An appraisal of Susan Haack’s Foundherentism as a theory of justification

Abstract

This study is an appraisal of Susan Haack’s foundherentism. Foundherentism as theory of justification is enmeshed in controversies. Some critics claim that the theory is not any different from already existing theories of justification such as foundationalism, coherentism and reliabilism. Haack on the other hand insists that foundherentism is a distinct theory of justification. By employing the method of epistemological theorizing, a means of conceptual analysis and critical argumentation, this study set out to ascertain whether foundherentism is actually distinct from the other theories of justification. The study, through an analysis of the internal dialectics of foundherentism and a critical examination of the critiques and responses to the theory, reveals that foundherentism is neither foundationalism nor coherentism inter alia but a hybrid theory of justification. The study found that the critics of foundherentism mainly ignore the character in virtue of which foundherentism is distinct from the other theories but brood over its similarity to the other theories. The study, however, identified some challenges with foundherentism, in its concepts of explication and ratification—the problem of transitioning from non-propositional to propositional source of justification, due to Haack’s double-aspect conception of justification. So, an attempt is made at the end to modify the theory in order to avoid those challenges.