UNIVERSITY OF CAPE COAST

# PEACE BUILDING AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: A CASE STUDY OF ALAVANYO AND NKONYA CONFLICT

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BY

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DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE INSTITUTE FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES OF THE FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, UNIVERSITY OF CAPE COAST IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR AWARD OF MASTER OF ARTS DEGREE IN PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

OCTOBER, 2013

#### DECLARATION

#### **Candidate's Declaration**

I hereby declare that this dissertation is the result of my own original work and that no part of it has been presented for another degree in this university or elsewhere.

Candidate's Name: Justine Aku Kpormasi

Signature:....

Date:....

## **Supervisor's Declaration**

I hereby declare that the preparation and presentation of the dissertation were supervised in accordance with guidelines on supervision of dissertation laid down by the University of Cape Coast.

Supervisor's Name: Prof. Dominic K. Agyeman

Signature:....

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#### ABSTRACT

Conflicts arise in many communities but if they are managed properly they are able to bring peace, which is prerequisite for development. Conflict is an active disagreement between people with opposing opinions or principles. In Ghana, there are land conflicts, chieftaincy conflicts, religious conflicts, and political conflicts among others.

This research is about the Alavanyo and Nkonya conflict which started in 1923 over a prime forest land with rich timber species, bamboo and cola nuts. The conflict has arisen from an 80 year old boundary disputes between the Nkonya, a Guan group and the Alavanyo, an Ewe group both in the Volta Region of Ghana.

A cross-sectional survey design was used to carry out the study. The basic instruments used were questionnaires and in-depth interview. The questionnaires were administered in some selected communities in Alavanyo and Nkonya. Traditional leaders, District Chief Executives and opinion leaders were interviewed because of time constraint.

The research has found out that the main occupations in the two towns were mainly farming, hunting, trading and some civil servants. The majority (83%) of the respondents reported that the conflict occurred because the area is a fertile land for farming and lumbering activities. There had been military and police interventions, court adjudication, and peace building methods involving stakeholders.

It is recommended that Government and the various Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies should set up Peace and Reconciliation committees in their various areas.

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# **DEDICATION**

To my late parents, Madam Lucy Adzoa Kpormasi and Mr. Nicholas Kpormasi, and my children Mawuko Komla Atsyor and Francis Kwasi Ahedo.

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# LIST OF ACRONYMS

ARS	-	Apostles Revelation Society	
GT	-	Ghanaian Times	
GSS	-	Ghana Statistical Service	
ISBN	-	International Standard Book Number	
IGP	-	Inspector General of Police	
LECIA	-	Legon Centre for International Affairs	
MP	-	Member of Parliament	
NDC	-	National Democratic Congress	
NGO	-	Non -governmental Organisation	
NPP	-	New Patriotic Party	
PNDC	-	Provisional National Defence Council	
UN	-	United Nations	
UNDP	-	United Nations Development Programme	
VRCC	-	Volta Regional Coordinating Council	
WANEP	-	West Africa Network for Peace	

#### **CHAPTER ONE**

#### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **Background to the study**

Conflict may be defined as a struggle or contest between people with opposing needs, ideas, beliefs, values, or goals. Conflicts are inevitable but the results are not predetermined. Conflict might occur and lead to non-productive results or conflict can be beneficially resolved and lead to quality final products. Therefore, learning to manage conflict is integral to a highperformance team. Although very few people go looking for conflict, more often than not, conflict results because of miscommunication between people with regard to their needs, ideas, beliefs, goals, or values (Agyeman, 2008).

Conflict management is the principle that all conflicts cannot necessarily be resolved, but learning how to manage conflicts can decrease the odds of non productive escalation. Conflict management involves acquiring skills related to conflict resolution, self-awareness about conflict modes, conflict communication skills and establishing a structure for management of conflict in the environment. Conflicts arise in many places and should be properly managed to bring peace and tranquility which is prerequisite for growth and development of communities (Agyeman, 2008).

Any government working towards sustainable development (political, economic and environment) must ensure relative peace within the country. Whenever there is conflict the clock of progress is drawn back. According to Cambridge Dictionary, Conflict is an active disagreement between people with opposing opinions or principles. Conflict can also mean fighting between two or more groups of people or countries (Amada, 2008).

According to Coser (1956), conflict is a struggle over values, claims to status, power and scarce resources in which the aims of the opposing parties are not only to gain the deserved values but also to neutralise, injure and eliminate rivals. The West Africa Network for Peace Building (WANEP) in 2006 stated that land, chieftaincy, religion, proliferation of small arms, poor governance, poverty and ethnic intolerance were identified as some of the main causes of conflicts in Ghana. So the types of disputes include chieftaincy conflicts, land disputes (land acquisition, use and ownership), labour disputes (between employers and employees), religious disputes (religious beliefs and differences), natural resource base conflicts (exploitation of minerals, water bodies and forests). Other examples are socio-cultural conflicts, political conflicts, border conflicts, student unrests, etc. Globally, there are examples of religious conflicts especially those between the Catholics and the Protestants in Religious Wars in France from 1530 to 1610. There are some labour disputes in the world, including the American labour strikes of 1819.

Land disputes are particularly very common in the world. Examples of land disputes in the world include the conflict between Palestine and Israel over the Gaza strip, Lebanon and Syria on the Golan Heights, invasion of Kuwait and Iraq and the claim over the entire Kuwaiti territory. Africa is no exception to the conflicts over land. Examples are the Ethiopia and Eritrea border conflicts, Sudan and Somalia border conflicts; Zimbabwe had internal conflicts with foreigners over land. These are examples in Africa. In West Africa, the situation is not different. The conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon over the Bakasi Peninsula is an example of conflict over the benefits accruing from natural resources. The communities of the Niger Delta believe that oil is drilled from their land and they suffer from the pollution and environmental degradation attendant to oil production. They have the right to adequate compensation, a clean and safe environment and a fair share of the oil revenue. The incompatibility of goals and interest over the proceeds from oil in the Niger Delta has been the main point in the occurrence of conflict and crises over the Niger Delta area.

There are also conflicts pertaining to land in Ghana. Examples are the Bawku crisis, which is on land and chieftaincy, the intra-ethnic land disputes between Peki and Tsito, Teshie and Nungua and inter ethnic conflict between Alavanyo and Nkonya over land. There are different levels of conflict. These include intra personal, inter personal, intra group, inter group, intra state, interstate conflicts. Intra personal conflict relates to conflicts that arise as a result of acquiring basic needs such as what to eat and wear. Inter personal conflict arises as a result of having conflicts with other people. Intra group conflict or intra ethnic conflict occurs when two or more people from one group are against two or more people from the same ethnic group. Examples of such conflicts in Ghana are the Dagbon conflict where the Andani and Abudu gates, who can enjoy the same chieftaincy, are quarrelling and the Peki-Tsito conflict in the same Ewe ethnic group (Francis, 2007).

Inter group or inter ethnic conflict occurs when one ethnic group is against another group or two distinct groups clash etc. Examples are the Alavanyo-Nkonya conflict where Alavanyo are an Ewe group and the Nkonya are a Guan group in the Volta Region. The conflict between the Nafana and the Ntore over land and sovereignty in the Brong Ahafo Region. The Kokomba and the Dagomba over chieftaincy and land issues in the Northern Region.

Intra-state conflict is also one of the levels of conflict. The 1970s wars in the world are intra state conflicts. An example is the Tutsis and the Hutus in Rwanda. Inter-state conflict occurs when there is conflict between two states. The conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon over the Bakasi Peninsula and the conflict between Palestine and Israel over the Gaza strip are examples (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998).

Conflicts do not just occur or erupt, there are stages. The first stage is the pre-conflict stage. At this stage there are signs and signals on misunderstandings from the parties, peers, homes etc. There is also no communication (Darby, 1995).

The second stage is the escalating stage. This is a stage which is characterised by confrontation and occasional fighting. The duration or the time frame at this stage is very short. The parties get to know and be aware that there is something wrong with the cordiality in the relationship (Darby, 1995).

The third stage is the crises state or most severe stage. This stage represents the peak of the conflict. This is the stage of war and intense fighting, leading to loss of lives and properties, injuries and large scale population displacements, churches, schools and hospitals are closed down. Economic activities come to a standstill since anybody can be attacked. At this stage small and light weapons are used in the conflict (Darby, 1995). The de-escalatory stage is the fourth stage of the conflict. At this stage, one assumes one party may declare peace or lay down tools. Also a stage where the government dispatches police and soldier troops and other security agents to the conflict areas. The warring factions become tired and room is made for peace treaty to be signed. Psychological education programmes are organised for the warring factions for reconciliation and compensation (Darby, 1995).

The fifth stage is the post conflict stage. This stage is concerned about repairing relationships, institutions and social facilities. Funds are raised at this stage for construction of economic ventures. The control of small arms, improved police services, accepted judicial systems and the monitoring of human rights prevail at this stage. Electoral reforms are carried out for socio - economic development. At the fifth stage, conflicts are solved for development (Darby, 1995).

#### Statement of the problem

In 1923, war broke out between the people of Alavanyo and Nkonya over a piece of forest land. This took place soon after the World War I (1918) when the Allied forces (Britain and France) took over the area which was initially colonised by the Germans. According to Prof. Kumado (2007), Director of the Legon Centre for International Affairs (LECIA), delivering the third Golden Jubilee lectures on "The Degree of Our Commitment to Our National Motto - Freedom and Justice argued that conflicts in some of the regions result from the oppression of some groups by others. He intimated that "we have sent the British away but to some people the internal colonial power is still there". "There may be eruptions somewhere, and when you look at it, the people do not understand why we say the country is independent while they are still under somebody". For instance, people saw the Nanumba-Kokomba and Alavanyo-Nkonya conflicts as ethnic problems, but observed that it was a feeling of domination. Invariably, the conflict had affected the activities the socio-economic of people leading to widespread impoverishment. The concern of this study is to investigate out why the conflict between the Alavanyo and Nkonya kept long and what were the mechanisms put in place for a lasting peace to be achieved.

## **Objectives of the study**

The main objective of the study was to find out how the conflict between Alavanyo and Nkonya was resolved. The specific objectives were to:

- Identify the causes of the disputes between the people of Alavanyo and Nkonya since the colonial era;
- 2. Examine the ways of resolving the disputes over the years by different governments and civil society organisations;
- 3. Explore which peace building and peace-making mechanisms and processes were used in the conflict areas;
- 4. Assess whether these processes are sustainable and lasting; and
- 5. Make recommendations based on the findings of the study.

#### **Research questions**

The main research questions that guided the researcher were:

- 1. What were the main causes of the conflict between the two towns?
- 2. What was the assumption that many conflicts were best solved by the warring parties themselves?
- 3. What was the impression of the warring parties towards the mediation parties?
- 4. Was there any relationship between the solution of the warring parties themselves and the facilitation of mediation parties?

