A Critical Study of David Chalmers‘ Conception of the Mind

Abstract

Consciousness is a mysterious phenomenon that has perplexed the field of philosophy, psychology and neuroscience. Due to the subjective and intrinsic nature of consciousness, it has been challenging to establish an objective theory of consciousness. Diverse perspectives and theories have been posited to help resolve this philosophical conundrum. One peculiar perspective theorised on consciousness is David Chalmers‘ position on the subject. David Chalmers posits the need for a fundamental theory of consciousness. He believes that consciousness cannot be understood, entirely, by appealing to facts about the physical world. A fundamental theory of consciousness should be established because even though consciousness ontologically depends on brain states to exist, it does not conceptually depend on the brain. One intriguing aspect of Chalmers‘ work is that he enriches the previous arguments for the relevance of consciousness by adding logical force to the arguments, through the use of logical supervenience theory. He submits five arguments to reject the reductive materialists‘ perspective on consciousness. This study lays out Chalmers‘ arguments for the fundamental nature of consciousness. It also discusses the arguments the reductive materialists propound for the fundamental nature of the physical (brain). Having articulated these two perspectives regarding consciousness, the study presents an evaluation of Chalmers‘ arguments and the arguments posited by the reductive materialists. Finally, I suggest four criteria one could use to construct a plausible theory of consciousness that might address Chalmers‘ concerns. Any theory of the mind that meets these criteria will hopefully improve our understanding of consciousness.