UNIVERSITY OF CAPE COAST POLITICS IN THE ROME OF CICERO’S DAY BY EMMANUEL TEIKO Thesis submitted to the Department of Classics and Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, College of Humanities and Legal Studies, University of Cape Coast in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of Master of Philosophy degree in Classics JUNE 2017 ii DECLARATION Candidate’s Declaration I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of my own original research and that no part of it has been presented for another degree in this university or elsewhere. Candidate’s Signature ......................................................Date........................ Name ……………………………………………………………………… Supervisors’ Declaration We hereby declare that the preparation and presentation of the thesis were supervised in accordance with the guidelines on supervision of thesis laid down by the University of Cape Coast. Principal Supervisor’s Signature ...…………….……….Date.......................... Name ………………………………………………………………………. Co-Supervisor’s Signature .........................……………...Date.......................... Name: ……………………………………………………………………… iii ABSTRACT Cicero is unique among the great men of Rome in antiquity because through him we gain an enormous reflection of the ancient Roman world, more especially the last century of the Roman Republic. The research seeks to assess and discuss salient factors that made Rome of Cicero’s day drift away “from the good old days” (i. e., the early Roman Republic) as well as abandon the ancestral ways, mos maiorum; in exchange for corrupt and violent politics. It also demonstrates how the Rome of Cicero’s day was governed by men who agreed far more than disagreed on the fundamental questions facing the ailing Republic. Inevitably, Cicero was the man who saw what had made his day become so different from the early Republic. In point of fact, an important feature during this turbulent period was the corrupt nature of Rome’s politicians. Political leaders were no more concerned about the safety and welfare of the citizens; rather they were filled with unbridled passion to exploit the Republic given the slightest opportunity open to them. The study ends with a concise discussion of how Cicero stood by the traditional Republican ideals, to defend the Republican government. iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS It was Prof. Richard V. Cudjoe who inspired me in my graduate studies to look seriously at Cicero, and who convinced me that there was much more yet to be said about him. I am most grateful for your unflagging support and generous temerity. To Mr. Jonathan Asante-Otchere whose assistance is just amazing, and whatever I am now as a student of Classics I owe to his wisdom and sage advice. I also owe an enormous debt of gratitude to my Head of Department, Prof. P. K. Grant and Prof. R. N. Osei, both whose critical comments and admonition helped shape this research. Also, I sincerely express my profound gratitude to all Lecturers, Principal and Senior Research Assistants and the administrative staff of the Department of Classics and Philosophy for their assistance in making this research a success. My greatest debts, however, are personal. I was inspired in my studies (as a young boy) by my biological father, Rev John K. Teiko. It was he who first planted and nurtured my love for history, and who never stopped encouraging me to hold on to God. How can I forget to acknowledge the unflinching support I’ve gained from fathers and a mum such as Rev. & Rev. (Mrs) Anderson-Aidoo and Rev. Dr. Francis Nyarko. I am proud of you people and God richly bless you all. Lastly, but particularly, I owe enormous debts to Mr. Julius E. Ampofo, David Gyane, and Pearl G. Amposah. Others are Chris Agbesi, Hayford A. Dacosta, and Ethel Agbe. When the going got daring, you people gave me hope and great encouragement. I could not have done it without you people. v DEDICATION To my lovely wife, Mrs. Linda Teiko. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Page DECLARATION ii ABSTRACT iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iv DEDICATION v TABLE OF CONTENTS vi LIST OF ACRONYMS ix CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION Background to the Study 1 Purpose of the Study 10 Methodology 10 Organization 11 Literature Review 12 Conclusion 26 CHAPTER TWO: THE NATURE OF POLITICS IN THE EARLY ROMAN REPUBLIC 28 Conclusion 46 CHAPTER THREE: THE NATURE OF POLITICS IN THE ROME OF CICERO’S DAY Introduction 48 The Optimates and the Populares 48 The Roman Contio 64 The Army in Roman Politics in the days of Cicero 68 Conclusion 92 vii CHAPTER FOUR: ELECTIONEERING CRISIS AND BRIBERY IN THE AGE OF CICERO 95 Electioneering Crisis 97 Electoral Corruption and Bribery 108 The effects of Electioneering Crisis and Bribery in Politics of the latter part of the Republic. 120 Conclusion 123 CHAPTER FIVE: Conclusion 127 REFERENCES 134 1 CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION Background to the Study We may begin with the question: What is politics? In Collins English Dictionary (2001, p. 1198) politics is defined as the art or the science of forming, directing and administering states and political units. It can also be defined as the complex or aggregate of relationships involving authority or power. Or, any activity concerned with the acquisition of power, gaining one’s own end. Politics has its roots from the Greek word polis, which literally means city-state. Thus ancient Greek society was divided into a collection of independent city-states, each of which possessed its own system of government. Athens, the largest and most influential among all the city-states, is often portrayed as the home of democratic government. In this light, politics can be understood to refer to the affairs of the polis, in effect, “what concerns the polis.” No wonder Aristotle opined that: “Man is by nature a political animal” (Aristotle, Politics, 1). Politics, in its broadest sense, is the activity through which people make, preserve and amend the general rules under which they live. The existence of rival opinions, different wants, competing needs and opposing interests guarantees disagreement about the rules under which people live. People recognize that, in order to influence these rules or ensure that they are upheld, they must work with others. Thus we can further define politics as “…the most important form of human activity because it involves interaction amongst free and equal citizens. It thus gives meaning to life and affirms the uniqueness of each individual” (Anonymous). 2 This is why the heart of politics is often portrayed as a process of conflict resolution in which rival views or competing interests are reconciled with one another. However, politics in this vein is the search for conflict resolution than just achievement. It is important to note that, not all conflicts are, or can be, resolved. From this point, Munroe (2002, pp. 3, 31) notes that attention is drawn to Cicero’s day which coincides with the last century of the Roman Republic and mainly the political behaviour that characterised the period. Cicero’s day presented a society in stark form with issues that marred the beauty of Roman politics till the commencement of the imperial era. Most people equate politics with the stereotypical politician and because of this, most of us have the view that the nature of politics is power-hungry, self-seeking, corrupt, and, in some cases, violent. These ideas come from our socialization as well as from our exposure to social forces and our own experiences with politicians. Marcus Tullius Cicero’s (106-43 BC) ascent into the political limelight in Rome at the time was not a swift leap to greatness, nor was it assured through privileges because he was a (novus homo) new man. However, Cicero worked arduously at his studies, and made a lot of valuable relationships early in his political career. One truth that cannot be ignored is the fact that he possessed unparalleled abilities as a public speaker, which was key to his political ambitions. His speech on Pro Roscio Amerino (80 BC) is an example of how Cicero’s skills gave him merit over most of his contemporaries. Without fail, Cicero upheld the firm belief that, public officials are bound ‘to keep the good of the people so clearly in view that, regardless of their own interests, they will make their every action conform to that (Cicero, De Officius, I. xxv. 85).’ ‘Exploiting ‘the state for selfish profit is not only immoral: it is criminal, and 3 infamous’ (Cicero, De Officius). Kathryn Tempest (2011, p. 20) suggests that Cicero’s dramatic rise through the Roman political system and his outstanding career as an orator was not without its struggles. To succeed in Rome, a man needed the right family and a substantial fortune. By Cicero’s time, the original distinction between the patricians and the plebeians was not as important as it once had been; but it was important that a man was descended from one of the noble families. The fact that the wealthy could manipulate the justice system was, for Cicero, pernicious to the Republic (Cicero, Against Verres, 1. 1. 1). With this belief in Cicero’s mind, he set out to achieve justice in his first public case in defence of Sextus Roscius in 80 BC. This case was one of the most significant in his life, for it was during this trial that he openly without fear indicates the trend of his political life. Hence, to accuse Cicero of being a coward must be of necessity overlooked and an assumption premised on quicksand. Cicero’s political life commences with this career at a sensitive period when all the great advocates of Rome were cowed by fear of Cornelius Sulla. It was Cicero who singlehandedly stood and dared to raise his voice against the cruel proscriptions, confiscation of property, and made an open attack on the Dictator’s favourite, Chrysogonus, and consequently Sulla himself. Thus, in this case, even in the presence of Sulla the dictator, Cicero unashamed and without fear exclaimed, “This government has of late lost not only the quality of pardoning but the habits of justice” (Cicero, Pro Sextio Amerino, 2). The fact is that Cicero was an exceptional statesman who distinguished himself from most of his contemporaries. To him, the proper task of the magistrate, that is, the politician, national figure, or the statesman, is to be aware 4 that he represents the state and that he must uphold its dignity and honour, respect the laws, define rights, and constantly bear in mind the things that are placed in his trust (De Officiis. 