## Scope of the study

The study sought to determine how conflict between Alavanyo and Nkonya would be resolved. These two tribes had family disputes which were based on chieftaincy, land acquisition and other religious issues. It also explored the perceptions that dwellers had about peaceful resolution of conflict. The study also sought to explain the factors that affect adequacy in peace building. Finally, the study which explored peace building and peacemaking mechanisms and processes were used in the conflict areas.

#### Significance of the study

A study conducted earlier indicates that conflict issues are more dominant in the Volta region of Ghana although researches have been conducted to know the extent of cases as well as impact on the environs, in a quest to delve to the impacts of such conflict and its wider effects. The research will serve as a document for future reference which will teach a lesson to the whole populace, about the impact of conflict. The study will also draw the attention of the populace about the aftermath of the conflict within Alavanyo and Nkonya and how it can be minimised.

## **Organisation of the study**

The study consists of five chapters. Chapter One contains the background, statement of the problem, study objectives, scope, significance, research questions and organisation of the study. Chapter Two dealt with the review of related relevant literature and Chapter Three covered the study methodology. The fourth chapter presents and discusses the results. The fifth chapter contains the summary, conclusions and recommendations of the study.

#### **CHAPTER TWO**

## **REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE**

#### Introduction

This section deals with various works done by people on conflict and theories on conflict and its resolution in Ghana and in the world at large. Various conflicts that occur in Ghana, their causes and its effect are also discussed.

### Peace and disagreement

Peace is an essential element for the development of all societies. Nation states which have wars or conflicts often lose the human population and the natural resources. Conflict is a disagreement through which the parties involved perceive a threat to their needs, interests or concerns. Within this definition, there are several important understandings that emerge. Generally, there is some level of difference in the positions of the two (or more) parties involved in the conflict. However, the actual disagreement versus the perceived disagreement may be quite different from one another (Burton, 1990).

Conflict tends to be accompanied by significant levels of misunderstanding that exaggerate the perceived disagreement considerably. If we can understand the true areas of disagreement, this will help us solve the right problems and manage the true needs of the parties (Burton, 1990).

#### Parties involved in conflicts

There are often disparities in our sense of who is involved in the conflict. Sometimes, people are surprised to learn they are a party to the conflict, while other times we are shocked to learn we are not included in the disagreement. On many occasions, people who are seen as part of the social system (e.g., work team, family, and company) are influenced to participate in the dispute, whether they would personally define the situation in that way or not. In the above example, people very readily "take sides" based upon current perceptions of the issues, past issues and relationships, roles within the organisation, and other factors. The parties involved can become an elusive concept to define (Dzodzi & Wayo, 2004).

### **Perceived threat**

People respond to the perceived threat, rather than the true threat, facing them. Thus, while perception does not become reality per se, people's behaviors, feelings and ongoing responses become modified by that evolving sense of the threat they confront. If we can work to understand the true threat (issues) and develop strategies (solutions) that manage it (agreement), we are acting constructively to manage the conflict (Dzodzi & Wayo, 2004).

#### Needs, interests or concerns

There is a tendency to narrowly define "the problem" as one of substance, task and near-term viability. However, workplace conflicts tend to be far more complex than that, for they involve ongoing relationships with complex and emotional components. Simply stated, there are always procedural needs and psychological needs to be addressed within the conflict, in addition to the substantive needs that are generally presented. The durability of the interests and concerns of the parties transcend the immediate presenting situation. Any efforts to resolve conflicts effectively must take these points into account (Dzodzi & Wayo, 2004).

So, is it still a simple definition of conflict? We think so, but we must respect that within its elegant simplicity lies a complex set of issues to address. It is not surprising that satisfactory resolution of most conflicts can prove so challenging and time consuming to address. Conflicts occur when people perceive that, as a consequence of a disagreement, there is a threat to their needs, interests or concerns (Lederach, 1998).

Although conflict is a normal part of organisation life, providing numerous opportunities for growth through improved understanding and insight, there is a tendency to view conflict as a negative experience caused by abnormally difficult circumstances. Disputants tend to perceive limited options and finite resources available in seeking solutions, rather than multiple possibilities that may exist 'outside the box' which can be employed in problem-solving (Lederach, 1998).

A few points are worth reiterating:

- A conflict is more than a mere disagreement it is a situation in which people perceive a threat (physical, emotional, power, status) to their well-being. As such, it is a meaningful experience in people's lives, not to be shrugged off.
- 2. Participants in conflicts tend to respond on the basis of their perceptions of the situation, rather than an objective review of it. As

such, people filter their perceptions (and reactions) through their values, culture, beliefs, information, experience, gender, and other variables. Conflict responses are both filled with ideas and feelings that can be very strong and powerful guides to our sense of possible solutions.

- 3. As in any problem, conflicts contain substantive, procedural, and psychological dimensions to be negotiated. In order to best understand the threat perceived by those engaged in a conflict, we need to consider all these dimensions (Lederach, 1998).
- 4. We need to develop mental procedures for identifying conflicts likely to arise, as well as systems through which we can constructively manage conflicts and may be able to discover new opportunities to transform conflict into a productive learning experience.
- 5. Creative problem-solving strategies are essential to positive approaches to conflict management. We need to transform the situation from one in which it is 'my way or the highway' into one in which we entertain new possibilities that have been otherwise elusive.

#### **Conflicts in Ghana**

Issues about access to and use of natural resources, appointment and elevation to chieftaincy, as well as the use and management of community resources by chiefs have led to a multitude of prolonged community level conflicts nation-wide (Agyeman, 2008).

According to national security sources, there are estimated to be over two hundred major chieftaincy disputes across the country. Multiple factors underlie chieftaincy disputes and conflicts, the most prominent being the following: succession rules, practices and processes; destoolment; corruption; misuse of stool properties and revenues; - disposal of and/or alienation of stool property, particularly stool lands without the consent and agreement of the principal elders of the stool; unwillingness to differentiate between public stool and private properties (Agyeman, 2008).

Inability of both the National and Regional Houses of Chiefs to mitigate, manage and/or resolve conflicts brought before these Houses, as a result of alleged corruption and the lack of judicial and research capacities to dispense with cases expeditiously and judiciously, are all examples (Agyeman, 2008).

#### **Political intervention**

The situation is exacerbated by a wide prevalence of small arms and light weapons throughout Ghana. The United Nations Development Programme, UNDP (1997) identified the need for sustained engagement with the arms producing communities, and for the introduction of innovative programmes to build awareness around the dangers of small arms, as well as to channel the energies of the producers to alternative productive economic activities. Besides small arms, the UNDP (1997) has supported the government to establish a national conflict prevention programme. The components of the programme include the establishment of national and regional Peace Advisory Councils, which perform the functions of early warning and early response policy mechanisms.

#### Violence in Ghana since the 1990s

From the foregoing analysis, it is possible to identify different categories of continuous conflict, some of them violent. These include interethnic conflicts, mostly centered on control over land and other resources and sovereignty issues in what Brukum (1995) has described as wars of emancipation or secession. A second category of conflicts are intra-ethnic conflicts partly over land ownership and competing uses of land. The above classification does not take into account the fact that often, the violent disputes reported by the media have multiple causes and elements. Thus policecommunity violence could arise from the policing of a chieftaincy or interethnic dispute and tap into existing mistrust of the police. In the same vein, an inter-ethnic dispute may be triggered by the locating of a facility by the District Assembly.

#### Inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic disputes

There are several longstanding inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic disputes among various communities across Ghana. In the Volta Region alone, three main conflict areas have been identified. They are the Alavanyo-Nkonya, Peki-Tsito and Abutia-Kpota conflicts (Daily Graphic, 2003). The first two are inter-ethnic while the last was intra-ethnic. Three of the conflicts, the Alavanyo-Nkonya and Peki-Tsito are land conflicts while the Abutia-Kpota conflict is a chieftaincy dispute. In the Northern Region, there are longstanding often violent inter-ethnic conflicts between the Gonja and the Konkomba (who are also implicated in the Nkwanta area conflicts of the Volta Region) and between Dagombas and Konkomba. In the Brong-Ahafo Region, violent clashes between the Nafana and Ntore ethnic groups at Brohani near Wenchi over land and sovereignty resulted in three deaths and 2,000 persons being rendered homeless.

Attempts by the courts to address the conflict were frustrated when the bailiffs and police were attacked as they tried to enforce a judgment debt against the chief of the Ntore (Ghanaian Times, 1997). Intra-ethnic conflicts in Ghana tend to be either land disputes (Peki-Tsito in the Volta Region; Nsuta-Beposo in Ashanti – GT, 25/1/97, Effiduase-Asokore in the Ashanti Region – GT, 27/4/2000; Weija-Oblogo in the Greater Accra Region – GT 3/5/2003), or more commonly, chieftaincy or succession conflicts.

Chieftaincy conflicts in which violence has been reported are Dagbon (2002); the Mossi chieftaincy dispute in Kumasi (2000); Teshie, Accra (1996; 1999); Old Tafo near Kumasi (1996); Donyina in the Ejisu Juaben District of Ashanti (1997); Banda–Ahenkro in the Brong Ahafo Region (1996); Brekusu near Aburi, (2003); Mampong, Ashanti (1996); Aplaku, near Bortianor in the Ga District of the Greater Accra Region (1999); Juaso, Ashanti Region (1999); Teshie, Greater Accra Region (1999); Akyem Nkwantanang in the Eastern Region (2000); Asutuare in the Eastern Region (2000); Bimbagu, West Mamprusi District of the Northern Region (2000); and Bimbilla (2003) in the Northern Region.

There was violence at Tanoso-Subin, Brong Ahafo Region, following the elevation of four traditional areas to paramountcy status by the Asantehene. These areas had hitherto been under the Techiman stool (GT 2/9/1996). It is estimated that there are over 100 chieftaincy disputes in Ghana, several of which have been complicated when politicians and political parties have supported one or the other faction. Land use conflicts have been a source of violence between Fulani herdsmen and local farmers in the Northern parts of Ghana. While essentially about land use, this class of conflict manifests itself as ethnic conflict between locals and migrants, with Ghanaian nationality as a subtext. In the Central Region, there are also disturbances arising from the activities of itinerant hunters accused of destroying crops by local farmers.

Conflicts over other resources have often been generated by decisions related to decentralization. For example, it was reported that forty persons had been arrested at Nalerigu in the Northern Region because they had created an illegal road block to prevent people from Gambaga from attending the only medical centre in the area and the market at Gambaga. Tensions between the two Mamprusi towns, five kilometers apart, had arisen because of their differences over the construction of a new administration block for the East Mamprusi District at Gambaga (GT, 15/1/98).

