated that community
members were deeply involved in the execution of all COMBAT programmes and activities, with the remaining 8 respondents indicating that the community members were fairly involved.

However, the contrary was noticed when it comes to community involvement in the monitoring and evaluation of COMBAT programmes. For instance, 15 respondents (50%) and 29 respondents (96.7%) pointed out that the extent to which they collaborated with community members was very low in terms of monitoring and evaluation of activities respectively.

Further investigation of the level of collaboration between the COMBAT and DAs also revealed that much needs to be done, since district assemblies play crucial role in the health, safety and security of every community. The results showed a weak collaboration in terms of planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of COMBAT activities in the districts. It can be seen from Table 12, 17 respondents (56.7) reported low in terms of planning, 19 respondents reported very low in terms of monitoring and the whole 30 respondents (100%) indicated that the DAs had absolutely no role to play in the evaluation of COMBAT programmes and activities.

Table 12: The COMBAT’s Collaboration with District Assemblies

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<th>Planning</th>
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<td>Very high</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>40.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>36.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Very low</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10.0</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>30</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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The relatively low COMBAT collaboration with the DAs has much implications for both the success and sustainability of the community policing programme. First, working closely with the DA provides a great opportunity for the project facilitators to request for financial support from the Assemblies as to provide incentives for the volunteers since their efforts in the hinterlands indirectly saves the cost of certain items in the DISEC’s budget. On the other hand, the presence of COMBAT volunteers within the villages can serve as sources from which the DAs can pick early warning signals in order to make the DISEC proactive in their security arrangements.

The schools within rural communities are cardinal targets of domestic violence campaigns since children are often victims to many cruel and unlawful acts perpetrated by adults who are familiar to them. Against this backdrop, one will expect that the collaboration between any community policing programme and local schools would be very high. However, Table 13 shows contrary findings as 20 respondents (66.7%) indicated that the COMBAT did not collaborate much with the school during planning of sensitisation activities.

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<td>Very high</td>
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<td>66.6</td>
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<td>23.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Very low</td>
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<td>26.7</td>
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<td>6.7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>96.7</td>
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</table>

Source: Field survey (2017)
This suggests that, the COMBAT often planned their programmes all alone and then just sought the permission of the schools to execute them. This is likely the prevailing situation because the findings reveal a relatively encouraging involvement of the schools in the execution of their programmes. Table 9 further indicates that 19 respondents (66.3%) stated that the COMBAT officers highly partnered with local schools during implementation of their programmes. However, it was found that the COMBAT hardly joined with same schools when it comes to evaluation of activities they executed together.

Likewise, the COMBAT’s partnership with the NCCE and health facilities was found not to be much encouraging, considering the enormous roles these institutions play in the fight against domestic violence. The data in Table 14 shows that the COMBAT does not work with the NCCE at all. The figures indicate that 22 respondents (73.3) reported that the COMBAT’s partnership with NCCE offices in the districts was very low while only 4 (13.3%) reported that the COMBATs once in a while joined hands with the NCCE to embark on domestic violence sensitisation campaigns.
Table 14: The COMBAT’s Collaboration with NCCE

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<tr>
<th>Levels</th>
<th>Very high</th>
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<td>26.7</td>
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</table>

Source: Field survey (2017)

With regards to the community health centres within the study area, 22 respondents (73.3%) reported that the COMBAT’s level of planning with them was very low. Table 15 further reveals that 17 respondents (56.7%) indicated that the COMBAT once in a while visited the health centres to interact with the workers. Lack of proper collaboration between health centres and community policing agents goes a long way to affect the programme, as the health workers would not readily notify the community police officers whenever victims report at the facility with assault complaints or sexual offences. In other words, if the community health centres are made to feel a part of the community’s policing project, they will not only stop charging illegal fees for issuing medical reports to victims but also, they will not let any such incident go unnoticed so long as they are reported at the facility.
The researcher also looked at the extent to which the COMBAT worked together with other NGOs in the study area other than the CMCE and SODIA. The results, as indicated in Table 16 reveal that there exist a very low collaboration between the COMBAT and other NGOs working in the study area. For instance, 18 respondents (60%) reported that partnership with other NGOs was very low in terms of project planning while 15 respondents (50%) indicated that the involvement of other NGO in the implementation of COMBAT programmes was very low.

Table 15: The COMBAT’s Collaboration with Local Health Centres

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<td>Medium</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>56.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low</td>
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<td>73.3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>40.0</td>
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<td>96.7</td>
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</table>

Source: Field survey (2017)
As indicated earlier, community participation (collaboration) is one of two most salient principles underlying most community policing strategies. According to Morgan (1993), community participation is the process through which stakeholders influence and take part in decision-making, which includes the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of programmes and projects that affect their lives. This definition suggests that members of the community should be fully engaged throughout the life cycle of community interventions. True community participation create sense of community ownership of the project and also increases the legitimacy of the project.

In this sense, though causality of crime varies from one jurisdiction to another depending on many factors, community participation must be an essential component of all crime prevention efforts irrespective of the setting. Hillier (2008) asserts that community participation renders more efficient and effective control than any programme by the state police alone. By this assertion the author sought to imply that involving the community in the planning, execution, monitoring and evaluation of the community in crime
prevention and fighting interventions makes it more successful than any other alternative conventional policing approach such as hot-spot policing, swoops, intensive foot patrol by the state police among others. From the sociological standpoint, explanations for criminal and deviant behaviours, when premised on community participation, has a greater success rate because community members become active defenders of their space against crime (Hillier, 2008; Wong, 2008)

Acceptance of the COMBAT Project in the Study Area

Since the acceptance of a community intervention programme by the community members largely depends on their feeling of ownership of the project, the researcher sought to find out the extent to which the COMBAT project had been embraced by the communities. In this regard, the researcher first examined the rate of exchange of information between the community members and the COMBAT officers as communication plays crucial role in the success of community policing interventions.

Figure 4 shows the rate of exchange of information between the COMBAT and community members. From the pie chart, approximately 46% percent of the respondents said exchange of information between the COMBAT and community members was very high, 51% percent said it was high while three percent said it was medium. This high rate of information exchange can explain why domestic violence incidences hardly occasioned without the notice of the COMBAT.
Figure 4: Distribution of COMBAT- Community Information Exchange Rate

Source: Fieldwork (2017)

It came to light that exhibition of maturity and confidentiality of information by COMBAT members in handling sensitive information gave residents enough assurance to volunteer information regarding perceived or actual domestic violence in their neighbourhoods. The willingness to freely share information that leads to collective actions that positively impacts the entire community could be explained by the level of collective efficacy in the communities (Sampson et al., 1999).

Just as communication between the COMBAT and their communities was found to be very effective, so was the level of communities’ acceptance of the COMBAT project. However, respondents gave mixed reasons for the high acceptance of the project by the different communities. During the FGDs, it came to light that community sense of partial ownership of the project, high level of transparency by the COMBAT officers and accountability to the community were associated with the project’s relatively high acceptance.
Still, some community respondents believed the project was highly accepted because the COMBAT members did not collect monies from residents before rendering services to them. Responding to the high acceptance of the project in Goamu Atwidie community, a participant in the FGD said:

*I recognise the efforts of the COMBAT far more than the police. The COMBAT do not take bribe, they treat each case based on the facts but not the social status of the persons involved. Unlike the police, the COMBAT don’t demand any money from you before or after their service.* (February 12, 2017).