1, 34, 124). This view is further developed in a passage from the De Legibus: “Here you can see what the power of the magistrate is: he must lead, and command what is right, useful, and in accordance with the laws. For as the laws govern the magistrate, so the magistrate governs the people and it may truly be said that the magistrate is a speaking law, whilst the law is a silent magistrate” (De Legibus, III, 1, 2). Marcus Tullius Cicero, was born on January 3, 106 BC and was murdered on December 7, 43 BC. He was born to a non-senatorial family but to a prominent and wealthy equestrian family from the municipium of Arpinum. He was educated both at Rome and Athens, and rose through the senatorial ranks of the cursus honorum to become the first novus homo in thirty-one years to reach the consulship and bestow the status of nobilitas upon his gens. During his days, the Roman Republic was filled with crucial events which shaped not only the political environment of the Republic, but also altered the personal and political relationships of the individuals within the Republic. It is noteworthy that Cicero’s day was characterised by fierce competition among an embattled oligarchy, the rise of military dynasts, a series of civil wars and urban riots, and vigorous literary activity. The literature at the time includes the poetry of Catullus (87-54) and Lucretius (99-55), war commentaries by Caesar (102-44), historical monographs by Sallust (86-35), biographies by Nepos (110-24). Yet, through it all, the figure who gave his name to the age was Marcus Tullius Cicero (Cf: Eric Gruen, 1974, p. 387; Michael Crawford (1978, p. 160), & Thomas N. Mitchell (1979, p. 203). Undoubtedly, Cicero has over the 5 centuries been lauded as one of the most clear-sighted statesmen produced by the Roman Republic. However, the last century of the Republic, which coincidentally coincides with Cicero’s day, was plagued with a lamentable story of political oppression and chicanery in which the optimates (i.e., politicians who conduct themselves so as to gain the approval of the best people for their policies) strove to retain control of the state against the populares (i.e., politicians who want their actions and words to be pleasing to the multitude) whose leaders, with but few exceptions, no less cynically used popular agitation for political and economic reform to advance their personal interests. However, not all populares politicians (such as the Gracchi) were self-centred or politically corrupt, though the majority of populares politicians were corrupt and defied the order of the Roman political and legal procedural system. Nevertheless, such issues are to be expected since Rome of Cicero’s day had already been thrown into a complex state of affair and unforeseen events We note that Cicero’s passion for the institutions of the Roman Republic drove his unparalleled devotion to the essence of coming up with his concordia ordinum. In the traditional or conventional sense, concordia ordinum meant “public harmony” or the “harmony of the Republic.” It was a basic principle or belief that the foundation of a well-functioning state must be the unity, friendship, agreement or reconciliation of its citizens. There is a conventional belief that concordia ordinum is a uniquely Ciceronian expression, that the expression forms part of “the Ciceronian tradition” (Nicolet & Oakley, 1997, p. 725). It was an arduous task for Cicero to drive through or make strides with his ideals, since he found himself in an age of military leaders who were ready at any given time to offer more compensation to their supports than Cicero’s political 6 rhetoric. Cicero’s concordia ordinum deserves our commendation as he was able to withstand danger from Catiline, the Roman Senate and Knights. Sadly, Cicero was forced into exile in 58 BC. Yet, when he returned in 57 BC, his political ideals remained unchanged. In the Pro Sestio, Cicero vigorously re-affirmed his belief in the necessity for unity of all the classes under the guidance of patriotic leaders bound by allegiance to the Roman Senate (Pro Sest. 136ff, p. 97). In addition, Cicero’s deeply patriotic devotion to the Roman Republic cannot be fully explained by Habicth in his book titled, Cicero the Politician, or by any utilitarian purpose. Cicero writes; “nothing in the world is more precious to me than the Republic herself” (Fam. II, xv, 3). Later, on two separate occasions, Cicero exclaims that he cherishes the state more than life itself, and further contends; “so great is love of country [patriae] that we measure it not by what we feel but by the salvation of our country itself” (Fam. VII, xxviii, 3; X, xii, 5). How then can such a person be tainted as a reporter and transmitter? Whereas, an achievement worth noting is his capacity as consul of 63 BC to foil the conspiracy hatched by Catiline (Anonymous), and ensure that peace prevailed in the Republic. In fact, one way to demonstrate Cicero’s firm stand for respect of the mos maiorum is what a small section of the Roman citizenry wondered as to whether that aroused Cicero’s detest for/of the Gracchi and Saturninus. These personalities had contravened the Roman mos maiorum which Cicero venerated because custom was the medium whereby the heritage of the past was to be transmitted from one person to another by virtue of auctoritas (Rambaud, 1953, p. 106f). However, the key point to note is Anthony Everitt’s (2003, pp. 10-11) position that: “The greatest underlying problem facing the Republic (as in, Rome 7 of Cicero’s day), was in its governance. Rome of Cicero’s day was a state without most of the institutions needed to run a state. The Republic was governed by the rule of law in theory but it did not operate a public prosecution service, and elected politicians acted as judges. Everitt further explained that all these things, in their various ways, were obstacles to effective administration. More so, the constitution, which controlled the conduct of politicians, was the Republic’s greatest weakness.” Despite the afore-mentioned challenges, Cicero began his public life by appealing to the conventional meaning of Republican harmony as a way of dealing with disagreements over Sulla’s reforms, over the management of economic resources, and to deal with the antagonism of certain ambitious individuals. The disagreement had been a long-ago problem between the optimates and the populares, or the rich and the poor over issues bothering on politics, legal matters, and social issues. He soon realised that his own success and the harmony of the Roman Republic could only be achieved within a kind of coalition, and thus began to see concordia ordinum as a political strategy. The strategy was to build an alliance, and in effect political harmony between the two major orders of the state: the Senate and the Equites. Unfortunately, the politicians of his time appeared to be corrupt and no longer possessed the “virtuous character” that had been the main attitude of Romans in the earlier days of Roman history. This loss of virtue was, he believed, the cause of the Republic’s difficulties. In fact, Cicero took up the political slogan concordia ordinum, that is, the harmony of the Orders, and this was a policy designed to prevent the different sectors of society from going into conflict with each other. Cicero thought that justice was necessary for this harmony, and that it was the most effective method 8 of preserving the state, and that he had achieved such a harmony during his consulship (Radford, 2002, pp. 35-6). Thus, after Cicero’s consulship in 63 BC the Roman Republic was not any better; the spark that was needed to ignite the flame had already taken place. Thus, there were power drunk men such as Catiline who were ready to turn down every custom or convention that had bound the Republic. Mary Beard (2005) notes that: “Whatever its rights and wrongs, ‘The Conspiracy’ takes us to the centre of Roman political life…The conflict between Cicero and Catiline was partly a clash of political ideology and ambition, but it was also a clash between men of very different backgrounds.” I agree to Mary Beard’s view that, “…the contrasting careers of Cicero and Catiline offer a vivid illustration of just how varied political life in Rome of the first century BC could be.” Particularly, it is fascinating how Cicero oftentimes in his speeches and letters made emphatic references to the Republic or the “Good old days.” It may be surprising when we begin to ponder as to why he persistently referred to the Republic and what deductions or inferences are most likely to be drawn from his use of the word or term, when, in fact, he still lived in the Republic. The notion of res publica is often translated as “the common good,” but more properly it is what citizens hold in common and above their own narrow self-interest. It may sound like an ancient term today, more appropriate for discourses on classical Roman law (Ola Zetterquist, 2011). In point of fact, Cicero mostly referred to the Republic with the backdrop of recounting or recalling a once virtuous driven Roman society. For, during Cicero’s day, respect for the various magistracies, as well as the rule of law was battered into submission, while the Republic all the more easily succumbed to the 9 rule of men. The fall was brought about not necessarily by external armies or revolution, but largely by the Romans’ own tacit agreement that their rules could be bent and broken as needed. For the Romans, at least, the argument that “the end justifies the means” proved to be the antithesis and the undoing of constitutional government. Although Rome was developing at a rate that it needed sincere and honest politicians to steer its affairs, on the contrary, while the masses had confidence in the ailing Republic, there were just a few men (such as Marcus Tullius Cicero) who still had confidence in the redemption of the once moral and politically moderate or ideal Republic. Interestingly, the richer Rome became, the more extensive, and diffused the problem of bribery seemed to become in Rome of Cicero’s day. During the time of Cicero, bribery became institutionalised and sums of money required became enormous. There were even organized associations many of which were based on tribes set up for extortion and intimidation. The long-term consequences of political bribery had become noticeable by the sixties and fifties BC when the massive borrowing needed for bribes created financial instability and subsequently political instability among the aristocracy and a subsequent loss of faith in the constitution. In all, as a result of the various struggles that emerged in the Rome of Cicero’s day, it must be acknowledged that the period under study was deeply immersed in political turmoil due to the quest for power by some self-seeking and power drunk generals as well as political stakeholders. Eric Gruen (1974, p. 47) argues strongly that politics in Rome had traditionally operated through aristocratic alliances, while a relatively small number of families occupied key positions and controlled the wellspring of power. Rome, during this period, 10 experienced an escalating abuse of elections which inculcated in the Romans the idea that their constitution and the rule of law had no intrinsic value, but existed only as tools in the service of power and desired goals. Besides, bribery and violence were key factors that disintegrated the Republic. Thus bribery and violence were symptoms of an increasing disrespect for all established values in a situation where a breakdown in consensus seemed to challenge the authority of values themselves. Purpose of the Study Marcus Tullius Cicero, considered that Rome had been at its best in ‘the good old days’ of the Republic under the administration of patriotic, selfless and virtuous statesmen. This sentimental regard for the past apparently arose from disgust at the excesses of individualism, political intrigues, and corruption at his time. Thus in his works, he presents an idealised ‘ancestral constitution’ by persistently referring to the good old days’, or ‘the Republic,’ with criticism of the existing political situation in Rome of his day. My purpose in this work therefore, is to examine the nature of politics and governance of the early Republic vis a vis political activities or events during the time of Cicero which informed him to persistently and nostalgically refer to ‘the good old days’ or ‘the Republic’ in his works and speeches, when, in fact, he was still living in Republican Rome. Methodology This research will apply the qualitative research approach or a library- based research. Thus, information will be gathered from both primary works in translation and secondary sources that are relevant to the general theme. 