Epistemology under the pen of Rorty: a critical study of Rorty's pragmatism

Abstract

This thesis examines Rorty’s pragmatic approach to epistemology. Rorty criticizes foundationalism for relying on the optical metaphor that sees knowledge as grounded in the given of sense impression. He also criticizes the enterprise for relying on absolute truth which is untenable. Sellar’s critique of the notion of the given and Quine’s attack on analytic synthetic dichotomy are by implication sufficient to show that foundationalism is misguided. According to Rorty, the idea that justification of a belief lies in its direct or indirect relation to what is given in experience is a misconception resulting from confusion, made possible by the optical metaphor, of justification with causation. Justification should be conceived rather as conversation, so that our beliefs are justified by the expression of judgment of a social group. On this construal, Rorty urges that epistemology is dead and no successor subject could take its place. However, in this thesis, using the analytic method, we argue that Rorty does not pronounce epistemology dead as he purports to have done. We also argue that Rorty’s death of epistemology thesis is a deviation from mainstream pragmatist view of epistemology. Our argument is that Rorty does not pronounce epistemology dead but in a frantic attempt to provide answer to the epistemological question purports to be pronouncing the enterprise moribund. A further argument is that the original pragmatists do not abandon epistemology entirely as Rorty has vehemently done. This is why we also try to show how Rorty strayed from original pragmatism.