Similarly, another FGD participant from the Amanfrom community asserted:

*The people of this community have confidence in COMBAT than sending their case to the chief’s palace. This is because the COMBAT do not delay when handling cases.* (February 11, 2017).

Additionally, the COMBAT project’s acceptance level was examined from the perspective of the state police and the COMBAT officers themselves. Figure 5 shows that 60 percent of the police respondents said the project’s acceptance in the community was high while 32 percent indicated that the acceptance level was very high. A similar response rate was received from the COMBAT respondents, with about 63.3 percent respondents indicating that the project had enjoyed high acceptance by the communities while 30 percent said its acceptance level was very high. In both interviews, none of the respondents indicated that the acceptance level of the COMBAT project was
low in the study area. Thus, the result from the COMBAT respondents corroborates the responses from both the police and community members.

Figure 5: Percentage Distribution of the COMBAT’s Acceptance (Perspectives of the Police and COMBAT Respondents)

Source: Field survey (2017)

Effects of COMBAT Operations on Local Domestic Violence Rates

A key indicator for examining effects of every community policing programme is its ability to contribute to reduction in disorder and crime in the local community. Following several reports that the COMBAT have immensely contributed to a steady decline in domestic violence rates at the community level (AAG Report, 2010, 2012, 2016), one of the objectives of the study was to investigate the extent to which this claims could be verified.

The data shows that efforts by the COMBAT have contributed to momentous reduction in domestic violence crimes such as spousal assault,
defilement, rape, child abuse, child labour, and cruel cultural practices in the operating communities. In some communities, the investigation also revealed that disorderly behaviours such as truancy at school, excessive drunkenness, community littering, indecent dressing by the teenage girls, watching of television into deep night by school going children were all checked by the COMBAT.

Two-thirds of all the reactions from the police respondents, COMBAT officers and community residents vis-à-vis the influence of the project attested to the fact that introduction of the COMBAT had observably reduced domestic violence in the operating communities and beyond. Table 17 shows responses from the police and COMBAT respondents in respect of effects of the COMBAT project on the rate of spousal abuse in the study area.

Table 17: COMBAT Operations and Reduction in Spousal Assault Rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spousal assault</th>
<th>COMBAT officers</th>
<th>Police officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Freq.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>43.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No idea</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field survey (2017)

The information in Table 17 indicates that contributions of the COMBAT to the reduction of spousal assault within the local communities cannot be overemphasised. For instance, 23 police respondents (76.6%)
reported that the COMBAT’s contribution to spousal abuse in the rural areas was relatively high. Otherwise stated, the respondents believed that implementation of the COMBAT programme had significantly contributed to evident reductions in incidents of violent conflicts between sexual partners in the communities. Likewise, the findings shown in Tables 18 indicate that 21 police respondents (70%) reported that efforts of the COMBAT have also helped reduce incidents of rape/defilement within the rural communities.

Table 18: COMBAT Operations and Reduction in Rape/Defilement Rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rape/defilement</th>
<th>COMBAT officers</th>
<th>Police officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Freq.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>90.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No idea</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field survey (2017)

Correspondingly, the trend was observed across other domestic violence cases such as child abuse and cruel cultural practices as displayed in Table 19 and Table 20 respectively. For instance, 73.3 percent of the police respondents reported high association between the COMBAT project and gradual reduction in cases of child abuse in the rural communities. Overall, the views of the police respondents on how the COMBAT have swayed local domestic violence levels over the period suggests a noticeable reduction in the
periodic domestic violence figures that are received from the rural communities.

Table 19: *COMBAT Operations and Reduction in Child Abuse Rates*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Child abuse</th>
<th>COMBAT officers</th>
<th>Police officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Freq.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>96.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No idea</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field survey (2017)

Table 20: *COMBAT Operation and Reduction in Cruel Cultural Practices*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cruel cultural practices</th>
<th>COMBAT officers</th>
<th>Police officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Freq.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>43.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No idea</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field survey (2017)

Furthermore, reactions from interviews with key informants as well as the various FGDs pointed to the impressive resolves the COMBATs were
making towards ensuring drastic reduction in the rate of domestic violence at the community level. In Obengkrom community for instance, all the six participants in the group discussion indicated that, as a result of anti-violence sensitisation and education from the COMBAT, issues of wife-beating, child abuse, and forced marriage were all considered things of the past.

Responding to a question on effects of the COMBAT project on domestic violence during a personal interview, the Regional DOVVSU Coordinator said:

*I have always associated the gradual reduction in the annual domestic violence figures in this region with the significant contributions from the COMBAT project being implemented in some rural communities. I acknowledge the efforts of the COMBAT anytime I meet with the media or the Regional Security Council (RESEG) to brief them on the state of domestic violence in the region. I can confidently say that if every community in BA forms a COMBAT, a time will come when DOVVSU would not have much work to do at all.*

*(February 6, 2017)*

In an exclusive key informant interview, a student who was given to over 48 years old man in a forced marriage at age seventeen passionately narrated how she was saved by the COMBAT. Now a second year student of Gyamfi Kumanini Senior High School in Wamahinso, AB (actual name withheld) said:

*I am 21 years and come from Yaw Brefo community. In 2013, my foster parents gave me to a cocoa farmer in marriage at age 17 in our village. My BECE results could permit me further my education but my husband intentionally impregnated. In 2015, I told the man that I wanted to further my education but he objected on the grounds that I had to rather think about raising*
a family. Not knowing what to do, I secretly informed the COMBAT leader in my community about the deprivation. Later that evening, the COMBAT members came to discuss with my husband to allow me continue with my education since the Newmont Ahafo Development Fund (NADeF) provided full scholarship for students within the mine catchment area. Two days later, I returned from the market only to find my BECE original result slip torn into pieces and scattered in my room. When I asked my husband why he did that, he told me that he was the man and could do whatever he wanted to me. Because of the trust I had in the COMBAT officers, I informed them about the situation but this time, they led me to lodge a formal complaint against my husband at the Regional DOVVSU in Sunyani. In my presence, the DOVVSU officers charged the COMBAT officers to arrest my husband for having caused unlawful damage to my property, which they did. To avoid prosecution, my husband pleaded with the police to allow him go to WAEC for a copy of my results slip and also promised to support me. The DOVVSU then handed over the case to the COMBAT to ensure that my rights were protected. The COMBAT prevailed on my husband to exact his promises and that is how come I find myself at the Gyanfi Kumanini SHS studying home economics. (February 9, 2017)

Another important narrative worth citing is how the anti-violence campaigns and educational programmes by the COMBAT have made positive changes in the views that men held about women, especially in patriarchal societies. For instance, the Chief (Odikro) of a community in Asutifi North District, where wife-battery reportedly used to be a commonplace, described how the sensitisation and education by the COMBAT have shaped men’s views and attitudes toward women in the community. He thus said:
I am the Odikro of this community and played a crucial role in the creation of COMBAT in this community. One night, my wife provoked me so much that I beat her up in the room. The following day, I received a message from the COMBAT requesting me to come and respond to some allegations my wife had made against me. I considered their invitation an affront to my authority so I did not show up. Surprisingly, I was in my farm some few days later when the COMBAT members led two policemen to arrest me. While in the police cells, one of the inmates advised me to call for the COMBAT leader and apologise to, which I did. The police then granted me bail on the condition that I fully cooperated with the COMBAT until the case was resolved. In fact, the COMBAT treated the case to the admiration of the whole community. The degree of firmness displayed by the COMBAT in my case sent a strong signal to the entire community that no one was above the law, and the intensive sensitisation on violence against women that followed my case has since built a strong public opinion against wife-beating in this community. (February 9, 2017)