11 Organisation The work is sectioned into five chapters. Chapter One, which is the introduction, comprises background issues during the early Roman Republic and Cicero’s days. Also, this chapter will undertake a review of scholarly literature. In Chapter Two, I shall discuss the nature of politics during early Republican Rome, highlighting events from the early years of the Republic to about the time of Cicero. In Chapter Three, my focus will be on the nature of politics in Cicero’s day. This chapter will comprise two sections. First, I shall examine the two main political divides, the Optimates and the Populares, and the means by which they dominated and determined the course of events in the Republic. Second, the chapter will also do a discussion and an examination of the intrusion of the army into Roman politics; assessing some personalities who spear-headed the practice, and then examine what activities precipitated the intrusion of the army into Roman politics. Following that discussion, I shall then consider how the Roman contio (i.e., a non-decision-making meeting called by a magistrate) in the period under study was used by magistrates and politicians to their advantage. In so doing, I shall hint on some of the intrigues that characterised the proceedings that went on in the contio and how it influenced decision-making in the Rome of Cicero’s day. In Chapter Four, I shall critically examine electioneering crisis in Roman politics of Cicero’s day, as well as bribery and corruption that became the norm of Roman political administration with respect to the period under study. Chapter Five will show how Cicero’s political life achieved some success. There will then be a summary of the work by way of conclusion. 12 Literature Review Cicero is one of the most revered orators of the ancient Roman world. He stands so tall above almost all his contemporaries. However, this work’s intent is to examine the nature of politics in the age of Cicero, and to look at Cicero as a Roman politician not as an orator. Indeed, we cannot entirely deny the fact that his oratorical prowess was what brought him unto the centre-stage of politics in the Roman Republic. As a matter of fact, it has been argued by some scholars such as Mommsen and Drumann who hold the view that Cicero was no better politician. In fact, Mommsen denied Cicero the accolade of a politician. Also, Mommsen assessed Cicero as “nothing but an opportunist who gained office after office posing as a reformer, only to reveal his true colours, those of a reactionary, once he had secured the highest rank, the consulate.” In addition, Meier, C. (1968) who also shares a similar view as that of the former, but slightly different, remarks that: “Cicero’s substance was in no way equal to his position, the less so, since he knew little of political tactics, not much more of political judgement. To put it bluntly, he was no politician.” As a matter of fact, it is unfortunate that some scholars do not view Cicero as a statesman, but rather as an orator and advocate. This is evident in the work of Jonathan Powell and Jeremy Paterson (2004, p. 6) in whose book titled Cicero the Advocate, they argue that Cicero’s real or essential talent was as an advocate rather than a politician. Jonathan Powell and Jeremy Paterson explain that Cicero’s success in the two capacities (i.e., as a politician and an advocate) has been commonly stated and probably has some truth, if one judges Cicero’s success in the two capacities with the hindsight of history; but I believe that Cicero himself would not have accepted it. For Cicero, advocacy was indeed a 13 form of service to the res publica and a means of acquiring popularity and fame. However, it must be noted that Cicero himself placed the greatest value on his achievements as a statesman (or politician). I think Jonathan Powell and Jeremy Paterson’s book is a brilliant academic work put together, but the thing that we must note is that Jonathan Powell and Jeremy Paterson portrayed Cicero distinctively as a legal advocate (i.e., a lawyer) who was more concerned about defending his clients at the law courts and the nature of his speeches. On the contrary, Christian Habicht (1990, pp. 3-4, 8) raises a strong counter view that Cicero’s distinction as a man of letters tends to obscure the fact that all his life he wanted nothing more than to be a statesman. It may seem tragic that in this role he failed more often than he succeeded (although in politics, too, he definitely had his moments) and that he achieved immortality by doing what he regarded as only a substitute (that is, as a legal advocate) for politics. Habicth goes on to explain that with regard to Cicero’s ability to judge politics, he did err often, but more often still he clearly analysed the political situation of the day and accurately foretold future developments. Only prejudice can deny that Cicero, despite all his weaknesses and lack of robustness, deserves a prominent place among the political leaders of the time. More so, Habicth hits hard at Cicero’s critics that for a scholar who enjoys a sheltered position at his desk, where no question of life and death is at stake, it is easy enough to poke fun at a politician who vacillates in critical situations. It is easy, but not fair. With regard to what the nature of politics was during the early years of the Roman Republic. Cowell (1962, p. 131) notes that so great was the prestige of the men and institutions by which the destiny of Rome had been guided and so high was the pride it inspired in every well-born Roman that the stubborn, stolid 14 and unimaginative Romans do not seem to have had serious doubts the governing bodies of their Republic would be able to handle the affairs of a world empire. During the first centuries of the Republic the political ‘centre of gravity’ in Rome may be found more often in the Senate than anywhere else, especially during the central period from 300 BC to 130 BC. According to Cowell (1962, p. 132) throughout the earliest centres of the Republic, politics had been a fairly simple business managed by a few officials called magistrates, given supreme power by people who elected them afresh every year. The magistrates were guided by a strong advisory council called the Senate. Later in the history of the Republic, the arrangement was supposed to rest largely on popular support because the people not merely elected the magistrates who became Senators after their first year of office, but also had the last word before any new law came into force. This system was bewildered with fierce challenge in the class struggle in which the older and richer patrician families, the optimates, without fail sought to do away with the new comers and poor plebeians. This momentous disparity between Cicero’s day and what he thought of the early Republic in its period of glory, clearly suggests how morally decayed and politically corrupt the Republic had become during his day. Lintott (1971, pp. 447-8) notes that Cicero considered as true patriots those who supported the collective authority of the Senate, and he often described such men as boni, meaning good. Other politicians tended to favour measures that had popular appeal, and preferred to legislate directly through the people’s Assembly. There might seem to be varying opinions to these positions held by Cicero. Cicero characterized such men as populares, and distrusted them. One of Cicero’s remarks on the populares politicians is revealing: “Populares are 15 people who, unable to win respect from the Senate, are driven out of the safe harbour of the Senate into the rough sea of popular politics.” But, in a more honest analysis I think Cicero got it wrong to some extent as regards the negative notion he held about the populares politicians. It would be a mistake to think of two parties with organized long-term programmes. Most senatorial decisions were pragmatic responses to the needs of the moment. It was also extremely rare for an individual magistrate to consistently and coherently propose popular reforms. Personal factors weighed heavily in the scale of political decisions. Senators were influenced not only by the content of a proposal, but also by the reputation of its proposer, and by considerations of kinship, political friendship and personal obligation (Rowe, Schofield, Harrison & Lane. ed., 2005, p. 479). The fierce antagonism between the two political factions, namely, the optimates and the populares, is a salient feature of Roman domestic politics during the age of Cicero. Cicero’s definition of the populares has been recognised to be polemical: The populares’ aim was to please the multitude, while the optimates sought to gain the approval of the best people. Equally suspect are Cicero’s remarks in speeches of the fifties on why politicians become populares; because they distrust their ability to win support and respect from the Senate; because of personal grievances against the Senate, and because they get carried away by a populares aura (or, in Clodius’ case, because of embarrassment) (Provo cons, 38). To Earl (1967, pp. 54-5), modern definitions of populares bear a striking resemblance to Cicero’s opinions: to be populares was to adopt a certain method of political working, to use the populace rather than the Senate as a means to an end; the end being most likely, personal advantage for the politician concerned. 16 However, as Nicola Mackie rightly points out, it seems some activities of the populares politicians had a level of positive undertones, as against the widespread view held amongst many scholars, even Cicero. Like Cicero, modern scholars believe that the populares politicians treated the populace as a means, not an end; that they aimed to please it, not genuinely to consult its interests; and that they chose this means because they believed it could be more effective than senatorial support in securing their objectives. However, according to Valentina Arena (2012, p. 170), the optimates subscribed to the concept of preserving the status quo of the Republic, using the concept of libertas as a rationale. Chaim Wirszubski (1950, p. 8) showed that this was exploited differently by the populares, who claimed libertas as the justification for enhancing popular sovereignty. The optimates were viewed as individuals who subscribed to a comparatively stable and restrictive interpretation of libertas, even if they did not form a fixed day. A clear aim of the optimates was identified by Walter Lacey (1962, p. 70): They strove to achieve recognition and fame through their opposition to dangers facing the state, endeavouring to be perceived as working selflessly. Another crucial issue in this discussion of the populares and the optimates politicians has to do with clientelae. It was the relationship of an inferior entrusted by custom or by himself to the protection, of a stranger more powerful than himself (Badian, 1958, p. 1). The relationship demanded certain services and observances in return for the protection of the patron. Ernst Badian enhances the interpretation of clientelae, by illustrating how this could be applied to foreign communities, rather than simply being viewed as an isolated practice. Brunt (1956, pp. 93-4) then confirmed the political importance of the Italian and 17 allied involvement in political events of the late Republic, supplementing Badian’s assertions. Brunt (1965, pp. 1, 7, 20) again expanded upon the understanding of political interrelations, demonstrating the diverse range of meanings associated with ties of amicitia which means friendship. He then investigated the varied practical application of amicitia in politics, in a progression of the understanding put forward by Taylor and Syme. However, amidst all the views discussed earlier, Mouritsen Henrik’s position proffers an idea of a better appreciation of the issues and why the activities of the populares politicians became rife. These views were reconciled by Henrik Mouritsen (2001, p. 15). Thus, Henrik Mouritsen recognised the political potential of the masses in Rome at the time. He attempted to compromise between the traditional views of senatorial dominance and the debate between Millar’s and North’s ideas. This was achieved by recognising the symbolic value of popular involvement in politics, but attributing it to a different level of abstraction than the political mechanisms employed by the state. Personally, Meier’s divergent view on the activities