Similarly, the youth of Adrobaa in the Tano District were reported to be planning to mount a roadblock to prevent the people of Subriso No. 2, a neighbouring village, from taking part in the weekly community market held at Adrobaa. This was in retaliation for the Subriso community's participation in the inauguration of an area Council at Terchire "without permission". Subriso had been one of a group of communities that had threatened to boycott the activities of the Terchire-Adrobaa Area Council to protest the siting of the Council's headquarters at Terchire instead of Adrobaa, a larger community that had since distanced itself from the protest when it attended the inauguration (GT, 24/8/98). At Fiapre, riots arose from the decision by the chief to grant land to the Catholic Church for a University, which was disputed by some members of the community (GT, 10/11/98).

#### **Religious conflicts**

Ghanaians are mainly Christians, although other religions are present. The composition of religious groups in Ghana are Christians (70%), Muslim (16%), traditional religion (9%) and others (5%), (Ghana Statistical Service 2000). There are some religious conflicts. While religious conflicts are not on the scale of other countries in the West African, there are longstanding religious conflicts, some involving intra- and inter-ethnic rivalries, periodically break into violence. There have been violent incidents among Muslims, especially in the Northern, Ashanti and Brong-Ahafo Regions. In 1996, a religious clash between Kotokoli and Dagomba at the Akim Oda Zongo resulted in six deaths, the burning of ten houses and destruction of property worth millions of cedis (GT, 17/9/96). Clashes have been reported between Muslim groups at Wa in the Upper West Region (GTR, 15/12/97), Tamale in the Northern Region (GT, 6/12/1997) and Kumasi in the Ashanti Region (GT, 5/9/98. In 1994 and 1998, there were clashes between the Tijaniya and Al-Sunna Muslims at Wenchi in the Brong Ahafo Region (GT, 6/10/97; 29/1/98). In the 1998 violence in which four persons died, twenty four others were seriously injured and property destroyed was triggered by a dispute between the two groups over proprietary rights over the Wenchi Muslim cemetery (GT, 19/1/98).

There was a suggestion by the then Inspector General of Police (IGP) that there could be non-Ghanaians involved in the conflict, when he stated that

if foreigners were found to be behind the violence, they would be deported (GT, 27/1/1998). The Tijanniya and Al-Sunni also clashed at Tamale in the Northern Region, where one person died and several were injured (GT 9/12/97). In another dispute between Muslims at Chereponi in the Northern Region over who should become the next Imam after the serving Imam died, police were called upon to prevent violence (GT, 15/4/2000). While there have been violent incidents between Muslims and Christians, such incidents are much reduced. In the period when all the intra-Muslim disputes were reported, there were no reports of violence between Muslims and Christians.

A religious conflict which has been much reported and debated is between the traditional religious authorities of the Ga Traditional State and Christian churches operating in several suburbs of the capital Accra. The annual ban on drumming and dancing which precedes the Homowo festival of the Ga people is the point of conflict as several Christian churches have refused to observe the ban and have been attacked by unofficial enforcers of the ban.

#### **Police-community violence**

Clashes between the police and communities have become endemic. Examples of such incidents are an attack against the police at Banda-Ahenkro in the Brong Ahafo Region on 24 November 1996 when they went to police a chieftaincy dispute (GT, 3/1/97). Two years later, about three hundred people in Banda-Ahenkro attacked a police-station to release two detained members of a faction in a chieftaincy dispute and attacked a policeman, forcing five others to flee (GT, 28/11/98). Also in the Brohani case mentioned earlier, a group of people attacked the policeman and bailiffs when they tried to enforce a judgment debt against the chief of the Ntore in the Brong-Ahafo Region (GT2/9/97).

At Amuana-Praso in the Birim North District, police and the townspeople accused each of attacking the other over disturbances arising from the death of a citizen of the community (Evening News, 8/9/03). At another incident in Tanoso when police attempted to dismantle an unauthorized roadblock, clashes resulted in five policemen and four civilians being injured (GT 6/6/98). There were also riots at Juaso in the Ashanti Region in which a faction in a chieftaincy dispute clashed with the police that attempted to keep law and order. The Juaso police station was burnt down (GT 5/1/1999).

Eighty people were arrested at Assin-Praso in the Central Region after the police were attacked, the police station vandalized and property destroyed; this followed their attempt to arrest a woman on suspicion that she had stolen her estranged husband's property from another community (GT, 26/2/97). In Ablekuma, a rural community in the Ga District of the Greater Accra Region, two policemen were murdered and buried secretly in December 1998 when they attempted to arrest a suspect. A contingent of three hundred policemen over-ran the community, vandalizing and burning down property, and arresting suspects. The residents fled for months before returning to their homes (GT, 22/10/99).

In one of the reported cases, the law and order authority in question was the Dakpema Palace Brigade, a traditional law enforcement group linked to a chief. They reportedly clashed with the youth at Sabonjida, Tamale in the Northern Region, leading to injuries and gunshot wounds. The conflict had arisen when the Brigade attempted to arrest some youth in the town for showing them disrespect as they went about their duties. The youth in turn accused them of often using excessive force and instituting corporal punishment against the people of Ghana (GT, 27/9/1996).

The violence involving law enforcement agencies and communities raises questions about policing culture and the loss of credibility of state institutions in conflict management and resolution. Often, the police are suspected of partiality and corruption by one side in communal disputes. This is compounded by the authoritarian police culture and the lack of proper communal violence management skills and facilities, which leaves individual police officers and police property vulnerable to attack.

Other kinds of state-related violence include incidents between communities and companies which have acquired community resources through the award of mining and timber concessions. An example is the reported conflict between the Bonte Mining Company and farmers in the Atwima District of the Ashanti Region arising from the destruction of a number of diesel drums belonging to the company. The police arrested the farmers and put them before court in Kumasi. The conflict had arisen because of contestations over land acquired by the company for its surface mining activities (GT, 10/3/98). Also, land disputes between communities and state agencies have turned violent. These conflicts have arisen from government acquisition of vast tracts of land for which little or no compensation has been paid. This creates long term disputes with the agencies that have been assigned the land or the individuals to whom they have allocated the land. At Frafraha in the Tema municipal area, land owners were threatening persons who had bought land from the State Housing Corporation which had (also) acquired the land (GT, 25/2/97). There are several such tensions all over periurban Accra.

#### **Political violence**

Political violence between supporters of the different political parties predates independence and has become part of the political scene since the anti-colonial struggle. Violent incidents in the early post-colonial period have included attempted and successful political assassinations, the most famous being the bomb blast at Kulungugu which threatened the life of President Kwame Nkrumah. More common is violence between supporters of rival political parties, which becomes common close to elections. In situations where party membership follows ethnic patterns, such violence feeds on already existing ethnic rivalries. At Bawku in the Upper East Region, on and around 7 December 2000, supporters of rival political parties were locked in bloody conflict in which cleavages were along ethnic lines (GT, 3/1/2001).

At Asutuare, violence between supporters of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and National Democratic Congress (NDC) injured thirty persons. However, it was reported that political differences had only exacerbated conflicts arising from chieftaincy and irrigated land distribution disputes (GT, 13/2/01). Political violence of a different order also occurs during coup d'états and over the life course of coup d'état regimes. The military and police are used in such periods for political repression. The student movement in Ghana suffered violent repression by the military and police when they opposed the Acheampong and Akuffo Regimes in the 1970s. In the early 1980s when Rawlings seized power, political violence between workers and the factory managers, and between organisations which supported the regime and those who opposed it, were common as were acts of military brutality – beatings, arbitrary arrests, rapes and murders.

#### **Football violence**

Football violence is common throughout Ghana. Wherever football matches are played, incidents between supporters can occur. However, with larger teams, the propensity for violence tends to be more serious. The great rivalry between the Asante Kotoko and Accra Hearts of Oak football clubs, which have support throughout the country, but are associated with the Ashanti Region and the Greater Accra Region Zongos respectively, has often resulted in violence. The most deadly incident occurred in 2001 after a match at the Accra Sports Stadium when rival supporters began to throw seats at each other. The police intervened with tear gas and in the ensuing stampede, over 120 persons died, most of them trampled underfoot. A Commission of Enquiry later discovered that, there is no certainty that future football violence is avoidable. Smaller incidents continue to occur. At Sekondi, a football fan was shot dead by police trying to bring order to an altercation between supporters of rival teams after a football match between Sekondi Eleven Wise and Accra Hearts of Oak (GT, 3/12/98).

#### Peace building in Ghana

Ghana currently enjoys the well-deserved reputation as one of Africa's most democratic and stable countries. This does not take away from the fact that the country has experienced high levels of debilitating and often violent inter-community conflict. Between 1990 and 2002, for example, 14 violent clashes between ethnic community groups took place. Most of these conflicts took place in the Northern region where strong perceptions of economic and political marginalization exist *vis-à-vis* the more powerful and prosperous south. One of these conflicts, the Konkomba-Nanumba 'war' in 1994 -1995, left 5000 people dead (Dodzi & Wayo, 2004).

In 1994, civil society organisations combined efforts to facilitate peace building. An 'Inter-NGO Consortium' was formed. They intervened by facilitating processes of dialogue and negotiation that had been successful in restoring peace in a number of these conflicts. Civil society's approach contrasted sharply to that of government. The approach of government was to suppress the violence through the use of force; to appoint a commission of inquiry that allocated blame; and then often to ignore the sanctions recommended by the commission because of unpalatable political consequences. In contrast civil society's approach sought to uncover the deeper sources of conflict and focus on dialogue, deeper mutual understanding, joint problem-solving and reconciliation.

Another violent conflict broke out in 2002 in the Dagomba Kingdom which led to the murder of the King of Dagbon and 40 others. The violence was caused by a long-simmering dispute between two royal 'houses' on issues of ascension to the throne (or 'skin'). The conflict was serious because of its potential to destabilize the Northern Region and to being excessively politicized with general elections looming in 2004. The two major political parties were perceived to have taken opposing sides in the conflict. In March 2003 the government declared a State of Emergency in the region. At this point government, because it had taken notice of the success of civil society's methodology, approached the UN Country Office in Accra for assistance. Following a UN assessment mission, a Peace and Governance Advisor was appointed. The latter worked with government and civil society in the facilitation of a process of dialogue and negotiation that had defused the violence potential of the conflict and made substantial progress in dealing with the underlying issues (UNDP 1997).

Following the success of this intervention, the government, with support from the UN system, set out to create a national mechanism for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict. The rationale was to provide formal recognition and institutional support for the approach that proved to be successful. The 'national architecture for peace' would consist of councils (i.e. statutory bodies) that would consist of representatives of relevant stakeholders as well as individual Ghanaians that enjoy high levels of trust and respect in society. These councils would exist at national, regional and district level with the mandate to facilitate dialogue, problem-solving and reconciliation processes at the levels of their jurisdiction. They would be served by a body of full-time, professional Peace Promotion Officers connected to the 10 Regional Peace Advisory Councils. Furthermore, a Peace Building Support Unit was established within the Ministry of the Interior to coordinate support and collaboration from government agencies. The process of erecting this 'architecture' is currently on-going. The National Peace Council has been established but does not yet have legal standing. Parliament still needs to debate a Bill to legalize their role. Even so, the Council has reportedly played a major role in ensuring peaceful elections in 2008 and a smooth transfer of power. They have done so through discreet meetings with stakeholders that had defused considerable tension. The fact that the role of the Council has not yet been legalized also means that it remains dependent on donor funding, the bulk of which was supplied by UNDP. UNDP had, apart from funding, also spent considerable energy in building the capacity of the Council and providing support to it.