Still on the key informant interviews, the study revealed how the COMBAT have tactically fought against child labour in the rural communities. A victim of child labour in Dokyikrom, a farming community in Asutifi North District, said:

I am 14 years and my younger brother is 12 years old. My uncle brought us from the North to stay with him when my father died in 2014. We always went to the farm with him while his children attended school. One day, Madam Doris (the COMBAT leader) my brother and I returning from the farm and asked us of the name of our parents and direction to our village. In the evening of that same day, Madam Doris visited our village in the company of some elders. They asked my uncle
why he had not registered us in school and he said he did not have enough money to take care of all of us in school. They warned him to either enrol the two of us at the community basic school or send us back to our mother. The following week, my uncle bought school uniforms, footwear and books for us to start schooling. Now, we go to school throughout the week and go to farm on Saturdays only. (February 13, 2017)

Evidently, the results reveal how the COMBAT project has empowered not only the local volunteers but also, the traditional and religious leaders as well, to be able to immensely contribute to the regulation of social disorder and crime through cautious examination of crime characteristics in the neighbourhoods and then applying appropriate tactics to resolve them. This is in line with community policing’s emphasis that careful analysis of crime patterns in a neighbourhood and application of suitable remedies are shared responsibilities of all stakeholders (Fielding, 2005; Skogan, 2004).

As indicated earlier, the presence of gold deposits in the Asutifi North and South districts has led to increased population densities in both urban and rural communities. Besides, it was observed that artisanal mining activities in the area have heightened disorderly behaviours such as hooliganism, excessive drinking by the youth, prostitution, and abuse of narcotic drugs among others. The presence of these activities in a community is supported by Wilson and Kelling’s (1982) analogy of the broken window theory.

According to the theory, visible signs of disorder are signals of social disorganisation and lack of formal and informal social control, these ultimately are fear inspiring and their continued presence sends a signal to a motivated offender that law enforcement agencies are unable to cope with the
challenge. Wilson and Kelling (1982) further contend that foot patrol is the most effective means of delivering police services because of the tactics provide ample opportunity for police officers to partner and interact with members in the neighbourhood.

However, the RAT approach assumes that the frequency of crime will decrease if (1) the probability of success is decreased, (2) the perceived benefits are reduced, and (3) the perceived costs are increased (Cohen and Felson, 1979). In effect, when potential criminals perceive prior attempts as successful and feel they are likely to avoid punishment, they are more likely to offend (Dugan et al, 2005). Thus, the presence of capable guardian is what is required to decrease the probability of success of a crime, reduce the perceived benefits and increased the costs of the crime. Therefore, the presence of the COMBAT serves as capable guardians in the areas as they engage in myriad of activities to make the commissioning of domestic violence crimes unattractive.

The results further suggest that the COMBAT have always received full cooperation from the state police whenever the need arose, and this motivated the volunteers to handle complaints with all firmness. This corroborates Terpstra’s (2009) argument that citizens are more willing to be involved in informal social control of their neighbourhood when they know they can count on police officers to back up their decisions (Terpstra, 2009).

According to Palmiotto (2000), one of the most important criteria for measuring the success of community policing initiatives is equity, which he referred to as the fair distribution of police services. Evidences from the
community residents revealed that the COMBAT officers handled all cases based on the facts as presented without fear or favour the personalities involved. In community policing, equity involves equal access to police services, equal treatment by the police and equal distribution of police services (Palmiotto, 2000).

Key Challenges of the COMBAT Project

Economic constraints that manifested in the form of insufficient budget obviously characterised the operations of the project from the highest level through to the community level. ActionAid Ghana Project Coordinator in BA unequivocally said that funding from their international partners, such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the United Nations International Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF) had always delayed and was inadequate.

The researcher discovered that AAG spent around twelve thousand Ghana cedis (GHC 12,000) on the creation of one COMBAT in a community. Reacting to plans on future replication of the project in more communities, the Project Coordinator said:

Many traditional rulers and opinion leaders from various communities have formally written letters to us, requesting AAG to establish COMBAT for them but we have not acted because of our current financial position. Funding is a major problem. As we speak, the key issues with all the teams is lack of means of transport inadequate motivation (February 6, 2017).

Reacting to questions pertaining to challenges of the COMBAT from her viewpoint as a major stakeholder, the Regional DOVVSU Coordinator
revealed that her outfit shared common problems with the COMBAT in terms of inadequate budget allocations that adversely affected their operations.

As a Command, we are also constrained by inadequate means of transport, inadequate human resources, and training to equip our personnel. My personal interactions with some COMBAT members have revealed that means of transportation is a serious problem, looking at the dotted pattern of their communities. Also, they often complain that AAG does not give them adequate financial motivation (February 6, 2017).

Correspondingly, responses from the two Executive Directors of the local NGOs (CMCE and SODIA) vis-à-vis challenges facing the project were all about financial constraints. One was quick to add that the COMBAT activism was gradually declining due to lack of motivation for team members. The Director of CMCE stressed:

Aside their issues with absence of means of transport, the COMBAT members have always complained about the inadequacy of the incentives given them. As a result, many of the COMBAT members have become sluggish towards duty in recent times (February 8, 2017).

Another major challenge noted was ineffective formal communication among the major stakeholders. It was surprising to find that most of the communications between AAG and DOVVSU Command during the initial planning of the COMBAT project were informal. The fact that DOVVSU was not fully involved in the drawing of the original blueprint of the project might account for what appeared as if they did not have sense of ownership for the project.
However, AAG’s exit plan in respect of the project indicated that the NGO would completely hand over management of the entire project to DOVVSU Command in the future, whereby the latter would partner with the communities to ensure sustainability of the project. Surprisingly, this documented exit plan was found not to have been duly communicated to the DOVVSU.

According to the COMBAT members, lack of transportation and poor communications systems posed great operational challenges. Apart from the fact that the COMBAT lacked basic logistics such as bicycles, motorbikes, and vehicles to expedite their operations, the deplorable nature of the road networks coupled with poor communications systems in most of the rural communities did not only affect their response time but also, made it practically impossible for them to respond to certain calls, especially during rainy seasons.

Table 21 shows the distribution of the common challenges that faced COMBAT operations. The data reveals that lack of financial motivation was considered the highest challenge for the COMBAT officers as they devoted much of their time for the task. One-third of all the responses affirmed this. The next key challenge mentioned was lack of means of transport, ineffective communication with the local police, inadequate training for COMBAT officers and many others as displayed in Table 21.
Table 21: *Key Challenges Facing COMBAT Members*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key challenges</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n = 30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of motivation</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of means of transport</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication with police</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate training</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interference by local elite</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultures and traditions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack protective devices</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>90</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ‘n’ is total number of COMBAT respondents. The total number of the responses is more than the total number of respondents due to choice of multiple responses.

