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Philosophical implications of Libet and Wegner on free will

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dc.contributor.author Fosu-Blankson, Ferdinad
dc.date.accessioned 2023-07-25T22:55:32Z
dc.date.available 2023-07-25T22:55:32Z
dc.date.issued 2021-04
dc.identifier.issn 23105496
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/8623
dc.description x, 110p:, ill. en_US
dc.description.abstract The conventional notion of free will does not possess formidable counter arguments to modern neurobiological investigations proving the implausibility of free will. The pool of evidence gathered by cognitive neuroscientists makes strong justifications to truncate the conception of free will. The research of Benjamin Libet and Daniel Wegner explicate the physical and cognitive limitations that makes free will untenable. Their position purports that we are neurobiologically determined. However, their empirical assessment of free will misguides their conclusion. Free will as a conceptual problem requires an assessment beyond the empirical domain. Despite the solid claims from neurobiological determinism, neurobiological determinism ignores the metaphysical entailment in action. Hence, it gives an unsatisfactory account for human action. This leads to my proposal of neurobiological freedom. en_US
dc.language.iso en en_US
dc.publisher University of Cape Coast en_US
dc.subject Free Will en_US
dc.subject Conscious Will en_US
dc.subject Determinism en_US
dc.subject Readiness Potential en_US
dc.subject Cause en_US
dc.title Philosophical implications of Libet and Wegner on free will en_US
dc.type Thesis en_US


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