of the populares politicians and what they stood for, to a large extent appears more appealing because he intelligently diagnosed the nature of party politics in Cicero’s day. I support Meier’s argument because I don’t entirely accept the general notion that the populares politicians thrived on just attaining goals that were selfish or partisan. Meier distinguished between unique and regular political practices, stating that populares politicians appeared principally in exceptional circumstances. Apparently, the Republic that governed at Rome for nearly 500 years with annually elected magistrates was wracked during Cicero’s day by an unprecedented degree of electoral abuse. The yearly ritual of choosing the state’s 18 leaders became a crass spectacle of delay, manipulation, mass bribery, corrupt deal-making and violence. These abuses occurred more regularly in thickets and multitudes. Cicero’s day witnessed a generation that trampled on its rules for desired ends, rules which were to be enforced against opponents, but to be dispensed with for supporters. According to Lintott (1991, pp. 1-3, 160), electoral bribery, like most other forms of corruption, seems to have been fairly normalised.” In fact, it was such a big business that it even gave rise to its own profession: distributors of bribes called divisores. Nonetheless, there was much moralising and handwringing on the subject, for Cicero emphasised the importance of laws to prevent the buying of votes (Cic, Laws, in De Republica; De Legibus, III. xvii. 39-49). Lintott (1999) explains that a review of primary source accounts vividly demonstrates how abuse accelerated over the final century of the Roman Republic. Until the turning-point of the 60s and 50s BC, a number of elections were either delayed, cancelled, rigged by violence, marred by bribery or prearranged by bargain. To Cowell (1962, p. 219), Lintott attempts to reconstruct the intellectual categories in which a Roman of this period would have processed a violent activity in the public square, concluding that personal enemies were invariably presented as enemies of the state; namely the optimates and the populares as noted above. These were the two main factions or “political parties” that dominated the political scene within the period under study. While the populares in most cases wanted their actions and words to be pleasing to the multitude or masses, the optimates conducted themselves in a manner to win or gain approval of the best people for their policies. According to Cowell (1962, p. 219) to win elections as a magistrate and 19 to become a Senator…had long been the height of ambition for any active, able young man of Rome, especially, Rome of Cicero’s day. It is noteworthy that a review of the primary accounts provides enormous instances of electoral crises that accelerated during Cicero’s day until the turning point of the 60’s and 50’s BC, a morass of elections delayed, some cancelled, others marred by violence, while there was also the practice of bribery. In this vein, Troxler Howard (2008, p. 8) posits that: “The escalating abuse of elections inculcated in the Romans the idea that their constitution and the rule of law had no intrinsic value by themselves, but existed only as tools in the service of power and desired goals. With the rule of law battered into submission, the Republic all the more easily succumbed to the rule of men. The fall was brought about not by external armies or revolution, but by the Romans’ own tacit agreement that their rules could be bent and broken as needed.” Ironic as it may be, elections in the Rome of Cicero’s day was the interest of all the rival groups, that is, the political factions, and it inevitably brought these groups together during the annual political ritual of elections. Undeniably, election was the core of Rome’s political identity, in other words, the heartbeat of the res publica. Yet, it suffered much crisis. These crises in effect, marred a beautiful political system which during Cicero’s day lacked men of virtuous nature to keep to the good old days of the early Republic. Electoral bribery was a phenomenon that was not experienced in the early Republic, but was rife in the Rome of Cicero’s day. The Latin word for electoral bribery is ambitus, and it is connected with the verb ambire, ‘to go round,’ ‘to canvass support,’ and with the noun ambitio, which expresses the concept of the pursuit of office and political fame (Lintott, 1990, p. 1). Ambitus traditionally has been defined in Roman Republican scholarship as electoral bribery, an illegal and 20 corrupt canvassing practice in which candidates gave money to voters in exchange for electoral support and votes (Linderski, 1985, pp. 93-94; Gruen 1991, pp. 255-257; Yakobson, 1999, pp. 22-26). However, recent discourses on ambitus have questioned fundamental assumptions about the concept, such as its status as a normatively defined crime or a form of corruption. Some scholars such as Andrew Lintott, have argued that charges of ambitus should best be understood as a form of invective Roman Senators used to weaken the prestige of political opponents (Lintott, 1990, p. 16). On the other hand, Cristina Rosillo Lopez (2010, pp. 16-23, 49-69) has taken note of these criticisms but nonetheless argues that ambitus should be understood as a form of corruption that the Romans had defined as such. In contemporary political practice it appears unacceptable for a canvassing politician to give a gift to a voter in his constituency in exchange for that voter‘s vote, yet in the Rome of Cicero’s day, gift giving, especially to a Senator‘s own tribe, was an acceptable and expected method of canvassing for votes. According to Malem Seña (2000, pp. 25-26) corrupt behaviour implies three things: (i) the violation of duties of an office granted by the state, (ii) an attempt to benefit privately, though not necessarily by gaining money, (iii) and a normative condemnation of such behaviour, whether from a legal, social or ethical source. Therefore, the supposition may be rnade that Romans in the Rome of Cicero’s day canvassing for office who committed ambitus undoubtedly wanted to benefit privately by employing methods condemned as illegal through many laws adopted against ambitus. It seems undeniable that the role of ambitus in the political culture of the Republic at the time is too complex to be labelled as corruption. We then conclude, as Lintott (1990, p. 16) does, that in the Roman 21 view the crime of bribery indeed depended on who was doing the bribing? Thus, if Lintott’s position is true, then we can conjecture those accusations of ambitus were purely methods for aristocrats to damage the careers of political rivals. In this view, there was nothing wrong with ambitus; because everyone engaged in the practice. There is some truth to Lintott‘s argument, but it is ultimately unsatisfactory. Another important issue is the Roman army’s intrusion into politics. This practice began when the military general Gaius Marius, of equestrian background, appeared to have found a solution to the masses of dispossessed and unemployed Roman and Italian citizens. J. B. Leaning (1987, p. 6) suggests that military service had become a possible career instead of a civic responsibility. But I find it hard to be convinced by J. B. Leaning’s position because most of the citizens who ended up in the army under the command of Marius were bent on survival. Hence, both by debt cancellation and land allotment or distribution, these disgruntled citizens (which were mostly peasants) saw the joining of the army as a means to an end, even though we can infer that they knew the risks involved. More to the point, I think we can perhaps conclude that the practice of recruiting volunteer soldiers, and the desire to partake in this process became a sort of occupation. Marius can thus be regarded as the originator of the professional army at Rome. And its professionalism was increased by the instilling of a new spirit and sense of discipline, and by the introduction of certain changes that made it a more effective fighting force. After Marius’ soldiers relied on their generals to provide them with an opportunity to gain, loot, and to provide them with land upon retirement in return, the generals relied on their troops to give them complete 22 loyalty and to support them in their goals to gain political power. In fact, it is worth noting that office-seekers (especially the generals) during Cicero’s days to a large extent did despise the venality of an electorate, which may, unknown to them, be exercising a considerable degree of independent judgement; the electorate for its part may deduce from the bribes that it is offered, that those pursuing public office are merely self-seekers who are not concerned with the general interest of the public. However, Leaning (1987, p. 6) appears to hold a different view that Marius’ use of the army was not necessarily meant to gain political power, but his reforms rather allowed and opened up the way for other generals to test their troops’ loyalty. Marius’ concern, to Leaning, was simply the welfare of his troops. He had no inclination to use his army to further his ambition, and, as its patron, to dominate the state. In point of fact, it was Sulla who first realized how he could use his troops or legions to achieve his own political ends. Particularly, Sulla capitalized on it by marching his forces on Rome in 88 BC and 82 BC. Sulla’s success at marching on Rome started a rippling effect causing other generals to imitate his actions by using their legions as their own political weapons to help advance their political careers. With the capite censi, that is, those assessed in the census by a head-count, making up the bulk of the military, the Senate did not realize they had to change their policy on troop retirement, in order to keep the loyalty of the troops. Consequently, the Senate’s inability to change its policy towards the troops, allowed the generals to step in and become the heroes by giving their troops land, which eventually caused the soldiers to shift their loyalty from the state to the generals. 23 But, prior to Sulla’s regime, Marius’s military reforms undoubtedly contributed to the decline of the Roman Republic by creating the potential for subsequent generals to use the promises of enrichment and land to gain the loyalty of the troops. These mercenary soldiers could then be used as political weapons against enemies in order to win control of the State. Unfortunately, Marius never realised the potential that he created, but future generals did. It would be these men who would bring about the shift of a loyal Roman army who took pride in serving their state, to the greedy soldiers who cared little for Rome, swearing loyalty to whomever would grant them most profit, which comprised war booty and lands as compensation. These generals of the late Republic of Cicero’s day turned the army into a political weapon, instead of its original function of protecting Rome and extending its imperial power. The accounts given by the primary sources seem to suggest that the intrusion of the army into Roman politics during Cicero’s day was just an event that could not have been avoided. To explain the just noted point, I agree with Kofi Ackah (2010, pp. 99-100) as he notes that: “For now the question of pension or pay for the new standard army has become acute; and the Senate had missed the opportunity of earning the loyalty of the army by its repeated failure to acknowledge that the army is entitled to a livelihood after serving the state in the risky business of war. The Republic lost control of the manpower reserves, as power shifted to the legions in which volunteers made up a majority of the troops.” Andrew White (2011, pp. 1-2) also holds the view that, Marius’ soldiers relied on their generals to provide them with an opportunity to gain loot and to provide them with land upon retirement. Hence