The current position with regional councils is more complex. Regional Peace Advisory Councils have not been established in all regions, and in some of the regions where they have been established they have merged with regional security structures that have a primary interest in issues of early warning and security. There is, in other words, not complete consensus on the precise role of these peace councils. There is a difference in role between a peace building body that focuses on dialogue and problem-solving and a body that has a primary security function. The Regional Peace Advisory Council in the North, however, has reportedly played a very constructive role in ensuring peace during the elections of 2008. No District Peace Advisory Councils have yet been established. Despite the unfinished nature of the Ghanaian peace architecture, some features stand out including the following;

1. The national architecture for peace is the first official national level programme for peace building in Africa. It is in consonance with the Resolution of African leaders at the First Standing Conference on Stability, Security and Development in Africa, in Durban in 2002, for each country to establish a national framework for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts.

- 2. Ghana provides one of the most interesting examples of a local peace building process that made a substantial contribution towards national security. Essentially the Dagbon-conflict was treated as a distinct conflict cycle and peace was secured through engaging local actors and stakeholders in a carefully facilitated process. This has defused much of the political tension that had built up at national level.
- Political consensus has been achieved across the board regarding the usefulness and value of the Peace Councils.
- 4. The consensus has been forged on the basis of the experience that all parties had with the peacemaking methodology that had been employed in the North and during the 2008 election period. In other words, the success achieved through carefully facilitated dialogue and joint problem-solving processes, as compared to strong-arm tactics, has provided the basis of the consensus.
- 5. The success of this process had much to do with the quality support and capacity building provided by civil society and the United Nations (UN) system. With particular reference to UNDP (1997), the presence of highly professional Peace and Development Advisers and the sustained attention of the programme to capacity building had good results.
- 6. The design provided for technical and administrative support to the councils in the form of the Peace Building Support Unit.

7. At a conceptual level, there is a clear distinction between the roles of the peace councils and that of governance structures. The peace council facilitates dialogue and joint problem-solving, they do not arbitrate nor do they have the authority to intervene with or override governance functions. The importance of role-clarity is highlighted by the impact of the remaining confusion regarding peacemaking and security roles.

On the whole the architecture, as it exists on paper at the moment, is an example of a well-designed structure. Traditional governance, especially in the rural areas is highly respected and appreciated. Chiefs and queen mothers are the embodiment of unity and leadership in these areas. They are not supposed to engage in party politics and, for that matter, they are expected to be apolitical. The rationale behind this provision is to promote equal leadership for all people irrespective of their political or ethnic affiliation in the areas that they govern (Ladoucer, 1979).

This respect for the chieftaincy system in Ghana places chiefs and queen mothers in a unique position to champion strong leadership and coexistence. The chieftaincy system has been instrumental in resolving disputes, including inter-ethnic ones, through dialogue. The National House of Chiefs has been an important player in this respect. Since the beginning of the Fourth Republic, the National House of Chiefs and its regional counterparts have successfully resolved all kinds of conflicts over issues such as land (which often leads to inter-ethnic tensions and conflicts) and chieftaincy, especially where politicians have not interfered. Some of these successful resolutions have been made public and received high level publicity. Others have not been given media coverage and were resolved more quietly by the House (Agyeman, 2008).

#### Implications from the literature review

From the literature, it can be inferred that there are various forms of conflict which exist and major causes of these conflicts are over resources. These resources have a link with power, physical resources and others. One unique observation from the literature review is that even though conflict may occur within a short period leading to destruction of properties, and quickly subside, its resolution to bring a lasting peace may take several years and could siphoned a chunk of a country's resources. The process of peace building is involving and combinations of mechanisms are used to bringing a lasting peace in an area. The short falls identified in the literature stems from the fact that there are conflicts that exist between two ethnic groups over ages and governments over the years have not been able to bring amicable peace. The question then is why is it so? This work stands to address this problem between the Alavanyos-Nkonyas in the Volta Region.

#### The history of Alavanyo and Nkonya conflict

"For years now, blood has been pouring on that small disputed land, and citizens of the two areas are waiting anxiously for government to come out with a permanent solution", (Leonard Yaw Gbedebu, a concerned citizen, Letter to the GT, 19/12/96). The Alavanyo/ Nkonya conflict is one of three major conflicts in the Volta Region. The Alavanyo /Nkonya conflict has arisen from an 80-year old boundary dispute between the Nkonya, a Guan group and the Alavanyo, an Ewe group. Alavanyo is in the Hohoe District while Nkonya is in the Jasikan District. It is not clear what the precise relationship between the two groups are apart from their situation as neighbours sharing land boundaries, but some accounts of the conflict state that the people of Alavanyo settled on Nkonya land with the consent of the Nkonya people years ago (Agyeman 2008).

The land in dispute is prime forest land rich in timber species, bamboo and cola nuts, and has also been used for cocoa, oil-palm and food crops. This discussion of the Nkonya-Alavanyo conflict was constructed largely from newspaper reports because of lack of more scholarly accounts of the conflict.

The first recorded violent incident took place in the colonial period in 1923 during preparations for Empire Day Celebrations. Since then, periodic violent incidents in the disputed area have been reported in 1980, 1983 and 1990. The late 1990s saw several escalations of tensions between the two communities involving the police, with one incident resulting in violence in which five people died. In October 1997, some Nkonya chiefs reported to the Divisional Commander of Police at Hohoe that some Alavanyo residents had trespassed on Nkonya land, and were felling trees and blocking the paths leading to Nkonya farms (Agyeman, 2008).

Consequently, the police held meetings to mediate the complaints. A counter report that some armed people were cutting timber near Alavanyo farms and an appeal to the police to investigate resulted in their going into the disputed area and confronting some people suspected to be Nkonya people sawing wood, which resulted in a gun battle between the police and the woodcutters. The Hohoe District Chief Executive (Mr. Peter Amewu) is quoted to have said that "it was when the team of policemen got to the disputed land that gunshots were fired from the Nkonya side by some unidentified people. The police returned fire immediately to repel the assailants but nobody was injured in the process". According to the report, the Jasikan District Chief Executive (Mr. Solomon Donkor) corroborated this account of the Hohoe District Chief Executive (GT, 1/11/97). A letter by the chief of Alavanyo referring to this incident alleged that a large Indian hemp farm was also discovered during the exercise (Letter of Togbega Tsedze Atakora VII, Fiaga of Alavanyo Traditional Area, GT, 12/1/98).

The latest troubles can be dated to 2001 when, according to a newspaper report, two Alavanyo men who were illegally cutting timber with a chain-saw in the Alavanyo-Nkonya Forest Reserve/Togo Plateau Forest Reserve were attacked by gunmen, resulting in the death of one of the illegal loggers. There was immediate suspicion that Nkonya gunmen were responsible and a report made to the police (GT 23/4/01). In a response to the newspaper report, the Nkonya-Tayi stool clerk wrote to the Ghanaian Times denying that any Nkonya person was responsible on that day, they were involved in communal labour to build a classroom block. The rejoinder was anxious to correct the impression that Nkonya people were responsible for the killing, in order not to create further confusion between the two communities (Anane-Quist, Nkonya Tayi Stool Clerk, GT, 14/6/01). There were also reports of the murder of a senior linguist of Alavanyo at Nkonya Ahenkro in December 2001.

In 2003, each of the parties accused the other of farming and felling timber in the disputed area, leading to attacks and retaliatory attacks on their citizens. For example, the newspapers have several references to the shooting of an Nkonya man and his daughter on their farm in February 2003, resulting in the death of the man (Chronicle, 4/11/2003; GT, 1/3/03; Evening News 3/3/03).

One report said that the murder had been followed by the raiding and looting of farms, food bans and the setting of fire to the forests and hilly slopes damaging farm produce and the environment (Evening News, 3/3/03). A man from Alavanyo also lost his life owing to the conflict in this period (GT, 12/6/2003). It was also alleged that Alavanyo people were inspecting vehicles travelling between Nkonya and Hohoe with the view to attacking Nkonya people on board (Chronicle, 4/11/2003) or at the very least preventing them from travelling through Alavanyo to Hohoe (GT, 1/3/03).

On 21 April 2003, a media report said the police were unable to substantiate allegations that armed men from Nkonya had camped at Akrofu near Ho to attack the people there. The reports led to the inhabitants of Akrofu fleeing their town. The rumour was that the planned attack was in retaliation for the suspicion that the people of Akrofu were giving moral and material support to the people of Alavanyo in their conflict with the Nkonya. The same report noted that following renewed fighting in the area in February, three people died (Joy on line, 21/4/2003).

There is a strong perception that the conflict has remained insoluble because some people benefit from the dispute. For example, a letter from an Nkonya citizen to the newspapers alleged that some people engage in "unprovoked skirmishes so that in the midst of the ensuing confusion they have a field day to harvest timber, bamboo, cola nuts and cocoa, fell palm trees for palm wine and also engage in the wild and ruthless looting of food crops, poultry, sheep and goats..." (Chronicle, 4/11/2003). This is supported by the Member of Parliament (MP) of Biakoye, Dr. Kwabena Adjei a citizen of Nkonya, who has also argued that the area's soils are rich for food and tree crops, and that disputes are usually generated around the harvesting of Odum, a very valuable timber species (GT, 1/3/03).

While different institutions have been involved in trying to resolve the conflicts, concerted attempts at resolution have only followed violent incidents. For example, the PNDC in November 1992 appointed the Acquah Committee to investigate the dispute and advise the government as to solutions. No hearings took place when hostilities began again. In 1995, the District Chief Executives of Hohoe and Jasikan jointly appointed the Mireku Committee to inquire into and resolve the dispute. Although the Mireku Committee wrote a report, it has not been implemented. There are regular calls for yet more committees.

The Alavanyo Youth Association in 1997, called for a high powered committee to look into the dispute and resolve it once and for all, instead of waiting for hostilities to begin and arresting culprits (Letter by Kwame Dzathor, Vice President, Alavanyo Youth Association, GT, 15/11/97).

The courts have also been involved in adjudicating the land dispute of the conflict. According to a rejoinder written by an Nkonya citizen, four court cases between 1957 and 1980 have all been decided in favour of Nkonya (letter from Komla Tom, Chronicle, 4/11/2003). Indeed, one of the arguments made regularly by the Nkonya side has been that the courts have always ruled in their favour. One Mr. Kwabena Onny, spokesperson of the Nkonya chiefs, stated at a news conference that as far as the Nkonya chiefs were concerned, there was no land dispute in the area as it had been settled by the court of appeal in 1975. He therefore concluded that all the trouble in the area was being fomented by the Alavanyo people so that the government would intervene to enable them to re-litigate (Evening News, 3/3/03).

