Epistemic injustice and the legitimization of feminist epistemology

Abstract

This thesis is an examination of epistemic injustice and how it legitimizes feminist epistemology. The argument is that the prevalence of epistemic injustice in mainstream epistemology has a positive implication for the legitimization of feminist epistemology as a sub-field of study. Epistemology, conventionally, has been construed as a discipline that deals with inquiries about knowledge devoid of social dimensions. These scholars hold the view that political power and other social constructs have no role to play in the conceptualization of knowledge. What that means is that, gender, place, time and historical factors have no impact on knowledge production. However, in this thesis, employing the normative approach, I argue that epistemic injustice exists in mainstream epistemology and that, these forms of injustice are perpetuated by the use of social factors contrary to the mainstream epistemological position that there is no social dimension to knowledge. I also argue that an attempt at minimizing epistemic injustice would call for a consideration of the arguments in defense of social epistemology. This consideration calls for a revision of some core-tenets of mainstream epistemology which legitimizes feminist epistemology, as revisionist social epistemology