the generals also expected their 24 troops to give them complete loyalty and to support them in their goals to gain political power. Due to Marius’s reforms, the loyalty of the Roman legions started to shift away from the Republic in favour of the generals. Since the Republic did not offer a retirement plan, the soldiers began to lose any loyalty they felt for/to the Republic. If a general did not offer his soldiers a chance at looting and therefore gain their loyalty, the soldiers did not become loyal to the state, but instead tried to transfer to serve under a new general, who looked out for his soldier’s interests. Sulla and Caesar were masters at gaining their troops’ loyalty to the point where they had created their own private armies. Both Sulla and Caesar knew the way to the troops’ loyalty was through wealth, which made them very generous in their spoils of war. Andrew White’s position depicts a moment whereby the two groups involved, that is, the generals and the volunteer soldiers simply could not do without each other. Therefore, it won’t be wrong to note that the change in loyalty (i.e., from the Roman Senate to the generals of the legions) played perfectly well against the Roman Republic since the Roman Senate failed to honour its soldiers who were risking their lives for the safety of the Republic and its imperialist ideals within the Mediterranean region. And, as a solution to the apparent loss of too much, Dyck (1996) suggests: “Cicero’s civic virtue aimed at reforming the political culture at Rome, which he saw veering dangerously from the ideals of traditional patriotism toward the kind of egotistical quest for glory and self-aggrandizement that had brought ruin upon Greek city-states and could lead to the permanent establishment of tyranny.” Apparently, Rome was in a state of moral decline as it was becoming populated by so many newcomers. It was therefore necessary, as recognized by Cicero and others, to provide reminders of moral and ethical 25 behaviour as well as simple social etiquette to those not exposed to them. The solution put forth was that all in Rome in their ethical conduct should return to the mos maiorum, the way of our ancestors. Neal Wood (1988), suggests that Cicero wanted principled leaders in the service of the Republic, and freedom for human beings so that they could do the right thing. As struggle between the ruling class and its chief class enemies’ wanes, when their threat diminishes, members of the dominant class can afford to quarrel among themselves, especially if the stakes are very high. The increasing strife within the Roman aristocracy seems, then, to have been proportionate to the decline of the peasant danger to their interests and security. On the basis of the evidence above, I support Gruen’s (1974, p. 498) view that, “The fall of the Republic was inevitable and desirable.” It is quite ungracious of Eric Gruen to ascribe to such a belief premised on the fact that the strife between the plebes and the nobiles and the practice of patronage amidst other factors plunged the Roman Republic, especially during the days of Cicero. As will be discussed in this study, a number of ancient sources such as Livy and Polybius, uphold the view that trust on virtue and respect for the mos maiorum were key principles that had been battered into the submission and replaced by vice and undisciplined behaviour among the citizens. Furthermore, Michael Grant (1960, pp. 7-8) gives credit to Cicero for his dedication to principle. He posits that Cicero was willing to fight against his opponents in spite of terrible discouragements for his Republican principles and against tyrannical rule. Cicero, to him, was determined to struggle for the freedom of the individual against odds and establish the Republic on consistent moral principles which should never be changed. Grant believes that Cicero held 26 the opinion that right and wrong are irreconcilable and that no law can change one into the other. To him, Cicero was completely against the concept of dictatorship; and that throughout Cicero’s career, he did everything he could to prevent tyrannical forms of government from coming into existence, and to support Republican government which he considered to be the only stable and balanced form of government. In any case, Grant believes that Cicero failed because he could not handle the “cutthroat” politics of late Republican Rome, and was only aided by his eloquence in combating his enemies. Lastly, Smethurst (1958, p. 75) posits that it is easy to poke fun at the visionary nature of Cicero’s ideas, even though any prejudiced student of Republican history must admit that Cicero, for all his weaknesses, did approach as closely to it as any of his contemporaries, including Cato, whose personality surely has been less repellent, had it been graced with a little humanity. It is evident that Cicero, consciously or not was trying to defend his own career, as he tried hard to live up to his ideals. At this point in time, public life and virtue consciousness had broken down. As political morality and politics in the Rome of Cicero’ day decayed, it paved the way for practices that inevitably drove out virtuous lifestyles among Roman citizens, especially members of the Senate, politicians and generals. Conclusion To sum up, the sources indeed indicate that during the age of Cicero, the Roman Republic on several occasions found itself nipped in the bud by its politicians and army commanders with the threat of civil war by the likes of Cornelius Sulla in 88 BC and 82 BC; Pompey and Crassus in 71 BC; Pompey, Crassus and Caesar in 60 BC; Caesar in 49 BC; and by the young Octavian in 43 27 BC. Cicero, as the study in subsequent chapters will demonstrate, emphasized service through political leadership, which he believed was the greatest necessity and calling among men, and that the well-being of the Roman Republic was dependant on the response of men with virtue. In all, the reviewed works have shown the contrast between what Cicero thought of ‘the good old days,’ while it was in its glory as against the actual experiences of his own day. 28 CHAPTER TWO THE NATURE OF POLITICS IN THE EARLY ROMAN REPUBLIC A popular refrain characteristic of Cicero was his reference to the Republic in his works. By this (the Republic), Cicero meant the good old days of Rome before his time, that is, the early years of the Roman Republic. By his almost persistent reference to the Republic one can notice that there was always a feeling of nostalgia in Cicero. He always felt that Rome had seen better days and better times. Tacitus holds the notion and reprehends the desire for gloria and potentia as a feature of human society. That such qualities broke down society and destroyed the Republic, he saw not the more alarming fact that that society itself was founded on them, and that individuals in displaying those qualities were responding to the demands and pressures it imposed. The early Romans, and of course, a handful that lived in Cicero’s day had obsession with morality. Therefore, it will appear that this consciousness had far reaching implications for the political culture of “the good old days” of the early Republic. Moral authority was political authority. This ideology or way of life that dominated the lifestyle of the early Romans is best captured in Dionysius’ words: “I am led to narrate these details for no other reason than to make clear to everyone what type of men the leaders of Rome were at that time, that they worked with their own hands, led self-disciplined lives, did not complain about honourable poverty, and, far from pursuing positions of royal power, actually refused them when offered” (Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, 10:17). And Cicero himself exclaims metaphorically: “But though the Republic, when it came to us, was like a beautiful painting whose colours, however, were 29 already fading with age, our own time has not only neglected to freshen it by renewing the original colours, but has not even taken the trouble to preserve its configuration and, so to speak, its general outlines” (De republica 5.1.2). Now, the important question is: What manner of men were the Romans during the early Roman Republic? Since men are best known by their deeds; therefore in response to this question, their history willingly judged them. Without fail, from the earliest days of Rome we can detect in the Roman citizen a sense of dedication, at first crude and inarticulate and by no means unaccompanied by fear. In the early Republic, Barrow (1958, pp. 10-11) hints that this is clearly expressed and is often the mainspring of action. The early Roman’s virtues are honesty and thrift, forethought and patience, work and endurance and courage, self-reliance, simplicity, and humility in the face of what is greater than him. In the De Officiis I. XVII. 57, Cicero, himself a man of provincial origin, notes: “Out of all relationships, there is nothing more serious, nothing dearer than that which exists for each one of us with the res publica. Parents are dear, children are dear, relatives, and good friends, but the fatherland embraces every affection of ours, for it, what noble man would hesitate to meet his death, if he might be useful?” As Andrew Feldherr (2009) notes; “civic loyalty is a natural extension of all other affections. Thus, if you love your wife and children, you will necessarily love the Republic which encompasses and protects them. Hence it is not enough to serve the Republic simply as a means of preserving your family.” This ideology reflects Livy’s projection of the values of the early Principate onto the early Republic, and echoes the words of Coriolanus’ mother. Thus, in Veturia’s speech to Coriolanus she is similarly presented as behaving in the way that a 30 Roman ought to behave: as an exemplary Roman matron she laments the fact that no attack on Rome would take place if she had never had a son. Livy’s presentation of a mother appealing to her son emphasises the duty owed to one’s state. Syme in his book titled The Roman Revolution (1939, pp. 444-6) reaffirmed this principle of family love vis a vis the state when he suggests that the morality and marriage legislations passed in subsequent years had as their aim; ‘to bring the family under the protection of the state, a measure quite superfluous so long as Rome remained her ancient self” and represented an unprecedented encroachment on the autonomy of the family. Reflecting on the early Republic, we note that the political scene in Rome was different and its wars were fought (far from the Italian peninsula). Also, the early Republic acquired immense wealth and still its political system was open to all including non-Romans. In describing the early Romans, Sallust portrays them as blameless, incorruptible, and all working in service of the res publica: “To such men, no labour was unaccustomed, no place was at all dark or steep, no armed enemy was scary; virtue was the master of all. But the greatest contest for glory was among themselves.” They had no regard for riches, “they were desirous of praise, generous with money; they wished for huge glory, honest riches.” It is noteworthy that to the Romans, there was an imperative continuity from the past to the present, guided by the ways of the forefathers, the mos maiorum. And so, the political system that Cicero had to learn to navigate naturally evolved through the wisdom of the ancestors (North, 2006, p. 252). This meant that the Roman Republic had no written constitution. The early Republic had just emerged from a rebellion against a monarchical system, and 31 particularly the Romans at the time had to prevent a relapse. Hence it won’t be wrong to posit that it was for this reason that the Roman constitution established such a weak executive, which is not of much importance to this study. According to Earl (1967, p. 33), there was an obsession with virtue (virtus) among Roman citizens at the time, which signified the embodiment of moral integrity as it pertains to the Roman perspective. Thus, the Roman aristocrat was expected to show courage and wisdom; the two qualities which are most important for a general and a magistrate. In this context, wisdom did not denote a rarefied philosophic detachment or an intellectual enquiry into first causes and the nature of things, rather it meant practical political judgement, which was of little use unless expressed in words at meetings of the Roman people and of the Senate, in such a way as to influence the course of events. In a more practicable manner, to demonstrate the virtuous nature of the early Romans, Livy records some ambiguity as to whether the embassy led by Coriolanus’ mother was the result of “public policy or the fear of women” (De Rep, II. 40. 