Not surprisingly, the Alavanyo side has a different position on the court decisions. They have argued that the 1913 Grunner map on which the decisions were based was not accurate, and too small in scale, and therefore never intended as the basis for boundary demarcations. They, in turn, have cited three colonial and post colonial court cases in support of this position (GT, 15/2/97, Letter of Togbega Tsedze Atakora VII, Fiaga of Alavanyo). This position appears to have the support of the Mireku Committee which has argued that "the implementation of the court's decision will not help to promote peace between the two traditional areas" (Mireku, quoted in letter of Togbega Tsedze Atakora, Fiaga of Alavanyo, GT, 15/2/97). However, the same Committee has also noted that it did not have the power to set aside court decisions.

Another institution pressed into service is the media. Long letters and rejoinders recounting the sins of each side are regularly published, with each side trying to portray the other as provocateurs and contemptuous of peace, law and order (see for example rejoinder by Komla Tom, Nkonya Ahenkro, Chronicle, 4/11/2003, in response to letter of 17/10, by Justice Vormawor of

Alavanyo). Perhaps the proliferation of would-be peacemaking institutions is a function of the intractable character of conflicts. The Nkonya-Alavanyo conflict continues with an ever-present danger of degenerating into violence. The latest to enter the fray has been the Volta Regional House of Chiefs which issued a statement asking the two parties to lay down their arms and exercise restraint. In addition, the House of Chiefs appointed a three-member committee under the headship of the Paramount Chief of the Buem Traditional Area to institute a process of reconciliation. The committee has been directed to meet both factions separately with a view to ending the hostilities (GT, 22/3/03). The multiplicity of institutions and the Mireku Committee's comment about its powers in relation to court decisions raises the question of the status of the different institutional efforts to solve the conflict the courts, the committees, the chiefs, the police and the army. The question was pertinent in the sense that these are the institutions regularly called upon to resolve the conflict.

In February 2003, the MP for Biakoye, Dr. Kwabena Adjei, appealed to the government to deploy soldiers to the area to "stem the tide of frequent conflicts and its attendant loss of lives" and also establish a high powered committee to investigate the conflict and define the boundaries of the two areas. This statement, made on the floor of Parliament, was challenged by the MP for Hohoe North, Mr. Jacob Hayibor. The Majority leader moved to stop further comments on the issue to avoid inflaming tensions (GT, 1/3/03). That same year, the Minister of the region went to Parliament at the behest of two MPs from the Volta Region to answer questions regarding the conflicts and government efforts to resolve them. It was revealed that the Volta Regional Security Committee had deployed a police military taskforce in the Nkonya-Alavanyo area since September 2002. MPs were also invited to help with conflict resolution and held separate meetings with the chiefs and people of the two areas to find solutions to the conflict. A newspaper (Daily Graphic, 2003) reported that eleven suspects arrested in the joint police-military operation in the Alavanyo-Nkonya area for possessing locally manufactured fire arms and Indian hemp (marijuana) had been put before a Kpando Circuit court. The judge had remanded them in police custody until 3 July to allow the police time for further investigations.

While it was not stated which side of the conflict the arrested persons were on, the report indicated that the Omanhene of the Nkonya Traditional Area, Nana Kofi Okotor I in whose room three locally manufactured cap guns were retrieved, had been invited to Hohoe for further investigations (Graphic 26/6/2003). In an earlier report, it was said that police and military personnel on patrol duties in the conflict zone had intercepted a large cache of firearms and ammunition being escorted from Alavanyo Deme towards Alavanyo Kpeme. The report further states that the firearms were meant for Alavanyo men deployed in the bush to attack Nkonya people. One Alavanyo man and two women were arrested in connection with the arms.

This incident, reported to have taken place on 17<sup>th</sup> April, appeared in the 12 June edition of the Ghanaian Times (12/6/2003). There are no clear reasons for the two-month gap between the date of the incident and the report in the newspapers. The different factions to the conflict were actively trying to use the Ghanaian mass media to present their version of events and highlight the alleged wrong-doing of their opponents.

The dispute has clearly been complicated by law and order issues such as the growing of marijuana and the illegal logging of trees from forest reserves. Other dispute-related law and order issues are of course the violent clashes, murders and fire-arms offences. The police tend to focus on these questions of law and order, as do the Regional authorities. Thus the Regional Minister warned that while the Regional Security Committee was trying to find a peaceful settlement to the conflict, it would "not countenance any acts of lawlessness but deal with them appropriately as is allowed by law" (GT, 4/3/03). Interestingly, both sides reject the Mireku Committee recommendation that the government take over the disputed land. The Nkonya side do so on grounds that the courts have adjudicated in their favour. They demand that those committing acts of violence be brought to justice and the decisions of the courts enforced.

Togbega Atakora of Alavanyo argues, for his part, that a government take-over would not address the issue of establishing the proper boundaries of the lands of the two communities (GT, 15/2/97). Instead, he argues that a boundary-cutting exercise be undertaken to expose the Anya trees that were used to demarcate the boundaries decades ago. There is something in this view. Seeing that the state cannot even police forest reserves, how would it police land taken over in the area? This is not one of the more bloody communal disputes in Ghana. However, its persistence and intermittent flaring up makes it expensive. Apart from police and army, time and other resources involved, it disrupts farming and related economic activities in the area, and presents a threat to the livelihoods and human security of the inhabitants of an area where the soils are agreed to be fertile and productive.

# CHAPTER THREE

# METHODOLOGY

## Introduction

This section discussed the study area, research design, the study population, the instrument and the methodology which was used for the study. It also discussed data analysis and the analytical tools employed in analysing the data.

## Study area

Alavanyo population was about 1,500 (District Assembly, Hohoe, 2010) and the Nkonya population was about 2,500 people (Biakoye District Assembly, Nkonya, 2010). Alavanyo had seven towns, this included Kpeme, Wudidi, Dzogbedze, Agorme, Deme Agorxoe and Abeheneasi. (Alavanyo Traditional Council). Nkonya had fourteen towns, this included Ahenkro, Kadjabi, Asakyiri, Ahundwo, Akloba, Ntsumuru, Tayi, Ntunda, Tepo, Wurupong, Bunbula, Adenkesu, Sibrisu and Mangoase. (Nkonya Traditional Council).

The dispute lasted over 83 years and many people within the area saw the extent of the conflict and know the history of the peace moves taken over the years to ameliorate the situation.

## **Research design**

This research used a mixed approach which was both quantitative and qualitative. Descriptive survey was used for the study. This was appropriate because the design had the tendency to reach people in a large geographical area. Again, it had the ability to describe situations which were currently happening in the country and had tried to find out people's views on them. Descriptive design aimed at explaining the social system, relations or social events (Sarantakos, 1998). This also provided background information about the issue in question as well as stimulating explanations. Conflict issues could best be discussed when this method was applied because it involves various dimensions, views and opinions.




Figure 1: Map of Alavanyo -Nkonya Source: Field work, 2011

## **Study population**

The study largely targeted people within Alavanyo and Nkonya geographic areas. The population consisted of all the adults (18 years and above) in the study areas. However, the study targeted specific groups of people within the study population. This included chiefs of both sides, the opinion leaders and other gate keepers. The size of Alavanyo is approximately 101square kilometers and the size of Nkonya is approximately 213 square kilometers. Municipal Assembly Hohe (2011) and Biakoye District Assembly Ahenkro (2011) respectively

# Sampling procedure and sample size

The technique used for data collection and eliciting information from the people of Alavanyo and Nkonya was the social survey method. The basic procedure was that the people were asked a number of questions. This was through interviews of the people who were not educated. The use of interviews encouraged people to easily respond, leading to higher response rates. The method of interviewing increased comprehension of questions by answering respondents' questions and allaying any fears. One hundred set of questionnaires were used. Fifty copies of the questionnaires were administered in Alavanyo and fifty in Nkonya. These questionnaires contain the same questions used in the interviews. The fifty copies of questionnaire were given to respondents selected from the Chiefs, elders, the youth and women organisers who attended the series of workshops, conferences and seminars organised at the Catholic Secretariat Ho. However, these were distributed to people who were literate and can fill the questionnaires. This is an efficient

way of collecting information from a number of respondents. Observation of places, events and focus group discussions were also conducted to make it possible for some of the participants to discuss pertinent issues about the conflict.

#### **Data sources**

Data from primary and secondary sources would be used. The primary data would be made up of the responses to administered questionnaires and detailed interviews schedules. The secondary sources would be gathered from related literature, files and documents relating to employee commitment from the internet.

## **Data collection instruments**

Questionnaires were used for data collection. The questionnaire covers two parts. Part one consists of personal information. This covers the town the respondents originate from, their age and profession. It also includes how long they were staying at the place. Part two was information on the conflicts. The questions cover the main causes of the conflict, how long the peace process has taken place, what methods were used in resolving the conflict and which form the peace process took. There were questions on personalities who visited the place on the conflict and mission for resolving the conflict.

An interview guide was also used and this was conducted on the chiefs and elders on how they are carrying out the peace building and conflict management.

#### **Data collection**

The data collection took two weeks. This involved the researcher and two assistants engaged in data collection. The two assistants were natives of the area who worked on this assignment. The researcher did the interviews using a structured set of questions and the responses captured on tape recorders. The recording was transcribed to form various themes for discussion. This was because of the use of the two local languages namely; Twi and Ewe. The researcher is fluent in these two languages and hence transcription was not an issue.

#### **Documentary sources**

Libraries were visited to get workshop reports, journals and books to gather information. Nkonya is in the Jasikan District and this District Assembly was also visited for maps and photos on the conflict. Currently the Biakoye District Assembly has taken over the town of Nkonya so they also provided some considerable amount of information for discussion. Alavanyo is in the Hohoe Municipal Assembly and was contacted for the necessary information. Chiefs were visited for any local historical records. Secondary data supported the field findings and helped indicate the form and direction the field work took.

#### **Reconnaissance survey**

A reconnaissance survey was undertaken in some of the towns surrounding Alavanyo and Nkonya to explain the positive and negative aspects of social interaction among the people. The researcher visited Kpando Agbenoxoe and Gbi Wegbe for this survey. This visit was significant recalling that the conflict had existed for over eighty years and lots of destruction had occurred.

#### Data processing and analysis

Questionnaires from the field were edited to ensure that all were fully completed. They were then coded and analysed. Information generated from the focus group discussions and informal interviews were recorded, analysed reduced and organised to bring out the key themes and trends for easy interpretation. The data collected from the questionnaires and on tape recorder were transcribed and collated. These were presented in raw form and in percentages for easy comparison. The data collated were shown in a descriptive form. However, large amount of quantitative data was put into charts to demonstrate what was captured in the field.

