Harmonising Kant's deontological ethics with utilitarianism: Intergrativist approach

Abstract

The study attempts to create a synthesis between two seemingly opposing ethical theories. The theories are Kant’s deontology and utilitarianism. Kant’s deontology urges that moral actions be assessed from the motive. In his view the motive for such an action is nothing else but the motive of duty. By duty, he means the necessity to act with respect for the moral law that is innate in all rational beings. Utilitarianism takes a consequentialist position on moral assessment. On utilitarianism the good action is whatever gives the greatest happiness to the greatest number of people. A happy life according to the utilitarian is a life full of pleasure. Bentham (1789) saw pleasure mainly in quantitative terms but Mill (1863) recognised two forms of pleasure; qualitative and quantitative pleasures. By quantitative pleasure, we mean sensual pleasure. Qualitative pleasure involves pleasure that encompasses intellectual, self-improvement and the rule of reason in enjoying happiness. In this vein, the best moral action is one that produces qualitative pleasure. The theory recognises the role qualitative pleasure plays in determining the morality of an action. The fundamental postulations of these two theories pose some challenges for integration. Kant’s a priori conception of duty makes it impossible for moral agents to act when duties conflict. For utilitarianism, the conception that pleasure alone is the highest good has created a lot of problems such as the conception of lower and higher pleasures. We therefore modify Kant’s concept of duty in order to allow his theory to make room for consequentialism. Also, pleasure alone is not the good, for there are other things which are not the product of pleasure but are intrinsically good. On the basis of these modifications, we recognise a logical space for reconciling the two theories. As a result, we create our synthesis called humanised deontologism which defends the position that the determination of a moral action is based on both motive and consequences and that these complement each other. Thus, the principles underpinning moral actions might be both a priori and a posteriori. In other words, ethical values are synthetic a priori. The synthesis therefore becomes possible because further analysis reveals a convergent point of the driving assumptions of both theories. That is they all propose for the achievement of intellectual virtue as the highest good.