1). Regardless of its origin, this contingent clearly had the true interests of the Republic at heart, as the women argue for the good of the Republic (res publica) in such an emotional, personal way. By all indications, the early Romans were also very much aware that liberty can be safeguarded only if the rule of law extends throughout society, binding everyone equally. It can admit of no legal privilege or of any possibility that anyone would become superior to the law. Those who govern must do so by virtue of lawfully constituted offices. The authority of rulers comes from the law and they are creatures of the law. It was this equality before the law that made all citizens pares libertate; that is, “equal in liberty,” a form of equality essential in a 32 res publica. But the rule of law does not, in itself, guarantee liberty, because clearly bad laws can emerge that destroy rather than protect the rights and interests of citizens. Similarly, Cicero speaks of the many pernicious and destructive enactments of peoples to be found in human history. As demonstrated in the preceding paragraphs, the obligations of a good Roman citizen as depicted by Livy do not necessarily match what might have actually been the case in Cicero’s day. As I explained earlier in this chapter, Livy treats Coriolanus as a fabula, a legend set in the early Republic that describes a fundamental truth of Roman identity. These identities were their respect for the mos maiorum and civic discipline. To this end, Raaflaub (2006, p. 128) writes that: “Indeed, the past is important because it served as a moral guide to the Romans in subsequent centuries of the Republican era.” Unfortunately, the story became the opposite during Cicero’s day. Also, though the early history of Rome, albeit legendary, is valuable to the Roman historian Livius because of the lessons of morality contained therein (Liv. Praef. 6–13. Cf: Cornell, 1995; Forsythe, 2005; Raaflaub, 2006). To Hammer (2013, p. 74) the Roman aristocracy and their system of values, the actions of their forefathers, described in Rome’s history, were an important source in determining proper political behaviour. The elite measured themselves against the past. Therefore, morality and politics were also fused together in a fundamental way through the link of history. Aided by a succession of able men, the might of Rome was painstakingly restored. Of all of them the name of Marcus Furius Camillus (a Roman soldier and statesman of patrician descent) is outstanding. For a quarter of a century, he was the man to whom Romans looked in times of trouble, and he did not fail 33 them. He and the men around him were succeeded by others famous in the traditions of Rome. For instance, T. Manlius Torquatus, was thrice consul (347 BC, 344 BC and 340 BC), and M. Valerius Corvus, Consul in 348 BC, and in 335 BC. Rome again became a strongly fortified town; military colonies were planted at strategic points, and the army was reformed by abandoning the phalanx or serried, as well as horde formation and introduction open order fighting by spear throwers. Also, Cowell (1962, p. 84) explains that one hero of the early Republic, M. Curius, was said that ‘after having subdued his enemies…of all the booty and pillage taken from them, he reserved nothing for himself except a little fewer of beechwood wherewith he might sacrifice to the gods. Livy tells us that Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus congratulated Gaius Servilius Structus Ahala for saving his country from tyranny and that in his official explanation of the incident the dictator declared that Maelius’ death was justified because “planning violence to avoid undergoing a trial, he had been repressed by violence” (Livy 4. 15. 3). Furthermore, Cincinnatus is said to have ordered that Maelius’ house be demolished and the “goods which had been tainted with the offer of them as the price to buy a tyranny be confiscated” (Livy 4. 15. 8). It was not until 1970 that Lintott wrote a controversial article titled “The Tradition of Violence in the Annals of the Early Roman Republic.” In it, he made the case, through textual analysis of the extant sources on the Early Republic, that although the stories of violence in the Early Roman Republic, in particular those about Spurius Cassius, Spurius Maelius (and his executioner Servilius Ahala), and Marcus Manlius Capitolinus, have certainly been embellished by 34 later historians (these are Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus) with details pertaining to late Republican politics, the basic plot of those stories can be found in the histories of Rome written by the early annalists (i.e., class of writers on Roman history). As such, Lintott (1970) suggests that due to Cicero’s frequent references to traditional figures (like Servilius Ahala) in his writings, as well as the occasional source citations found in Dionysius’ histories and the writings of Pliny the Elder, it is necessary to re-evaluate the importance of these early Republican stories when it comes to explaining the violence of the Late Republic. The overthrow of monarchy in Rome by members of the aristocracy in 510 BC did not bring about the immediate creation of a full-fledged Republic. Power was merely transferred from the kings to the aristocracy represented by the consuls. As such, since Lucius Junius Brutus was one of the leaders of the revolt against the Tarquins, he was elected as one of the first consuls. So too was Lucius Tarquinius Collatinus, who joined in the revolt against the royal family after his wife Lucretia had been raped by Sextus Tarquinius, the son of Rome’s last king. Yet, shortly after Brutus and Collatinus ascended to the reign of the Republic, Brutus publicly pressured Collatinus to resign because of his name. His wife’s rape and subsequent suicide to preserve her honour had served as a powerful way to rally the people against Rome’s last king, yet Collatinus himself was nonetheless a member of the Tarquin family. Brutus, too, was related to the Tarquins, but unlike Collatinus, his name was not an overt reminder of the monarchy, and so Collatinus stepped down (Livy 2. 2. 10). To further prove his loyalty to the Republic, Brutus not only had the people swear that they would never allow a king to come to power in Rome, but even had two of his biological 35 sons executed for being culprits in a plot to restore the overthrown monarchy. With the passage of time, Brutus died in battle against Rome’s last king. Thus, according to tradition, Rome’s first consul set the standard for loyalty to the Republic with both his words and his actions. Neal Wood (1988, pp. 182, 185-6) describes Cicero’s attitude toward violence by hinting that Cicero believed that there should be no leniency towards enemies or law breakers, but that one should always be severe with them. He states that Cicero believed that the severity should always be “impartial, consistent, and firm.” He further goes on to posit that Cicero advocated violence contrary to the law as a political instrument in special cases. When law and order break down, Cicero might perhaps approve of the use of violence when self- defence, survival and the safety of the state were involved. Thus Cicero believed that violence should only be used when there was the possibility of success. He thought that it should not become an end in itself and thus degenerate into tyranny, and be used only when there was no other alternative. For us, it won’t be wrong to conclude that to Cicero, the killing perpetuated by Junius Brutus against Sextus Tarquinius was a legitimate action; since it helped to forestall peace and ensure that the Republican ideals were adhered to. I agree to Wood’s view on Cicero’s notion of violence even though it was contrary to the law. Hence, it stands to reason that one man’s ego (especially in the early Republic) which is inimical to the survival of a whole society cannot be sacrificed above the ideals of a whole state. Interestingly, Tiberius Gracchus was not the first “friend of the people” in Roman history to be killed in 133 BC because of the trumped-up charge of “aiming at the royal power.” Both Spurius Cassius (485 BC) and Spurius Maelius 36 (439 BC) were accused of it too, and so was Manlius who prior to his execution had the honour of being called the “saviour of the Capitol.” Though Manlius was asleep at the time, the cackling of the sacred geese allegedly woke him up, thus enabling him to wake up his comrades and dispatch the Capitol’s attackers. For his bravery, Manlius was subsequently given the title Capitolinus and was held in high esteem by his fellow citizens, both patricians and plebeians. The following year, however, only the plebeians held him in high regard. Whether it was because of righteous indignation, or because, as Livy believed, “he perceived that his abilities did not bring him that leadership amongst the nobles as he thought he merited,” Marcus Manlius decided to spurn his fellow patricians and be the first among them to “cast in his lot with the plebeian magistrates” (Livy 6. 11. 6-7). Yet, instead of championing the cause of agrarian reforms, Manlius chose to take a stand on debt slavery. At first, he confined himself to only delivering speeches against its practice, and even verbally attacked those patricians who profited from it (Livy 6. 11. 8-9). The obvious effect was that the Senate was displeased at Manlius inspiration and insistence on the plebes to fight for the liberty. Consequently, Manlius encountered an ironic end. His penalty for aspiring to be a king was to be flung “from the Tarpeian Rock,” so that the “same spot served to commemorate extraordinary fame and the extremity of punishment” for the “self- same man” (Livy 6. 20. 10-12). Unlike Livy, however, Florus does not mention the charge of aiming at kingship, and instead says that Manlius was “hurled from the citadel” for behaving in a manner “too arrogant and ill-fitting a private citizen on the strength of having set free a number of debtors” (Florus, Epitome of Roman History 1. 17. 25. 8). Even so, Florus still placed the execution of 37 Manlius in the same category as the executions of Cassius and Maelius, and expressed admiration for the ability of the Roman people during the early Republic to zealously uphold their liberty and guard against the corrupting influence of “dangerous citizens.” Another personality worth our attention is Veturia, Coriolanus’ mother. She blends the private and the public, but in the appropriate way, and Livy speaks of her approvingly. She cares so deeply about the Republic that her private, personal interests are compromised. Indeed, she would have preferred not to have a son than to see the Republic endangered by him. In no situation is the conflict between the interests of the individual and those of the state more sensitive than in cases in which the state demands that the individual split from his or her family, yet this is exactly the distinction for which Veturia argues. Upon first approaching her son, Veturia asks whether she has come “to an enemy or to my son” (De Rep, II. 40. 