#### **Ethical issues**

This study is for academic purposes and therefore demands quality in the processes as in commissioned or contract research. As such, the researcher and the research assistants carried letters along that introduced them and the importance of the research being conducted. Informed consent, and voluntary participation was sought and all respondents were assured of confidentiality

## **Field work challenges**

Several problems were encountered in the course of this survey. Most of these problems were envisaged. This was because the locality continued to be a volatile area. There was a lot of mistrust between the two communities and when they encountered strangers who mentioned the conflict they became suspicious of them. They were always very careful about what they would tell strangers concerning the conflicts. Some of the respondents thought the questionnaires were from government institutions to gather information from them. They were therefore suspicious of the whole intent of the work. Some respondents also were demanding financial rewards for the responses provided. This could be understood from the background of poverty in the area. It was explained to them that the research was an academic work.

There was a lot of delay in retrieving the questionnaires. There were enough suspicion so many respondents were reluctant to submit the responses. The Paramount Chief of Alavanyo granted interview to this researcher because they knew each other way back at the University of Cape Coast during their first degree work. Other chiefs were particularly not enthused that their Paramount chief had granted such extensive interview. They felt it was not safe so he explained to them the purpose of the research.

#### **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

#### Introduction

This chapter presents the results and discussion from the data analysis. Relevant works from the literature review is also used to support the findings.

Good governance, whether on national or local level has been seen as one entry point for conflict management (Ellen, 2003). Most of the discussions on good governance in Ghana are largely focused on the macro level, analysing the shortcomings of the central government and the political system in general (Tuvi, 2004). There is still a lack of focus on good governance at the local level, especially in conflict affected areas such as Bawku and other Districts/communities. There is a need to focus and improve local level problem solving capacities, in order to address the structural causes of conflict in Ghana as a whole.

One reason for the pervasive interest in good governance issues is certainly the quest for inclusiveness and accountability. Successfully promoting good governance in post-conflict societies depends on a number of issues, particularly the way in which the conflict was settled, the actions undertaken by the central/local government, and international/local NGOs in order to stabilise the post-conflict environment and the extent to which statehood has been weakened or destroyed during the time of conflict. Chances for consolidating peace and improving governance are certainly best where the conflict parties themselves negotiate a settlement and are merely supported and monitored by central/local government and the international/local NGO community. A high degree of ownership also means that the parties involved are more likely to compromise in order to gain the higher good-peace.

It is also critical for one to understand and be able to analyse the local state and non-state institutions that are shaped by the historical experiences backed by culture, and social norms. These factors determine the power relations that define the social strata, the decision-making processes and resource distribution in a given community.

# Demographic characteristics of respondents

Information in the social and economic characteristics of people is relevant in understanding the opinions of people about certain subjects. When the questionnaires were retrieved only 40 out of the 50 which were sent to Alavanyo were retrieved. In Nkonya the situation was even worse. Only 32 of the questionnaires were retrieved. Interview and focus group discussion were also carried out for 50 respondents each from Alavanyo and Nkonya.

The question was posed as to where the respondents came from and the following answers were given. The number of respondents who were natives of Nkonya were 48 percent of respondents and those of Alavanyo were 51 percent. Only 1 percent of respondents hailed from other areas outside the two towns. From the results it could be inferred that there was a higher proportion of respondents from Alavanyo than Nkonya.

## Age of respondents

The ages of respondents from both Alavanyo and Nkonya range from 20 to 60 years and above. Since the war raged on for a long time many people have actively participated or witnessed it at first hand. The percentage of respondents who were between 20 to 39 years was 34 percent; those who were between 40 and 59 years were 41 percent and those who were 60 years and above were 25 percent. From this results, it can be deduced that a greater number of respondents sampled 41 percent were in the age range of 40 and 59 years.

#### **Occupation of respondents**

The main occupations in the two towns were mainly farming, hunting, trading and some civil servants. Most of the civil servants were teachers, medical officers especially nurses, some agricultural extension officers and those working in the district assemblies in which the two towns are located. When the occupation of the respondents was monitored the farmers and hunters form 51 percent of the respondents in the area, Traders form about 22 percent of respondents who were interviewed. The civil and public servants were about 27 percent.

#### Length of time of resident in the locality

People who were resident in the two towns for a long time were able to know the root causes of the war and the devastations that have occurred over the years. They were able to appreciate the valuable peace overtures that have been undertaken by central government, churches and the local nongovernmental organisations. The question was posed on the length of time respondents were resident in the area. About 22 percent of the respondents had spent less than 10 years in the area. Again, 35 percent of the respondents had spent 10-20 years while 43 percent of the respondents had spent over 20 years in the area. Those who were the natives or reside in the area for a longer time were able to give historical antecedents to the war and provided good background information on the conflict in the area.

#### Causes of the conflict between Alavanyo and Nkonya

The question was posed for people to identify the main causes of the war between the two towns which have led to the destruction of human life and property such as farms. Table 1 presents the results on the issue. The question on what were the main causes of the war between the two towns show that nearly all the respondents (33 representing 83 percent for Alavanyo) and (28 representing 88 percent for Nkonya) were fully aware that the area where the conflict occurred is a very fertile land which is good for farming activities.

Town	Respondents	Yes	Percent
Alavanyo	40	33	83
Nkonya	32	28	88
Total	72	61	100.0

Table 1: Eye witness account and main issues in the conflict

Source: Field data, 2011

Issues on land holding and ownership were a major cause of the conflict. There were trees for lumbering purposes. The Nkonya Tayi is directly involved in the conflict because it is almost near to Alavanyo Kpeme. The main issues in the conflict as have also been vividly presented in the Table 2 are about personal conflict and land conflict.

Town	Personal conflict	Land conflict	
Alavanyo	40	40	
Nkonya	32	32	
Total	72	72	

Table 2: Personal and land issues in the conflict

Source: Field data 2011

Table 2, examined the main issues in the conflict, per the study it had been seen that two main issues resulted for such conflict and these were both personal and land conflict. Forty (40) out of 72 respondents said that the main issue that resulted in these conflicts was on personal reasons. Thirty two (32) out of 72 also claimed that most of the conflicts were land issues. Some citizens personally had the view that, they were the only household that could farm on the conflict land.

Table 3 explores peace building process in the two conflict areas. Issues discussed revolve around duration of peace building, methods of resolving conflict and forms of the peace building process in the area. Twenty respondents from Alavanyo representing 50 percent maintained that the peace building process lasted for less than 10 years while 59 percent of the respondents were from Nkonya. Others from Alavanyo and Nkonya also maintained that the conflict lasted for 10-20 years and this represents about 50 and 37 percent respectively.

Duration of Peace Building							
Town	<10 years	Percen	tage 10-20	) Percentage			
			years	5			
Alavanyo	20	50	20	50			
Nkonya	19	59	12	37			
Methods of resolving the con	nflict						
	War	Military/Police		Court			
Alavanyo	14 (35)	16 (40)		10 (25)			
Nkonya	17 (53)	11 (34)		4 (13)			
Forms of the Peace Building Process							
	Grass roo	t peace	Workshops	Mediation			
Alavanyo	19 (48)		8 (20)	13 (32)			
Nkonya	13 (40)		5 (15)	14 (43)			

Table 3: Duration and peace building process in the conflict

Source: Field data, 2011

On methods of resolving the conflict, war, military and police intervention and the use of the court were some of the issues mentioned in the questionnaire. Out of the 40 respondents from Alavanyo, 14 (35%) maintained that the only method used for resolving the conflict was war. From Nkonya, 17 (53%) respondents maintained that war was the method used to resolve the conflict as well. On military police intervention, 40 respondents from Alavanyo affirmed the use of police while 34 percent of respondents from Nkonya also mentioned police military intervention to resolve the conflict. On the issue of the use of court 10 respondents representing 25 percent from Alavanyo maintained that court was used prominently to resolve the conflict while 13 percent of the respondents from Nkonya also mentioned the use of court to prevent conflict. It can be inferred from the findings that war was the main method used to resolve the conflict.

Peace building processes were in the form of grass root mediation and workshops. On the issue of grass root peace, 48 percent of the respondent's from Alavanyo maintained that the process was used and 40 percent of them from Nkonya also agreed to the use of grass root peace. Eight respondents (20%) also affirmed that workshops were also used as one of the processes in solving the conflict while for Nkonya 5 (15%) said workshops were used at Nkonya for resolving the conflict. Mediation also got a favourable response, 13 respondents from Alavanyo representing 32 percent maintained that mediation was used frequently for resolving the conflict and another 14 (43%) from Nkonya also mentioned the use of mediation.

Issues on where the workshop was organised shows that the respondents have all chosen their own towns as the venue of the workshop apparently because that is what they are aware of. Issues on who organised the workshops also show that the respondents mentioned the Peace and Reconciliation Committee as the organisers of the workshop because the people were involved in the peace building process.

## Attendance at peace building workshops

The questions to ascertain the attendance of workshops by the two towns show that almost all the respondents had attended the workshops organised by the mediation committees which pointed to the fact that the two sides would want to see a lasting peace. Issues on what transpired in such workshops showed that the seminars were made for brainstorming on best ways to promote peace in the area. Many of the youths had heard the history of the town and when they met at the seminars they also thought of how development could come to the town when peace returns.

#### Key stakeholders and personalities

The people who visited the town in the course of the conflict included the police, the military, the officers of WANEP, officers from the United Nations and the leaders of the Peace and Reconciliation Committee.

## Other Initiatives towards the resolution of the conflict

One significant initiative is that women groups and constituencies are being sensitised to act as agents of change for peace and conflict prevention by identifying root causes of conflict aid opportunities for reconciliation. Another area is the sensitisation of the youth on conflict prevention, management and resolution. They are taught to respect life and the dignity of people. The chiefs and other opinion leaders were helpful in organising the people so that they can take part in meetings. Through their influence many of the people are willing to stop the war and look for peaceful ways of resolving the conflicts. On the work of the mediation committee, it was found that the mediation committee was able to organise the youth and the women to speak their mind and offer suggestions on ways to end the conflict. Through the committee women were mobilised to understand that they needed to visit markets in the two towns.

#### Satisfaction with conflict resolution process

Question on whether the respondents were satisfied about the way the conflict was being managed shows that all the respondents maintained that they were satisfied with the conflict process. Those who responded yes thought peace was crucial for the development of the area. According to them, when roads are made it would help open up the area. Life and property would be safe and people could go about their work without fear. Others suggested that, the only way the conflict could be resolved was through the provision of a good map which could properly demarcate the conflict area because it was essentially a land dispute.

The Peace and Reconciliation Committee should also take some of the people to locate the boundary between Nkonya and Alavanyo by looking for the boundary pillars planted by a German called Grunner. On the outcome of the discovery of the pillars, Togbe Atakora Tsedze VII, Fiaga of Alavanyo Traditional Area said, "we have already made peace and our peace vehicle has no reverse gear. It will no longer be a matter of guns and knives in coming to a permanent settlement".