Source: Field survey (2017)

In terms of motivation for the team members, the research revealed that the only tangible reward each COMBAT member received for their
voluntary services for the whole year was a package from AAG that was worth not more than fifty Ghana cedis (GHc 50). The AAG Project Coordinator explained that the incentives were delivered in the form of ‘wellington boots’, half piece of cloth, machetes, mobile phones, wall clock among others.

As such, it was observed that most of the COMBAT officers felt they had spent so many years working voluntarily for their communities and deserved much better than what they received as motivation at the end of every year. Some COMBAT members also explained how the voluntary work had affected their farming and other commercial activities.

**Summary of Key Findings**

The degree of awareness creation as well understanding of the concept of community policing among key actors are the hallmarks of every successful community policing programme. However, the data shows that two police respondents (6.45%) in the study area were not aware of the ongoing COMBAT programme. In terms of structure and strategies, the administrative power of COMBAT was concentrated at the top (AAG) while the local COMBAT officers exercised absolute decision-making authority. Besides, the COMBAT adopted proactive, reactive, and women empowerment and livelihood improvement approaches to fighting domestic violence. To this end, the situation determined the approach.

Effective communication and exchange of information between the COMBAT and community members coupled with equity, transparency, and accountability were associated with the high community acceptance of the
COMBAT’s activities. The results further indicate that COMBAT operations have immensely contributed to notable decline in spousal assault, defilement, rape, child labour, and cruel cultural practices in the operating communities. However, inadequate funding for the project was the key challenge to the facilitators while absence of incentives affected the zeal of the volunteers towards work. Besides, means of transport and inadequate training for the volunteers were also identified as pressing concerns.
CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

The study sought to examine effects of community policing on domestic violence in rural communities, using the COMBAT community policing programme in BA as a case. Specifically, the study sought to find out people’s views and awareness of community policing, analyse the structure and strategies of the COMBAT project, identify the roles and collaboration among actors in COMBAT, examine impact of COMBAT activities on domestic violence rates, and explore the major challenges facing the COMBAT programme.

The mixed-method approach, also referred to as methodological triangulation, was adopted. A total of 89 participants composed of COMBAT officers, police personnel, social workers, public officials and community residents were drawn for the study using both probabilistic and non-probabilistic sampling techniques. Data were collected from both primary and secondary sources using interviewing and FGD techniques. Besides, ethical considerations regarding research data collection such as informed consent, privacy, deception, confidentiality and anonymity were religiously observed. The data collected were coded, edited, and analysed using descriptive statistics. Results were presented in the form of tables, charts, direct quotations from personal interviews, and statistical commentary.
Summary

The main findings of the study are summarised as follows:

First, the investigation revealed that stakeholders in the COMBAT project have different views of what a practical community policing ought to be. Whereas some believed the concept of community policing was about using specially selected people from the community to fight local crime, others viewed it as paid local members who assist the police in minor duties like traffic control, community foot patrols, and serve informants purposes. Besides, general awareness of the COMBAT project was found to be relatively prominent in rural communities than urban centres within the study area. For instance, the results show that whereas all the 18 (100%) community residents said they were fully aware of the COMBAT project, two police officers (6.5%) were not aware of the ongoing COMBAT project.

Second, it was found that the centralisation of administrative powers of the COMBAT in AAG ignores the views of locals in policy decision-making processes. However, the structure allowed operational decisions to be independently taken by local COMBAT officers who exercised a great deal of discretion. Also, unlike the traditional policing approach which only legally reacts to incidents of domestic violence, the COMBAT added proactive and women empowerment approaches, including building public opinion against domestic violence through anti-violence campaigns in schools, churches, and market centres as well as scheduling training programmes to give rural women employable skills in order to empower them economically.
Third, the COMBAT’s level of collaboration with local institutions usually ranged from average to high during planning and execution stages of their programmes. However, the collaboration level was found to be very low in terms of monitoring and evaluation of COMBAT activities. For instance, there was low level of partnership between the COMBAT and the DAs, granting the enormous roles Assemblies play in ensuring the safety of their constituents. Despite the low level of collaboration, activities of the COMBAT have inspired institutions like the DOVVSU, CHRAJ, DWS, and NCCE to occasionally join them to undertake rural anti-violence campaigns, thus bridging the gap between these social protection institutions and the rural dwellers.

Fourth, the researcher found that activities of the COMBAT reduced incidents of domestic violence in the communities. In examining the influence of COMBAT operations on local domestic violence rates from the police viewpoint, 23 police respondents (76.6%), 21 respondents (70%), 22 respondents (73.3%) and 7 respondents (23.3%) reported that there was ‘High’ inverse relationship between COMBAT operations and rates of spousal assault, rape/defilement, child abuse and cruel cultural practices respectively, at least, at the community level. In this regard, the importance of effective communication and exchange of information between the COMBAT and their communities, leading to high community acceptance of the COMBAT project, cannot be underestimated.

Fifth, the study found lack of adequate financial resources to be the key challenge to the effective running of the project. Economic constraints that
manifested in the form of insufficient budget obviously characterised the operations of the project across all levels. Besides, low or absence of incentives for the volunteers really affected their enthusiasm towards work. It came to light that the only tangible reward received by each COMBAT officer for the whole year was a package from AAG that worth not more than fifty Ghana cedis (GHc 50). Moreover, lack of transport for COMBAT volunteers was found to be greatly affecting both response time and patrol coverage of the COMBAT officers due to dotted nature of the rural communities.

Conclusions

The following conclusions were drawn from the findings:

Major actors in the COMBAT project, including police officers, did not have full appreciation of what community policing is all about. The varied understanding of community policing among the actors may be attributed to scant education on the concept by the facilitators (AAG, CMCE and SODIA). Besides, not all actors and residents in the study area were fully aware of implementation of the COMBAT programmes. Surprisingly, some police officers were not aware of the project. It appears awareness creation in respect of the project has overly focused on rural communities at the expense of the towns and settlements where Police Stations existed.

The hierarchical administrative structure of the COMBAT does not encourage effective monitoring and evaluation of the programme. Since key actors like DOVVSU and DAs were not fully engaged by AAG in designing of COMBAT policies, they did not have any financial obligations its implementation, especially when they are aware that all donations, grants and
aids given in support of the community project passed through the AAG alone. However, sanctioning the local COMBAT officers to exercise absolute operational decision-making authority enabled them choose which problem-solving approach best suits the situation on the ground.

The level of collaboration between the COMBAT and crucial community institutions in the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of COMBAT activities is not encouraging. Since the COMBAT’s main focus is on fighting domestic violence, one would expect a very close partnership with community health centres and local schools at all times, but this was not the case. It is noteworthy that the project has no special mutual arrangements with local health centres regarding treatment of domestic violence cases. However, occasional anti-domestic violence outreach programmes jointly organised by the COMBAT and public institutions such as the DOVVSU, CHRAJ, DWS, and NCCE have yielded good results.

There is inverse relationship between community policing activities led by locals and neighbourhood crime levels since socially-bonded communities always act together to protect their social space against disorder and crime. This implies that crimes generated by community members can be more successfully resolved by community-sanctioned structures. To this end, effective communication and timely exchange of information between community police officers and community members enhance social cohesion among neighbours, thus enabling them to act as capable guardians in whose presence criminal and disorderly activities are highly unlikely to occur.
Inadequate funding is the bane to the success and sustainability of most community policing programmes, which the COMBAT is not an exception. Additionally, the absence of financial motivation as well as well-tailored career development plan for the COMBAT volunteers continue to discourage youth participation, thus threatens the sustainability of the project. Besides, the one-time training for COMBAT officers was not enough, granting the extensive roles they play in their communities. Lastly, lack of transport for community police officers delays response time and limits scope of patrol.

