Abstract:
This thesis is an examination of epistemic injustice and how it legitimizes feminist
epistemology. The argument is that the prevalence of epistemic injustice in
mainstream epistemology has a positive implication for the legitimization of
feminist epistemology as a sub-field of study. Epistemology, conventionally, has
been construed as a discipline that deals with inquiries about knowledge devoid of
social dimensions. These scholars hold the view that political power and other
social constructs have no role to play in the conceptualization of knowledge. What
that means is that, gender, place, time and historical factors have no impact on
knowledge production. However, in this thesis, employing the normative approach,
I argue that epistemic injustice exists in mainstream epistemology and that, these
forms of injustice are perpetuated by the use of social factors contrary to the
mainstream epistemological position that there is no social dimension to
knowledge. I also argue that an attempt at minimizing epistemic injustice would
call for a consideration of the arguments in defense of social epistemology. This
consideration calls for a revision of some core-tenets of mainstream epistemology
which legitimizes feminist epistemology, as revisionist social epistemology