The efforts of the peace building lead to the reconstruction of roads from Alavanyo Kpeme towards Nkonya Ntsumuru and from Nkonya Ntsumuru towards Alavanyo Kpeme to show reconciliation. A durbar was held and merry making drumming and dancing were carried out by the people from Alavanyo and Nkonya.

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#### **Report from the Mediation Committee**

A Mediation Committee was envisaged by the Government of Ghana to find a lasting solution to the conflict. Initiatives at resolving the protracted Alavanyo-Nkonya land dispute started on 16<sup>th</sup> June 2004, when the government through the Volta Regional Coordinating Council inaugurated a government and clergy Alavanyo-Nkonya Mediation Committee to facilitate the settlement of the dispute. The Right Reverend Dr. Livingstone Buamah, Moderator of the Evangelical Presbyterian Church was Chairman of the Mediation Committee. The Committee initiated the formation of a number of grassroots peace machinery and a series of workshops for the Chiefs and opinion leaders and those community level committees as part of the strategies to build a foundation for mutual trust between the feuding communities. The focus of the Mediation Committee was to get the people of Alavanyo and Nkonya to broker a permanent peace to end their protracted 85-year land dispute.

The Mediation Committee gave land surveyors the task to produce a composite map of the disputed areas. The map produced showed that the disputed area is about 25.6 square kilometers. The map was then submitted to the Committee, the Chiefs and opinion leaders of the two traditional areas. Fortunately the two protagonist towns accepted the map.

The acceptance of the map formed the basis for further consultations and dialogues between the two traditional areas to reach a peaceful and permanent settlement. The Chairman of the Mediation Committee said: "We did dread this day". Nana Okotor Kofi III, Omanhene of Nkonya said, "I am full of happiness and I cannot express my joy. I am convinced that all will be well" he said and urged those who were at the forum to tell the story truthfully at home about how excellently the surveyors have done their job, and how the mystery surrounding the whole affair have been demystified.

The Strategic Facilitator of the Peace Process and Executive Director of the West Africa Network for Peace (WANEP), Mr. Emmanuel Bombande, said a series of consultations would be held with various identifiable groups from the two traditional areas to fashion out further processes at reaching final peaceful settlement. He said what the map has shown indicated the two truths as presented by the two traditional areas. Mr. Bombande said from now on, they (Nkonya and Alavanyo) would both dialogue and work together to reach "one Nkonya and Alavanyo truth" about the disputed land. By October, all the ideas would be discussed in order to arrive at the "one truth", Mr. Bombande said. The Peace and Governance Programme Officer of the United Nations Development Programme, Mr. Francis Azuimah said the United Nations body was keenly interested in the developments unfolding in the Alavanyo-Nkonya peace process as evidenced by a delegation from that body to the area not long ago. He observed that, what was unfolding in Alavanyo and Nkonya was a laudable process, which promised to be of immense benefit and a useful lesson to Ghana, Africa and the world.

As a result, the past five years have witnessed the resumption of healthy social interactions between the people of the two traditional areas, which have long eluded them. The main thrust of the peace processes has been to help the two traditional areas to resolve their differences and arrive at settlements to their mutual and collective benefit. The Chairman of the Mediation and the Consultative Committee of the Alavanyo -Nkonya peace process, Right Reverend Dr. L. K. Buama appealed to the government, through the Volta Regional Minister, Mr. Joseph Amenowode, to support the committee, since its work had come to a standstill due to lack of funds. He said the Mediation Committee had completed the greater part of its work, as the two traditional areas co-exist peacefully without verbal or physical attacks on each other, since the Committee started its peace moves in 2004 - the development the Rt. Rev. Buama said, was positive and must be completed.

The Mediation Committee Chairman disclosed that the disputed land between the two areas was 16 square kilometres, and that having identified the size of the land in dispute, it was left with the sharing of the land between the two parties. This called for dialogue between the Mediation and the Consultative Committees, with stakeholders in the conflict.

#### **Financial challenges**

The Chairman of the Mediation Committee said the government should support the committee with the needed funds to enable it complete its work. He emphasised that the people from both sides were cooperating with the Committee, and stressed that the future of the people in the area would largely depend on the peace that was gradually returning. He noted that peace had returned to the area, as the people from the two traditional areas share common markets at Alavanyo and Nkonya, and the youth also organise outdoor games like football in both communities. The Vice Chairman of the Committee, the Catholic Bishop of Ho, the Most Rev. Bishop Francis Lodonu, said government ought to address the financial problems confronting the Committee, because peace was a prerequisite to development in any community. He said the level of peace in the area had reached an appreciable level, but a lot more needed to be done by the Committee to finish its work, which would bring lasting peace, and that this was the time to seal the peace deal in that part of the region.

Dr. Buama continued that the Catholic Relief Service, initially provided funds for the work of the Committee, with support from the Volta Regional Coordinating Council (VRCC), and commended the Catholic Church for their support, as well as the Coordinator of the West Africa Network for Peace, Mr. Emmanuel Bombande, whose invaluable support to the Mediation Committee, assisted it to discharge its duties diligently.

#### The way forward

Dr. Buama called for effective collaboration between the National Peace Council, the Mediation and the Consultative Committees of the Alavanyo-Nkonya and other peace building committees, to facilitate peace process between factions. He said, after meeting the chiefs from the two traditional areas, the Committee also met the youth, who signed a treaty to ensure that there would be no physical or verbal confrontation between the parties.

The Chairman of the Consultative Committee, Mr. William Kpende, also appealed to the government to open up the road that linked Alavanyo-Nkonya to the Gbi Traditional Area, as the road equally played a vital role in unifying the people, because both parties would travel on it. The Volta Regional Minister commended the Committees for their hard work and dedication to duty, which had made it possible for peace to return to the area, and assured the Committee members that he would inform the Presidency, to help find the needed money to complete the peace process. He said the Alavanyo-Nkonya peace deal would serve as an example that the people in the region were capable of resolving their own problems, and that other conflict areas like the Peki-Tsito and the conflict within the Apostles Revelation Society (ARS) Church, could be settled to ensure total peace in the region. The ARS could use a similar method of bringing peace.

#### **CHAPTER FIVE**

# SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Introduction

The research has realized many findings and come out with some conclusions which provide the background for some recommendations to be made. This chapter therefore, presents summary, conclusions and recommendations.

## Summary

This study used both qualitative and quantitative approach to explore into various mechanisms of peace building and conflict management in the Alavanyo and Nkonya traditional areas. Questionnaires and focus group discussions were used to elicit response from respondents from the two study areas. It was found that a multiple strategy was used for resolving the conflict.

First, the conflict and its resolution have a chequered history. The inter-tribal wars between the people of Alavanyo and Nkonya have gone on for a long period of time since colonial era. The first recorded violent incident took place in the colonial period in 1923 during preparations for Empire Day ccelebrations. Several escalations of tension have taken place between the two communities involved the police, with one incident resulting in the death of five people.

There is a strong perception that the conflict has remained insoluble because some people benefit from the dispute. For example, a letter from an Nkonya citizen to the newspapers alleged that some people engage in "unprovoked skirmishes so that in the midst of the ensuing confusion they have a field day to harvest timber, bamboo, cola nuts and cocoa, fell palm trees for palm wine and also engage in the wild and ruthless looting of food crops, poultry, sheep and goats..." (Evening News, 10/9/03)

The PNDC in November 1992 appointed the Acquah Committee to investigate the dispute and advise the government but no hearings took place when hostilities began again. In 1995, the District Chief Executives of Hohoe and Jasikan jointly appointed the Mireku Committee to inquire into and resolve the dispute. The Mireku Committee wrote a report which has not been implemented. The Alavanyo Youth Association in 1997 called for a high powered committee to look into the dispute and resolve it instead of waiting for hostilities to begin and arresting culprits.

The courts have also been extensively involved in adjudicating the land dispute as four court cases between 1957 and 1980 have all been decided in favour of Nkonya. The Alavanyo side has a different position on the court decisions that the 1913 Grunner map on which the decisions were based was not accurate, too small in scale, and therefore never intended as the basis for boundary demarcations. They have cited three colonial and post colonial court cases in support of this position. This position appears to have the support of the Mireku Committee which has argued that "the implementation of the court's decision would not help to promote peace between the two traditional areas".

The role of the media was an important factor. Letters and rejoinders recounting the sins of each side are published, with each side trying to portray

the other as provocateurs and contemptuous of peace, law and order. Perhaps the proliferation of would-be peacemaking institutions is a function of the intractable character of the conflict.

The Volta Regional House of Chiefs issued a statement asking the two parties to lay down their arms and exercise restraint. The House of Chiefs appointed a three-member committee under the headship of the paramount chief of the Buem Traditional Area to institute a process of reconciliation. The committee has been directed to meet both factions separately with a view to ending the hostilities (GT, 22/3/03). The multiplicity of institutions and the Mireku Committee's comment about its powers in relation to the court decisions raises the question of the status of the different institutional efforts to solve the conflict the courts, the committees, the chiefs, the police and the army. The question is pertinent in the sense that these are the institutions regularly called upon to resolve the conflict.

In 2003, the MP for Biakoye, Dr. Kwabena Adjei, asked government to deploy soldiers to the area to "stem the tide of frequent conflicts and its attendant loss of lives" and also establish a high powered committee to investigate the conflict and define the boundaries of the two areas. This was challenged by the MP for Hohoe North Constituency. It was revealed that the Volta Regional Security Committee had deployed a police- military taskforce in the Alavanyo-Nkonya area since September 2002. MPs were also invited to help with the conflict resolution and held separate meetings with the chiefs and people, which they reported in the newspapers. It may not be far-fetched to assume that the different factions to the conflict were actively trying to use the Ghanaian mass media to present their version of events and highlight the alleged wrong-doing of their opponents.

The dispute has clearly been complicated by law and order issues such as the growing of marijuana and the illegal logging of trees from forest reserves. Other dispute-related law and order issues are of course the violent clashes, murders and fire-arms offences. The police tend to focus on the question of law and order, as do the Regional authorities. Thus, the Regional Minister warned that while the Regional Security Committee was trying to find a peaceful settlement to the conflict, it would "not countenance any acts of lawlessness but deal with them appropriately as is allowed by law".

The Alavanyo and Nkonya sides rejected the Mireku Committee recommendation that the government take over the disputed land. The Nkonya side did so on grounds that the courts had adjudicated in their favour. They demand that those committing acts of violence be brought to justice and the decisions of the courts enforced.

Togbega Atakora Tsedze VII, Paramount Chief of Alavanyo argued, for his part, that a government take-over would not address the issue of establishing the proper boundaries of the lands of the two communities. Instead, he argues that a boundary-cutting exercise be undertaken to expose the Anya trees that were used to demarcate the boundaries decades ago. Seeing that the state cannot even police forest reserves, how would it police land taken over in the area?