Recommendations

The study reveals that a lot of opportunities exist for capacity building in typical community policing initiatives whereby local people are empowered and equipped to maintain law and social order. A well designed community policing programme has the potential of forestalling community crime and disorder at relatively low costs, thus saving the state time and other scarce resources. In this regard, following recommendations are made:

1. ActionAid Ghana must ensure that awareness creation becomes an integral part of the entire COMBAT process as stakeholders’ level of understanding about the importance and implications of the project increases enthusiasm and support, stimulates self-mobilisation and action, and mobilises local knowledge. This can be done by effectively communicating the mission, vision, objectives and core values of the COMBAT project to the stakeholders.

2. It is recommended that the hierarchical administrative structure of the COMBAT be decentralised to promote effective local management. Specifically, AAG must cede some administrative authority to the
District COMBAT Executives to enable them seek funding in the name of the project from internal sources for their day-to-day activities while AAG focuses on seeking external funding to expand the project.

3. The COMBAT officers must intensity their collaboration with traditional and religious leaders in their efforts to build strong community opinion against social and cultural patterns that promote domestic violence, as the results show that more needs to be done to arrest cruel cultural practices in the study area.

4. It is also recommended that AAG, CMCE and SODIA design simple tools which community members can use to monitor and evaluate progress of activities of the COMBAT and give periodic feedback. Allowing locals to monitor and evaluate a community project will promote sense of community ownership.

5. ActionAid Ghana COMBAT Project Coordinator and all District COMBAT Executives are hereby advised to establish strong working relationship with the DAs, factoring views of the DISEC into planning and execution of all COMBAT activities. This will make the DAs feel part of the project and offer political, financial and material support as and when needed.

6. Moreover, AAG must go beyond DOVVSU to establishing new working relationships with the Domestic Violence Secretariat and the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection (MoGCSP), deeply involving them in the design and implementation of COMBAT activities, as this will help it secure funding from government to support their activities.
7. To ensure sustainability of the project, AAG and its partners should review their current policies on provision of incentives for COMBAT volunteers and offer them attractive quarterly incentives. Besides, AAG should come out with a promising career development plan for the youth in the COMBAT. This may include signing MoU with the Ghana Police Service Administration to give a recruitment quota for COMBAT officers who demonstrate exceptional commitment towards the voluntary community service.

8. ActionAid Ghana should organise periodic capacity building workshops for the COMBAT officers in areas of effective communication, interpersonal skills, and relationship building as the one-time training was found to be woefully inadequate.

9. Furthermore, AAG, traditional rulers, and religious leaders in COMBAT communities are advised to jointly procure, at least, one motorcycle and a bicycles for the COMBAT officers in every community in order to improve response time and cover larger area during patrols.

10. Additionally, Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief Executives (MMDCEs) across the country are advised to adopt the COMBAT system to help control crimes in rural communities where state police presence is lacking. This is because local-led structures like the COMBAT can give accurate and timely early warning signals in respect of impending chieftaincy or land disagreements to the DISEC or RESEC in order to curtail them at the early stages.

11. Furthermore, it recommended that individuals who are well to do, corporate institutions, non-governmental organizations and other
benevolent organizations should partner the AAG with regard to funding and equipping the COMBAT officers by emulating the exemplary gesture of the British High Commission which donated $50,000 worth of equipment such as handcuffs, shoulder guards, batons, baton holders, knee and elbow protective guards, shields, body armour, body bags for carrying dead bodies, helmets and groin guards to the Ghana Police Service to fully equip the Service to be able to embark on modern policing which is based on proactive policing rather than reactive policing.

**Suggestions for Further Research**

This study has examined the impact of the COMBAT community policing project on domestic violence in some districts in Brong Ahafo Region of Ghana. The outcome of this research provides opportunities for further research. It is therefore suggested that further studies on community policing in Ghana look at the Ghana Police Service’s own approach to community policing and its impact on rural crime rate. A similar study could also be conducted to compare the effects of Ghana Police Service’s approach to community policing on rural areas and urban areas.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Interview Guide for Key Actors in the COMBAT Project

Dear Respondent,

I am a final year M. Phil (Peace & Dev’t Studies) student from the University of Cape Coast. This questionnaire is prepared to gather information about the role of community policing in preventing domestic violence in your locality. In answering my questions, please remember that there are no correct or wrong answers. I am just after your honest opinion. I assure you that the responds you provide will be kept confidential and will be used solely for academic purpose. Thank you in advance for your time and cooperation.

Date of interview: ……/……./2016

SECTION A: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. Age: 10 – 19 [ ] 20 – 29 [ ] 30 – 39 [ ] 40 – 49 [ ] 50 + [ ]
2. Sex: Male [ ] Female [ ]
3. Educational Level: Nil [ ] JHS [ ] MSLC [ ] SHS [ ] Tertiary [ ]
4. Relationship status: Single [ ] Married [ ] divorced [ ] Courting [ ]
5. Religion: Traditional [ ] Christianity [ ] Islam [ ] Other [ ]
6. Occupation: ............................................................
7. Name of your community: ........................................
SECTION B: HISTORY OF THE COMBAT PROJECT

8. When was COMBAT introduced in Brong Ahafo region?

9. Who informed you about the initial planning and organisation of the project?
   Was the initial communication formal or informal?

10. What necessitated the need for creation of the COMBAT?

SECTION C: UNDERSTANDING OF COMMUNITY POLICING AND AWARENESS OF THE COMBAT PROJECT

11. As key actor in this intervention, what is your understanding of the concept of community policing?

12. In your opinion, to what extent has awareness creation in respect of the COMBAT project gone?

13. By what means do you create awareness of the project?

SECTION D: ROLES AND COLLABORATION

14. What kind of Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) exists between AAG and your outfit regarding the COMBAT project?

15. What are your defined roles in the COMBAT project?

16. What kind of financial obligation do you have in the project?

17. To what degree does AAG, CMCE, SODIA or the COMBAT officers collaborate with your outfit?

18. As a major stakeholder, describe your level of participation in COMBAT activities, in terms of:
   Planning / Implementation / Monitoring / Evaluation
SECTION D: STRUCTURE AND STRATEGIES OF COMBAT

19. Could you please describe the organisational structure of COMBAT?

20. In practice, how does the COMBAT structure operate?

21. Explain the approaches employed by the COMBAT to engage the communities in fighting domestic violence?

22. Describe mechanisms you have put in place to provide support for victims of domestic violence in terms medical care, shelter, counselling, legal assistance, and economic empowerment.

23. How do you handle perpetrators of domestic violence?

SECTION F: EFFECTS OF COMBAT OPERATIONS ON LOCAL CRIME LEVELS

24. How would you describe the COMBAT-community relationship?

25. To what extent has the COMBAT project increased awareness of domestic violence?

26. Have you observed any reduction in domestic violence rates following the implementation of the COMBAT project? Yes [ ] No [ ].