5). To her, Coriolanus cannot be her real son if he would become an enemy of Rome. In the scenario in which she is forced to choose between her son and the Republic, she chooses the Republic. She asks how he was able “to lay waste to this land, which gave you birth and nourished you” (De Rep, II, 40. 7). Here, she goes so far as to allow Rome to take her own role in the family structure, that of the life-giving mother. Again, Veturia asks her son if, when he looked upon the walls of Rome, he did not think to himself, “Within those walls are my home and my household gods, my mother, my wife, and my children.” (De Rep, II. 40. 7). To some degree, I am convinced without an iota of doubt that Coriolanus is to think of the land within those walls as his mother, not just containing his mother. Also, in this episode, Livy idealizes the Roman Republic 38 (that is, the early Roman Republic) as a family knit together. Invariably, this could mean nothing in comparison with an individuals’ commitment to the Republic. It is noteworthy that when referring to their past, the Romans idealized their history. As such another personality worthy of mention is Lucius Qunctius Cincinnatus. Cincinnatus was regarded as one of the Republic’s heroes, somebody who embodied virtue and simplicity in his lifestyle and approach to life. After resolving the threat from the Aequi, he stepped down from dictatorship after fifteen days. This almost immediate resignation was viewed as the ultimate example of civic duty, modesty, and good leadership, and above all, service to the res publica. A second dictatorship to deal with threats from the plebeian class further strengthened the view of Cincinnatus as the ideal Roman, who returned to his farm and his modest life (Marin, 2009, p. 6). The great men of the early Republic hitherto were men such as Cincinnatus, a man who left his plough to serve the state in time of crisis, and returned to it when his work was done. But this does not mean to say that the early Roman Republic was without any political blemish. Of course, they encountered certain challenges in their political administration. However, we can note that whatever challenges they faced cannot in any way be compared to what characterised Cicero’s day. Not only that, but also the impression is created that the political stakeholders at the time of Cicero were apparently unconcerned about the wellbeing of the Republic, as Cicero would have it. According to Cowell (1962, p. 18) with the Romans of the early Republic, the community spirit of readiness of the individual to sacrifice himself to it was a natural and spontaneous thing.” 39 From more recent Roman history, Livy gives the example of young Scipio, later on the conqueror of Hannibal, who in 218 BC, at the tender age of 17 and in the first phase of puberty, came to the aid of his father and managed to rescue him from certain death (Livy, 21, 46, 7). After his victory over Perseus in 168 BC, Paullus Aemilius’ immediate concern was the fate of his seventeen- year-old son, the Younger Scipio to be, who was nowhere to be found. Great was his relief, and that of the whole army, when he turned up, dripping with blood but otherwise all in one piece: like a bloodhound, as Plutarch tells us, he had allowed himself to be carried away by the intoxication of victory (Plut, Aem, 22, 1–4). The heroism of the Elder Cato’s son, too, was remarkable, particularly in view of his poor health. After having lost his sword in the heat of the battle, he thought life not worth living, begged his friends for help, fell upon the enemy and at last found his weapon hidden among great heaps of armour and fallen bodies. (Plut, Aem, 21, 1–2). A Roman myth celebrated Titus Manlius Torquatus (thrice consul 347 BC, 344 BC and 340 BC), the commander who executed his own son for a heroic but disobedient act while on campaign, and a disgraced body of soldiers might be decimated, one in ten being selected to be brutally killed by his fellow soldiers. It is revealing a characteristic that the epithets single out praise for Barbatus (one of the two elected Roman consuls in 298 BC). He led the Roman army to victory against the Etruscans near Volterra; bravery and wisdom and the fact that his outward appearance was equal to his virtus may mean ‘virtue’ in the modern sense, but it was often used more literally, to refer to the collection of qualities that defined a man (vir), virtue in Roman terms being the equivalent of ‘manliness.’ As he walked through the Forum or stood up to address the people, 40 his inner qualities were clearly revealed in how he looked.” Not only was the Elder Cato known as “the most excellent and learned man of his time,” but his descendant, Marcus Porcius Cato Uticensis (Cato the Younger), was a participant in several of Cicero’s trials on the opposing side. This meant that Cicero could reproach the Younger Cato with not living up to the reputation of his illustrious great-grandfather, and that this rhetorical device would be fully appreciated by everyone else present (Pro Archia, 15-6). Cowell (1962, p. 4) notes that “the great renown of these and other historical figures was kept alive in the minds by the loyalty of the Romans to their ancestors and by the devotion of Roman fathers who trained their sons to reverence the memory of the mighty deeds of the men whose achievements made up the heroic story of the rise and grandeur of Rome.” It appears to me that this profound love for their past demonstrates how the Romans of Cicero’s day loved and revered their ancestors who were deified for their virtuous and patriotic deeds, as well as their wisdom. Sallust echoes these sentiments by hinting that: “The glory of one’s ancestor is, in effect, a light which shines on succeeding generations, allowing neither their good nor their bad deeds to remain hidden” (Jugurthine War, LXXXV, pp. 313- 17). But, the repugnant question is; did the virtuous deeds of the early Romans (i.e., ancestors) reflect in the lives of the Romans that lived in the Rome of Cicero’s day? This question will be answered in the subsequent chapters as we discuss the prevailing issues identified in this work. Another personality worthy of note is Gaius Servilius Structus Ahala. He was a fifth century BC politician of Republican Rome, and was considered by many later writers to have been a hero. His fame rested on the contention that he saved Rome from Spurius Maelius in 439 BC by killing him with a dagger https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ancient_Rome https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rome https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spurius_Maelius 41 concealed under an armpit (William, 1867, p. 83). As related by Livy and others, Ahala served as magister equitum in 439 BC, when Cincinnatus was appointed dictator on the supposition that Spurius Maelius was styling himself a king and plotting against the state. During the night on which the dictator was appointed, the capitol and all the strong posts were garrisoned by the partisans of the patricians. In the morning, when the people assembled in the forum, with Spurius Maelius among them, Ahala summoned the latter to appear before the dictator; and upon Maelius disobeying and taking refuge in the crowd, Ahala rushed into the throng and killed him. [Livy, iv. 13, 14, & Cicero, Trans. Archibald A. Maclardy (1902, p. 26)] This is mentioned by several later writers as an example of ancient Roman heroism, and is frequently referred to by Cicero in terms of the highest admiration (Cicero, Catiline Orations 1, Pro Milone 3, Cato Maior de Senectute 16); but was regarded as a case of murder at the time. Ahala was brought to trial, and only escaped condemnation by going into voluntary exile (Valerius Maximus, v. 3. & 2; Cicero, De re publica i. 3, Pro Dom. 32). Livy tells us that Cincinnatus congratulated Ahala for saving his country from tyranny and that in his official explanation of the incident the dictator declared that Maelius’ death was justified because, “planning violence to avoid undergoing a trial, he had been repressed by violence” (Livy 4. 15. 3). As noted above, Cincinnatus is said to have ordered that Maelius’ house be demolished and the “goods which had been tainted with the offer of them as the price to buy a tyranny be confiscated” (Livy 4. 15. 8). With a well-structured and organised semi-professional army the Roman Republic first began the task of systematically conquering their Italian neighbours. However, the success of Rome in conquering her neighbours soon 42 led to changes in her methods of warfare. Having subdued her enemies at home, her armies could not resist the temptation to embark upon distant military campaigns (Erdkamp, 2007, p. 5). According to Oman (1968, p. 28) training and discipline received much attention in the moulding of the Roman army. The training of the legionary was designed to produce drilled obedience, a high sense of competence and initiative. They were taught a vital lesson in loyalty and complete allegiance to their commander and country. Seneca has this to say about the military oath of the army at the time: “The chief bond is respect for an oath and love for the standards, and dread of deserting” (Seneca, Epp. 95. 35). The oath or sacramentum was the legal basis of the soldier’s status. The order was that the Tribunes swore an oath to the general and themselves received an oath of loyalty and allegiance. A new oath-taking had to be carried out if during a campaign there was a change of leader. Army discipline was extremely severe in the Roman army (Grimal, 1963, pp. 163, 175). With the end of the “Conflict of the Orders,” the Roman Republic settled into a more peaceful pattern until the last half of the second century BC. There were a few popular disturbances from the end of the struggle between Plebeians and Patricians and the turmoil associated with Tiberius Gracchus in 133 BC, but overall, there were 150 years of relative peace (Taylor, 1962, pp. 19-27). The Plebeians were absorbed into the higher nobility and became part of the new, expanded governing aristocracy, although the poorer Romans actually gained very little. The poorer groups even lost their natural leaders who had been co- opted into the existing nobility. Over time, in fact, the Plebeians actually attained a position of numerical predominance in this consolidated ruling elite (Abbott, 1963, p. 48; R. Develin, 1985, p. 314; & D. C. Earl 1963, p. 44). The failure to 43 integrate a larger segment of the Roman population into the political system set the stage for the conflicts in later years. Other mechanisms existed to ensure a more peaceful political system. The Plebeians had gained the right to elect members of their own group into high office, but they usually supported patrician candidates instead of candidates from their own group because they accorded greater legitimacy to the higher nobility (Yakobson, 1999, p. 195). Consequently, the shared values and rules of the political game in early Republican Rome allowed intense competition between individual leaders without disturbing the basic stability of the Republican system itself. In fact, the competition amongst the nobiles and would-be candidates for political careers was essential in creating the stability and dynamism of this period, which extends towards the “Middle Ages.” The third and second centuries, characterised a period the Romans became guided by an advisory group of senators, who were able to withstand the challenges of long wars with Carthage, as well as keep many Italians loyal to the cause of Rome, and to expand to a position of dominance in the eastern Mediterranean, easily defeating the military might of the various Hellenistic kingdoms. It is essential to note that at this stage in Roman political history individual competition and ambition supported rather than subverted a stable Republican form of government. At the same