Alavanyo- Nkonya conflict is not one of the more bloody communal disputes in Ghana. However, its persistence and intermittent flaring makes it expensive. Apart from police and army time and other resources are involved,

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it disrupts farming and related economic activities in the area, and presents a threat to the livelihoods and human security of the inhabitants of an area where the soils are agreed to be fertile and productive.

The second finding is related to the peace building and peace making mechanisms used. The people of Alavanyo and Nkonya have brokered a permanent peace to end their protracted 85-year land dispute. This follows the acceptance of a composite map of the disputed land by the Chiefs and opinion leaders of the two traditional areas, which was presented to them by the peace process was facilitated by Executive Director of the West Africa Network for Peace (WANEP), Mr Emmanuel Bombande. He said a series of consultations would be held with various identifiable groups from the two traditional areas to fashion out further processes at reaching final peaceful settlement. He said what the map has shown indicated the two truths as presented by the two traditional areas.

The third finding was on the sustainable of the peace processes. The United Nations was interested in the peace building process and developments in the Alavanyo-Nkonya. This peace was as evidenced by a delegation from that body to the area. The laudable process was seen as of immense benefit and a useful lesson to Ghana, Africa and the world. Rev. Dr. Buama said, after meeting with the chiefs from the two traditional areas, the Committee also met the youth, who signed a treaty to ensure that there would be no physical or verbal confrontation between the parties. The Mediation Committee Chairman said currently, peace had returned to the area, as the people from the two traditional areas share common markets at Nkonya and Alavanyo, and the youth also organise outdoor games like football in both communities.

#### Conclusions

The findings of this research have clearly demonstrated the following significant points:

- Over the years since the conflict broke out, many methods had been used in an effort to resolve the problem to protect life and property. These included the use of the security forces such as the army and the police to apprehend the perpetrators of the crime. This has not worked to resolve sufficiently the conflict. The perpetrators were protected by their supporters, hence justice eluded the process.
- 2. The law courts played a role in bringing solution; however, these were not successful and not respected. The basis of the ruling which was the Grunner used for the demarcation was not accepted by the Alavanyo people.
- The next method of the setting up of Acquah Committee by government and the Mireku Committee to find solutions were both not successful.
- Parliament as a law making body has not got a finger on the problem as the Members of Parliament of the two areas were also very much divided as their constituents.
- 5. The solution has rather emerged out of the Peace and Mediation Committees work of helping the people to talk to themselves, women to go to each other's market while the youth play football among themselves.
- 6. It can therefore, be concluded that people can take entrenched positions to safeguard their interests, but if sections of the protagonists

are engaged to talk to each other in mediation, some positive results can be achieved.

## Recommendations

Based on the findings in the summary and the conclusions, it is recommended that:

- Government and the various Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies should set up Peace and Reconciliation committees in their various areas of jurisdiction to offer ideas and processes for the resolution of conflict especially Alavanyo and Nkonya.
- 2. Central government and local authority should make funds made available to these structures especially in areas where there are conflicts so that the work of the committees can be carried out smoothly.
- 3. Membership of the committees must be composed of people who have trust such as churches and mosques. If politicians and chiefs are to be part of these then they should be people who command respect among the protagonists.
- Government should do well to put in place the proper legal procedence to back these committees so that they can be recognised under the laws of Ghana to give effect to their work.

### Areas for further research

There are pockets of conflicts in the Volta Region which also need further research. This has become very imperative because data and information are essential in peace building processes. A case in point is the Peki-Tsito conflict which has claimed lives and property. The land and houses at Dededo between these two settlements have been abandoned because of fear of the escalation of the conflict. If well documented the positive achievements of the current study can be used in the Peki-Tsito conflict. This transfer of knowledge from one area of the Volta Region to another part will be very useful.

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#### APPENDICES

### **APPENDIX A**

#### QUESTIONNAIRE

This questionnaire is meant to solicit information on the Alavanyo and Nkonya conflict, how the conflicts came about and how they are being resolved. It is also to find out the peace building processes being carried out to resolve the Alavanyo-Nkonya conflicts. This is a purely research work for the Masters Programme Dissertation as part of requirements for the Award of the MA (Peace and Development Studies) at the University of Cape Coast. It is to gather information on the role the chiefs and opinion leaders, the mediation committee, and the people of the area played in resolving the issues. The final work will serve as a reference document to assist other conflict areas in managing and resolving their conflicts. No information will be given to a third party and anonymity is assured.

## Part one: Personal information

1.	Where do you come from?	a) Alavanyo	b) Nkonya
	c) outside the area		
2.	How old are you?	a) 20 to 39 years	b) 40 to59 years
	c) 60years and above		
3.	What is your profession/work?	a) farmer/hunter	b) trader
	c) civil/ public service		
4.	How long have you stayed in the	e area? a) less	than 10years

b) 10-20years c) over 20 years

5. Do your parents originate from the area or you just live in the area?

#### Part two: Information on conflict

- 6. What are the main causes of the conflict between the two towns?
- 7. Did you see what actually happened at any of the conflict?

a) Yes b) No

- 8. If Yes, what were the main issues? a) personal conflict b) land issuesc) old tribal issues
- 9. What methods were used to resolve the conflict? a) War,
  - b) Police/military intervention, c) court
- 10. How long has the peace building process started? a) less than 10 years

b) 10-20years c) over 20 years

- 11. Which form did the peace building process take? a) grassroot peace machineryb) workshops/seminarsc) mediation committee
- 12. Do you belong to the grassroots peace machinery? a)Yes b)No
- 13. If yes, what does the machinery do?.....

.....

.....

- 14. Were you invited to any of the mediation committee meetings?
  - a) Yes b) No
- 15. If yes, what was discussed at the meetings you attended?.....
- 16. Were there any seminars or workshops organised to resolve the issue?
  - a) Yes b) No

17. Where was the workshop organised? a) Alavanyo, b) Nkonya,

c) Outside the area

- 18. Who organised the workshops?.....
- 19. Have you attended any of the workshops? a) Yes b) No

20. If Yes, what transpired at the seminars.?	••
21. In the course of the conflict, which personalities or organisations visited	
the place?	
	•••
	••
22. Where do they come from?	
23. What other initiatives were taken towards the resolution of the	
conflict?	•
24. What is the role of the chiefs / opinion leaders in the conflict	
resolution?	
25. What work did the mediation committee do?	
	•••
	••
26. Are you willing to see peace in these two towns? a) Yes b) No	
27. If Yes, why and if no why?	•
28. Are you satisfied about the way the conflict is being managed?	
a) Yes b) No	

#### **APPENDIX B**

#### **INTERVIEW GUIDE QUESTIONNAIRE**

This questionnaire is meant to solicit information on the Alavanyo and Nkonya conflict, how the conflicts came about and how they are being resolved. It is also to find out the peace building processes being carried out to resolve the Alavanyo-Nkonya conflicts. This is a purely research work for the Masters Programme Dissertation as part of requirements for the Award of the MA (Peace and Development Studies) at the University of Cape Coast. It is to gather information on the role the chiefs and opinion leaders, the mediation committee, and the people of the area played in resolving the issues. The final work will serve as a reference document to assist other conflict areas in managing and resolving their conflicts. No information will be given to a third party and anonymity is assured.

#### **Sample of Interview Guide**

- 1. How long have you been enstooled?
- 2. How did the Mediation Committee influenced the resolution of the conflict?
- 3. Were you regular at the seminars organized by the catholic secretariat at Ho?
- 4. How did the seminars attended influenced the conflict resolution?
- 5. How are you carrying out the peace building and conflict management with your elders?

# APPENDIX C

# **CHIEFS OF NKONYA**

NO	STOOL NAME OF	TITLE OF CHIEFS	TOWN/VILLAGE
	OCCUPANT		
1	Nana Okotor Kofi III	Paramount Chief	Nkonya Ahenkro
		Nkonyahene	
2	Nana Yaw Sibri II	Adontenhene of	Nkonya Kadjebi
		Nkonya	
3	Nana Addae Kofi	Baamuhene of Nkonya	Nkonya Asakyiri
	Nkansah II		
4	Nana Ampem Kofi	Ankobeahene of	Nkonya Ahundwo
	Darko III	Nkonya	
5	Nana Kwadwo Duedu	Krontihene of Nkonya	Nkonya Akloba
	III		
6	Nana Yaw Osiakwan	Benkumhene of	Nkonya Ntsumuru
	П	Nkonya	
7	Nana Kwabena Agya	Gyasehene of Nkonya	Nkonya Tayi
	Attah IV		
8	Nana Kwabena K	Nifahene of Nkonya	Nkonya Ntumda
	Basahia VII		
9	Nana Kwabena	Kyidomhene of	Nkonya Tepo
	Baffour III	Nkonya	
10	Nana Kwadwo	Divisional Chief	Nkonya
	Asiakwan II		Wurupong
11	Nana Osei Tuo I	Divisional Chief	Nkonya Bumbula

12	Nana Kwaku Sarfo I	Divisional Chief	Nkonya Adenkesu
13	Nana Kofi Tettey I	Divisional Chief	Nkonya Sibrisu
14	Ezu Kwadjo	Headman	Nkonya Mangoase
15	Nana Abena Otubia	Paramount Queen	Nkonya Ahenkro
		Mother Nkonya	

Source: Nkonya Traditional Council, Nkonya

# **APPENDIX D**

# **CHIEFS OF ALAVANYO**

STOOL NAME OF	TITLE OF	TOWN/VILLAGE
OCCUPANT	CHIEFS	
Togbe Atakora Tsedze VII	Paramount Chief	Kpeme
	or Togbega of	
	Fiaga Alavanyo	
Togbe Asigbalo V	Miame fia (left)	Wudidi
Togbe Tetekwatsi V	Dusi fia (right)	Dzogbedze
Togbe Nyame Kuamoah	Ngor fia (front)	Agorme
VII		
Togbe Kuttoh	Megbe fia	Deme
	(behind)	
Togbe Afenyo VI	Megbe fia	Agorxoe
	(behind)	
Togbe Kunde IV	Megbe fia	Abeheneasi
	(behind)	
Mamaga Ametor III	Queen mother	Kpeme
Mad. Beatrice Kuma Antwi	Women Leader	Kpeme
	OCCUPANT Togbe Atakora Tsedze VII Togbe Asigbalo V Togbe Tetekwatsi V Togbe Nyame Kuamoah VII Togbe Kuttoh Togbe Kuttoh Togbe Kuttoh	OCCUPANTCHIEFSTogbe Atakora Tsedze VIIParamount or Togbega of Fiaga AlavarreTogbe Asigbalo VMiame fia (I=)Togbe Tetekwatsi VDusi fia (rig+)Togbe Nyame KuamoahNgor fia (fiom)VIIMegbe fiaTogbe KuttohMegbe fiaTogbe Afenyo VIMegbe fiaTogbe Kunde IVMegbe fiaTogbe Kunde IVMegbe fiaMamaga Ametor IIIQueen mother

Source: Alavanyo Traditional Council, Alavanyo.