27. If yes, to what extent would you associate the observed reduction in domestic violence figures with operations of the COMBAT? Very high [ ] High [ ] Moderate [ ] Low [ ] Very low [ ]

28. Would you recommend that COMBAT projects be replicated in other area? Very high [ ] High [ ] Moderate [ ] Low [ ] Very low [ ]
SECTION E: KEY CHALLENGES OF COMBAT

29. What major challenges have you identified with respect to the COMBAT project?

30. In the meantime, what have you done about these challenges?

31. What policy alternatives do you propose to improve on COMBAT operations?
APPENDIX B

Interview Schedule for COMBAT Members

Dear Respondent,

This questionnaire is prepared to gather information about the role of community policing in preventing domestic violence in your locality. The data is intended to develop a mechanism to help improve the efficiency of community policing in dealing with domestic violence based on your suggested solutions. In answering my questions, please remember that there are no correct or wrong answers. I am just after your honest opinion. The responds you provide would be kept confidential and will be used solely for academic purpose. Thank you in advance for your time and cooperation.

Date: …………../…………./……………

SECTION A: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

   43 – 47 [ ]  48 + [ ]
2. Sex: Male [ ] Female [ ]
3. Educational Level: Nil [ ] JHS [ ] MSLC [ ] SHS [ ] Tertiary [ ]
4. Relationship status: Single [ ] Married [ ] divorced [ ] Courting [ ]
5. Occupation ..............................................................
6. Name of your community: ..........................................

SECTION B: THE CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY POLICING

7. Is it the responsibility of the following categories of people to help fight domestic violence in this community?
   a. Teachers Yes [ ] No [ ] I don’t know [ ]
   b. Police officers Yes [ ] No [ ] I don’t know [ ]
   c. Market women Yes [ ] No [ ] I don’t know [ ]
   d. Nurses Yes [ ] No [ ] I don’t know [ ]
e. Information centres Yes [ ] No [ ] I don’t know [ ]
f. Assemblyman Yes [ ] No [ ] I don’t know [ ]
g. Family head Yes [ ] No [ ] I don’t know [ ]
h. Pastors Yes [ ] No [ ] I don’t know [ ]
i. Queen mother Yes [ ] No [ ] I don’t know [ ]
j. Students Yes [ ] No [ ] I don’t know [ ]
k. Drinking bar operators Yes [ ] No [ ] I don’t know [ ]
l. Churches Yes [ ] No [ ] I don’t know [ ]
8. Do you understand what is meant by community policing? Yes [ ] No [ ]
9. If yes, what is your view of community policing?

8. If yes, what is your view of community policing?

10. In general, the rate of exchange of information between the community and

    COMBAT officers is: Very high [ ] High [ ] Neutral [ ]
    Low [ ] Very low [ ]

11. In general, the exchange of information between COMBAT officers and the

    local police is: Very high [ ] High [ ] Neutral [ ]
    Low [ ] Very low [ ]

SECTION C: STRUCTURE AND STRATEGIES OF COMBAT

12. What is the reporting relationship within the COMBAT in BA?

13. What is the reporting relationship within the COMBAT in this district?

14. What is the reporting relationship within the COMBAT in this community?

15. Who coordinates activities of the COMBAT in this district?

16. Who coordinates activities of the COMBAT in this community?

17. To which authority is the COMBAT in this community responsible?

18. What are the mechanisms adopted by the COMBAT to fight physical and

    economic abuse of women?

19. How does the project equip locals against child abuse?
20. How does the project empower locals against cruel cultural practices?

**SECTION D: COMBAT OPERATION AND CRIME RATES**

21. Prior to the implementation of the COMBAT project, how was the rate of domestic violence in this community? Very high [ ] High [ ] Neutral [ ] Low [ ] Very low [ ] I don’t know [ ]

22. Have you observed any differences in the rates of the following crimes, subsequent to implementation of the COMBAT project? Spousal assault: Neutral [ ] Low [ ] Very low [ ] No idea [ ]

Family violence: Neutral [ ] Low [ ] Very low [ ] No idea [ ]

Rape/defilement: Neutral [ ] Low [ ] Very low [ ] No idea [ ]

Children maltreatment: Neutral [ ] Low [ ] Very low [ ] No idea [ ]

Cruel cultural practices: Neutral [ ] Low [ ] Very low [ ] No idea [ ]

23. On a scale of 1 to 5 (where 1 is ‘not a good job at all’ and 5 is ‘an outstanding job’), how do you rate the performance of the COMBAT in this community?

a. Transparency in dealings [ ]

b. Response time [ ]

c. Accountability [ ]

d. Equal treatment of complaints [ ]

e. Community partnership [ ]

f. Fairness in procedure [ ]

g. Firmness in decision-making [ ]
SECTION E: COLLABORATION AMONG ACTORS

(From question 4 – 11, Rank from 1 to 5, where 5 = Highest)

What is the level of collaboration between the COMBAT and the following institutions?

24. Traditional rulers, in terms of?

   Planning [ ] Implementation [ ] Monitoring [ ] Evaluation [ ]

25. Community members, in terms of?

   Planning [ ] Implementation [ ] Monitoring [ ] Evaluation [ ]

26. NGOs (other than CMCE and SODIA) in terms of:

   Planning [ ] Implementation [ ] Monitoring [ ] Evaluation [ ]

27. Local schools, in terms of:

   Planning [ ] Implementation [ ] Monitoring [ ] Evaluation [ ]

28. District Assemblies, in terms of:

   Planning [ ] Implementation [ ] Monitoring [ ] Evaluation [ ]

29. Local health facilities, in terms of:

   Planning [ ] Implementation [ ] Monitoring [ ] Evaluation [ ]

30. Local FM station, in terms of:

   Planning [ ] Implementation [ ] Monitoring [ ] Evaluation [ ]

31. National Commission on Civic Education, in terms of:

   Planning [ ] Implementation [ ] Monitoring [ ] Evaluation [ ]

32. In general, the rate of exchange of information between the COMBAT officers and community members is: Very high [ ] High [ ] Neutral [ ] Low [ ] Very low [ ]
33. In general, the exchange of information between COMBAT officers and local police is:

- Very high [ ]
- High [ ]
- Neutral [ ]
- Low [ ]
- Very low [ ]

34. In general, community’s acceptance of the COMBAT programme is:

- Very high [ ]
- High [ ]
- Neutral [ ]
- Low [ ]
- Very low [ ]

SECTION F: CHALLENGES OF COMBAT OFFICERS

35. What do you consider the five (5) most serious challenges facing the day-to-day activities of COMBAT? (choose from 1 - 5, where 1 = most serious)

- Lack of adequate human resources (understaffed) [ ]
- Ineffective communication with police [ ]
- Lack of adequate transportation [ ]
- Lack of protective devices (handcuffs /pepper spray) [ ]
- Interference by local elites [ ]
- Lack of motivation and morale [ ]
- Inadequate training [ ]
- Abusive cultural practices [ ]
- Ineffective communication with the police [ ]
- Lack of confidence and support of community members [ ]
- Other [ ] Specify .........................................................

THANK YOU
APPENDIX C

Interview Schedule for Police Officers

Dear Respondent,

This questionnaire is prepared to gather information about the role of community policing in preventing domestic violence in your locality. The data is intended to develop a mechanism to help improve the efficiency of community policing in dealing with domestic violence based on your suggested solutions. In answering my questions, please remember that there are no correct or wrong answers. I am just after your honest opinion. The responds you provide would be kept confidential and will be used solely for academic purpose. Thank you in advance for your time and cooperation.