time, an influential and largely effective Senate did not hamper individual competition for rank and renown. It is important to stress the fact that the violence of the late Republic should not be regarded as the result of a sudden reversal of Roman values but the re-emergence of long-standing attitudes and conflicts, which had been temporarily suppressed by political prudence and the profits from success 44 abroad” (Crook, Lintott, & Rawson, 2008, p. 41). There is no doubt that the long periods of the fifth and fourth (as well as the third) centuries were fractured by social and political struggles between a privileged, hereditary minority and the rest (Beard, 2015, p. 151). Nonetheless, Cicero, touching on moral principles which are evident in De Legibus, De Officiis, De Oratore, and other speeches referenced the glory of the Roman Republic and the need for the people to live up to the deeds of their ancestors, thus proving themselves worthy successors to the once glorious Republic that had been handed to them. At this stage, it is all the more remarkable that Cicero was entirely in favour of retaining the cultural tradition of placing a high value on ancestral example. Ancestry was vitally important to Cicero because he saw the great men of Rome’s past as the cultural, rather than biological, ancestors of Romans (including himself) who were true to Roman values (Van Der Blom, 2010, p. 13). By the end of Cicero’s career, the Republic was (as it turned out) on its last legs. Over about the same period, the shape of Rome’s territory and the numbers of Roman citizens and Roman subjects changed dramatically. While Cicero’s was perhaps not the most important or influential voice at the time, it was certainly one of the loudest; Cicero directly addressed the problems of decline of virtuous living and determining who was and was not a Roman in character. Unfortunately, during Cicero’s day, the crowning blow to the old morality came. In Sallust’s account on Sulla, Sallust discussed how the Roman army became demoralised by their exposure to the luxury of Asia which in effect accelerated the growth of extreme greed for wealth. All that virtue represented had now faded. Riches had become the honoured goal of the young, directing them towards greed and waste and depriving them of all principle and 45 moderation (Sall, Jug. 41-42; Cat. 10-13). Hence it is not surprising that Cicero persistently echoed the reasons for the mounting woes of the Republic he found himself in to moral reasons rather than political or economic terms. Cicero’s writings are dotted with descriptions of moral degeneracy of his time and its harmful political consequences, but perhaps the clearest expression of his view occurs when in the preface to the fifth book of the De Republica he highlights the line on Ennius. He notes; “…that the ancient values preserved by the poets as props of the state have been consigned to oblivion, vice has replaced them and reduced the Republic to a word without substance” (De Rep, 5.1-2). Not altogether surprisingly, in the first century BC, Senators were finding it more and more difficult to maintain their hold on the Assemblies by these means. Many of their humble dependants had been driven off the land to live in idleness in the city and to sell their vote to the highest bidder. It was often a useful practice (even though it was a bad practice) because unemployed farmers living in Rome still voted with their rural tribe. The Senators now had to compete for it with the businessmen (equites) who, since the second century BC, were taking an increasingly independent line in politics and who often had very much longer purses than the Senators. Senatorial control was weakened by this disturbance of the old balance of power but the businessmen gained nothing by upsetting it. In the confusion caused by their quarrels, both they and the Senators, deaf to Cicero’s insistent plea for harmony between them, concordia ordinum, fell a prey to a third power based upon the political strength of a popular army commander. As a matter of fact, Cowell (1962, p. 164) best explains that this obscure but serious struggle brought about a breakdown of Roman public life. The 46 question is; how did it come about that the old ways (especially the political sphere) ceased to maintain their hold? In other words: What remains of the old ways in which Ennius said the Roman state stood rooted? This very question was once asked by Ennius and it is being asked again by Cicero. To this end, responses to the aforenoted question will be unravelled in subsequent chapters of this research. As a matter of fact, there are indubitable sources on which to premise our belief that there was a strong tradition at Rome that moral corruption was at the root of the failure of the Republic, which had its origins in the second century BC, most especially during Rome of Cicero’s day. At any rate, a salient point that must be acknowledged is that the early Republic was a much better period unlike Cicero’s day. And that the violence that was witnessed in the early Republic was mainly between the higher nobility and lower nobility, and these conflicts which resulted in violence were geared toward attaining positions of political power, unlike the factional politics that was characteristic in Rome of Cicero’s day. Conclusion In concluding, we have made an attempt to demonstrate how the early Romans lived their lives and how politics was revered to a large extent by most of its citizens and political stakeholders at large. The deeds and exploits of these men who even till date are held in high esteem as heroes of the ancient Republic of Rome have inevitably won our admiration. The Roman notion of this was perhaps best expressed by Ennius in his Annals (Fragment, 467): Moribus antiquis res stat Romana virisque, that is, “Upon the manners and men of former times stands the Roman state.” I am of the view that despite the challenges the early years encountered, it was still a better-off period as compared to Cicero’s 47 day. As Powell rightly points out, it is unfortunate that many readers of Cicero’s works conclude that he was an exceptionally self-promoting and self- conscious individual, even for a Roman; and that his frequent references to the way he saved the Roman state from the Catilinarian conspiracy, have earned for him a reputation of “self-glorification,” while the contents of some of his letters have been taken by many to reveal his “evident vanity” (Balsdon, p. 1560). But as Kaster (2005) notes, Cicero’s self-praise was not only acceptable, but expected. He did cling tenaciously to the idea of a Republic built on the lines of “the good old days,” yet fitted to the changed conditions. He was the opponent of all who aimed at power by unconstitutional means; the part of any man whom he thought capable of restoring a form of government similar to the old Republic. In fact, Cicero’s mind was much absorbed with concern for a virtuous life not just in his own lifetime, but in the times to come. The fact is that politics in Rome of Cicero’s day was much different from that of the early Republic, whereby in his day, politics had become a matter of personal ambition than the general devotion to the welfare of the Republic. 48 CHAPTER THREE THE NATURE OF POLITICS IN THE ROME OF CICERO’S DAY Introduction It is noteworthy that there are a vast number of inter-related questions and issues that embodied Roman politics during the time of Cicero. In the best expression of Anthony Everitt (2001, pp. 11-12) “at bottom, politics was a hullabaloo of equal and individual competitors who would only be guaranteed to cooperate for one course, the elimination of anybody who threatened to step out of line and grab too much power for himself.” With this phenomenon and its attendant pressures, ranging from the senatorial nobility to the problems that had beleaguered the plebes, there were factors that naturally exerted various challenges for Rome at the time. Thus, this chapter focuses mainly on two of such pressing issues; the controversial power play between the optimates and the populares politicians, and the intrusion of the army into Roman politics in the age of Cicero. The Optimates and the Populares To begin with, when Cicero entered his year of office in 63 BC as consul, to quote the words of Elizabeth Rawson (2001, p. 63) it was “a moment of great uncertainty, with rumours and suspicions of rife.” To Anthony Everitt (2003, p. 96), the populares immediately threw down a challenge to the new regime. In January 63 BC, a tribune tabled the first land-reform bill for years. It was generally thought that, once again, Crassus and Caesar were behind the move. Everitt further notes that the afore-noted challenge presented Cicero with a ticklish problem. Thus, Cicero was indebted to the optimates, who were as hostile to the redistribution of state land as their fathers and grandfathers had 49 been, and indeed shared their conservative instincts. But if he could, Cicero wanted to be consul for all, believing that Rome would not have a future without what he called the concordia ordinum, the “concord of the classes.” The misuse of personal power which resides in dominant political stakeholders, which originates from military, political, or social popularity has plagued mankind and his institutions from society’s inception. One of the most noteworthy features of Cicero’s day in Roman politics was the incessant conflict between two ideologically opposed factions, namely the optimates and the populares. And whereas before the period in focus, the populares and the optimates had been anachronistically referred to as “political parties,” they were now referred to as “factions,” since in practice they lacked not only a clearly defined party platform, but also the kind of organizational structure associated with modern day political parties. Instead, these “factions” came to be seen as differing from one another only, in that one used “traditional” tactics to climb the political ladder, while the other used more openly “populist” methods. Also, Cicero applied the term factio to a group of people, called optimates, who controlled the commonwealth by reason of wealth, birth, or some kind of power (De Re Publica, in. 13, 23; cf. I. 45, 69). It is noteworthy that politicians in Rome, prior to and during Cicero’s day were accustomed to compete vigorously against one another from prestige and public offices, even if the Romans often wanted to present themselves ideologically as desiring only to co-exist with one another harmoniously. Competition meant that there would always be open wrangling in the Senate over, for instance, what advice the Senate should offer, as against what advice the Senate should give the people when the need arose. 50 Outside the Roman Senate, the wrangling (in an extreme case) might be about whether the people were always morally bound to take the Senate’s advice, since the Roman people and not the Senate created the law in the first place and elected the magistrates to public offices. In these circumstances, Roman politicians could propose many plausible yet conflicting interpretations of what the constitution or the public interest reflected in particular situations (such as in the Senate debate about the Catilinarians). Consequently, the situation made unsatisfied politicians (the populares politicians) now move outside the Senate for appeal to the masses. Besides, the political gravity for political activities prior to Cicero’s day had been with the Senate, especially during the central period and from about 300 BC to 130 BC. But thereafter, Cowell (1962, p. 143) notes; Senatorial influence was challenged in the name of the people of Rome, first by political reformers such as the Gracchi and lastly, with fatal results, by popular army commanders. Cicero makes the situation explicit in the Pro Sestio of 56 BC as he remarked that; “there have always been in thi