Date: ……………./…………./……………

SECTION A: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

2. Sex:  Male [    ]         Female [    ]
3. Educational Level: Nil [    ]     JHS [    ]    MSLC [    ]  SHS [    ]    Tertiary [    ]
4. Relationship status:  Single [    ]   Married [    ]   divorced [    ]  Courting [    ]
5. Occupation ……………………………………………………………
6. Rank :  Senior officer [    ]        Junior officer [    ]
7. Name of your community: ………………………………………
SECTION B: KNOWLEDGE ON COMMUNITY POLICING

8. Is it the responsibility of the following categories of people to help fight domestic violence in this community?
   a. Teachers   Yes [   ] No [   ] I don’t know [   ]
   b. Police officers Yes [   ] No [   ] I don’t know [   ]
   c. Market women Yes [   ] No [   ] I don’t know [   ]
   d. Nurses   Yes [   ] No [   ] I don’t know [   ]
   e. Information centres Yes [ ] No [ ] I don’t know [   ]
   f. Assemblyman Yes [ ] No [ ] I don’t know [   ]
   g. Family head Yes [ ] No [ ] I don’t know [   ]
   h. Pastors Yes [ ] No [ ] I don’t know [   ]
   i. Queen mother Yes [ ] No [ ] I don’t know [   ]
   j. Students Yes [ ] No [ ] I don’t know [   ]
   k. Drinking bar operators Yes [ ] No [ ] I don’t know [   ]
   l. Churches Yes [ ] No [ ] I don’t know [   ]

9. Do you believe police-community partnership can reduce domestic violence?
   Yes [   ] No [   ] I don’t know [   ]

10. In maintaining law and order, how do you regard the average citizen in this community? (Tick 3 applicable)
    Someone to serve and protect [   ]
    Someone to be taken advantage of [   ]
    Someone to partner in combating crime [   ]
    Someone who needs police assistance [   ]
    Everyone is a potential criminal [   ]
    A threat to the interests or security of the police [   ]
    Other (specify) ........................................ [   ]

11. Do you understand community policing? Yes [   ] No [   ]

12. If yes, could you explain what community policing is?
    ......................................................................................................
13. Are you aware of any community policing project called COMBAT?
   Yes [   ] No [   ]

   If yes, what is the COMBAT about?  

SECTION C: COLLABORATION WITH COMBAT OFFICERS

14. To what extent do the police involve COMBAT officers in crime prevention activities?  Very high [  ] High [  ] Neutral [  ] Low [  ] Very low [  ]

15. How would you rate the exchange of information between the police and COMBAT officers?  Very high [  ] High [  ] Neutral [  ] Low [  ] Very low [  ]

16. What is the police’s acceptance of the COMBAT programme?  Very high [  ] High [  ] Neutral [  ] Low [  ] Very low [  ]

17. What is the communities’ acceptance of the COMBAT programme?  Very high [  ] High [  ] Neutral [  ] Low [  ] Very low [  ]

SECTION D: COMBAT OPERATIONS ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

18. In your view, does the COMBAT project serve the following needs of domestic violence victims:

   a) provide counselling to victims  Yes [  ] No [  ] Don’t know [  ]

   b) provide shelter to victims  Yes [  ] No [  ] Don’t know [  ]

   c) provide rapid response to victims  Yes [  ] No [  ] Don’t know [  ]

   d) empower women economically  Yes [  ] No [  ] Don’t know [  ]

19. In your opinion, would you say the COMBAT have contributed to reduction of:

   a) Spousal assault:  Very high [  ] High [  ] Neutral [  ] Low [  ] Very low [  ]

   b) Family violence:  Very high [  ] High [  ] Neutral [  ] Low [  ] Very low [  ]

   c) Rape/defilement:  Very high [  ] High [  ] Neutral [  ] Low [  ] Very low [  ]
d) Children maltreatment
Very high [ ] High [ ] Neutral [ ] Low [ ] Very low [ ]

e) Cruel cultural practices:
Very high [ ] High [ ] Neutral [ ] Low [ ] Very low [ ]

20. To what extent would you attribute reduction in domestic violence cases in this Police Station to the operations of the COMBAT? Very high [ ] High [ ] Neutral [ ] Low [ ] Very low [ ]

SECTION E: CHALLENGES OF COMBAT

21. List five (5) challenges impeding the operations of COMBAT

......................................................................................................................

22. Ranking from 1 – 3, indicate the three (3) most serious challenges facing the police in this Station? (1=most serious)

   Lack of adequate human resources (understaffed) [ ]
   Lack of communication equipment [ ]
   Lack of adequate budget [ ]
   Police are subject to political interference [ ]
   Police are subject to interference by local elites [ ]
   Inadequate training [ ]
   Lack of confidence and support of the community [ ]
   Police lack incentive and morale [ ]

THANK YOU
APPENDIX D

Interview Guide for Regional Combat Coordinator

SECTION A: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. Age: 10 – 19 [ ] 20 – 29 [ ] 30 – 39 [ ] 40 – 49 [ ] 50 + [ ]

2. Sex: Male [ ] Female [ ]

3. Educational Level: Nil [ ] JHS [ ] MSLC [ ] SHS [ ] Tertiary [ ]

4. Relationship status: Single [ ] Married [ ] Divorced [ ] Courting [ ]

5. Religion: Traditional [ ] Christianity [ ] Islam [ ] Other [ ]

6. Occupation: ..................................................

7. Name of your community: .........................................

SECTION B: THE HISTORY OF COMBAT PROJECT

8. When was the COMBAT project established in Ghana?

9. When was the COMBAT introduced in Brong Ahafo region?

10. What necessitated the need for the establishment of the COMBAT BA?

..................................................

11. What is/are your major source(s) of funding for COMBAT?

12. What kind of Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) exists between ActionAid Ghana and the Ghana Police Service regarding the COMBAT programme? ..........................
SECTION C: UNDERSTANDING OF COMMUNITY POLICING AND AWARENESS OF THE COMBAT

13. How far and by which channels have education and publicity about the COMBAT gone across BA?

14. How do you understand the concept of community policing?

SECTION D: ROLES AND COLLABORATION

15. List the major stakeholders in the COMBAT programme?

16. Could you please outline the expected roles of each of the major stakeholders?

………………

17. Indicate levels of participation of the major stakeholders at the various stages of the programme (choose: Very high, High, Moderate, Low and Very low)

Planning Implementation Monitoring Evaluation

……………… ………………… ………………… …………………

18. If you are to indicate the level of collaboration between COMBAT and other stakeholders, how would you describe it?

Very high [ ] High [ ] Neutral [ ] Low [ ] Very low [ ]

SECTION F: STRUCTURE AND STRATEGIES

19. Could you describe the structure of COMBAT project?

20. What key strategies does the COMBAT adopt in fighting domestic violence?

21. What arrangements have you made with health facilities in your operational areas? …………………

22. Supporting with figures, can you tell me the effects of COMBAT activities on local crime rates? …………………
SECTION G: CHALLENGES OF THE COMBAT

23. What are the major challenges facing the COMBAT project?

24. What attempts have you made to address them?
APPENDIX F

Interview Guide for Regional DOVVSU Coordinator

SECTION A: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. Age:  20 – 29 [ ] 30 – 39 [ ] 40 – 49 [ ] 50 + [ ]
2. Sex: Male [ ] Female [ ]
3. Educational Level: Nil [ ] JHS [ ] MSLC [ ] SHS [ ] Tertiary [ ]
4. Relationship status: Single [ ] Married [ ] Divorced [ ] Courting [ ]
5. Occupation: ...........................................................
6. Name of your community: .........................................

SECTION B: HISTORY OF THE COMBAT PROJECT

7. When was the COMBAT project launched in BA?
8. What influenced the selection of Asutifi North, Asutifi South, Tain and Banda Districts for the COMBAT project?
9. What kind of Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) exists between AGG and the DOVVSU Command?
10. What financial obligation has DOVVSU in the COMBAT?

SECTION C: UNDERSTANDING OF COMMUNITY POLICING AND AWARENESS OF THE COMBAT

11. How far has awareness creation and publicity about the COMBAT project gone as far as DOVVSU is concerned?
12. By which means does the DOVVSU create awareness of the COMBAT project among police personnel in this region?
13. How do you understand the concept of community policing?
14. To what extent has the DOVVSU educated its personnel about community policing?

**SECTION D: ROLES AND COLLABORATION**

15. What has been the level of collaboration between the DOVVSU and the COMBAT programme?

16. Could you please outline specific roles the DOVVSU play in the COMBAT programme?

17. What is DOVVSU’s level of participation at various stages of the programme (Very high / High/ Moderate/ Low/ Very low)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning</th>
<th>Implementation</th>
<th>Monitoring</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SECTION D: COMBAT OPERATION AND CRIME RATES**

18. Prior to implementation of the COMBAT project, what was the rate of domestic violence in this area? Very high [ ] High [ ] Neutral [ ] Low [ ] Very low [ ] I don’t know [ ]

19. Has there been any observed differences in the rate of domestic violence following implementation of the programme, in terms of:

- Spousal assault: Neutral [ ] Low [ ] Very low [ ] No change [ ]

- Family violence: Neutral [ ] Low [ ] Very low [ ] No change [ ]

- Rape/defilement: Neutral [ ] Low [ ] Very low [ ] No change [ ]

- Children maltreatment: Neutral [ ] Low [ ] Very low [ ] No change [ ]

- Cruel cultural practices: Neutral [ ] Low [ ] Very low [ ] No change [ ]
20. Supporting with figures, can you tell me the effects of COMBAT activities on local crime rates?

21. To what extent would you associate the drop in local crime levels to operations of the COMBAT?

SECTION G: CHALLENGES OF THE COMBAT

22. What are the major challenges facing the administration of the COMBAT programmes?

23. What attempts have you made towards addressing the above challenges?

24. What new policies would you suggest to improve on the success of the project?
APPENDIX G

Focus Group Discussion Guide for Community Members

SECTION A: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

2. Sex: Male [ ] Female [ ]
3. Educational Level: Nil [ ] JHS [ ] MSLC [ ] SHS [ ] Tertiary [ ]
4. Relationship status: Single [ ] Married [ ] divorced [ ] Courting [ ]
5. Occupation …………………………………………………
6. Name of your community: ……………………………

SECTION B. COLLECTIVE EFFICACY SCALE

7. For each of these statements, please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree:
   a. This is a close-knit neighbourhood.
   b. People in this area are willing to help their neighbours.
   c. Residents in this community don’t get along with each other.
   d. People in this neighbourhood do not share the same values.
   e. People in this neighbourhood can be trusted

8. For each of the following, please tell me if it is very likely, likely, unlikely or very unlikely that people in your neighbourhood would act:
   a. If a man is severely assaulting his own wife.
   b. If a couple engages their adopted child in very intensive labour.
   c. If a child shows open disrespect to adult.
d. If a group of children skip school and are seen loitering.

e. If a big tree fell on telephone lines as a result of heavy rains.

9. For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree, if a neighbour:

a. Questions unfamiliar characters strolling in this neighbourhood

b. Suggests you contribute to buy streetlamps.

c. Reports to the chief another neighbour who have sexual affairs with his own niece.

d. Warns a teacher against unjustifiable punishment of their child.

e. A neighbour drops a litter because there is no dustbin in this area

SECTION C: UNDERSTANDING OF COMMUNITY POLICING AND KNOWLEDGE OF THE COMBAT

10. Is it the responsibility of the following categories of people to help fight domestic violence in this community?

a. Teachers Yes [ ]    No [ ]       I don’t know [ ]

b. Police officers Yes [ ]    No [ ]       I don’t know [ ]

c. Market women Yes [ ]    No [ ]       I don’t know [ ]

d. Nurses Yes [ ]    No [ ]       I don’t know [ ]

e. Information centres Yes [ ]    No [ ]       I don’t know [ ]

f. Assemblyman Yes [ ]    No [ ]       I don’t know [ ]

g. Family head Yes [ ]    No [ ]       I don’t know [ ]

h. Pastors Yes [ ]    No [ ]       I don’t know [ ]

i. Queen mother Yes [ ]    No [ ]       I don’t know [ ]

j. Students Yes [ ]    No [ ]       I don’t know [ ]

k. Drinking bar operators Yes [ ]    No [ ]       I don’t know [ ]

l. Churches Yes [ ]    No [ ]       I don’t know [ ]

11. Do you understand what is meant by community policing? Yes [ ]    No [ ]
If yes, what is your view of community policing? 
...........................................................................

12. Do you know about COMBAT? Yes [ ] No [ ] If yes, what is the COMBAT about? ............................................

SECTION D: COMMUNITY-COMBAT COLLABORATION

13. Does the community approve of the COMBAT’s operations?

14. In what ways do community members support the COMBAT?

15. How regular does community members engage the services of the COMBAT? Very often [ ] Often [ ] Seldom [ ] Not at all [ ]

16. How often do you volunteer sensitive information to the COMBAT? Very often [ ] Often [ ] Seldom [ ] Not at all [ ]

17. In case you are a victim of or witness to domestic violence, explain why you would first report to the COMBAT before of the police.

SECTION E: STRATEGIES OF THE COMBAT

18. Could you please describe mechanisms adopted by the COMBAT in their fight against domestic violence?

29. How does the project empower women to overcome physical and economic abuse?

20. What steps do the COMBAT take to discourage domestic violence among members in this community?

21. On a scale of 1 to 5 (where 1 is ‘not a good job at all’ and 5 is ‘an outstanding job’), how do you rate the performance of COMBAT in this community, in terms of?
SECTION F: EFFECTS OF COMBAT OPERATIONS ON LOCAL CRIME RATES

22. What support does the COMBAT offer to rape/defilement victims?

23. How does the COMBAT provide temporary shelter to victims of domestic violence?

24. What form of legal assistance does the COMBAT provide for victims of domestic violence?

25. How does the COMBAT provide physical security for victims?

26. How does the COMBAT handle perpetrators of domestic offences?

27. In general, how would you describe the relationship between operations of the COMBAT and domestic violence rates in this area?

28. On the average, the handling of domestic violence cases by the COMBAT is: Satisfactory [ ] Unsatisfactory [ ]

39. What do you think are the major challenges of the COMBAT?